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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. S. M.

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 668
• Docket Number: A187353
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Lagesen

• Disposition: Reversed.

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed.

Combined Opinion

668 March 11, 2026 No. 184

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of S. M.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
S. M.,
Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
25CC01818; A187353

Jane W. Fox, Judge.
Submitted February 19, 2026.
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the brief for appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Kyleigh Gray,
Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Kamins, Judge.
LAGESEN, C. J.
Reversed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 668 (2026) 669

LAGESEN, C. J.
Appellant appeals a judgment civilly committing
him to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority on the
ground that he has a mental disorder that makes him dan-
gerous to himself.1 He assigns error to the trial court’s
determination that the standard for a civil commitment is
satisfied, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port it. We conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the determination that appellant is a danger to
himself and therefore we reverse.2
Neither party requests de novo review and, as this
is not an “exceptional case[ ],” we decline to exercise our
discretion for de novo review. See ORAP 5.40(8)(c). When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evi-
dence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and determine
whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support civil
commitment. State v. L. R., 283 Or App 618, 619, 391 P3d
880 (2017). “[W]e are bound by the trial court’s findings of
historical fact that are supported by any evidence in the
record.” State v. M. J. F., 306 Or App 544, 545, 473 P3d 1141
(2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Whether the evidence was legally sufficient is a question of
law. State v. A. D. S., 258 Or App 44, 45, 308 P3d 365 (2013).
“Ultimately, in view of the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard of proof that applies in civil commitment proceed-
ings, the question for us as the reviewing court is whether a
rational factfinder could have found that it was highly prob-
able that appellant was a danger to [themself]” as a result of
a mental disorder. State v. S. A. R., 308 Or App 365, 366, 479
P3d 618 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]lear
1
The judgment ordered appellant to be committed to the custody of the
Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days, based on appellant
being a “person with mental illness,” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C) (2023), amended by
Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 5. New civil commitment statutes became operative on
January 1, 2026. Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 66. Appellant was committed under
the prior version of the statutes. The judgment also prohibits appellant from pur-
chasing or possessing a firearm unless he obtains relief from the Psychiatric
Security Review Board. See ORS 426.130(1)(a)(D) (2023); ORS 166.273 (2023).
2
Because the order prohibiting purchase or possession of firearms is depen-
dent upon the court’s determination that appellant is a danger to himself, and
because we reverse that determination, we also reverse the order regarding fire-
arms. State v. S. R. J., 281 Or App 741, 743 n 1, 386 P3d 99 (2016).
670 State v. S. M.

and convincing evidence must” demonstrate that there is “a
particularized and highly probable threat to the appellant’s
safe survival, including a risk of substantial harm, in the
near future.” State v. S. R. J., 281 Or App 741, 749, 386 P3d
99 (2016) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
“[T]he prospect of serious physical harm must be based on
more than apprehensions, speculations, and conjecture.” Id.
at 750 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the record reflects that appellant’s commit-
ment was based in the main on concerns that his mental
condition placed him at risk from traffic. Our decision in
S. R. J., a case that addressed—and reversed—a commit-
ment based on (in our words) “delusional interactions with
traffic,” compels the conclusion that the evidence here is not
sufficient to support appellant’s commitment. In S. R. J.,
id. at 752-53, there was evidence in the record regarding
two “traffic encounter[s].” During one encounter, the appel-
lant’s conduct “ ‘backed up [traffic] in all directions’ because
‘everyone at every corner of the intersection was stopped
and watching.’ ” Id. at 744. During the second, the appellant
was “sitting near, but not in, traffic.” Id. at 752. We deter-
mined that both of those incidents were insufficient to sup-
port a danger-to-self commitment because the “possibil[ity]”
that the appellant could have “crossed in front of rapidly
approaching cars” or the “possibil[ity] that some car had to
stop abruptly to avoid hitting” the appellant were “merely
speculative.” Id. The concern in that case—that the “appel-
lant w[ould] be seriously injured in the near future because
of her delusional interactions with traffic,” did “not rise
beyond the level of apprehension and speculation,” therefore,
reversal was warranted. Id. at 750, 758. The record “con-
tain[ed] no evidence that [the] appellant placed herself in
the path of any vehicle approaching with enough speed to
harm her or that any driver had to stop abruptly to avoid
hitting [the] appellant.” Id. at 752.
Similarly, the record in this case contains no evi-
dence that appellant placed himself in the path of any
vehicle. There was no evidence that appellant had ever put
himself in the way of traffic and there was no evidence that
appellant failed to move out of the way of oncoming traffic.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 668 (2026) 671

The psychiatrist who examined appellant did not think that
appellant intended to harm himself but thought that defen-
dant might unintentionally place himself in harm’s way as a
result of his illness.3 The only evidence addressing the dan-
ger that appellant posed to himself was that on two occa-
sions appellant was walking or standing in places that could
have put appellant at risk if traffic had been present, and
that one of the locations is often busy.4 Although the officer
who took appellant into custody opined that appellant did
not appreciate the danger he might be placing himself in,
she did not think he intended to harm himself.
The record in this case includes less evidence
regarding a risk of substantial harm than what we deemed
insufficient in S. R. J. See id. at 753 (even if the appellant
will repeat similar behavior, “there is no evidence that those
situations exposed [the appellant] to the type of danger that
[demonstrates] a particularized and highly probable threat
to [the] appellant’s safe survival” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
Consequently, the evidence is insufficient to support a com-
mitment of appellant on a danger-to-self basis.
Reversed.

3
During the hearing, the psychiatrist opined that if appellant were to fol-
low someone in public, it is possible that the individual could pose a danger to
appellant. That is an insufficient basis for commitment because it is “merely
speculative on this record,” S. R. J., 281 Or App at 752, and we have previously
rejected the argument that an appellant is a danger to themself simply if there
is a possibility that the appellant’s behavior may lead to another person harming
the appellant, State v. D. J., 206 Or App 146, 153-54, 135 P3d 397 (2006).
4
Regarding the first incident, the officer who took appellant into custody tes-
tified that appellant was in a place where there “could be traffic,” but that “there
wasn’t much traffic going on on the street” at the time. Regarding the second
incident, which the officer did not personally observe, the officer testified that “[t]
here is a good amount of traffic” near that intersection.