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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Red Roof Inns, Inc.; Red Roof Franchising, LLC; Sandra Wunderlich; And Stephanie Rzepka v. Jane Doe, as Parent and Next Friend of Jane Doe, a Minor; Sai Lodging, Inc., D/B/A Red Roof Inn; Batesville Lodging Group, Inc.; Rajendra Patel; Roshni Patel; John Does 1-4; And John Doe Entities 1-2

Supreme Court of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. 50

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.5K)

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 50
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-25-569

Opinion Delivered: March 12, 2026

RED ROOF INNS, INC.; RED ROOF
FRANCHISING, LLC; SANDRA
WUNDERLICH; AND STEPHANIE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
RZEPKA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLANTS [NO. 60CV-24-1541]

V. HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS
FOX, JUDGE
JANE DOE, AS PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF JANE DOE, A MINOR;
SAI LODGING, INC., D/B/A RED REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ROOF INN; BATESVILLE LODGING
GROUP, INC.; RAJENDRA PATEL;
AND ROSHNI PATEL; JOHN DOES
1–4; AND JOHN DOE ENTITIES 1–2
APPELLEES

KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice

Appellants Red Roof Inns, Inc., and Red Roof Franchising, LLC (“RRI”), filed this

interlocutory appeal from the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s orders denying out-of-state

attorneys’ pro hac vice petitions and subsequent motions for reconsideration. On appeal,

RRI argues that the circuit court erred and abused its discretion in denying attorneys

Stephanie A. Rzepka and Sandra J. Wunderlich pro hac vice admission. Appellees did not

file a responsive brief. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

On February 21, 2024, appellee Jane Doe filed the underlying complaint in the

Pulaski County Circuit Court alleging sex trafficking of a minor at a Red Roof Inn located
in North Little Rock, Arkansas. On May 30, 2025, Jane Doe filed her second amended

complaint adding Red Roof Inns, Inc., and Red Roof Franchising, LLC, as defendants. On

July 11, RRI filed its answer and cross-claim, which was signed solely by Arkansas counsel

Jane A. Kim of Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP. In addition, the pleading listed three out-

of-state attorneys with the firm Tucker Ellis LLP, including Rzepka and Wunderlich. 1 The

out-of-state attorneys did not sign the pleading and there is a notation after each name

clearly stating “(motion for pro hac vice admission forthcoming).”

On July 29, RRI filed pro hac vice petitions for Rzepka and Wunderlich. Attached

to the petitions were the affidavits of the attorneys seeking admission, proofs of payment of

the nonresident attorney fee, and affidavits of Arkansas counsel, Jane Kim. On August 6,

the circuit court denied both petitions, reasoning that the nonresident attorneys “appeared

on pleadings prior to filing the above petition to appear pro hac.”

On August 15, RRI filed a motion for reconsideration along with briefing and an

affidavit. RRI explained that, in 2023, RRI retained the law firm of Tucker Ellis LLP, and

specifically, Wunderlich, to serve as national coordinating counsel in defense of sex-

trafficking litigation filed in multiple jurisdictions.2 RRI stated that Wunderlich “developed

a deep knowledge of [RRI], their corporate structure and history, their employees, potential

witnesses, as well as sources of documents and information.” RRI explained that it utilized

the national counsel role to maintain consistency and efficiency across the litigation based

1
Chelsea Mikula was one of the three out-of-state attorneys listed, but a petition for
pro hac vice for Mikula has not been filed.
2
RRI noted that while not lead counsel, Rzepka is also an important part of the team
representing RRI.
2
on counsel’s preexisting knowledge base. Tucker Ellis LLP, recognizing the need for local

counsel to advise on the rules and procedures particular to Arkansas law, contacted Jane Kim

to serve as local counsel. RRI explained that Kim is the only attorney of record for RRI

and has been the signatory on all pleadings. Kim included Rzepka’s and Wunderlich’s names

and contact information as a courtesy, and it was not intended to be an appearance or

constitute a signature of the pleading. RRI requested that the circuit court reconsider its

orders denying the pro hac vice petitions because none of the enumerated bases for denial

of pro hac vice admission under Rule XIV of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar

are present in this case, and the circumstances do not warrant the drastic measure of

prohibiting RRI from using counsel of its choice. On August 19, the circuit court denied

the motion for reconsideration, and RRI timely appealed. On September 26, RRI filed an

unopposed motion to stay the circuit court proceedings and to expedite the appeal. On

November 6, we granted the motion to stay pending appeal but denied the motion to

expedite the appeal.

I. Point on Appeal

On appeal, RRI argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying

attorneys Rzepka and Wunderlich pro hac vice admission based on the inclusion of the

attorneys’ names under Arkansas counsel’s signature block. As an initial matter, we must first

determine whether we have jurisdiction over the present interlocutory appeal. RRI argues

that the denial of pro hac vice admission is the equivalent of an order disqualifying counsel,

which is immediately appealable. See Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(8) (stating that an appeal

may be taken from the circuit court to the supreme court from an order that disqualifies an

attorney from further participation in the case). In Herron v. Jones, we held that
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disqualification orders are immediately appealable because “if the order of disqualification is

not appealable the litigant will be compelled to employ other counsel and to submit to a

useless trial before he learns by appeal that the disqualification order was wrong and he is

entitled to start all over again.” 276 Ark. 493, 495–96, 637 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1982). RRI

argues that the same is true of an order denying pro hac vice admission. We agree. As we

explained in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas,

“[d]isqualification” is defined as “[s]omething . . . that prevents a lawyer from representing

a party.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

(11th ed. 2014) (“disqualify” means to “deprive of a power, right, or privilege”). 2022 Ark.

146, at 4, 646 S.W.3d 361, 364. Similarly, here, the circuit court’s orders denying attorneys

Rzepka’s and Wunderlich’s pro hac vice petitions clearly prevented them from representing

RRI and therefore deprived RRI of representation of its choice. Accordingly, we hold that

the orders at issue here are immediately appealable pursuant to Rule 2(a)(8).

A circuit court’s ruling on an attorney’s motion for admission to practice pro hac

vice is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Tobacco Superstore, Inc. v. Darrough,

362 Ark. 103, 109, 207 S.W.3d 511, 514 (2005). An abuse of discretion occurs when the

circuit court exercises its discretion thoughtlessly and without due consideration. Travelers

Indem. Co., 2022 Ark. 146, at 5, 646 S.W.3d at 364. We have also held that an abuse of

discretion may be manifested by an erroneous interpretation of the law. Id. This court has

stated that disqualification of an attorney is a drastic measure that should be imposed only

when clearly required by the circumstances. Id.

RRI argues that the circuit court’s ruling misapplied that standard for pro hac vice

admission, disregarded the narrow grounds for denial, and conflated benign counsel
4
identification with impermissible participation. RRI cites Rule XIV of the Rules

Governing Admission to the Bar, which governs the admission of attorneys to practice pro

hac vice. RRI argues that Rule XIV limits judicial discretion to deny pro hac vice admission

to specific grounds—repeated appearances within a year, lack of local counsel,

noncompliance with application requirements, or professional misconduct. See Ark. Bar.

Adm. R. XIV(e), (f). However, RRI argues that nothing in this rule prohibits a nonresident

attorney from including his or her name below Arkansas counsel’s signature block—

identifying the attorney’s out-of-state status and stating that a pro hac vice motion will be

filed—nor does it treat that listing as an “appearance” or the unauthorized practice of law.

Next, RRI addresses the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct and argues that

these rules likewise do not provide a basis for the circuit court’s ruling. Rule 5.5 prohibits

the unauthorized practice of law and practicing in a jurisdiction in violation of that

jurisdiction’s regulation of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 5.5(b) provides as follows:

A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:

(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or
other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the
practice of law; or

(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is
admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 5.5(b). RRI correctly points out that Rule 5.5(b) does not include

listing a nonresident attorney on a pleading as the unauthorized practice of law, especially

here, where the pleading made clear that Rzepka and Wunderlich (1) were admitted in

Missouri and Texas, respectively—not Arkansas; and (2) the petitions for pro hac vice were

“forthcoming.”

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Further, RRI argues that neither the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure nor the

Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Orders support the circuit court’s decision. For

example, Rule 11 requires that all filings be signed by an attorney of record, but the rule

does not prohibit identifying associated counsel who are not yet admitted, provided that an

Arkansas-licensed attorney signs and assumes responsibility for the filing. See Ark. R. Civ.

P. 11(a) (stating that “every pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party represented

by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his or her individual

name”). Again, RRI argues that nothing in Rule 11 bars listing a nonresident attorney

below Arkansas counsel’s signature block when their out-of-state status and intent to seek

pro hac vice admission are noted. Further, RRI cites Administrative Order No. 21, which

governs electronic filing and signature procedures. RRI notes that while it mandates an

electronic signature, it does not forbid listing a nonresident counsel along with the admitted

counsel who sign.

Next, relying on Travelers, supra, RRI argues that this court has made clear that

adverse pro hac vice decisions must be grounded in legitimate, rule-based reasons, and courts

cannot transform minimal filing issues into grounds for the denial of a pro hac vice motion

or disqualification. While we recognize that Travelers concerned the revocation of pro hac

vice admission, it is helpful to our analysis of the present case. In Travelers, we held that the

circuit court abused its discretion in revoking a nonresident attorney’s pro hac vice

admission on the basis that Travelers’ motion contained external hyperlinks to websites in

violation of Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 21. We explained that

“[w]hile the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct are applicable in disqualification

proceedings, a violation of the rules does not automatically compel disqualification; rather,
6
such matters involve the exercise of judicial discretion.” Travelers, 2022 Ark. 146, at 5, 646

S.W.3d at 364. In holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by revoking the

nonresident attorney’s pro hac vice admission, we explained:

The circuit court did not find that [the nonresident attorney] had committed
any violation of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct. Instead, the
circuit court, without giving notice to appellants or an opportunity for them
to be heard, summarily concluded that the failure to comply with an
electronic-filing provision warranted the disqualification of [the nonresident
attorney] simply because he was listed as one of the signors of the motion.
This ruling was a drastic measure that does not comport with the provisions
in Rule XIV(g) regarding revocation of a nonresident attorney’s admission.

2022 Ark. 146, at 7, 646 S.W.3d at 365. As in Travelers, the decision here to deny pro hac

vice admission was not supported by our rules and was drastic in nature.

Accordingly, we hold that the above-cited authority does not prohibit listing the

names of nonresident attorneys beneath Arkansas counsel’s signature block—particularly,

here, where Rzepka’s and Wunderlich’s out-of-state status and forthcoming pro hac vice

motions were clearly noted. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion

by denying pro hac vice admission on that basis.

Reversed and remanded.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Michael A. Thompson and Jane A. Kim, for

appellant.

One brief only.

7