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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People of Michigan v. Rogelio Nasario Reyna

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 370499
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (27.9K)

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Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
March 12, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:07 AM

v No. 370499
Van Buren Circuit Court
ROGELIO NASARIO REYNA, LC No. 2023-024451-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of delivery of methamphetamine
(meth), MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.12, to serve 90 months to 40 years’ imprisonment. For the reasons set forth in
this opinion, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Between December 2022 and January 2023, an associate of defendant commenced
cooperation with law enforcement as a confidential informant (CI) after being apprehended in
possession of methamphetamine. The CI identified defendant as his supplier and, in exchange for
avoiding prosecution, agreed to participate in three controlled purchases from defendant. Over the
course of approximately one month, the CI executed three such transactions: on December 20,
2022; December 27, 2022; and January 20, 2023. Law enforcement and the CI adhered to
consistent procedures for each operation. Each transaction occurred within the same county,
involved the same monetary consideration, and pertained to comparable quantities of
methamphetamine.

Approximately one month after the final controlled purchase, defendant was arrested and
charged with three separate counts of delivery of methamphetamine. The prosecution elected to
try each count separately. The conviction at issue in this appeal arises from the December 27,
2022, transaction.

-1-
Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss all three cases on the grounds of entrapment.
The trial court denied the motions, concluding that none of the substantive elements of entrapment
were established.

Defendant first proceeded to trial on the charge pertaining to the December 27 transaction.
The prosecution did not present evidence of the other controlled buys. Instead, the prosecution
presented testimony only from the CI, the lead detective, and the laboratory technician who
analyzed the methamphetamine. Defendant’s main argument throughout his first trial was that the
CI already had the meth, so defendant did not actually engage in delivery of meth. In making this
argument, defense counsel emphasized the lack of testimony from any of the other officers
involved in the buy. Particularly, defense counsel argued that, because there was no testimony
about how the CI’s car was searched, the CI could have hidden the meth from the police in his car.
The jury deadlocked, and the trial court declared a mistrial.

Following the mistrial, the prosecution filed a Notice of Intent to Introduce Other Acts and
Propensity Evidence pursuant to MRE 404(b). The prosecution contended that evidence of the
other two transactions, together with the doctrine of chances, was necessary to establish absence
of mistake and a common scheme or plan. The trial court admitted the evidence and permitted
reliance on the doctrine of chances, finding that the transactions shared “striking similarities.” The
court concluded that the evidence was relevant and that its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

Subsequently, the delivery-of-methamphetamine charge relating to the December 27
transaction proceeded to retrial. On this occasion, the prosecution introduced evidence of the two
additional controlled buys, including the testimony of all law enforcement officers who
participated in any of the three transactions. The trial court provided the jury with the following
instruction concerning the admission of evidence regarding the other two controlled buys:

You’ve heard evidence that was introduced to show that the Defendant committed
crimes for which he is not on trial. If you believe this evidence, you must be very
careful only to consider it for certain purposes. You may only think about whether
the evidence tends to show that the defendant used a plan, system, or characteristic
scheme that he has used before or since. And that because there were a series of
similar incidents it’s less probable that the charges in this case arise out of a
mistake on the part of the police or deception on the part of the informant.
(emphasis added).

You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose. For example,
you must not decide that it shows that the Defendant is a bad person or that he’s
likely to commit crimes. You must not convict the Defendant here because you
think he’s guilty of other bad conduct. All the evidence must convince you beyond
a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the alleged crime or you must
find him not guilty.

Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court determined that the italicized language
quoted above properly explained the doctrine of chances as applied to the specific facts of the
present case.

-2-
The jury found defendant guilty of delivery of meth, and the trial court sentenced
defendant—within the guidelines—to serve 90 months to 40 years’ imprisonment. Defendant now
appeals.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed due to the trial court’s
alleged errors in admitting highly prejudicial other-acts evidence under the doctrine of chances
and also in denying his motion to dismiss on grounds of entrapment. Defendant further asserts
that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate and should be vacated. We examine each
of defendant’s assertions.
A. MRE 404(b) AND DOCTRINE OF CHANCES

In his appeal, defendant asserts that the admission of other-acts evidence, i.e., the evidence
of the other two controlled buys, combined with the jury instruction on the “doctrine of chances”
denied him a fair trial. Specifically, defendant argues, the other-acts evidence was unfairly
prejudicial because it was unnecessarily cumulative and unreliable. And the prosecution misused
the “doctrine of chances” because it has only been allowed to rebut a defendant’s claim that his
own conduct was accidental. Lastly, defendant alleges, because the other-acts evidence and
“doctrine of chances” instruction were not presented at the deadlocked trial, the fact that they were
presented in the trial that led to defendant’s conviction suggests that their inclusion was an
outcome-determinative error and reversal is required.

We review this preserved evidentiary error for an abuse of discretion. People v Thorpe,
504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019); see also MRE 103(a)(1). “A trial court necessarily
abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law.” People v
Denson, 500 Mich 385, 396; 902 NW2d 306 (2017).

Generally, “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an individual is inadmissible to
prove a propensity to commit such acts.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785
(1998), citing MRE 404(b). However, this evidence may be admissible for other purposes under
MRE 404(b)(1), which provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.[1]

1
The Michigan Rules of Evidence were substantially amended on September 20, 2023, effective
January 1, 2024. See 512 Mich lxviii (2023). We rely on the version of MRE 404(b) in effect at
the time this matter was decided in December 2023.

-3-
Before evidence of other crimes, acts, or wrongs may be admitted, the evidence must pass
a four-part test as established by our Supreme Court in People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55;
508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). See People v Sabin (After Remand), 463
Mich 43, 55-56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). The test is as follows: (1) the evidence must be offered
for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b); (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value
of the evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; and (4) “the trial court
may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury.” VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 55. In
summary, if “the evidence also tends to prove some fact other than character, admissibility depends
upon whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, taking into account the efficacy
of a limiting instruction in cushioning the prejudicial effect of the evidence.” Crawford, 458 Mich
at 385.

Defendant does not dispute that the evidence of the other controlled buys was offered for
the proper purpose of proving defendant’s scheme, plan, or system. We agree because “scheme,
plan, or system” is clearly included in MRE 404(b)(1) as a proper purpose. People v Roscoe, 303
Mich App 633, 646; 846 NW2d 402 (2014). Accordingly, the first part of the test has been
satisfied.

The prosecution also must explain “how the evidence relates to the recited purpose” to
justify admission under MRE 404(b). Crawford, 458 Mich at 387. Our Supreme Court has
emphasized that “logical relevance,” i.e., the second part of the VanderVliet test is the
“ ‘touchstone’ of the admissibility of other-acts evidence.” Denson, 500 Mich at 401. “Other-acts
evidence is logically relevant if two components are present: materiality and probative value.” Id.

“Materiality is the requirement that the proffered evidence be related to ‘any fact that is of
consequence’ to the action.” Crawford, 458 Mich at 389. A fact is “of consequence to the action”
if it is “directed at an element of the crime or an applicable defense” or if it “is ‘in issue’ in the
sense that it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy.” Sabin, 463 Mich at 57
(quotation marks and citations omitted). In general, when a defendant denies that he committed
the charged offense, all elements of the offense are “in issue.” Crawford, 458 Mich at 389.

Here, defendant framed his defense as leading the jury to believe that the CI already had
the meth and framed defendant by claiming that the meth came from defendant. The prosecution
introduced evidence of the controlled buys specifically to counter defendant’s framing defense,
thereby placing the contested fact at issue. Accordingly, the threshold requirement of materiality
under the relevance analysis is satisfied. See, e.g., People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 624; 790
NW2d 607 (2010); People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 501; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).

The prosecution is further required to establish the probative value of the other-acts
evidence. Denson, 500 Mich at 402. Evidence is considered probative if it tends to increase or
decrease the probability of a consequential fact in the litigation. Crawford, 458 Mich at 389–390.
Where the evidence concerns other acts, its probative value must derive from something other than
a propensity inference. Id. at 390. Absent a cogent logical nexus connecting the prior act to the
ultimate inference sought, such evidence must be excluded, even if it is logically relevant to
character. Id.

-4-
Hence, the central inquiry is whether the prosecution met its burden to demonstrate that
the defendant’s involvement in the other controlled buys establishes an inference—distinct from a
propensity inference—that is probative of the two dispositive issues: (1) whether the CI fabricated
evidence to frame defendant, and (2) whether defendant delivered meth to the CI. The prosecution
advanced two distinct theories of logical relevance to support the probative value of each material
fact: the “doctrine of chances” and the theory that it showed defendant’s plan, scheme, or system.
Defendant only contests the prosecution’s use of the doctrine of chances; however, we determine
that the prosecution properly relied on both theories.

The doctrine of chances constitutes a theory of logical relevance that operates
independently of character inferences. Mardlin, 487 Mich at 616. In the context of MRE 404(b),
this doctrine elucidates a logical connection—grounded in objective probability—between
evidence of prior acts linked to a defendant and legitimate, non-character inferences that may arise
from the frequency of such events. Id. at 616–617. In principle, as the incidence of anomalous
events increases with respect to a particular defendant, the objective probability that the charged
act or prior occurrences resulted from mere happenstance or natural causes correspondingly
diminishes. Id. at 616.

For the doctrine of chances to be properly applied, the prosecution must make a persuasive
showing that each uncharged incident bears substantial similarity to the charged offense, and that
the defendant has engaged in such incidents with greater frequency than would be expected of an
ordinary person. Crawford, 458 Mich at 394. The application of the doctrine is context-dependent
and varies according to the issue for which it is invoked. Mardlin, 487 Mich at 620. Where the
prosecution’s theory of relevance is predicated on the asserted similarity between the defendant’s
other acts and the charged offense, a “striking similarity” between those acts is required for
admissibility. Denson, 500 Mich at 403; see also Mardlin, 487 Mich at 620–622.

Here, the prosecution invoked the doctrine of chances to establish the probative value of
the question whether the CI framed defendant. The prosecution contended that the controlled buys
were conducted pursuant to uniform procedures, including comprehensive searches of the CI and
his vehicle prior to each transaction. The fact that law enforcement uncovered no meth during any
of these searches reduced the likelihood that the CI could have concealed meth for the purpose of
framing defendant. Given that the prosecution’s argument relied on the similarity between the
controlled buys and the charged offense, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate a
“striking similarity” among the acts to satisfy the doctrine of chances. See Denson, 500 Mich at
403; Mardlin, 487 Mich at 620–622; Crawford, 458 Mich at 394–395.

The prosecution offered significant evidence detailing the similarity of each controlled buy.
In particular, the police followed the same pre-buy and post-buy procedures for each controlled
buy. Further, each buy occurred in the same county, involved the same amount of money, and
involved a similar amount of meth. Also, at each buy, defendant and the CI agreed on a time and
place to meet; defendant then met the CI at the agreed location, briefly talked with the CI,
exchanged the meth for money, and then promptly left. Most importantly, defendant concedes
that the buys were similar and fails to demonstrate any significant dissimilarity between the other
acts and the charged offense. Further, no significant dissimilarity exists in the record.
Accordingly, as the trial court found, there is a clear “striking similarity” between the other

-5-
controlled buys and the charged offense. See Denson, 500 Mich at 403; Mardlin, 487 Mich at
620-622; Crawford, 458 Mich at 394-395.

The prosecution also presented sufficient evidence to prove that defendant was involved in
all three controlled buys. See Crawford, 458 Mich at 394. Importantly, defendant does not contest
that he was the person who met the CI during these controlled buys. Further, the prosecution
presented photo, video, and testimony evidence that defendant met the CI during these controlled
buys. Accordingly, the similarity between the controlled buys and the proof that defendant was
involved in each buy provided a sufficient “factual nexus to warrant admission of the evidence
under the doctrine of chances.” Id. at 395-396.

Therefore, under the doctrine of chances, the prosecution properly “weaved a logical
thread” to show that, because of the significant similarity of the other controlled buys to the
charged offense, it was highly improbable that the CI was able to successfully hide meth from the
police officers on three separate occasions considering that the police thoroughly searched the CI
and his car before each buy and surveilled the CI to, from, and during each buy. This is a proper
noncharacter inference. Further, this inference lends to the objective improbability that the CI
framed defendant for the charged offense, or any of the other controlled buys. Accordingly, the
prosecution demonstrated that the other-acts evidence had sufficient probative value because it
made it less likely that the CI framed defendant.

The prosecution also used the theory of logical relevance that the evidence of the other
controlled buys showed defendant’s plan, scheme, or system. Our Supreme Court has held that
evidence of misconduct similar to that charged is logically relevant to show that the charged act
occurred if “the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to support
an inference that they were manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system.” Sabin, 463
Mich at 63. In other words, the logical relevance of the controlled buys is on the basis of the
inference that defendant used a common system in committing the charged offense; therefore, the
proof of defendant using the common system is proof that the charged act occurred. See id. at 63
n 10. When evidence is offered to prove common scheme or plan, there cannot solely be a general
similarity between the charged and uncharged acts; instead, “the common features must indicate
the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed
need not be distinctive or unusual.” Id. at 65-66. This theory of logical relevance contains two
situations: (1) when the charged and uncharged acts are pieces of a larger plan, and (2) when the
defendant used the same plan to commit separate acts. Id. at 63-65.

Here, the trial court determined that the evidence of the controlled buys demonstrated the
first situation. Specifically, the fact that defendant sold meth to the CI multiple times in a short
period suggests that the charged offense was part of defendant’s larger plan of routinely selling
meth to the CI.

The same facts support either situation under this theory of logical relevance. As discussed
earlier, defendant concedes that the buys were similar. Further, the record clearly indicates that
the circumstances of each controlled buy were identical. The CI texted defendant about buying
meth; defendant and the CI agreed on a time and place (all in the same county); at each buy
defendant would approach the CI’s car, engage in small talk, and while talking, they would

-6-
exchange money for meth; the meth provided by defendant was packaged the same way each time;
$60 worth of meth was bought each time, and defendant provided a similar amount of meth in
exchange; and defendant left shortly after each buy took place.

The similarities between the controlled buys support the inference that defendant employed
the same system, plan, or scheme for the charged offense. Therefore, the evidence of the other
controlled buys is relevant because it makes it more probable that defendant delivered meth during
the charged offense because he delivered meth to the CI using the same plan as the other buys.
Further, as stated by the trial court, the fact that all three buys occurred in a short period suggests
that defendant routinely sold meth to the CI. Therefore, the evidence is relevant because it makes
it more probable that defendant sold meth to the CI on the date of the charged offense.

The crux of defendant’s argument on appeal and in the trial court was that the evidence
should have been excluded under MRE 403 because of its prejudicial nature. A trial court may
exclude otherwise admissible evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” MRE 403.
“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence
will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” Crawford, 458 Mich at 398.

As discussed earlier, the evidence of the other controlled buys is clearly relevant, i.e.,
highly probative of two material facts. However, our Supreme Court has noted that other-acts
evidence nearly always carries some amount of prejudice. See id. at 384, 398. Therefore, we
recognize that the evidence of the other controlled buys certainly carries some prejudice. However,
the evidence is still admissible as long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 487; 818 NW2d 296 (2012);
Crawford, 458 Mich at 385; VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 55. Our Supreme Court has provided a list
of considerations for courts to assess when determining whether other-acts evidence should be
excluded:

(1) the dissimilarity between the other acts and the charged crime, (2) the temporal
proximity of the other acts to the charged crime, (3) the infrequency of the other
acts, (4) the presence of intervening acts, (5) the lack of reliability of the evidence
supporting the occurrence of the other acts, and (6) the lack of need for evidence
beyond the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimony. [Watkins, 491 Mich
at 487-488.]

Here, defendant concedes the similarity between the prior acts and the charged offense.
The temporal proximity is likewise established, as all three controlled buys—including the charged
offense—occurred within a single month. Defendant does not assert the existence of any
intervening events, nor does the record reveal any such occurrences. These factors, therefore,
support admissibility. Moreover, defendant does not contest the necessity of evidence beyond the
testimony of the complainant and defendant. Thus, the record amply supports the prosecution’s
position that other-acts evidence was essential, given that defendant’s defense strategy centered
on repeated challenges to the confidential informant’s credibility and to the competence of the

-7-
investigating officers. Accordingly, the necessity of the other-acts evidence was manifest. See
People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 195-196; 891 NW2d 255 (2016).

Defendant also contends that the evidence supporting the occurrence of the prior controlled
buys lacks reliability. Defendant has not made a convincing argument here as our review of the
record lacks any factual evidence to support this claim. The CI was subject to continuous law
enforcement surveillance before, during, and after each controlled purchase, and was required to
adhere to stringent procedural protocols. Under these circumstances, it is improbable that the CI
could have acted outside the officers’ observation. The CI’s testimony unequivocally denied any
attempt to frame defendant and affirmed that meth was obtained from defendant during each
transaction, as well as on prior occasions. Both the CI and the CI’s vehicle underwent thorough
searches before and after each controlled buy, and law enforcement consistently testified that no
contraband was found before the transactions. Additionally, four police officers provided
testimony that was mutually consistent and corroborative of the CI’s account and the procedural
safeguards in place. This factor likewise supports admissibility.

Finally, the trial court issued a limiting instruction to the jury. “Jurors are presumed to
follow the court’s instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People v
Mullins, 322 Mich App 151, 173; 911 NW2d 201 (2017); see also Weeks v Angelone, 528 US 225,
234; 120 S Ct 727; 145 L Ed 2d 727 (2000). Thus, any potential for unfair prejudice arising from
the admission of other-acts evidence, assuming there was any, was mitigated by the court’s
instruction. See Roscoe, 303 Mich App at 646.

On this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of the prior controlled buys and in applying the doctrine of chances. The evidence was
proffered for a permissible purpose, was relevant, and its probative value substantially outweighed
any risk of unfair prejudice. Furthermore, the trial court provided an appropriate limiting
instruction. Accordingly, the admission of the evidence was proper. Defendant is not entitled to
relief on this issue.
B. ENTRAPMENT

Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the
charge on the basis of entrapment. Defendant argued in the trial court and in his appeal that
because the police improperly used defendant’s close relationship with the CI to induce defendant
into committing a crime, defendant was entrapped. Further, defendant contends that the CI was
the one who asked defendant for meth and “was given free rein to target and set up defendant.”

A trial court’s factual findings concerning entrapment and its ultimate ruling on the issue
of entrapment are reviewed for clear error. People v Jade, ___ Mich App __, _; __ NW3d
___ (2024) (Docket No. 365951); slip op at 6. “Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491,
497-498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002).

In Michigan, “a defendant is considered entrapped if either (1) the police engaged in
impermissible conduct that would induce a law-abiding person to commit a crime in similar
circumstances or (2) the police engaged in conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated.”

-8-
Jade, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The focus of the
entrapment test is on the nature of the government conduct that resulted in the charges against
defendant because “[t]he purpose of the entrapment doctrine is to deter unlawful government
activities and preclude the implication of judicial approval of impermissible government conduct.”
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “if law enforcement officials present nothing
more than the opportunity to commit the crime,” then there is no entrapment. Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Further, defendant “has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was entrapped.” Johnson, 466 Mich at 498.

Here, the trial court, defendant, and prosecution all agree that the police did not engage in
conduct “so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated.” Accordingly, the only question we must
address is whether “the police engaged in impermissible conduct that would induce a law-abiding
person to commit a crime in similar circumstances.” Id.

When examining whether governmental activity would impermissibly
induce criminal conduct, several factors are considered: (1) whether there existed
appeals to the defendant’s sympathy as a friend, (2) whether the defendant had been
known to commit the crime with which he was charged, (3) whether there were any
long time lapses between the investigation and the arrest, (4) whether there existed
any inducements that would make the commission of a crime unusually attractive
to a hypothetical law-abiding citizen, (5) whether there were offers of excessive
consideration or other enticement, (6) whether there was a guarantee that the acts
alleged as crimes were not illegal, (7) whether, and to what extent, any government
pressure existed, (8) whether there existed sexual favors, (9) whether there were
any threats of arrest, (10) whether there existed any government procedures that
tended to escalate the criminal culpability of the defendant, (11) whether there was
police control over any informant, and (12) whether the investigation was targeted.
[Id. at 498-499.]

The record reveals that the trial court rendered findings as to each of the twelve entrapment
factors, concluding that none supported a finding of entrapment. On appeal, defendant contends
that law enforcement improperly exploited defendant’s personal relationship with the CI; that the
CI was the initial actor in the controlled purchase and that, absent the CI’s solicitation, defendant
would not have delivered methamphetamine; that the CI operated with undue autonomy in
targeting and orchestrating defendant’s involvement; and that the police lacked prior knowledge
of defendant’s criminal propensity prior to the controlled purchases. As such, defendant’s
appellate challenge is limited to the trial court’s determinations with respect to Factors (1), (2),
(4), (7), (10), and (11).2

2
Defendant does not contest the trial court’s factual findings regarding Factors (3), (5), (6), (8),
(9), and (12), and our review reveals no clear error in the trial court’s determination that these
factors weigh against a finding of entrapment.

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First, the mere existence of a friendship between the CI and defendant does not support a
finding of entrapment, as law enforcement did not instigate the relationship between the two.
People v Juillet, 439 Mich 34, 64; 475 NW2d 786 (1991). The CI’s testimony established that
defendant regularly supplied him with methamphetamine prior to the controlled buys, having
conducted at least ten such transactions. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the CI
exploited their friendship to elicit sympathy or otherwise induce criminal conduct. Both the CI
and the lead detective confirmed that, at no time before or during the controlled purchases, did the
CI invoke the personal relationship as a means to procure methamphetamine. Accordingly, Factor
(1) weighs against a finding of entrapment.

Defendant further contends that he was not known to engage in the charged criminal
conduct because law enforcement had no prior familiarity with him before the controlled
purchases. The record belies this assertion. The record demonstrates that the CI identified
defendant as his methamphetamine supplier, and law enforcement independently corroborated this
information. The lead detective’s testimony established that defendant had two prior convictions
for delivery of controlled substances and was identified as a dealer by other informants known to
law enforcement. Additionally, the CI confirmed multiple prior methamphetamine purchases from
defendant. These facts collectively establish that defendant was known to engage in the charged
offense, supporting the trial court’s assessment that Factor (2) weighs against a finding of
entrapment.

Defendant also asserts that the CI induced the methamphetamine transaction by initiating
contact and requesting drugs. While it is undisputed that the CI initiated the transaction, the record
is devoid of evidence that the CI’s requests constituted any inducement rendering the commission
of the offense unusually attractive to a hypothetical law-abiding citizen. Johnson, 466 Mich at
498-499. Both the CI and the supervising officer testified that communications between the CI
and defendant concerned only routine logistical details such as timing, location, and quantity.
There is no indication that any improper inducement was offered, and defendant has identified no
such evidence. The record reflects a straightforward transaction: the CI requested
methamphetamine, defendant agreed, and a standard exchange occurred. A law-abiding
individual, if similarly approached, would not have acquiesced. Accordingly, Factor (4) weighs
against a finding of entrapment.

In a similar vein, there is no evidence that governmental action exerted undue pressure on
defendant or implemented procedures that heightened his criminal liability. The record reveals
that the CI contacted defendant on only three occasions over the course of a month, each time
seeking to purchase a modest quantity of methamphetamine. There is no suggestion that the CI
persistently solicited defendant after any refusal. Rather, on each occasion, defendant willingly
agreed to the transaction and fulfilled the delivery. As previously discussed, the CI also testified
to at least ten other methamphetamine transactions with defendant. Accordingly, Factors (7) and
(10) weigh against a finding of entrapment.

Finally, defendant contends that the CI was afforded unrestricted discretion to target and
entrap him. Again, the record belies this assertion. Rather, law enforcement maintained
substantial oversight and control over the CI’s activities. As previously noted, while the CI
identified defendant as a potential dealer, police independently corroborated this information and

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did not rely solely on the CI’s representations. Thus, the assertion that the CI operated with “free
rein” is erroneous.

Moreover, law enforcement implemented comprehensive procedures to curtail any
possibility that the CI could independently “set up” defendant. A detective was present during the
CI’s initial contact with defendant to arrange the transaction. Multiple officers conducted pre-buy
searches of the CI and his vehicle for contraband, provided the funds for the transaction, and
prohibited the CI from using personal funds. The CI was equipped with a recording device that
documented both the transit and the transaction itself, and law enforcement maintained constant
surveillance throughout. The CI was barred from making any unsupervised stops and was required
to immediately surrender the purchased methamphetamine. Post-buy, the CI and his vehicle were
re-searched. These procedures directly refute defendant’s claim of CI autonomy. As the trial court
noted, the operations were “extremely supervised,” precluding any credible argument to the
contrary. Accordingly, Factor (11) also weighs against a finding of entrapment. Following review
of the record evidence, for the reasons stated above, we concur with the trial court’s conclusion
that defendant was not entrapped.
C. PROPORTIONALITY OF SENTENCE

Defendant argues that his sentence was disproportionate and unreasonably harsh because
the sentencing guidelines did not consider the mitigating circumstances of defendant’s
background. Defendant suffered with drug addiction that influenced his criminal history, and his
parents were divorced when he was young, and he frequently moved around. In addition,
defendant delivered a very small amount of meth, defendant received no sentencing credit, and
defendant will receive access to reentry resources. Further, defendant argues, the guidelines range
for his conviction was so large that it should be entitled to less weight.

We review the proportionality of a trial court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.” People
v Teike, 348 Mich App 520, 537; 19 NW3d 733 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
An abuse of discretion occurs when a sentence violates the principle of proportionality. Id. “[T]he
principle of proportionality simply requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate
to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Id. at 537-538
(quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 59; 130 S Ct 2011;
176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010).

A trial court has the authority to sentence a defendant within the range of sentencing
outcomes assigned by the Legislature for a given conviction. People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 183;
987 NW2d 58 (2022). The trial court has a duty to exercise discretion in a way that ensures that
the sentence is “tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and offender” and “conforms
with the principle of proportionality.” Id. Specifically, “[a]n appropriate sentence should give
consideration to the reformation of the offender, the protection of society, the discipline of the
offender, and the deterrence of others from committing the same offense.” Id. See also People v
Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972).

When a trial court sentences a defendant within the guidelines range, there is a presumption
that the sentence is proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.
People v Posey, 512 Mich 317, 360; 1 NW3d 101 (2023) (opinion by BOLDEN, J.). However, a
defendant may rebut this presumption if he or she presents “unusual circumstances that would

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render the presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.” People v Ventour, 349 Mich
App 417, 430; 27 NW3d 660 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Unusual means
uncommon, not usual, rare.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the trial court imposed a sentence of 90 months to 40 years’ imprisonment, consistent
with the sentencing guidelines range of 72 months to 40 years, as enhanced by defendant’s fourth-
offense habitual offender status. MCL 777.13m; MCL 777.63; see also MCL 777.21(3)(c).
Defendant does not challenge the calculation of the guidelines range or assert that the imposed
sentence falls outside of that range. Nor does defendant allege the trial court relied on inaccurate
information. Accordingly, the sentence is presumed to be proportionate, and defendant bears the
burden of demonstrating unusual circumstances sufficient to rebut this presumption. See, Posey,
512 Mich at 357; People v Powell, 278 Mich App 318, 323, 750 NW2d 607 (2008).

On appeal, however, defendant does not acknowledge this Court’s established
jurisprudence requiring that a defendant challenging the proportionality of a within-guidelines
sentence must identify unusual circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption of
proportionality, nor does he allege the existence of such circumstances. Ventour, 349 Mich App
at 430. Instead, defendant contends that his sentence is disproportionate in view of his substance
abuse history, adverse childhood experiences, and the absence of sentencing credit. He further
asserts that the breadth of the sentencing guidelines range warranted less deference by the trial
court. Defendant also suggests that access to reentry resources would ensure that a lesser sentence
would still accomplish the aims of punishment, deterrence, and societal protection. Finally, he
claims that the sentence is disproportionate to the offense because it involved only a minimal
quantity of drugs.

Defendant cites no authority holding that any of the factors he advances constitute “unusual
circumstances.” To the contrary, several of these factors are inherently common. The denial of
sentencing credit—resulting from defendant’s commission of the offense while on parole—is a
routine consequence for all similarly-situated defendants. See MCL 791.238(2). Likewise,
defendant’s critique of the breadth of the sentencing guidelines applies universally to offenses of
this nature. See MCL 777.21; MCL 777.66. The availability of reentry resources is similarly
unremarkable, as such resources are accessible to all returning citizens. In the absence of caselaw
deeming any of the cited circumstances as unusual, defendant has failed to rebut the presumption
of proportionality.

Moreover, the additional circumstances cited by defendant—including the minimal drug
quantity, substance abuse history, and adverse childhood background—are neither uncommon nor
unknown to the trial court, as they were detailed in the presentence investigation report or
otherwise addressed during sentencing. Despite the presence of these potential mitigating factors,
the trial court properly found that defendant’s persistent failure to comply with rehabilitative
efforts, repeated parole violations, and criminal history—including offenses involving controlled
substances, domestic violence, and accosting children—warranted imposition of a sentence within
the recommended guidelines range.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a minimum sentence
at the lower end of the recommended guidelines range. Thus, for the foregoing reasons,

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defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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