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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of New Jersey v. Jaibre Parker

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1435-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (12.7K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1435-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAIBRE PARKER, a/k/a
JAIBRE R. PARKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Submitted February 4, 2026 – Decided March 12, 2026

Before Judges Mayer and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 21-07-
0709.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).

LaChia L. Bradshaw, Burlington County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Nicole Handy, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
Defendant Jaibre Parker appeals from an order denying his post-

conviction relief (PCR) petition, which the court entered after hearing argument

but without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Perceiving no error in the PCR

court's finding that defendant did not establish a prima facie case of ineffective

assistance of counsel and no abuse of discretion in the court's decision not to

conduct an evidentiary hearing, we affirm.

Defendant was arrested on March 31, 2021, after police earlier that day

had received a report of a stolen vehicle. At the time of the arrest, defendant

was on parole after serving a prison term imposed with respect to a prior

conviction. A grand jury subsequently charged defendant with multiple

offenses, including first-degree robbery N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2), first-degree

carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2), and related weapons charges in connection

with the March 31, 2021 incident.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant entered a guilty plea

to a single amended charge of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2).

In the plea agreement the prosecutor agreed to recommend defendant receive an

eight-year imprisonment term, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA),

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, "to be served concurrently to par[]ole violation sentence

defendant is currently serving." At the time of the plea agreement, defendant

A-1435-24
2
was incarcerated in state prison because he had violated parole. The prosecutor

also agreed to recommend defendant receive "all lawful jail credits."

During the plea hearing, the court acknowledged defendant's parole

violation and stated:

THE COURT: And as far as the jail credits . . . I
heard that defendant is serving a parole violation, is
that correct, sir?

THE COURT: Okay. [Bec]ause there are unique
issues with parole violations and . . . I don't know when
you started serving that parole violation. But . . . that'll
all be addressed in the . . . pre-sentence report. I'll give
you whatever jail credits, GAP time, Rosado credits,
anything that you're entitled to, okay?[1]

The presentence report subsequently indicated defendant was entitled to

one day of jail credit for May 31, 2021. The report contained the following

comment: "[i]f a defendant who has been released on parole is arrested for a

1
A defendant is entitled to jail credits "for any time served in custody . . .
between arrest and the imposition of sentence." R. 3:21-8(a). "[A] defendant
who has previously been sentenced to imprisonment" is entitled to gap-time
credits when "subsequently sentenced to another term for an offense committed
prior to the former sentence . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b); see also State v.
Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 36-39 (2011) (explaining jail credits and gap-time
credits). In State v. Rosado, 131 N.J. 423, 428-30 (1993), the Court held a
defendant receives credit for time the defendant spent on parole when he or she
is resentenced after violating a term of probation.
A-1435-24
3
new offense and a parole detainer is subsequently lodged, credit ceases to accrue

on the new charge and begins to accrue on the sentence from which the

defendant was originally paroled."

During the sentencing hearing, plea counsel objected to the presentence

report's calculation of defendant's jail credits:

[PLEA COUNSEL]: I had a chance to review the
presentence report. I believe there's an error
concerning his jail credits. It shows just one day. He's
been incarcerated now for 23 months and --

THE COURT: I know he's serving a parole
violation. He's not entitled to the jail credit.

[PLEA COUNSEL]: Okay. But . . . the parole
violation is supposed to be concurrent to his --

THE COURT: I will run this sentence
concurrently. . . . I'm going to get a letter from the
Department of Corrections . . . citing case law telling
me that it should be consecutive. But I'm going to run
it concurrently as has been negotiated over the
objection of and the case law being cited by the
Department of Corrections.

[PLEA COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor.
And . . . I would ask that the court, and I think the
prosecutor concurs with me, just to make sure that the
jail credits are accurately reflected in the judgment of
conviction.

THE COURT: Well, again, I only see, again, one
day jail credit. I will run this sentence concurrently to
any parole violation . . . that he's continuing to serve

A-1435-24
4
. . . But I don't have the authority to give jail credits
beyond that which . . . appear in the presentence report.

Before imposing sentence, the court afforded defendant the opportunity to

bring any additional matters to its attention:

DEFENDANT: . . . I just want to know am . . .
I[] go[ing] to get all my jail credits --

THE COURT: I've now said twice because
you're serving a parole violation you're not entitled to
any jail credit other than the one day that you have here.

Also, I anticipate when I place in the judgment of
conviction and I'm running this sentence concurrently
to the parole violation that you're serving the
Department of Corrections is going to write me a letter
back saying that pursuant to case law that I shouldn't do
it. But I am going to do it and I am going to run it
concurrently. But the jail credits are what they are.

I will ask probation to double check, . . . because
. . . from my perspective you completed serving your
parole violation, then you will be entitled to additional
jail credits. But my view also is that because you're still
in the custody of the Commissioner of the Department
of Corrections you're still actually serving that parole
violation.

I will ask through my colleague . . . to double
check and to have probation double check.

I'll tell you this. I like to get the judgments of
conviction out quickly for the sake of defendants
moving on with their lives. But there may be a slight
delay in getting yours out, because again, every day of
credit GAP time, Rosado credit, whatever it might be,

A-1435-24
5
is immensely important to you, . . . I understand that.
So we'll make sure that they're correct.

I looked into it yesterday just on my own when I
saw this, okay. So you will get whatever jail credits,
GAP time, Rosado credit, prior service credit, whatever
you're entitled to. This is what was provided to me by
the professionals who are in charge of calculating these
things. I will double check.

Consistent with the negotiated plea agreement and as memorialized in a

March 2, 2023 judgment of conviction, the court imposed an eight-year prison

term subject to NERA "[t]o run concurrent to [the p]arole sentence [defendant

is] currently serving." Consistent with the presentence report, the court awarded

defendant one day of jail credit. Defendant did not appeal the conviction or

sentence.

In a verified PCR petition, defendant asserted his "credits" were "not

being counted" and asked the court to look into that issue. In an amended

petition2 executed by appointed PCR counsel on defendant's behalf, defendant

asserted plea counsel had "failed to advise him of the real-world result of the

guilty plea, the custody credits, and the parole violation sentence." He

acknowledged "the parole violation sentence was mentioned to him during the

2
Although captioned as an "AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION," the amended
petition did not contain any language attesting to the veracity of the factual
assertions it contained.
A-1435-24
6
plea and sentencing proceedings" but claimed "how it impacted [his] custody

credits was not explained or calculated for him." Defendant asked the court to

remand the case for resentencing or, alternatively, to return the case "to the trial

list." In a brief, PCR counsel argued defendant had received "ineffective

assistance of counsel with respect to sentencing" in that plea counsel had "failed

to advise defendant how the parole violation . . . impacted his jail credits."

PCR counsel asserted that, had defendant known of the "real-world

consequences" of his plea, "he would not have agreed to [the] plea offer ." That

assertion was not supported by any affidavit or certification of defendant.

During oral argument, PCR counsel contended that before entering his

plea defendant had not been properly advised about the calculation of gap time

and argued defendant was "entitled to fully understand everything about his

plea." Counsel asserted defendant was entitled to approximately 694 days (or

twenty-three months) of gap-time credit and asked the court to issue a corrected

judgment of conviction awarding that credit. The State responded that defendant

was entitled only to whatever credits were legally applicable and indicated it

had no objection to the court awarding gap-time credits if the court determined

defendant was entitled to them.

A-1435-24
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At the end of oral argument, the court asked counsel to confer about

whether defendant was entitled to any gap-time credit, indicating the court

would award it if defendant were entitled to it. The assistant prosecutor

subsequently advised the court in an email that counsel had discussed whether

defendant was entitled to any gap-time credits and had "agreed that he is not

entitled to any additional gap credits." She explained: "The facts indicate that

he was incarcerated on other charges until 2/10/21 and that this offense occurred

on 3/31/21 and he was arrested on 4/1/21. He was held on a probation violation

at that point, and thus not entitled to any gap credits." In response, PCR counsel

confirmed she and the assistant prosecutor had conferred about defendant's

entitlement to gap-time credits, and she conceded "[t]he caselaw on parole

violations is a dead end for my client." She nevertheless asserted "plea counsel

should have looked into and explained" the case law to defendant and "should

have moved this case faster to resolution, knowing the days would not count

toward the new conviction." Counsel again "ask[ed] for a resentencing to make

up for the information gap [plea] counsel left in this case." The court advised

counsel in an email that it had reviewed their messages and concluded that "if

defendant is not entitled to GAP credits, there [wa]s no reason to go on the

A-1435-24
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record for a resentencing." The court told counsel it would issue its decision on

the PCR petition "in the near future."

Judge Richard J. Nocella denied defendant's petition in a December 12,

2024 order and written opinion. The judge concluded defendant had failed to

establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-

pronged test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme

Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). See Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (to

establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show (1) "counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by

the Sixth Amendment" and (2) counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced the

defense" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)); see also State v. Hernandez-

Peralta, 261 N.J. 231, 247 (2025).

Citing State v. Bellamy, 462 N.J. Super. 107 (App. Div. 2019), the judge

found defendant was entitled only one day of jail credit, which he received.

Based on that finding and considering the plea colloquy and information

provided to defendant during the plea and sentencing hearings, the judge

concluded counsel's performance did not "fall[] below the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance" and, thus, defendant had not established the

A-1435-24
9
first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. The judge found defendant also had

failed to show he was prejudiced under the second prong of the test because

defendant "received all the jail credits he was entitled to receive at sentencing"

and his counsel's assertion he would not have entered into the plea agreement if

he had known he was entitled to only one day of jail credit was "not rational or

believable given . . . the [potential forty-year] exposure [he] faced if he had gone

to trial."3 Because defendant had not demonstrated a prima facie case of

inadequate assistance of counsel, the judge declined to conduct an evidentiary

hearing.

Defendant makes the following arguments on appeal:

POINT I

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING TO EVALUATE HIS CLAIM THAT PLEA
COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO
ADVISE HIM THAT HE WAS NOT ELIGI[BL]E
FOR JAIL CREDITS WHILE SERVING TIME ON A
PAROLE VIOLATION AND NOT ADVOCATING

3
We note that in response to defendant's petition, plea counsel submitted a
certification in which she provided information regarding her discussions with
defendant, including that "consistent with [her] practice," she had advised
defendant "of all possible consequences of the[] decision[] to plead out or to go
to trial." The court appropriately did not reference or rely on that testimony in
its opinion denying defendant's PCR petition without conducting an evidentiary
hearing.
A-1435-24
10
FOR GAP-TIME CREDITS. ALTERNATIVELY,
BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF GAP-TIME CREDIT WAS
ARGUED BEFORE THE PCR COURT, BUT NOT
ADDRESSED IN THE PCR COURT'S WRITTEN
OPINION, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED
FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW.

POINT II

THE PCR COURT ERRED BY NOT CONDUCTING
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo both the

factual inferences drawn from the record by the PCR judge and the judge's legal

conclusions. State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020).

Based on our de novo review, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth

in Judge Nocella's comprehensive written opinion. The judge correctly applied

the Strickland/Fritz test to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance by plea

counsel. See State v. Chau, 473 N.J. Super. 430, 445 (App. Div. 2022) (finding

"[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a plea is

measured by the familiar two-part" Strickland/Fritz test). Applying that

standard, we reach the same conclusions as Judge Nocella. Defendant did not

establish plea counsel's performance "was not within the range of competence

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Chau, 473 N.J. Super. at 445 (quoting

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973)) (internal quotation marks

A-1435-24
11
omitted). He also did not demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on

going to trial." Ibid. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to forego an

evidentiary hearing. See State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div.

2020) (holding "[w]e review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a defendant's

request for a hearing under an abuse of discretion standard"). A PCR petitioner

is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Porter, 216 N.J.

343, 355 (2013); see also State v. Peoples, 446 N.J. Super. 245, 254 (App. Div.

2016) (holding "[t]he mere raising of a claim of [ineffective assistance of

counsel] does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing").

Rule 3:22-10(b) provides a court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a

PCR petition only if the defendant establishes "a prima facie case in support of

[PCR]," "there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by

reference to the existing record," and "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to

resolve the claims for relief." See also Porter, 216 N.J. at 354. Defendant did

not meet that standard, and, thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion by

deciding the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

A-1435-24
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Defendant faults the judge for not addressing the applicability of gap-time

credits. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the post-argument email exchange

between counsel and the court make clear counsel conferred, agreed, and

informed the court defendant was not entitled to gap-time credit. Accordingly,

the court did not need to address the gap-time credit argument. Moreover,

defendant has not demonstrated he is entitled to gap-time credit.

Affirmed.

A-1435-24
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