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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jennifer Pringle v. Mackenzie Alice Hunt

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2024-000677

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8K)

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Combined Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jennifer Pringle and Dewayne Pringle, Plaintiffs,

Of whom Jennifer Pringle is the Appellant,

v.

Mackenzie Alice Hunt and Thomas Christopher
Newman, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000677

Appeal From Dorchester County
Heath P. Taylor, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-103
Heard December 8, 2025 – Filed March 4, 2026

REVERSED

Robert Brian Critzer, of Greenville, and Kaye Gorenflo
Hearn, of Conway, both of Wyche, PA; and Jonathan
Michael Riddle, of Jeffcoat Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, all for Appellant.

Megan Elyse Corrie, of Clawson & Staubes, LLC, of
Charleston, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Jennnifer Pringle (Jennifer) appeals the circuit court's order
granting Mckenzie Alice Hunt and Thomas Christopher Newman's (collectively,
Respondents) motion to enforce settlement as well as its order denying her motion
to alter or amend. We reverse.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September 2022, Dewayne Pringle (Dewayne) and Jennifer Pringle (Jennifer)
were involved in a car accident with Respondent Hunt. Both Dewayne and
Jennifer sustained injuries in the crash.

The Pringles sent Respondents' insurer, State Farm Insurance (State Farm), an
Offer of Compromise (the Offer) to settle both Dewayne and Jennifer's claims.
State Farm responded via letter through its attorney and indicated it would accept
the demand "as to Jennifer Pringle only," and it attached a Covenant Not to
Execute (the Covenant) to be signed by Jennifer. With this letter, State Farm
included a check for Jennifer's claim. Jennifer did not sign the Covenant.

The Pringles subsequently filed suit in the circuit court, raising causes of action
against both Respondent Hunt, as the driver, and Respondent Newman, as the
owner of the car Hunt was driving. Respondents denied the claims.

Respondents then filed a motion to enforce settlement as to Jennifer. They argued
the parties entered a valid contract when State Farm accepted the Offer as to
Jennifer's claim. Following a hearing on the motion, the circuit court granted
Respondents' motion to enforce settlement. Jennifer filed a motion to alter or
amend pursuant to Rule 59(e), South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which the
circuit court denied. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In South Carolina jurisprudence, settlement agreements are viewed as contracts."
Byrd v. Livingston, 398 S.C. 237, 241, 727 S.E.2d 620, 621 (Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting Pee Dee Stores, Inc. v. Doyle, 381 S.C. 234, 241, 672 S.E.2d 799, 802
(Ct. App. 2009)). "An action to construe a contract is an action at law." Id. at 241,
727 S.E.2d at 622. "In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried without a jury,
the judge's findings will not be disturbed unless they are without evidentiary
support." Id. "However, this court is free to decide questions of law with no
particular deference to the trial court." Id.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Jennifer argues the circuit court erred in enforcing a settlement when State Farm
did not accept the Offer but instead counteroffered. She asserts the Offer was a
single offer to settle both her and Dewayne's claims together and State Farm's letter
purporting to accept the Offer changed a material term by "accepting" a settlement
for only Jennifer's claim. We agree.

"The necessary elements of a contract are an offer, acceptance, and valuable
consideration." Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 406, 581 S.E.2d
161, 166 (2003). "South Carolina common law requires that, in order to have a
valid and enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between the
parties with regard to all essential and material terms of the agreement." Player v.
Chandler, 299 S.C. 101, 105, 382 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1989).
Nothing is better settled than that in order to constitute a
contract there must be an offer on one side and an
unconditional acceptance on the other. So long as any
condition is not acceded to by both parties to the contract,
the dealings are mere negotiations . . . . To constitute a
contract the acceptance of the offer must be absolute and
identical with the terms of the offer. If one offers another
to do a definite thing, and that other person accepts
conditionally or [introduces] a new term into the
acceptance, his answer is either a mere expression of
willingness to treat or it is in effect a counter proposal.

Sossamon v. Littlejohn, 241 S.C. 478, 485–86, 129 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1963)
(quoting Cohn v. Penn. Beverage Co., 169 A. 768, 769 (Pa. 1934)).
"In construing a contract, the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the parties." Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries v. Outparcel Assocs., LLC,
374 S.C. 483, 497, 649 S.E.2d 494, 501 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Southern Atl.
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Middleton, 349 S.C. 77, 80–81, 562 S.E.2d 482, 484–85 (Ct.
App. 2002)). "Contracts should be liberally construed so as to give them effect and
carry out the intention of the parties." Id. (quoting Mishoe v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 234 S.C. 182, 188, 107 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1958)). "The parties'
intention must, in the first instance, be derived from the language of the contract."
Id. "[I]f the language is perfectly plain and capable of legal construction, it alone
determines the document's force and effect." Id. "The parties' intention must be
gathered from the contents of the entire agreement and not from any particular
clause thereof." Id. at 498, 649 S.E.2d at 502.
We hold State Farm's letter purporting to accept only Jennifer's claim constituted a
counteroffer, and because Jennifer refused to accept State Farm's counteroffer by
not signing the Covenant, a contract was not created. See Sauner, 354 S.C. at 406,
581 S.E.2d at 166 ("The necessary elements of a contract are an offer, acceptance,
and valuable consideration."). It is clear from the language that the Pringles
intended the Offer to settle both Dewayne and Jennifer's claims together. See
Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries, 374 S.C. at 497, 649 S.E.2d at 501 ("In construing a
contract, the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
parties." (quoting Southern Atl. Fin. Servs., Inc., 349 S.C. at 80–81, 562 S.E.2d at
484–85)); id. ("[I]f the language is perfectly plain and capable of legal
construction, it alone determines the document's force and effect."). Specifically,
the Offer began with the heading, "Offer of Compromise" and stated it regarded
"our clients' claims." Although the Offer initially separated Dewayne and Jennifer
under different headings, it is apparent that the purpose in so doing was to discuss
each of their individual damages, injuries, and medical bills, rather than to indicate
separate "offers." Further, in the summary of damages, the Offer referred to
"[p]ayment from all applicable policies." Although the Offer referred to Jennifer
and Dewayne's "claims," it stated "their medical bills are collectively over
$200,000." Most important to our analysis is the final section of the Offer titled,
"Offer Pursuant to Tyger River . . . ." In this section, the Offer required
"unequivocal" acceptance "without variance," and included a demand for "payment
of policy limits." The Offer further stated "[w]e must RECEIVE the policy
limits" by a date certain. In one footnote, although Jennifer and Dewayne's claims
were separated by bullet points, we find it is still clear these claims were meant to
be settled together as indicated by the preceding requirement that State Farm "pay
the settlement funds by Cashier's Checks or Certified Bank Checks" by a date
certain. The language warned that "only performance will accept this Offer" and
that it must have been accepted "exactly as stated." The Offer then discussed the
singular covenant to be signed by Respondents that would be limited to protect
Respondents from the "clients' rights to [Respondents'] personal assets." Finally,
we find the language at the end of the Offer stating the "letter is our clients' formal
Offer" and requiring acceptance of the Offer "in order for [the law] firm and [their]
clients to agree that a binding agreement" was formed further indicates the parties'
intention that the Offer function as a singular offer to resolve both claims.
In light of our holding that the Offer constituted a single offer to resolve both
Dewayne and Jennifer's claims, we hold State Farm's "acceptance" functioned as a
counteroffer because it differed from the Offer, particularly as it relates to
Dewayne's claim. See Sossamon, 241 S.C. at 486, 129 S.E.2d at 127 ("So long as
any condition is not acceded to by both parties to the contract, the dealings are
mere negotiations . . . ." (quoting Cohn, 169 A. at 769)); Weisz Graphics Div. of
Fred. B. Johnson Co., Inc. v. Peck Indus., Inc., 304 S.C. 101, 106, 403 S.E.2d 146,
149 (Ct. App. 1991) ("[A]n acceptance which adds different or additional terms is
treated as a counteroffer, which may be accepted or rejected by the other party.").
While Jennifer focuses her appeal on the fact that State Farm only accepted her
claim and not Dewayne's, we find the telling language in State Farm's letter is its
offer to "split" the remaining amount between Dewayne and the other claimant.
We further find the offer to settle Dewayne and Jennifer's claims together was a
material and essential term because that was the entire purpose of the Offer.
Therefore, we hold the language in State Farm's letter created a counteroffer and
indicated there was no meeting of the minds and no contract formed. See
Sossamon, 241 S.C. at 485–86, 129 S.E.2d at 127 ("Nothing is better settled than
that in order to constitute a contract there must be an offer on one side and an
unconditional acceptance on the other. . . . To constitute a contract the acceptance
of the offer must be absolute and identical with the terms of the offer." (quoting
Cohn, 169 A. at 769)); Player, 299 S.C. at 105, 382 S.E.2d at 893 ("South Carolina
common law requires that, in order to have a valid and enforceable contract, there
must be a meeting of the minds between the parties with regard to all essential and
material terms of the agreement.").

Based on the foregoing, the orders of the circuit court are
REVERSED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.