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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. / E. S.

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 555
• Docket Number: A187442
• Judges: Ortega

• Disposition: Affirmed.

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.9K)

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Disposition

Affirmed.

Combined Opinion

                        by [Darleen Ortega](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8195/darleen-ortega/)

No. 175 March 11, 2026 555

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of M. M. J.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
J. J.,
Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
24JU03926; A187442 (Control)
In the Matter of M. M. J.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
E. S.,
Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
24JU03925; A187985

Courtland Geyer, Judge.
Submitted December 17, 2025.
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appel-
lant J. J.
G. Aron Perez-Selsky and J. Peter Druckenmiller filed
the brief for appellant E. S.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Erica L. Herb,
Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
556 Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. / E. S.

ORTEGA, P. J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 347 Or App 555 (2026) 557

ORTEGA, P. J.
Father and mother appeal judgments terminating
their parental rights to their child, M, who was five years old
at the time of the termination of parental rights trial. Father
makes several challenges to the juvenile court’s rulings that
he was unfit under ORS 419B.504 and that terminating his
parental rights was in M’s best interests. Similarly, mother
asserts that the court erred in terminating her parental
rights as to M. On de novo review, we conclude that the
Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) established
unfitness as to both parents and neglect as to mother by
clear and convincing evidence and, further, that termina-
tion is in M’s best interests. Therefore, we affirm.
“We review the record in proceedings for termina-
tion of parental rights de novo, ORS 19.415(3)(a), and deter-
mine anew whether to terminate parental rights.” Dept. of
Human Services v. J. M.-A., 333 Or App 334, 336, 554 P3d
263 (2024).
A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental
rights based on unfitness, ORS 419B.504, if it determines
“by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit by
reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the
child or ward and integration of the child or ward into the
home of the parent or parents is improbable within a reason-
able time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.”
Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. K., 270 Or App 1, 16, 346
P3d 1254, rev den, 357 Or 324, cert den, 577 US 944, 136 S
Ct 371, 193 L Ed 2d 300 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted); ORS 419B.521(1) (“The facts on the basis of which
the rights of the parents are terminated, unless admitted,
must be established by clear and convincing evidence * * *.”).
To determine whether a parent is unfit, the court
must first determine whether “the parent has engaged in
conduct or is characterized by a condition that is seriously
detrimental to the child.” Dept. of Human Services v. R. K.,
271 Or App 83, 88, 351 P3d 68, rev den, 357 Or 640 (2015). At
the second step, the court must determine whether “integra-
tion of the child into the parent’s care is improbable within
a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to
558 Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. / E. S.

change.” Id. Both the “serious detriment” and “reasonable
time” inquiries are specific to each child and require evidence
“in psychological and developmental terms” regarding the
particular child’s needs. Dept. of Human Services v. T. M. M.,
248 Or App 352, 366-67, 273 P3d 322, rev den, 352 Or 170
(2012); Dept. of Human Services v. A. L. M. / J. T. C., 242 Or
App 625, 635, 259 P3d 17, rev den, 350 Or 716 (2011) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “a parent’s fitness
must be measured at the time of the parental rights termina-
tion trial.” State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Simmons,
342 Or 76, 96, 149 P3d 1124 (2006) (emphasis in original).
In addition to unfitness, the juvenile court may
terminate a parent’s rights on the ground of neglect. The
statute allows for termination “if the court finds that the
parent * * * ha[s] failed or neglected without reasonable and
lawful cause to provide for the basic physical and psycholog-
ical needs of the child or ward for six months prior to the fil-
ing of a petition.” ORS 419B.506. As relevant here, a parent
neglects a child when the parent, without justifiable excuse,
fails, for the six months prior to the filing of the petition, to
maintain visitation or contact with the child, to communi-
cate with the child, or to communicate with the child’s cus-
todian. ORS 419B.506(1) - (3); State ex rel Dept. of Human
Services v. Squiers, 203 Or App 774, 788-89, 126 P3d 758
(2006). ODHS filed its petition to terminate mother’s rights
on August 2, 2024, so the relevant period is February 2024
to the end of July 2024.
Even if the court determines that one or more statu-
tory grounds for termination are proved, the court may only
terminate the parent’s parental rights upon concluding that
clear and convincing evidence also establishes that termina-
tion is in the particular child’s best interests. ORS 419B.500;
Dept. of Human Services v. D. E. P., 315 Or App 566, 570, 502
P3d 764 (2021). That determination involves considerations
of such factors as “(1) the strength of the bond between the
parent and child; (2) whether severing that bond will help or
harm the child; (3) the benefits to the child of terminating
parental rights; and (4) the risk of harm to the child posed
by termination.” Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. B., 321 Or
App 50, 53, 515 P3d 927 (2022).
Cite as 347 Or App 555 (2026) 559

We recount the evidence pertinent to those inqui-
ries. The juvenile court took jurisdiction over M in January
2023 when he was two years old over concerns that father’s
untreated mental health issues and mother’s substance use,
as well as both parents’ residential instability, interfere with
their ability to safely parent M. M has been with the same
resource parent since he was removed from father’s custody
in August 2022, except for a few months in 2023.
Before the juvenile court pursued jurisdiction over
M, mother had already moved to Colorado and had no con-
tact with M for about a year. During the life of the depen-
dency case, mother visited Oregon twice for a couple months
at a time to try to establish a bond with M. During the first
visit, she failed to make any visits with M, but she was able
to visit with M twice during her visit in 2024. While moth-
er’s visits with M were calm and uneventful, M did not show
signs that he understood that she was his mother; according
to the resource parent, he describes her as daddy’s mom.
Mother testified that while she wanted custody of M, it
would be in his best interest to stay in his current placement
because “it’s just been too long.” In addition, while mother
claimed she had been sober for five months at the time of
the termination trial, she had not completed any services
recommended by ODHS to ameliorate the conditions or cir-
cumstances that led to jurisdiction.
Father, on the other hand, actively engaged with
ODHS, participating in visits with M and some recom-
mended services. Despite his own distrust of the process,
which he attributed in part to his own childhood experienc-
es,1 father showed substantial dedication to M. It is appar-
ent on this record that father loves M, and that M continues
to have an emotional attachment to father.
Father was diagnosed with bipolar disorder at a
young age and received medication for it; he described tak-
ing medications for his mental health as being “drugged.”
His adoptive mother testified that father’s bipolar disorder
was “very manageable” while he was consistently taking
medication. However, he stopped taking medication at age
1
Father was adopted at age six from foster care and has described the expe-
rience and his childhood as abusive.
560 Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. / E. S.

18 and has stated repeatedly that he disputes the diagnosis
of bipolar disorder. According to his adoptive mother, father
became more aggressive after he stopped taking his medica-
tion, had more angry outbursts, and had trouble maintain-
ing employment. His adoptive parents asked him to leave
their house after an incident in which he shoved his adop-
tive mother, and his relationship with them is, in his adop-
tive mother’s words, “not a good relationship.”
Dr. Guastadisegni psychologically evaluated father
in the course of these proceedings and diagnosed him with
bipolar I with mixed features and mood congruent psychotic
features; unspecified anxiety disorder; attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder; and excoriation disorder, which is
a skin picking disorder. Father also has features of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Guastadisegni also
opined that a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, schizo-
phrenia, and delusional disorder needed to be ruled out.
During his evaluation, father presented in a “hyperverbal
manner,” as he also did during his trial testimony and in
various other contexts. He spoke insistently about violations
of his rights and expressed convoluted theories about who
was responsible. Guastadisegni found that when father dis-
cussed those topics, he presented as “irrational, illogical,
if not delusional.” Such communication by father occurred
during his interaction with caseworkers, treatment provid-
ers, and during his trial testimony.
Father believes that he was misdiagnosed and
improperly treated with medication and therapy as a child.
Guastadisegni concluded that father suffers from chronic
mental health issues that stem from childhood and that
since discontinuing medication, father has “never func-
tioned independently with any consistency.” He observed
that father has “flight of ideas and racing thoughts,” and
has delusional beliefs surrounding his birth certificate, the
government, sovereignty, and citizenship. Guastadisegni
recommended that father be referred to a psychiatrist to be
prescribed medication and that his treatment should include
education to help father understand the cycles of bipolar
disorder. He also recommended education for father’s “delu-
sional and irrational thinking regarding the government
Cite as 347 Or App 555 (2026) 561

and his sovereign rights” because “they lead to aggressive
interactions and unusual behaviors.” Father also needs to
work with a parent trainer to understand M’s developmen-
tal needs.
Father made several threatening phone calls to
Guastadisegni following the evaluation and maintained at
trial that the diagnosis of bipolar I is “wrongful.” He acknowl-
edges that he suffers from PTSD due to all the trauma
inflicted on him by violations of his rights and acknowledges
that he sometimes reacts in anger, including in front of M,
but believes his reactions are justified and denies that M is
harmed by witnessing angry interactions between him and
ODHS staff.
Father acknowledged at trial that, to regain cus-
tody of M, he needs to “see a psychiatrist and deal with
medication management.” However, he claims that despite
his efforts, he has not been able to find someone who will
provide such treatment to him.
Father has been working with the same ODHS case-
worker, Davis, throughout the life of the case, and Davis has
made steadfast efforts to assist father. Although father was
ordered to follow up with the treatment recommended by
his psychological evaluation, he refused Davis’s numerous
offers of help to connect him with a psychiatrist and assist
him with transportation, communicating in an email, “I told
you I don’t need your help to schedule or do anything for my
mental or physical health.” Case planning with father was
also difficult because conversations with him were gener-
ally one-sided and unproductive. Father calls and sends text
messages to Davis 20 to 30 times a day, expressing griev-
ances about violations of his rights and threatening to sue
Davis. Davis has made an effort to stay engaged whenever
possible, though often he can do little more than listen to
father for 45 or 60 minutes or, in at least one case, for three
hours.
Father’s testimony about his efforts to work with
treatment providers was inconsistent with Davis’s own
understanding of what was available to him and occurred
despite father’s refusals of help from Davis. Father did
562 Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. / E. S.

participate in remote talk therapy sessions with Melissa
Nelson, a behavioral health therapist, for four months with-
out reporting those efforts to Davis and testified that he
found those sessions “very helpful,” though Nelson reported
similar dysregulated interactions with father.2 Nelson diag-
nosed father with complex PTSD (CPTSD) and believes
that father needs to see a psychologist or psychiatrist in an
office setting so that a person can take his vitals and man-
age medication for him. In the four months that she treated
him, Nelson did not make much progress in helping father
regulate his emotional response. She explained that, with a
diagnosis of CPTSD, it can take a year or more for a person’s
dysregulation to be controlled, and until then, the person
will show symptoms of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
Although Nelson’s group provides medication man-
agement and Nelson would have helped father connect to
that service, father abruptly ended their relationship in a
text that led Nelson to believe that father had been ordered
to work with a psychiatrist. Nelson believed that, without
medication management and therapy, father’s symptoms of
dysregulation will not go away on their own and that he will
have to actively work to resolve them.
The record contains evidence of many volatile inter-
actions between father and members of the public, court
staff, and ODHS staff. Some of those interactions occurred
in M’s presence and occasionally impacted visits between
father and M, including a period when visits were paused
and then moved to virtual visits.
M was evaluated by Dr. Giesick, who described him
as anxious and ultimately diagnosed him with other speci-
fied anxiety disorder and noted a need to rule out attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum dis-
order, and intellectual disability. M was nonverbal when he
came into care at age 2 and Gieseck believed he has spe-
cial needs that heighten the need for a stable and consis-
tent parent. She acknowledged that a cessation of contact

2
In addition to father’s dysregulations in Nelson’s sessions that made it “very
difficult to get his attention or to break his focus,” Nelson also testified that father
texted her as many as 70 times in a day. She admitted that had they ever met in
person, his “level of dysregulation would have made me feel uncomfortable.”
Cite as 347 Or App 555 (2026) 563

with father would be difficult for M in the short term, but
considers their connection to be tenuous, in part due to M’s
anxiety about father’s unpredictable behavior.
Testimony from M’s resource mother also suggested
a need for a stable caregiver. M requires intervention for
emotional dysregulation and needs lots of cues and repe-
tition to complete daily tasks. He has shown aggression
towards other children and requires cues to use his coping
skills. There have been incidents that required M’s resource
mother to go to the school to help him de-escalate. M has
an individual education program (IEP) at school, and due
to his cognitive delays, will be tested for autism spectrum
disorder.
If father’s rights are terminated, M’s resource
mother, who is prepared to adopt him, would be willing
to allow contact between M and father, if it was safe and
appropriate and done through mediation. She has concerns
about it but would be open to contact if it could be done in a
safe and healthy manner for M. She expressed commitment
to provide M with counseling to assist him with any such
transition.
We proceed to our analysis of the bases for termi-
nation of the rights of the parents, beginning with mother.
The juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights,
determining that she was unfit based on multiple grounds,
including her failure to treat her substance abuse, and fail-
ure to maintain a stable living situation suitable for M. The
trial court also determined that mother had neglected M.
Considering that the evidence demonstrated that mother
moved to Colorado and effectively abandoned M with father,
whom she knew struggled with a serious mental health con-
dition, after which she had little contact with ODHS and
engaged in only two in-person visits with M over the entirety
of the case, ODHS presented clear and convincing evidence
that mother is unfit based on neglect. Because the evidence
showed that mother failed to engage in any alcohol abuse
treatment and did not have a stable residence at the time
of termination, ODHS also presented clear and convincing
evidence that mother is unfit based on her failure to address
her substance abuse and maintain a stable living situation.
564 Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. / E. S.

Considering the length of time that M has been in
substitute care and his special emotional and developmental
needs, and mother’s failure to even begin to take the steps
necessary for M to be integrated into her care, the evidence
demonstrated that M could not be integrated into mother’s
care within a reasonable period of time.
As to the trial court’s determination that mother
neglected M, the evidence established that between February
and August of 2024, mother had two in-person visits with
M in February before she returned to Colorado. After that,
she maintained sporadic contact with ODHS despite having
Davis’s phone number and knowing how to reach him for
the entire pendency of the case. She did not begin virtual
visits with M until November 2024, well after the petition
was filed. She also did not communicate with the new per-
manency worker assigned to the case until November 2024.
That evidence clearly and convincingly established that
mother failed to maintain visitation and contact with M and
failed to communicate with M’s custodian for the six months
prior to the filing of the termination petition. Thus, the evi-
dence established that mother neglected M.
Finally, ODHS presented clear and convincing evi-
dence that it was in M’s best interest to terminate mother’s
parental rights. Mother and M have no bond; he does not even
understand that she is his mother. Mother herself admitted
that it would be traumatic for M to return to her care at
this point because it has been too long and that it is in his
best interests to remain in his current placement, which is
being considered as an adoptive resource. Considering those
facts, and M’s heightened need for stability and consistency,
the benefits of terminating mother’s parental rights far out-
weigh the potential harm.
We proceed to address the case for termination of
father’s parental rights. We again acknowledge at the outset
that father loves M, has remained engaged in the case and
participated in visits, and is motivated to regain custody of
M. However, father’s untreated mental illness continues to
be a serious barrier to his ability to be a safe parent to M and
to access the services that would help him do that. Though he
understands that he must engage in services to resume care
Cite as 347 Or App 555 (2026) 565

of his son, he is not in a state to receive such services and,
indeed, continues to dispute that the services are needed at
all. Most if not all of his interactions with service providers
and others are characterized by an inability to listen and
engage productively, even while his trial testimony suggests
he is making a genuine effort to do so at times.
Father challenges the determination of unfitness
on several grounds, asserting that there is insufficient evi-
dence of lack of effort to adjust his circumstances despite
reasonable agency efforts, that his mental illness renders
him unfit, and that he has failed to present a viable plan for
M’s return to father’s care. We have reviewed the record with
great care and conclude that it provides clear and convinc-
ing evidence to refute all of the bases for reversal asserted
by father. The record leaves no room for doubt that father’s
mental illness is seriously detrimental to M and that father
has not made sufficient efforts to mitigate those concerns
despite extensive ODHS efforts on father’s behalf.
Father demonstrates no insight about the impact
on M of his volatile interactions with others and shows no
concern about how efforts to accommodate father may pres-
ent difficulties for M. As an example, father was unmoved
by the significant additional distances M was required to
travel to accommodate father’s preferences regarding visits
and attributed any problems M was experiencing to actions
of others that he considered wrongful or unjust. The record
demonstrates that father’s mental illness has contributed
to instability in his personal circumstances that would
impact his ability to provide a stable environment for M.
Significantly, father dismissed any concerns about his abil-
ity to work with teachers and treatment providers who may
be working to address problems related to M’s behavior and
his special needs, but father’s history of volatile interactions
with service providers does not provide any basis for believ-
ing such interactions will be productive. Given M’s signif-
icant support needs, father’s inability to act cooperatively
with various providers, and his tendency to act in an unpre-
dictable and volatile manner without regard for its impact
on M, father’s untreated mental illness poses a serious det-
riment to M.
566 Dept. of Human Services v. J. J. / E. S.

The record provides no reason to believe that father
is capable of addressing these unfitness concerns within
a time period that is reasonable for M. Though father has
remained engaged during M’s extended period in substitute
care, and despite efforts that father no doubt experiences as
quite extensive, he has not demonstrated any progress in
addressing his mental illness and the volatility and instabil-
ity that it produces in his interactions with others. Father’s
unfitness is established by clear and convincing evidence on
this record.
The record also establishes that termination of
father’s parental rights is in M’s best interest, though
addressing that question is difficult. We are not inclined to
minimize the importance of the bond between M and father
and have wrestled with our concern regarding the loss that
M will experience if contact is severed. However, the record
does not persuade us that a guardianship is a viable option
in this case. Although father argues that ODHS failed to
establish that a guardianship is not possible, father’s testi-
mony consistently focused on his desire to parent M himself,
and he did not display any willingness or ability to adjust
to circumstances where another caregiver was exercising
primary responsibility for M’s care. Father’s inability to
work with service providers and his insistence that all of
his difficulties are attributable to other people’s failures
make it impossible to imagine him cooperating with such
an arrangement. On this record, clear and convincing evi-
dence establishes that, of the options practically available,
termination of father’s rights is in M’s best interest.
Affirmed.