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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Jennings

Utah Supreme Court

• Citations: 2026 UT 4

• Docket Number: Case No. 20230556

• Opinion

• Authorities (32)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (11.9K)

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Combined Opinion

AMENDED OPINION
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter

2026 UT 4

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
v.
DEON ANDRE JENNINGS,
Petitioner.

No. 20230556
Heard October 25, 2024
Filed November 28, 2025
Amended March 12, 2026

On Appeal of Interlocutory Order

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Coral Sanchez
No. 221904766

Attorneys:
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Andrew F. Peterson, Dep. Solic. Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for respondent
Erick Grange, Salt Lake City, for petitioner

---

 Petitioner Deon Andre Jennings filed a petition for rehearing

after we published our original opinion. We grant the petition in
part and have modified paragraph 53, footnote 2 accordingly.
The petition for rehearing was decided by a majority vote of
the Justices who acted on the original opinion. Because the petition
for rehearing was filed after Associate Chief Justice John Pearce’s
retirement, he did not have the opportunity to vote on the petition.
STATE v. JENNINGS
Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE HAGEN and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored a separate opinion concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment, in which
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE joined.

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Deon Andre Jennings is charged with the murder of Willie
Houston and is awaiting trial in the district court. He moved for a
pretrial justification hearing to adjudicate his claim that he was
justified in killing Houston because he was defending himself.
¶2 The Pretrial Justification Statute, Utah Code
section 76-2-309, provides a mechanism for a criminal defendant to
have a justification defense determined by the district court before
trial. That Statute provides that upon a defendant’s motion, the
court “shall hear evidence” on the asserted justification and “shall
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was
justified in the use or threatened use of force.” UTAH CODE
§ 76-2-309(3)(a). At the evidentiary hearing, the Statute establishes
a burden-shifting framework. First, the defendant must “make[] a
prima facie claim of justification.” Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b). If the
defendant clears this hurdle, the burden shifts to the State to “prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or
threatened use of force was not justified.” Id. If the court decides
that the State has met its burden, the case proceeds to trial—where
the defendant can raise the issue of self-defense to the jury. Id. § 76-
2-309(3)(c)(iii). But if the court determines that the State has not met
its burden at the pretrial hearing, the court “shall dismiss the
charge with prejudice.” Id. § 76-2-309(3)(c)(i).
¶3 The question before us is what the Statute requires of a
defendant to successfully make a prima facie claim of justification
and thereby shift the burden of proof to the State. Is it sufficient for
the defendant to simply allege or proffer facts meeting the elements
of justification? Or must the defendant produce some evidence on
each element? Jennings argues that a defendant is required only to
proffer facts, which must be taken as true.
¶4 The district court interpreted the Statute to require more
than that. It concluded that a mere proffer was insufficient, and it

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Opinion of the Court

considered evidence that Jennings had presented. It ultimately
concluded that Jennings had failed to make a prima facie claim of
justification.
¶5 We agree with the district court that the Statute requires a
defendant to make a prima facie claim with evidence. Accordingly,
we hold that to make a prima facie claim of justification, a
defendant must present evidence at the hearing that, if believed by
the factfinder, would be legally sufficient to satisfy each element of
the defendant’s justification claim. To be clear, this is a burden of
production; it is not a burden of proof. If the defendant meets this
burden of production, the burden shifts to the State to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s use of force was
not justified.
¶6 We also conclude that the district court was correct that
Jennings failed to make a prima facie claim of justification.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Jennings’
motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND1
¶7 Jennings and Houston got into an argument at the
apartment where Houston lived. Houston ordered Jennings to
leave multiple times, but he did not. At some point, Houston went
outside, and Jennings tried to lock the door behind him. But
Houston pushed his way back in and ended up on top of Jennings
on the floor. Jennings grabbed an object and “struck” Houston on
the back with it multiple times. Houston then left the apartment,
looking for help.
¶8 After a neighbor called 911, emergency services
transported Houston to the hospital with two stab wounds in his
back. He later died from his injuries.
¶9 The State charged Jennings with first-degree murder. As
the case proceeded in the district court, Jennings moved for a
pretrial justification hearing, asserting that he had acted in self-
defense and the charge should therefore be dismissed. His motion
included both a written proffer of facts and references to attached
exhibits, including the preliminary hearing transcript.

---

1 “In providing the background relevant to the issue on
interlocutory appeal, we emphasize that the allegations against
[Jennings] are not proved and that he is presumed innocent.” State
v. Jolley, 2025 UT 9, n.1, 568 P.3d 1040.

3
STATE v. JENNINGS
Opinion of the Court

¶10 In response to Jennings’ motion, the district court held a
pretrial justification hearing. At such a hearing, the Statute
contemplates that the defendant will go first, and it requires the
defendant to “make[] a prima facie claim of justification.” UTAH
CODE § 76-2-309(3)(b).
¶11 Under Utah law, “[a]n individual is justified” in using non-
lethal force “when and to the extent that the individual reasonably
believes that force . . . is necessary to defend the individual . . .
against the imminent use of unlawful force.” Id. § 76-2-402(2)(a). An
individual is justified in using lethal force—meaning, force
“intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury”—“only
if the individual reasonably believes that force is necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to the individual . . . as a
result of imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.” Id. § 76-2-402(2)(b).
¶12 Jennings argued that the Statute allowed him to make a
prima facie claim of justification through a proffer of facts. He
included a written proffer in his pretrial justification motion, and
his counsel orally proffered facts at the hearing. Jennings also
contended that if the Statute required him to produce evidence, the
exhibits he had attached to his motion sufficed to carry this burden
of production.
¶13 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court
determined that a proffer alone was not enough to evaluate
Jennings’ prima facie claim but that, with the exhibits, the court had
sufficient information to do so. The court found that the exhibits
conflicted with some of Jennings’ proffer. And at the end of the
hearing, it orally ruled that Jennings had failed to make a prima
facie claim of justification.
¶14 In a subsequent written order, the court denied Jennings’
motion to dismiss and recited the facts based on Jennings’ exhibits.
According to the court’s findings, Houston and Jennings were at
the apartment drinking beer when an argument broke out.
Houston told Jennings to leave multiple times, but Jennings
refused. Jennings went to gather his belongings when he suddenly
“became dizzy and felt a sharp pain.” “However, [Jennings] did not
know whether [he] was hit or what caused his pain.” He couldn’t
tell if Houston “hit him or if he was ‘too messed up.’”
¶15 Houston left the apartment, and Jennings tried to lock him
out. While Houston was outside, Jennings “grabbed a knife to
protect himself.” At some point, Houston tried to get back in, but

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Opinion of the Court

Jennings held the door closed until Houston eventually used the
weight of his body to open it. From the force of opening the door,
Houston fell on top of Jennings, and the two “‘tussled’ on the floor
for a short period of time.” While Houston was on top of Jennings,
Jennings struck him in the back with an object multiple times.
Jennings didn’t know what he had struck Houston with.
¶16 Houston got up, ran out of the apartment, and asked a
neighbor to call 911. He was transported to a hospital, where he
died from “injuries caused by stab wounds to his back.” Those stab
wounds measured approximately 13 cm in depth and 7.5 cm in
depth.
¶17 Houston never “physically assault[ed]” or “threaten[ed]
[Jennings] with an act of physical violence.” Jennings “never saw
[Houston] with a weapon nor did [Houston] threaten to use a
weapon against [him].”
¶18 The district court determined that the evidence presented
in Jennings’ exhibits did not support his proffer. But it also
considered the proffer alone.
¶19 Jennings’ proffer described the same sequence of events,
with some additional details. Jennings proffered that, just before he
thought he had been hit over the head, Houston had “threat[ened]”
him by saying, “Well, if you don’t want to leave, I have something
for you.” He described Houston’s reentrance to the apartment in
more aggressive terms—stating that Houston hit him in the face
with the door and tackled him, rather than falling on top of him
from the force of opening the door. And according to the proffer,
Jennings was “just focused on getting [Houston] off of him,” and
while he suspected Houston was injured, he “didn’t think he’d
really done anything” to Houston.
¶20 Viewing the proffer in the light most favorable to Jennings,
the district court found that Jennings had not alleged that Houston
had ever assaulted him or threatened to physically harm him. Thus,
even considering the proffer alone, the court concluded that
Jennings’ factual assertions did not show that he reasonably
believed deadly force was necessary to prevent death, serious
bodily injury, or the commission of a forcible felony.
¶21 And considering the proffer and the evidence together, the
district court also concluded that Jennings had failed to make a
prima facie claim of justification. See id. § 76-2-309(3)(b). As such,
the burden never shifted to the State to disprove justification. And

5
STATE v. JENNINGS
Opinion of the Court

the court accordingly denied Jennings’ motion to dismiss the
murder charge.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶22 The issue before us on interlocutory appeal is whether
Jennings made a prima facie claim of justification at the pretrial
justification hearing. Whether a defendant has made a prima facie
claim is a legal question reviewed for correctness. State v. Clara,
2024 UT 10, ¶ 30, 546 P.3d 963.
ANALYSIS
¶23 Jennings seeks a reversal of the district court’s
determination that he failed to make a prima facie claim of
justification at the pretrial justification hearing. This requires us to
determine what the Pretrial Justification Statute demands of a
defendant to make such a showing, and to then analyze whether
Jennings cleared that hurdle.
¶24 We first turn to the language of the Statute. And we hold
that to make a prima facie claim of justification, a defendant must
present evidence that, if believed by the factfinder, would be legally
sufficient to satisfy each element of the defendant’s justification
claim.
¶25 We then analyze the district court’s conclusion that
Jennings failed to make a prima facie claim of justification. And we
conclude the court was correct.
I. THE PRETRIAL JUSTIFICATION STATUTE REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO
MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF JUSTIFICATION WITH EVIDENCE
¶26 To determine what the Statute requires of a defendant to
“make[] a prima facie claim of justification,” UTAH CODE
§ 76-2-309(3)(b), we begin with the text of the statute, see State v.
Sanders, 2019 UT 25, ¶ 17, 445 P.3d 453. “We read the plain language
of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.” State
v. Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶ 11, 395 P.3d 92 (cleaned up).
¶27 The Statute provides a mechanism for a defendant to have
a claim of justification resolved by the district court before trial. The
relevant language of the Statute states:
(3)(a) Upon motion of the defendant filed in
accordance with Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the court shall hear evidence on
the issue of justification under this section and shall

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Opinion of the Court

determine as a matter of fact and law whether the
defendant was justified in the use or threatened use
of force.
(b) At the pretrial justification hearing, after the
defendant makes a prima facie claim of justification,
the state has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or
threatened use of force was not justified.
(c)(i) If the court determines that the state has not met
the state’s burden . . . , the court shall dismiss the
charge with prejudice.
UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(a)–(c)(i).
¶28 This language establishes that if a defendant moves for a
pretrial justification hearing, then the “court shall hear evidence on
the issue of justification”; and ultimately, the court “shall
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was
justified in the use or threatened use of force.” Id. § 76-2-309(3)(a).
This provision contemplates that upon the defendant’s motion, the
court will hold an evidentiary hearing at which the court will not
only make legal determinations but will also ultimately act as the
factfinder.
¶29 The Statute then describes the parties’ responsibilities at
the evidentiary hearing. Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b). The defendant is to go
first and must “make[] a prima facie claim of justification.” Id. If the
defendant succeeds, then “the state has the burden to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or
threatened use of force was not justified.” Id.
¶30 The question before us is what a defendant must do to
successfully make a prima facie claim of justification at the hearing.
As we noted in State v. Clara, the Statute “does not define” the term
“prima facie claim.” 2024 UT 10, ¶¶ 33, 34 n.2, 546 P.3d 963. But
because the parties had not preserved the issue, we declined to
interpret the required showing in that case. See id. ¶ 34 n.2
(applying the prima facie standard that the parties had agreed to in
the district court). However, we noted in Clara that “‘prima facie’ is
a frequently used term of art that generally means ‘sufficient to
establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted;
based on what seems to be true on first examination, even though
it may later be proved to be untrue.’” Id. ¶ 33 (cleaned up) (quoting
Prima Facie (adj.), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)).

7
STATE v. JENNINGS
Opinion of the Court

¶31 But the term “prima facie,” standing alone, does not
indicate what type of proof is required. That answer comes from
the subject at issue—be it a particular fact, presumption, or legal
claim—and the procedural posture in which the requirement to
make a prima facie claim arises. Id. (noting that the meaning of
prima facie is “informed by the procedural posture”). For example,
to overcome a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff need only allege
facts in the complaint that, taken as true, make out the elements of
the claims asserted. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Am. W. Bank
Members, L.C. v. State, 2014 UT 49, ¶ 7, 342 P.3d 224. But at summary
judgment, evidence becomes necessary. “A plaintiff’s failure to
present evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would
establish any one of the elements of the prima facie case justifies a
grant of summary judgment to the defendant.” Clara, 2024 UT 10,
¶ 33 (cleaned up). And at trial, “a prima facie case has been made
when evidence has been received” that, absent “contrary evidence,
would entitle the party having the burden of proof to judgment as
a matter of law.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶32 Under the Pretrial Justification Statute, the procedural
posture is an evidentiary hearing in which a judge must make
determinations of fact and law. This suggests that in this context, a
prima facie claim requires evidence.
¶33 Jennings and the dissent, see infra ¶ 65, argue that the word
“claim” suggests that no evidence is required. But “claim” has
various meanings that depend on context. It can mean “[t]he
assertion of an existing right” or “[a] statement that something yet
to be proved is true.” Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed.
2024). It also often refers more specifically to a “claim for relief,” as
in “a demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one
asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil action
specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.” Id. (cleaned up). Or, it
can refer to a cause of action, as in “an interest or remedy
recognized at law; the means by which a person can obtain a
privilege, possession, or enjoyment of a right or thing.” Id. (cleaned
up).
¶34 And in a legal proceeding, the word “claim,” on its own,
does not inherently signal that no evidence is necessary to support
it. Like the term “prima facie,” the type of showing required to
make a claim depends on which party asserts it and the procedural
posture in which the claim arises. For example, when a plaintiff in
a civil case asserts a claim in a complaint, allegations of fact will
suffice to survive a motion to dismiss. See Am. W. Bank Members,

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Opinion of the Court

2014 UT 49, ¶ 7. But at trial, to survive a motion for a directed
verdict, a “plaintiff must present sufficient evidence” of the
elements of a claim “to establish a prima facia case.” Lindsay v.
Gibbons & Reed, 497 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1972). And to actually prevail
on a claim at trial, the plaintiff must prove the claim by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Smith v. Volkswagen
SouthTowne, Inc., 2022 UT 29, ¶¶ 47–50, 513 P.3d 729.
¶35 In the Statute, the word “claim” does not stand alone. It
refers to a criminal defendant’s “claim of justification.” So, in
context, it refers to a defendant’s assertion of the affirmative
defense of justification. The showing required to assert such a
claim, again, depends on the context in which the claim arises. At
trial, a criminal defendant asserting a claim of justification (or other
affirmative defense) may have a burden to produce enough
evidence to put the defense at issue, if the State’s evidence did not
do so in its case in chief. See State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 15, 233 P.3d
476. But unlike a plaintiff in a civil trial, a criminal defendant will
not bear the burden to prove the claim. See id.
¶36 Bottom line, “prima facie” and “claim” derive meaning
from the context in which they appear. In the context of the Statute,
a defendant must make “a prima facie claim of justification” at an
evidentiary hearing, in which the district court must ultimately
“determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was
justified in the use or threatened use of force.” UTAH CODE
§ 76-2-309(3)(a)–(b). In this context, it follows that to make a prima
facie claim of justification, the defendant must present evidence
that, if believed, is legally sufficient to make out each element of
justification.
¶37 We clarify, however, that this is a burden of production,
not a burden of proof. We agree with the observation of the district
court in Clara that this is similar to what is required to survive a
motion for a directed verdict at trial. See 2024 UT 10, ¶ 34. Under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1), a court may dismiss a claim
if the factfinder “would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis to find for the party on that issue.” “A party who moves for a
directed verdict has the very difficult burden of showing that no
evidence exists that raises a question of material fact.” Mahmood v.
Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 18, 990 P.2d 933 (cleaned up). “Where there is
any evidence that raises a question of material fact, no matter how
improbable the evidence may appear, a directed verdict is
improper.” Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 34 (cleaned up).

9
STATE v. JENNINGS
Opinion of the Court

¶38 Similarly, the Statute sets a low bar for a defendant to clear.
Producing enough evidence to make a prima facie claim—with no
burden of proof—means that the defendant is required only to
produce some evidence on each required element. And at the prima
facie stage, the district court’s job is not to weigh the evidence or
determine the credibility of witnesses, but to determine whether
the defendant has produced evidence that is legally sufficient—
meaning that, if believed, it would make out each element of the
asserted justification defense.
¶39 The Statute’s burden-shifting procedure reinforces this
reading. If a defendant could satisfy the prima facie stage of the
hearing with only proffered facts, then the second stage—in which
the State would bear the burden of disproving the proffer by clear
and convincing evidence—would likely prove unworkable. For
example, in cases where crucial evidence regarding the self-defense
claim is solely in the possession of the defendant—say, the
defendant proffers that the victim made a threatening statement
that only the defendant heard—the State would be expected to
disprove the proffer with evidence. But this would be difficult, with
no testimony or evidence supporting the proffer that the State
could confront. Further, the court is required to determine as a
matter of fact and law whether the State disproved, by clear and
convincing evidence, the defendant’s justification claim. But at this
final stage of the proceeding, the court, as the factfinder, could not
just assume the defendant’s proffered facts to be true. Instead, the
court would need to weigh the evidence before it. Yet, it might have
no actual evidence on important, material facts. As a practical
matter, that doesn’t work.
¶40 Jennings and the dissent, see infra ¶ 66, argue that
requiring only a proffer from a defendant comports with precedent
holding that a defendant asserting self-defense at trial may be
entitled to a jury instruction without producing any evidence. But
that is only partly correct, and only because the State goes first at
trial. If the State’s evidence of the charged crimes in its case in chief
puts self-defense at issue, the defendant is entitled to a self-defense
instruction without putting on any additional evidence. State v.
Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985) (“[W]hen there is a basis in the
evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or
by the defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for
the jury to conclude that a killing was done [in self-defense], an
instruction on self-defense should be given [to] the jury.”). Notably,
however, if the State’s evidence does not put self-defense at issue,

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Opinion of the Court

a defendant wanting a self-defense instruction shoulders the
burden of production on that issue. Id. at 215 (“[A] defendant may
have to assume the burden of producing some evidence of self-
defense if there is no evidence in the prosecution’s case that would
provide some kind of evidentiary foundation for a claim of self-
defense.”).
¶41 Thus, it is our reading of the Statute that is consistent with
the parties’ respective burdens at trial. At trial, a defendant seeking
a self-defense instruction may have a burden of production if the
State’s evidence did not raise the issue. The only difference at a
pretrial justification hearing is that the defendant goes first, so the
burden of production necessarily falls to the defendant.
¶42 Importantly, none of this contradicts the general rule that
a defendant has no burden to prove self-defense. See id. at 214 (“[W]e
explicitly and firmly emphasize that this case does not alter the
long-standing law of this State concerning the . . . allocation of the
burden of persuasion with respect to [self-defense].”); State v. Bess,
2019 UT 70, ¶ 34, 473 P.3d 157 (“Importantly, this does not shift the
burden of proof from the State to the defendant. Rather, it means
that sufficient evidence must be presented at trial to put the
affirmative defense at issue.”).
¶43 This interpretation of the Pretrial Justification Statute also
synchronizes with related provisions of the criminal code. When
we interpret a statute, “we read the plain language of the statute as
a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes
in the same chapter and related chapters.” Rushton, 2017 UT 21,
¶ 11 (cleaned up).
¶44 The criminal code provides that “[e]vidence of an
affirmative defense . . . shall be presented by the defendant.” UTAH
CODE § 76-1-504. And the code classifies justification as an
affirmative defense. See id. § 76-2-308 (“Defenses enumerated in
this part constitute affirmative defenses.”); id. § 76-2-309 (defining
“Justified use of force”).
¶45 Additionally, the criminal code makes clear that the State
has no burden to negate a defense until evidence of the defense has
been presented:
Negating defense by allegation or proof -- When not
required.
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:

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STATE v. JENNINGS
Opinion of the Court

(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or
other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of
evidence presented at trial, either by the
prosecution or the defense; or
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the
defendant has presented evidence of such
affirmative defense.
Id. § 76-1-502; see also Bess, 2019 UT 70, ¶¶ 33–34 (concluding that
self-defense is an affirmative defense, not an element of a crime,
and the State need not disprove it in its case in chief at trial).
¶46 For these reasons, we interpret the Statute to require a
defendant to make a prima facie claim of justification at a pretrial
justification hearing by presenting evidence that, if believed, would
be legally sufficient to satisfy each element of the defendant’s
justification claim.
II. JENNINGS DID NOT MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF JUSTIFICATION
¶47 We now address Jennings’ argument that the district court
incorrectly concluded that he did not make a prima facie claim of
justification at the hearing. We disagree and affirm the district
court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.
¶48 Jennings asserts that he did not know what object he hit
Houston in the back with, and he did not intend to kill him.
Consequently, he argues that he used non-lethal force to defend
himself. “An individual is justified in” using non-lethal force “when
and to the extent that the individual reasonably believes that force”
is “necessary to defend the individual . . . against the imminent use
of unlawful force.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2)(a).
¶49 The State contends that Jennings used lethal force because
he, in fact, killed Houston. A person is justified in using lethal
force—force “intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury”—“only if the individual reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the
individual . . . as a result of imminent use of unlawful force, or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” Id. § 76-2-402(2)(b).
¶50 Under either type of self-defense, a self-defense claim
requires defendants to have a reasonable belief that the force they use
is necessary to defend themselves from an imminent use of

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Opinion of the Court

unlawful force or a forcible felony. Id. § 76-2-402(2); see also State v.
Sorbonne, 2022 UT 5, ¶¶ 25–30, 506 P.3d 545. A “reasonable belief”
has both a subjective and an objective component. See Sorbonne,
2022 UT 5, ¶ 2. Thus, defendants must genuinely, subjectively
believe that unlawful force (or a forcible felony) is imminent, and
that the force they are using is necessary to defend themselves from
it. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. And those subjective beliefs must be objectively
reasonable. Id. ¶¶ 28–29.
¶51 Under either strain of self-defense, Jennings failed to make
a prima facie showing that he had a genuine, subjective belief that
the force he used was necessary to defend himself from the threat
of force he perceived from Houston.
¶52 We first assess the force that Jennings used. The district
court accepted as true Jennings’ proffer that he struck Houston in
the back multiple times with an unknown object that he grabbed
while he was underneath Houston. Jennings asserts that his force
should not be considered lethal, because he did not know what he
was striking Houston with. But even so, Jennings was not punching
Houston in the back with his fist. Whether or not he knew exactly
what the object was when he struck Houston with it, he inserted
the object several inches deep into Houston’s back—and not just
once.
¶53 And Jennings has provided no evidence—nor a proffer of
fact—that he subjectively believed the force he used was necessary
to protect himself from Houston. Both non-lethal and lethal self-
defense include a “necessity” element.2 See id. § 76-2-402(2). And as

---

2 Under the non-lethal standard, defendants are justified only

“when and to the extent” they reasonably believe force is necessary
to defend against imminent, unlawful force, and thus a defendant’s
response must be proportional to the threat. UTAH CODE
§ 76-2-402(2)(a). Similarly, defendants may use lethal force only if
they reasonably believe “that force is necessary” to prevent either
serious bodily harm, death, or a forcible felony. Id. § 76-2-402(2)(b).
The phrase “that force” appears to refer back to the force actually
used, suggesting that defendants must reasonably believe that the
force they use is necessary (i.e., proportional) to respond to the
threat at hand. See That, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/that (last visited
Nov. 19, 2025) (“that” is an adjective, meaning “being the person,
thing, or idea specified, mentioned, or understood”).

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STATE v. JENNINGS
Opinion of the Court

the court of appeals has noted, that necessity element incorporates
a requirement of proportionality. State v. Wall, 2020 UT App 168,
¶¶ 19–20, 479 P.3d 355. “[T]he law on self-defense does not allow
for disproportionate use of defensive force.” Id. ¶ 19. “It is assault
and not self-defense when a defendant fights back with a level of
violence that is out of proportion to the provocation.” Id. ¶ 20; see
also UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2); State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 14, 299
P.3d 1133 (“The necessary requirement distinguishes wanton
violence from force that is crucial to averting an unlawful attack.”).3
¶54 Yet, the evidence Jennings presented did not suggest that
he subjectively believed he was in danger, let alone that he believed
the force he used was necessary to stave off that danger. As the
district court observed, Jennings’ evidence established that he
“never saw [Houston] with a weapon nor did [Houston] threaten
to use a weapon against [him].” Houston never “physically
assault[ed]” or “threaten[ed] [Jennings] with an act of physical
violence.” Nor did Jennings present evidence indicating that he
ever felt physically threatened.4

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3 Other states have concluded the same. See, e.g., Commonwealth

v. Adams, 941 N.E.2d 1127, 1133–34 (Mass. 2011) (“[T]he degree of
force used must be reasonable in the circumstances, with
proportionality being the touchstone for assessing
reasonableness.”); Parker v. United States, 155 A.3d 835, 845–46 (D.C.
2017) (“A defendant may use only reasonable force to repel the
perceived attack. . . . The government can rebut a self-defense claim
only if it proves that a defendant used excessive force.” (cleaned
up)); Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868, 874–75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“The
amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself must
be proportionate to the urgency of the situation. When a person
uses more force than is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances, the right of self-defense is extinguished.” (cleaned
up)).
4 And even if we were to consider Jennings’ proffer, it would

not alter this conclusion. Jennings proffered that Houston may
have hit him over the head. And he also asserted that Houston hit
him in the face with the door and then tackled him to the floor. But
his proffer also indicates that Jennings used force only to “get[]
[Houston] off of him,” not that he believed Houston was about to
assault, kill, or seriously injure him, or commit a forcible felony. See
UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2)(a)–(b).

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Opinion of the Court

¶55 Thus, neither the evidence nor Jennings’ proffer indicates
that he subjectively believed it was necessary for him to use the
force he did—striking Houston in the back with an object that left
deep stab wounds—in order to defend himself from Houston. And
therefore we agree with the district court that Jennings failed to
make a prima facie claim of either non-lethal or lethal self-defense.
CONCLUSION
¶56 We hold that to make a prima facie claim of justification
under the Pretrial Justification Statute, a defendant must present
evidence that, if believed by the factfinder, would be legally
sufficient to satisfy each element of the defendant’s justification
claim. Here, Jennings failed to present evidence supporting each
element of self-defense. His evidence, and even his proffer, does
not support that he subjectively believed the force he used was
necessary to protect himself from Houston. Accordingly, Jennings
failed to make a prima facie claim of justification, and we affirm the
district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment:
¶57 Interpreting Utah Code section 76-2-309 (Pretrial
Justification Statute), the majority concludes that to make a prima
facie claim of justification, a defendant must “present evidence
that, if believed, is legally sufficient to make out each element of
justification.”5 I disagree. I conclude that a defendant may make a
prima facie claim of justification through a proffer of specific,
known facts that support each element of the asserted justification
defense. But because I conclude that under either reading of the
statute, Jennings did not make a prima facie claim of justification
as required, I join the majority’s analysis in Part II and concur in the
judgment.
¶58 The question of what “prima facie claim” means in the
context of a pretrial justification hearing is one of first impression.
Like the majority, my analysis begins with the statutory text.6 “The
point of statutory interpretation is to understand what the
Legislature intended,” and “the best evidence of the legislature’s

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5 Supra ¶ 36.

6 See State v. Sanders, 2019 UT 25, ¶ 17, 445 P.3d 453.

15
STATE v. JENNINGS
DURRANT, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment

intent is the plain language of the statute.”7 “We presume that the
legislature used each word advisedly.”8 We also “read the plain
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related
chapters.”9
¶59 As recounted in the majority opinion, the Pretrial
Justification Statute describes the pretrial justification process in
this way:
Upon motion of the defendant filed in accordance
with Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the court shall hear evidence on the issue of
justification under this section and shall determine as
a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was
justified in the use or threatened use of force.
At the pretrial justification hearing, after the
defendant makes a prima facie claim of justification,
the state has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or
threatened use of force was not justified.
If the court determines that the state has not met the
state’s burden . . . the court shall dismiss the charge
with prejudice.10
In short, the defendant files a motion.11 The court convenes a
hearing, at which the court hears evidence and ultimately
determines, as a matter of fact and law, whether the defendant’s
use or threat of force was justified.12 At that hearing, the defendant
must first “make[] a prima facie claim of justification.”13 And if the
defendant is successful, the burden of disproving the justification

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7 Id. (cleaned up).

8 Id. (cleaned up).

9 State v. Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶ 11, 395 P.3d 92 (cleaned up).

10 UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(a)–(c)(i); see also supra ¶ 27.

11 UTAH CODE Id. § 76-2-309(3)(a).

12 Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b)–(c).

13 Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b).

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concurring in the judgment

defense “by clear and convincing evidence” shifts to the State—
with dismissal as the sole remedy if the State fails.14
¶60 So what constitutes a “prima facie claim”? Jennings and
the State both argue that a proffer alone is enough, but neither party
offers a clear description of the “proffer” procedure for which they
advocate. Instead, the parties seem to use the term somewhat
interchangeably with “allege” and the State invites us to analogize
to the federal civil pleading standard.15 The majority, like the
district court, rejects this reading, holding that Jennings was
required to introduce evidence.16
¶61 The majority primarily looks to the statutory directive that,
after receiving a defendant’s motion, “the court shall hear evidence
on the issue of justification . . . and shall determine as a matter of
fact and law whether the defendant was justified.”17 The majority
argues, in essence, that because this is an evidentiary hearing, the
legislature intended to import a set of default rules for evidentiary
hearings, including placing a particular burden of production on
the moving party.18
¶62 I believe that approach oversimplifies the analysis. The
moving party usually goes first because they bear the burden of
proof.19 And no one disputes that the burden to disprove

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14 Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b)–(c)(i).

15 See Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting

that a federal civil complaint must “sufficiently allege[] facts
supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to
relief under the legal theory proposed”(cleaned up)).
16 Supra ¶ 36.

17 UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(a) (emphasis added); supra ¶ 28.

18 See supra ¶¶ 28–32.

19 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2022 UT 13, ¶ 35, 513 P.3d 629
(outlining a defendant’s limited burden of proof before the burden
shifts to the State in a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing);
State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, ¶¶ 16–17, 994 P.2d 1237 (outlining the
elements the moving party must demonstrate in an evidentiary
hearing on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence); Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983)
(continued . . .)

17
STATE v. JENNINGS
DURRANT, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment

justification falls on the State in the pretrial justification context.20
Against that backdrop, the majority’s approach sheds little light on
what burden of production the legislature intended to impose by
requiring the defendant to first “make[] a prima facie claim of
justification.”21
¶63 Admittedly, the Pretrial Justification Statute is not a model
of clarity. And I acknowledge the intuitive appeal of the majority’s
reading, which does find some support in the statute. For example,
the statute says that the State’s burden kicks in “[a]t the pretrial
justification hearing, after the defendant makes a prima facie claim
of justification.”22 It seems odd to suggest that the defendant must
make a claim at the hearing if defendants could do their part solely
by filing a motion proffering facts that prove justification.23 But
despite this confusing statutory language, I believe the broader
context of the pretrial justification process and the parties’
corresponding burdens at trial support the conclusion that a
defendant may make a prima facie claim based on a proffer alone.
¶64 The statute requires the State to disprove justification by
clear and convincing evidence at the hearing, but it mentions no
particular standard of proof for the defendant.24 That suggests the
defendant has no obligation to introduce evidence. 25 I agree with
the majority that there is some obligation on the defendant. Our
disagreement is narrow, limited to what quantum of proof is
required to meet the defendant’s burden of production.
¶65 The term “prima facie claim” seems to indicate that the
defendant’s burden is something less than introducing evidence.
We noted in State v. Clara that the Pretrial Justification Statute “does

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(describing the burden on the movant for a preliminary injunction
to introduce evidence showing irreparable injury).
20 See UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(b).

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id. § 76-2-309(3)(a)–(b).

24 Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b).

25 See id.

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concurring in the judgment

not define ‘prima facie [claim].’”26 But we noted that “prima facie”
generally means “sufficient to establish a fact or raise a
presumption unless disproved or rebutted; based on what seems to
be true on first examination, even though it may later be proved to
be untrue.”27 Black’s Law Dictionary further defines a “claim” first
as “[a] statement that something yet to be proved is true.”28 Taken
together, those definitions sound like allegations that have not yet
been tested—akin to allegations in a civil complaint, which need
not cite specific evidence.29 Relatedly, when a party has failed to
allege sufficient facts in their complaint to support relief, we say
that they have “fail[ed] to state a claim.”30
¶66 Contrasting the term “prima facie claim” to the procedure
at trial is also informative. At trial, “when there is a basis in the
evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or
by the defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for
the jury to conclude” that the defendant acted in self-defense, the
defendant is entitled to a self-defense jury instruction, and the State
has the burden to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt.31 Thus a defendant may prevail at trial without introducing
any evidence of self-defense.32 The statutory language does not

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26 2024 UT 10, ¶ 33, 546 P.3d 963.

27Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Prima Facie (adj.), BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)).
28 Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).

29 See generally UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a); 1600 Barberry Lane 8 LLC v.

Cottonwood Residential O.P. LP, 2021 UT 15, ¶ 43, 493 P.3d 580.
30 UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (emphasis added); see also Am. W. Bank

Members, L.C. v. State, 2014 UT 49, ¶ 40, 342 P.3d 224 (“[When]
essential elements [we]re set forth nowhere in the complaint[,] . . .
th[e] claim was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.”).
31 State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985). Notably, Knoll did

not address Utah Code sections 76-1-502 and -504, nor have the
parties discussed those provisions. But those provisions could raise
a question as to the respective burdens at trial. See State v. Drej, 2010
UT 35, ¶ 15, 233 P.3d 476.
32 See Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214.

19
STATE v. JENNINGS
DURRANT, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment

indicate that the legislature intended to reverse that burden in the
pretrial justification context.
¶67 The term “prima facie claim” appears nowhere else in the
Utah Code. The term “prima facie evidence,” however, appears
dozens of times.33 And the term has a clear definition in our
caselaw: “that quantum of evidence that suffices for proof of a
particular fact until the fact is contradicted by other evidence.”34
Admittedly, our caselaw has used the terms “prima facie
evidence,” “prima facie claim,” “prima facie showing,” and “prima
facie case” apparently interchangeably to describe both pleading
and evidentiary burdens at multiple stages of litigation.35 But the

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33 See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 8-5-3; id. § 59-1-302(7)(b); id.
§ 67-4a-1005(1); id. § 70A-1a-307; id.§ 76-6-402(1).
34 Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998)(cleaned up)

(quoting Prima Facie Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990)); cf. Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024)
(defining “prima facie evidence” is “[e]vidence that will establish a
fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is
produced”).
35 See, e.g., Searle v. Milburn Irrigation. Co., 2006 UT 16, ¶¶ 51–52,

133 P.3d 382 (noting that “a prima facie showing is made by
successfully producing enough evidence to survive a motion to
dismiss and to send the matter to the jury” and relying on Johnson
v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 311 (Utah 1983), and Godesky v. Provo City Corp.,
690 P.2d 541, 547 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added)); Johnson, 666 P.2d
at 309–11 (rejecting plaintiff’s appeal of district court’s granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to “ma[k]e out a prima facie case”
(emphasis added)); Godesky, 690 P.2d at 547 (defining “prima facie
evidence” as “the minimum quantum of evidence necessary for a
party to prevail” in a jury trial “if the evidence remains unrebutted”
(emphasis added)); United Park City Mines Co. v. Est. of Clegg, 737
P.2d 173, 177 (Utah 1987) (affirming grant of a directed verdict
motion when plaintiffs failed to “establish[] a prima facie claim” of
adverse possession (emphasis added)).

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legislature has not. I believe we should give meaning to the
legislature’s intentional use of a different term here.36
¶68 Comparing the Pretrial Justification Statute to the
entrapment statute, which sets up a similar framework for raising
the entrapment defense, is also helpful.37 Utah Code section
76-2-303 allows defendants to challenge many criminal charges
before trial on the grounds of entrapment, as follows:
Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall
hear evidence on the issue [of entrapment] and shall
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. . . .
Should the court determine that the defendant was
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice,
but if the court determines the defendant was not
entrapped, such issue may be presented by the
defendant to the jury at trial.38
Like the Pretrial Justification Statute, the entrapment statute allows
a defendant to file a motion asserting an affirmative defense, after
which the court holds an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the
defense applies.39 But unlike the Pretrial Justification Statute, the
entrapment statute does not lay the burden of proof on either party
or mention a “prima facie claim.”40

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36 See State v. Sanders, 2019 UT 25, ¶ 17, 445 P.3d 453. My
colleagues in the majority also evaluate the word “claim.” See supra
¶¶ 33–36. While the word “claim” may have nuanced meanings in
different settings, and in certain contexts a party must present
prima facie evidence to support a given claim, see id., the legislature
intentionally chose the term “prima facie claim” and we must do
our best to interpret it in this context—a pretrial justification
hearing.
37 Compare UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3) (Pretrial Justification
Statute), with id. § 76-2-303(4)–(6) (entrapment statute).
38 Id. § 76-2-303(4)–(5).

39 Id. § 76-2-303(4)

40 Compare id. § 76-2-309(3), with id. § 76-2-303(4)–(5).

21
STATE v. JENNINGS
DURRANT, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment

¶69 This court has long interpreted the entrapment statute as
allowing dismissal only if the defendant was entrapped as a matter
of law—that is, that “reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence
should necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s
guilt.”41 We have said that “a defendant may assert [an
entrapment] claim by filing a written motion before trial that
identifies the evidentiary foundation for the claim.”42 And ultimately,
we have held the defendant responsible for proving entrapment at
the pretrial hearing, rather than placing the burden on the State to
disprove it.43
¶70 But the Pretrial Justification Statute is different.44 The
defendant has no obligation to make a “showing” of justification.45
Rather, the burden is on the State to show that the defendant was
not justified by clear and convincing evidence.46 Though the State’s
burden of proof is lower than at trial, the tables are turned from the
presumption that a defendant was not entrapped unless every
reasonable juror would find him to be so.47 And a defendant’s
obligation is expressly limited to making “a prima facie claim.”48
Where the legislature has laid out different rules in these two
analogous contexts, I would interpret the Pretrial Justification
Statute to give meaning to those differences.49

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41 State v. Smith, 2024 UT 13, ¶ 35, 548 P.3d 874 (cleaned up); see

also State v. Pappas, 588 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1978).
42 Smith, 2024 UT 13, ¶ 35 (cleaned up) (emphasis added).

43 Id. (holding that “[t]he bar for [an entrapment] motion is high”

and putting the onus on the defendant to make a “showing” of
entrapment as a matter of law).
44 See generally UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3).

45 See Smith, 2024 UT 13, ¶ 35.

46 UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(b)–(c)(i).

47 Compare id., with Smith, 2024 UT 13, ¶ 35.

48 UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(b).

49 See Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶ 11 (“We . . . interpret [a statute’s]

provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters . . . .” (cleaned up)); Jensen v. Intermountain
(continued . . .)

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concurring in the judgment

¶71 Against this statutory backdrop, I would hold that a prima
facie claim requires something less than the introduction of
evidence. Having reached that threshold conclusion, I further
conclude that the legislature intended a defendant to be able to
make a prima facie claim of justification by proffer. Though the
term is used in various contexts, generally a proffer is a procedural
mechanism by which parties may tell the court what their evidence
would show were it admitted.50 The defendant must make a proffer
of specific, known facts supporting each element of the asserted
justification defense before the burden shifts to the State to
disprove the justification defense by clear and convincing evidence.
This approach would balance the statutory directives with the need
for particular judicial factfinding in this pretrial proceeding.
¶72 In the pretrial justification process, the defendant—the one
who allegedly used force—is best positioned to provide the facts
underlying the justification claim. In many cases, the defendant
alone has firsthand knowledge of the circumstances that led to the
use of force. It is therefore reasonable to expect the defendant to
provide more than conclusory allegations asserting justification. As
the State points out, it “needs reasonable notice of what it must
disprove” in the second stage of the hearing. In that stage, the State
“has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant’s use or threatened use of force was not justified.”51 The
State cannot meet that burden if the defendant has not articulated

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Healthcare, Inc., 2018 UT 27, ¶ 25, 424 P.3d 885 (“We . . . sometimes
find that the use of a term elsewhere shows that the Legislature
knows how to use those terms, and would have used them again if
it intended the same effect.”).
50 See 23A C.J.S. Criminal Procedure & Rights of Accused § 1693

(2025) (“An ‘offer of proof’ is generally described as allegations by
an attorney to the court of what that attorney expects to prove
through certain evidence.”); see also State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶ 36,
25 P.3d 985 (“A proffer is a mechanism by which a party may create
an appellate record of what the evidence would have shown.”);
State v. Richardson, 2013 UT 50, ¶¶ 14, 21, 308 P.3d 526 (noting that
a defendant proffered a description of specific acts evidence to
allow the court to determine admissibility under rule 412 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence).
51 UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(b).

23
STATE v. JENNINGS
DURRANT, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment

any theory of how and why the use of force was justified. Without
those facts, the State is left in an impossible position when trying to
rebut the justification claim.
¶73 And the definitions of “prima facie” and “claim” both
center around asserting facts that are facially sufficient to establish
something, even though they have not yet been proven.52 While
allegations in a civil complaint may be based on good faith beliefs,53
I would hold that to make a prima facie claim of justification in the
pretrial context, a defendant must do slightly more, namely to base
their proffer in their own actual knowledge of facts that would be
borne out in evidence were they required to present it. I do not
adopt the standard of the majority that is still a low standard but
requires some evidence, akin to the directed verdict standard.54 I
believe that in a pretrial justification hearing, a defendant need not
introduce evidence—let alone prove anything. But I do not believe
the legislature intended the pretrial justification hearing to be a
venue for unfounded claims of justification, which would deplete
court resources by placing on the State the onerous burden of
disproving these affirmative defenses not once but twice.
¶74 And the defendant’s proffered facts would need to be
specific enough that, if taken as true, they “establish a fact or raise

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52 See Prima Facie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024);
Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
53 See UTAH R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (“By presenting a pleading,
written motion, or other paper to the court . . . an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances, . . . the allegations and other
factual contentions have evidentiary support or . . . are likely to
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.”).
54 Supra ¶ 37 (“This is similar to what is required to survive a

motion for a directed verdict at trial. . . . ‘Where there is any
evidence that raises a question of material fact, no matter how
improbable the evidence may appear,’ a directed verdict is
improper.” (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 34,
546 P.3d 963)).

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a presumption.”55 Taken together, the proffer must plausibly make
a claim for justification that appears true at first glance.56 A mere
statement that “I acted in self-defense” would not be enough.
Neither would a mere recitation of the elements.
¶75 In sum, though I would hold that, under the Pretrial
Justification Statute, a defendant need not put on evidence to make
a prima facie claim, I read the statute as requiring the defendant to
proffer specific, known facts to support each element of the
asserted justification defense. That proffer would be enough to shift
the burden to the State and trigger the second phase of the
hearing.57
¶76 The majority suggests that this reading of “prima facie
claim” would render the second stage of the hearing “difficult” or
even “unworkable.”58 Whether or not this is the case, the court’s
role is to give effect to the legislative language even if we think the
resulting policy unwise or confusing.59 Still, the second stage of the
hearing may not be so unworkable under this reading as the
majority perceives.
¶77 In the trial context, the State bears the burden to disprove
justification only if something in the evidence first raises the issue
of justification.60 The pretrial hearing context is different because
the burden to disprove justification arises based on the defendant’s
prima facie claim—which I would hold does not require the

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55 Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 33 (quoting Prima Facie (adj.), BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)).
56 See id.

57 UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(b).

58 Supra ¶ 39.

59 See Cox v. Laycock, 2015 UT 20, ¶ 72, 345 P.3d 689 (Lee., J.,

concurring in part) (“[W]e must not override the statutory text with
our sense of good policy in a case in which we deem the statute’s
formulation merely unwise or incongruous.”); Strohm v. ClearOne
Commc’ns., Inc., 2013 UT 21, ¶ 32, 308 P.3d 424 (“The text of [the
statute] is the governing public policy in this area. . . . By applying
the statute as written, we remain faithful to the public policy
embraced by the legislature.”).
60 See Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214; Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 15.

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DURRANT, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment

defendant to introduce evidence. But the requirement that the
prima facie claim, made by proffer, include “specific, known facts
that support each element of the asserted justification defense” 61
means the State would be apprised of the defendant’s theory of the
case before it puts on its evidence. Given the State’s burden to
disprove the justification claim, the State would not be able to
prevail at a pretrial justification hearing merely by proving the
elements of the underlying crime. Rather, it would need to provide
evidence disproving at least one element of the asserted defense by
clear and convincing evidence. As at trial, the defendant could
prevail without introducing evidence, but in many cases would
desire to introduce evidence of the claimed justification defense to
support the court in finding justification “as a matter of fact and
law.”62
¶78 Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the
Pretrial Justification Statute requires a defendant to introduce
evidence to make a prima facie claim of justification, I dissent from
Part I of the majority’s opinion. But I join the court’s analysis in Part
II and concur in the conclusion that Jennings failed to make a prima
facie claim in this case.

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61 Supra ¶ 57.

62 See UTAH CODE § 76-2-309(3)(a).

26