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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Steven Norris v. Jennifer Norris

Indiana Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25S-DR-00226
• Panel: Mark S. Massa, Loretta H. Rush
• Judges: Rush, Massa, Slaughter, Goff, Molter

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.3K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

                        by [Loretta H. Rush](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/4347/loretta-h-rush/)

FILED
Mar 12 2026, 1:26 pm

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case No. 25S-DR-226

Steven Norris,
Appellant

–v–

Jennifer Norris,
Appellee

Argued: November 18, 2025 | Decided: March 12, 2026

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
No. 49D14-1403-DR-9766
The Honorable Alicia A. Gooden, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
No. 24A-DR-1109

Opinion by Chief Justice Rush
Justices Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
Rush, Chief Justice.

Because trial courts regularly observe witness demeanor and assess
credibility firsthand, they are best positioned to gauge the significance of
the testimony and evidence before them. By contrast, reviewing courts
like ours consider only the paper record. So, recognizing our limited role,
we do not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility. Nor do we require trial
courts to accept a witness’s self-serving testimony even when it’s
uncontradicted.

Here, an ex-husband claimed that his ex-wife’s failure to pay a joint
loan—as required by their divorce settlement—damaged his credit rating,
causing financial harm. During an evidentiary hearing, the ex-husband
testified about his claimed damages but offered scant corroborating
evidence. The trial court ultimately found the ex-wife in contempt for not
paying the loan but declined to award the ex-husband damages, finding
them speculative and unproven. The Court of Appeals issued an opinion
partially reversing the trial court. And although that appellate opinion
was not certified, the trial court issued a revised order to comply with it.

We first hold that the trial court did not clearly err in declining to
award the ex-husband damages. We then hold that the trial court’s
revised order is void because the court had no jurisdiction to issue it
during the pendency of this appeal. We thus affirm the court’s original
order and remind trial courts, administrative agencies, parties, and
counsel to refrain from relying on uncertified appellate opinions.

Facts and Procedural History
Steven Norris and Jennifer Norris divorced in 2014 after four years of
marriage. They reached a settlement agreement, which was incorporated
into the dissolution decree, that awarded Jennifer the marital home and
made her responsible for all home-related debts. One of those debts was a
$4,220 “furnace loan with Wells Fargo on a Home Projects Visa.” Jennifer
agreed that “all payments” would be “made on time” and, if not, Steven
could “pursue” her “for any credit reporting or scoring damages.”

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-DR-226 | March 12, 2026 Page 2 of 9
In 2017, Jennifer stopped making payments on the Wells Fargo loan
and told Steven she was going to file for bankruptcy. Steven was not
served with any notice of Jennifer’s bankruptcy proceedings, although he
attended a creditors meeting, and he missed a deadline to object to the
discharge of Jennifer’s debt to Wells Fargo. Ultimately, Wells Fargo failed
to prove it had perfected a security interest in any of Jennifer’s property,
so its claim was treated as unsecured. Jennifer then began paying off part
of her debts—though not the Wells Fargo loan—in installments pursuant
to a payment plan. And when she completed those payments in 2021, her
debt to Wells Fargo was deemed discharged through bankruptcy. Steven,
meanwhile, made no payments on the loan.

The following year, Steven filed a contempt petition for Jennifer’s
failure to pay the Wells Fargo loan. He claimed that he had been pursued
by “Wells Fargo and other creditors,” his “credit ha[d] been damaged,”
and he was “unable to secure lending for purchasing a home, etc.”

In November 2023, the trial court held a lengthy evidentiary hearing on
multiple issues, including Steven’s contempt petition. Steven testified that
Jennifer’s non-payment reduced his credit rating, forcing him to pay an
extra $300 per month in interest on a truck loan for three years before he
managed to refinance the loan at a more favorable interest rate. He also
stated that he was a general contractor and claimed that, because of his
lower credit rating, he lost a nearly finalized $142,000 loan to build a
house on land he owned. And he testified that he was denied an
economic-relief loan during the pandemic. To support these claims,
Steven introduced screenshots showing his declining credit rating from
2016 to 2017, as well as a notice from a credit agency reflecting missed
payments on the Wells Fargo loan. But he stated he had gotten “very
upset and intoxicated” and burned documents concerning the lost home-
construction loan. An attorney also testified that missed payments can
significantly affect one’s credit rating, but he had not reviewed Steven’s
credit report. And a real estate broker testified that if Steven had built the
house as planned in 2018, it would be worth around $360,000, though he
could not say how much it would have cost to build. Based on this
evidence, Steven specifically requested $228,800 in damages: $218,000 in

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-DR-226 | March 12, 2026 Page 3 of 9
lost home equity plus $10,800 in extra truck payments (but not the $4,220
balance on the Wells Fargo loan).

A few months after the hearing, the trial court issued an order in which
it found Jennifer in contempt for her “willful failure” to pay the loan. But
the court did not award Steven any damages, finding that his “professed
damages were based upon speculation” and there was “insufficient
evidence to show a direct correlation” between the unpaid Wells Fargo
loan and Steven’s credit rating.

Steven appealed, arguing only that the trial court erred in declining to
award him damages. In a published opinion, a divided Court of Appeals
panel partially reversed, instructing the trial court to award Steven over
$14,000 and deciding other issues not raised by the parties. Norris v.
Norris, 253 N.E.3d 1115, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Judge Tavitas dissented,
concluding that the majority had reweighed evidence. Id. at 1127‒28
(Tavitas, J., dissenting). Without waiting for certification, the trial court
issued a revised order carrying out the Court of Appeals’ instructions.

Jennifer petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court
of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law,
our review is for clear error under Trial Rule 52(A). Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51
N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016). In conducting this review, we determine
whether the evidence supports the court’s findings and whether those
findings support the court’s judgment. Id. We do not reassess witnesses’
credibility or reweigh evidence. Id. at 124. And we will reverse only if the
findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the
wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Wysocki v. Johnson, 18
N.E.3d 600, 603‒04 (Ind. 2014).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-DR-226 | March 12, 2026 Page 4 of 9
Discussion and Decision
A party commits civil contempt by failing to do something a court
orders for the benefit of an opposing party. Cowart v. White, 711 N.E.2d
523, 530 (Ind.), clarified on reh’g, 716 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. 1999). When this
happens, trial courts have inherent authority to hold a disobedient party
in contempt and to sanction them “to compensate the aggrieved party for
losses and damages resulting from another’s contemptuous actions.” In re
Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 770‒71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting
Scoleri v. Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d 1211, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). Though
determining the amount of damages falls squarely within the trial court’s
discretion, City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 172 (Ind. 2005), those
damages “may not be based on mere conjecture, speculation, or
guesswork,” Ponziano Constr. Servs. Inc. v. Quadri Enters., LLC, 980 N.E.2d
867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

In reviewing a damages decision, we defer to our trial courts as
factfinders, recognizing that they are “far better than appellate courts ‘at
weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility.’” S.D. v. G.D., 211
N.E.3d 494, 498 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind.
2017)). And so, absent legal error, we reverse a sanctions ruling “only
when there is no evidence to support” it. Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964
N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ind. 2012). That said, a trial court commits legal error if it
issues an order without jurisdiction. And, as relevant here, once an
appellate court acquires jurisdiction over a case, the trial court may not
revise the judgment under appeal until an appellate opinion is both issued
and certified. G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 192 (Ind. 2024). Indeed,
Appellate Rule 65(E) prohibits trial courts, administrative agencies, and
parties from taking any action in reliance upon uncertified appellate
opinions.

These principles guide our resolution of this appeal, in which Steven
challenges only “the lack of sanctions” for Jennifer’s contumacious
actions. We first explain why the trial court did not clearly err in declining
to award Steven damages. We then explain why the court’s revised order,
issued while this appeal remained pending, is void. Ultimately, we affirm
the trial court’s original order and remind trial courts, administrative

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-DR-226 | March 12, 2026 Page 5 of 9
agencies, parties, and counsel to refrain from acting in reliance upon
uncertified appellate opinions.

I. The trial court did not clearly err in declining to
award Steven damages.
We begin by determining whether the trial court clearly erred in
declining to award Steven damages for credit-related losses stemming
from the unpaid Wells Fargo loan. Steven asserts that the court
disregarded “[u]nrefuted testimony” that Jennifer’s failure to pay the loan
hurt his credit rating, which he claims led to increased truck-loan
payments, a denied home-construction loan, and a denied economic-relief
loan during the pandemic. Jennifer responds that the court acted within
its discretion due to the “speculative nature” of Steven’s claims “and the
lack of evidence of actual monetary damages.”

We agree with Jennifer. Once the trial court held Jennifer in contempt,
it could have ordered her to pay Steven any resulting credit-related
damages under either its inherent authority or the settlement agreement.
But considering the dearth of evidence to support Steven’s claimed
damages, coupled with the deference we afford the trial court as
factfinder, we conclude that it did not clearly err.1

Though Steven testified about his alleged credit-related damages, he
offered little supporting evidence. He introduced two screenshots
showing a 73-point decline in his credit rating from October 2016 to
October 2017, but he presented neither a credit report nor an expert
opinion explaining his personal credit history. Therefore, the trial court
could not determine whether factors other than the unpaid loan might
have affected Steven’s credit rating. Additionally, though Steven testified

1 Aside from resolving Steven’s contempt petition, the trial court instructed counsel to file a
joint notice offsetting various amounts Steven and Jennifer were ordered to pay each other.
Counsel did not do so. But as this pending joint notice will only tidy up the net effect of the
payments ordered, and no outstanding claims remain, we have appellate jurisdiction over a
final judgment here. See App. R. 2(H)(1), 5(A).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-DR-226 | March 12, 2026 Page 6 of 9
that Wells Fargo had sent him several “collection letters,” he did not
submit any into evidence. And he likewise offered no documentary
evidence related to his claimed increase in truck-loan payments or his
claimed denials of home-construction and economic-relief loans. Simply
put, Steven presented little evidence corroborating his claims that
Jennifer’s failure to pay the Wells Fargo loan caused the decline in his
credit rating and resulted in financial damages.

These evidentiary shortcomings support the trial court’s finding that
Steven’s request for damages was “unpersuasive.” To be sure, the trial
court could have believed Steven’s testimony, found that the unpaid loan
impacted his credit rating and caused him financial harm, and awarded
him damages. But “factfinders are not required to believe a witness’s
testimony even when it is uncontradicted.” Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d
1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). And we will not reassess Steven’s credibility or
reweigh the evidence for ourselves.

Ultimately, this record supports the trial court’s finding that the size of
Steven’s alleged financial losses and their connection to the unpaid Wells
Fargo loan were speculative and unproven. That finding, in turn, supports
the court’s conclusion that Steven was not entitled to damages. That said,
if he suffers other financial losses in the future, he may seek recourse at
that time. Until then, he has merely suffered a breach of the settlement
agreement without establishing resulting damages.

We now turn to the actions the trial court, the parties, and their
attorneys took during the pendency of this appeal.

II. Trial courts, administrative agencies, parties, and
counsel must not act in reliance upon uncertified
appellate opinions.
After the Court of Appeals issued its published opinion that partially
reversed the trial court’s judgment, Jennifer timely sought rehearing.
While that request was pending, the trial court, on its own, issued a
revised order to implement the Court of Appeals’ instructions. But the
trial court lacked authority to issue that order because the appellate

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-DR-226 | March 12, 2026 Page 7 of 9
opinion was not yet certified. We thus take this opportunity to emphasize
the importance of following Appellate Rule 65(E), which prohibits trial
courts, administrative agencies, and parties from taking action based on
published opinions or memorandum decisions (collectively “opinions”)
before they are certified.

An opinion is not final so long as opportunities for further appellate
review remain. When the Court of Appeals issues an opinion, the
appellate clerk’s office initially serves uncertified copies on counsel,
unrepresented parties, and the trial court. App. R. 65(E). Parties then have
thirty days to petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals or forty-five
days to seek transfer to this Court. App. R. 54(B), 57(C)(1). If rehearing is
sought, transfer petitions must then be filed within thirty days after the
Court of Appeals’ disposition of the rehearing petition. App. R. 57(C)(2).
And if this Court grants transfer and issues an opinion, a party has thirty
days to petition for rehearing. App. R. 54(B).

Because of these opportunities for appellate review, the clerk’s office
will certify a Court of Appeals opinion “only after the time for all Petitions
for Rehearing, Transfer, or Review has expired, unless all the parties
request earlier certification.” App. R. 65(E). And if we grant transfer, the
clerk’s office will not certify any opinion until we dispose of the appeal. Id.
In practice, certification occurs a few days after the window for review
closes. And only after certification may a trial court, administrative
agency, or party “take any action in reliance upon” the opinion. Id.

This certification process prevents trial courts from interfering with the
subject matter of a pending appeal. Once an appeal is filed and the trial
court clerk’s record is complete, “Appellate Rule 8 divests the trial court of
‘jurisdiction to act upon the judgment appealed from until the appeal has
been terminated.’” Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners Ass'n,
Inc., 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1005 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Schumacher v. Radiomaha,
Inc., 619 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. 1993)). And thus, before certification, a trial
court’s order is void and a nullity if it interferes with the appeal’s subject
matter. G.W., 231 N.E.3d at 192. Only upon certification does jurisdiction
over that subject matter return to the trial court. Id.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-DR-226 | March 12, 2026 Page 8 of 9
This case illustrates the pitfalls of ignoring these rules. While the appeal
was pending, the trial court revised its judgment in an order that was and
remains void. Yet, relying on that order, Jennifer began making payments
of $500 per month to Steven—which his law firm held in trust—to satisfy
the revised judgment. The parties will now have to unwind those
payments. Going forward, we urge trial courts, administrative agencies,
parties, and counsel to comply with Appellate Rule 65(E) by not taking
any action in reliance upon uncertified opinions.

Conclusion
The trial court did not clearly err in declining to award Steven damages
for Jennifer’s contempt in its original order. But the court did err in issuing
a revised order imposing sanctions pursuant to the Court of Appeals’
uncertified opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s original order.

Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Denise F. Hayden
Jessica S. Lacy
Lacy Law Office, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Nicole A. Zelin
Pritzke & Davis, LLP
Greenfield, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-DR-226 | March 12, 2026 Page 9 of 9