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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Dcpp v. A.T. – in the Matter of the Guardianship of C.J. III

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-3651-24/A-3652-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (22)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.3K)

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Combined Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3651-24
A-3652-24

NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.T. and C.J.,1

Defendants-Appellants.

---

IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF C.J.
III, a minor.

---

Submitted February 3, 2025 – Decided March 12, 2026

Before Judges Gilson, Perez Friscia, and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County,
Docket No. FG-21-0102-25.

1
We refer to the parties and the children by initials and fictitious names to
protect their privacy. R 1:38-3(d)(12).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant A.T. in A-3651-24 (Deric Wu, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant C.J. in A-3652-24 (Bruce P. Lee, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).

Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Nicholas Dolinksy,
Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor C.J. III (Meredith Alexis Pollock,
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa R.
Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel
and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In these consolidated appeals, defendants A.T. and C.J., the biological

parents of C.J., III (Charlie), appeal from a June 30, 2025 judgment of

guardianship terminating their parental rights to Charlie. A.T. contends the

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove prongs

three and four of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Specifically, she argues the court's

prong three analysis was deficient because it considered the caregiver's

preference for adoption over kinship legal guardianship (KLG) as dispositive

and its prong four analysis was incorrect because both the Division's expert

and A.T.'s expert agreed termination of parental rights (TPR) would do more

harm than good.

A-3651-24
2
C.J. contends the court "erroneously concluded that adoption was in

Charlie's best interest[s] when considering prong [three] overlapping with

prong [four]." He additionally argues the law guardian failed to represent

Charlie's interests, provided ineffective assistance of counsel to Charlie, and

that the court improperly considered prejudicial and inadmissible hearsay

statements.

Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied

the record evidence supports the decision to terminate defendants' parental

rights by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we affirm substantially

for the reasons set forth by Judge John J. Abromitis in his thorough and well-

reasoned fifty-one-page written opinion. We will not recite in detail the

history of the Division's interactions with defendants. Instead, we incorporate

by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in the court's

opinion. We add the following comments.

I.

A.T. has two living biological children in addition to Charlie: R.T., born

in 2008, and F.T., born in 2014. Defendants had another child together, P.J.,

who was born in October 2018, but tragically died in December 2018.

The Division's involvement with defendants began in 2017, when it

received a referral regarding A.T.'s drug use and a physical altercation between

A-3651-24
3
A.T. and her mother, B.Y. After A.T. was arrested for assault and C.J. was

arrested for obstruction, B.Y. was granted emergency temporary custody of

R.T. and F.T. A.T. completed a substance abuse evaluation (SAE) but

declined the recommended intensive outpatient (IOP) treatment.

In August 2018, when A.T. was pregnant with P.J., her physician

reported to the Division that she tested positive for marijuana and opiates at a

pre-natal appointment. She subsequently tested positive for marijuana,

suboxone, oxymorphone, and oxycodone. A.T. completed another SAE and

again refused to comply with the recommended IOP treatment.

On December 6, 2018, P.J., who was six weeks old, was found

unconscious in bed between defendants and was pronounced dead. On

December 10, defendants both tested positive for oxycodone and

oxymorphone. After completing SAEs, A.T. was recommended for intensive

inpatient treatment and C.J. for IOP treatment, which they refused.

In January 2019, the Division implemented a safety protection plan after

a January 6, 2019, domestic violence incident between defendants that resulted

in their arrests. B.Y. was granted custody of R.T. and F.T. pursuant to an

order entered in a separate Family Part matter. They have remained in the care

of their grandparents, B.Y. and F.Y., since that time

A-3651-24
4
In January 2019, A.T. tested positive for benzodiazepines, cocaine, and

oxycodone. In July 2019, C.J. tested positive for oxycodone. On November

24, 2019, while A.T. was pregnant with Charlie, A.T. reported to law

enforcement that C.J. choked her during a fight and C.J. was arrested.

When Charlie was born in December 2019, he tested positive for cocaine

and A.T. tested positive for Subutex and cocaine. Charlie experienced

withdrawal symptoms and remained hospitalized for several days.

By July 2020, the Division reunited Charlie with defendants with sole

custody granted to C.J. and supervised contact by A.T. A.T. repeatedly tested

positive for substances, including fentanyl, methamphetamine, and opiates.

The Division received five additional referrals between March 2021 and

December 2022 regarding substance use, domestic violence, and supervision

concerns. In March 2022, C.J. was arrested for driving while intoxicated. In

April 2022, police responded to a hospital concerning a suspected overdose by

A.T. and confiscated three vials of suspected heroin from her. In May 2022,

police executed a search warrant for defendants' residence and A.T. was

arrested after she was found in possession of heroin, cocaine, and methadone.

C.J. provided urine screens in February and July 2022 that were positive

for substances, including oxycodone, oxymorphone, methamphetamine,

fentanyl, and cocaine. On December 9, 2022, C.J. appeared to pass out in his

A-3651-24
5
car while waiting at the Division's office to do a drug screen, became agitated

with Division workers, and "appeared to be under the influence." Between

August 2022 and October 2023, A.T. was requested to submit to urine screens

approximately twenty-five times, which she generally refused to do. She

submitted one urine screen, which was positive for amphetamines and

fentanyl.

Throughout 2023, the Division attempted to stabilize the family by

offering defendants substance abuse and mental health services , but they

refused to comply with the recommended services. In June 2023, Charlie was

placed with C.J.'s grandmother, M.P., by way of a family agreement between

defendants and M.P. Defendants were limited to supervised visits with Charlie

at M.P.'s home.

In October 2023, the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) investigated

defendants for distributing controlled dangerous substances (CDS) from their

residence and completed two controlled buys of fentanyl from the residence.

On November 14, 2023, M.P. dropped Charlie off at defendants' residence

unsupervised in violation of the terms of the family agreement. While Charlie

was in the residence with defendants unsupervised, NJSP executed a search

warrant. They seized fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine "concealed in

A-3651-24
6
multiple locations . . . including in the children's toys and areas easily

accessible to the child," and three "large homemade explosive devices."

Defendants were arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including

first- and second-degree CDS offenses, second-degree endangering the welfare

of a child, and third-degree possession of destructive devices. While being

processed at the jail, addition fentanyl and other CDS was found on C.J.'s

person. Defendants were released on conditions pending trial.

The Division emergently removed Charlie from M.P.'s care and placed

him with B.Y. and F.Y. The Division substantiated defendants and M.P. for

abuse and neglect. Charlie has lived with his grandparents and older siblings

since November 2023.

The Division continued to offer services to defendants. In March 2024,

the Division referred them to psychiatric evaluations, which they never

completed. In April 2024, the Division referred them for SAEs, which neither

attended. The Division rescheduled A.T. for a psychiatric examination on May

1, 2024, which she failed to attend. C.J. also failed to complete a rescheduled

psychiatric evaluation.

In July 2024, while defendants were visiting Charlie at a Division office,

A.T. took Charlie from the building insisting that the Division did not have

A-3651-24
7
authority to keep him. Police arrived as A.T. was attempting to place Charlie

in her car and she was arrested.

On October 31, 2024, C.J. was found unconscious in his vehicle and

arrested on an outstanding warrant and for possession of drug paraphernalia

and unlawful possession of a knife. On November 14, just over a week after

he was released from jail, C.J. was arrested again and incarcerated for

possession of a BB gun.

In October 2024, the Division changed its permanency plan from

reunification to adoption by B.Y. and F.Y. The Division explored KLG with

B.Y. and explained the differences between KLG and adoption. B.Y.

understood the differences and expressed her desire to adopt Charlie to live

with her, F.Y., and Charlie's older siblings. The Division also explored

numerous other placement options, including defendants' parents, siblings, and

a cousin who were all unable or unwilling to adopt. M.P. was not a viable

option because she was substantiated for neglect following the November 2023

incident, when she left Charlie unsupervised at defendants' residence.

On November 12, 2024, the Division filed its complaint for guardianship

of Charlie. A six-day guardianship trial was conducted from April to June

2025.

A-3651-24
8
The Division called Dr. Kinya Swanson as an expert in psychology,

parental fitness, and bonding. Dr. Swanson completed a psychological

evaluation with defendants, bonding evaluations with both defendants and

Charlie, and a bonding evaluation with B.Y. and F.Y.

Dr. Swanson concluded Charlie should remain with his grandparents and

be free for adoption. She noted that if defendants' "rights were

terminated, . . . there would be some level of harm, emotional or psychological

harm to [Charlie]." However, "his . . . grandparents have the skills and have

evidenced the ability to mitigate a good amount of that potential harm through

the level of security, love, affection, resources, [and] the family unit that they

have there." Dr. Swanson concluded terminating parental rights would not

cause more harm than good and "the potential for harm would be adequately

mitigated by the resource parents."

The law guardian called Dr. Leslie Trott as an expert in the area of

psychology, parental fitness, and bonding. Dr. Trott conducted a parenting

fitness and a bonding evaluation of A.T., a parenting fitness evaluation of C.J ,

and a comparative bonding evaluation with the grandparents. Regarding the

bonding evaluation of A.T., Dr. Trott testified A.T. "did a reasonably good job

of keeping [Charlie's] behavior in control . . . [b]ut it was clear that he was

limited in how he showed affection towards her. . . . He was distancing

A-3651-24
9
emotionally from her." He opined Charlie had a "significant emotional void

inside of him, that he suffered through some adverse childhood experiences."

Dr. Trott did not consider there to be a significant bond between Charlie and

A.T.

During Dr. Trott's evaluation of C.J., he "started to sag into the table and

his head began to nod . . . [and] he was not able to control the pencil." Dr.

Trott told C.J. he believed he was impaired and C.J. "lost his temper and he

said . . . I do[ not] have to finish this evaluation and . . . he walked out." Dr.

Trott attempted to convince C.J. to stay and told him that his son was there

waiting to visit with him but C.J. refused to stay.

A.T. called Dr. Bianca Kazoun as an expert in psychological

evaluations, bonding evaluations, and parental fitness. Dr. Kazoun

interviewed A.T. and conducted a bonding evaluation between her and Charlie

to assess "the appropriateness of [KLG]." Dr. Kazoun testified A.T.'s "insight

into the problems that she was experiencing was poor." Regarding the bonding

evaluation, Dr. Kazoun found that "their bond was strong and secure." Dr.

Kazoun did not recommend adoption because she thought that "there is a

potential for [Charlie] to suffer enduring harm from severing the relationship

[with A.T.] . . . [b]ecause the nature of their bond was so strong."

A-3651-24
10
Dr. Kazoun conceded A.T. was not capable of parenting full-time at the

time. Dr. Kazoun recommended KLG and family therapy but did not

recommend reunification based on the "incarceration," "drug use," and failure

to "follow through with services." She stated, "I mean, you know, in

maintaining an environment where [A.T.] does[ not] need to be supervised."

She thought all those factors are important before considering reunification.

On June 30, 2025, the court issued its written opinion, finding the

Division had proved by clear and convincing evidence all four prongs of

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and entered an order terminating defendants' parental

rights. This appeal followed.

II.

Our "scope of review on appeals from orders terminating parental rights

is limited." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. M.M., 459 N.J. Super.

246, 256 (App. Div. 2019). We review the trial court's factual findings "in

accordance with a deferential standard," N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 19 (2023), and its findings "generally

should be upheld so long as they are supported by 'adequate, substantial, and

credible evidence.'" M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 256 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014)). We defer to the factual

findings of the family court due to that court's special expertise in family

A-3651-24
11
matters and the limitations of reviewing a cold record. See N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). "We will not overturn a

family court's fact[ ]findings unless they are so 'wide of the mark' that our

intervention is necessary to correct an injustice." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Having reviewed the record, we rely upon the court's findings, which are

all supported by substantial credible evidence. We also agree with the trial

court's legal conclusions regarding all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).

Accordingly, we address only defendants' arguments regarding prongs three

and four and C.J.'s additional arguments.

III.

Pursuant to the third prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), the Division must

demonstrate it has attempted alternatives to termination of parental rights in its

proposed permanent placement of a child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), "KLG is considered an alternative to

termination of parental rights that offers permanency and stability to a child

residing with a relative or kinship caregiver." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &

Permanency v. D.A., 477 N.J. Super. 63, 82-83 (App. Div. 2023).

A-3651-24
12
"The decision of a resource parent to choose adoption over KLG must be

an informed one," M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 260, and must be "unconditional,

unambiguous, and unqualified." Id. at 264. Once the caregiver is provided

information regarding the benefits and burdens of a KLG, the caretaker's

preference between the two alternatives "should matter." Id. at 263.

Moreover, neither the Division nor the trial court may force a resource parent

or relative to become a KLG. See D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 24 n.8 ("When a court

orders KLG, the child is placed with a caregiver with whom the child has a

kinship relationship and 'who is willing to assume care of a child due to

parental incapacity, with the intent to raise the child to adulthood'" (quoting

N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-2)).

We are unpersuaded by A.T.'s contention that the court "relying on

outdated laws, mistakenly" ordered KLG "so as to appease the resource

parents." We are also unconvinced by A.T.'s argument that had the court "not

deferred [its] authority to consider alternatives to termination to [the Division]

and the resource parents, and seriously considered KLG," it would have

ordered KLG.

We are satisfied the court appropriately considered KLG as an

alternative to TPR and determined KLG was not a viable option. It found the

Division reviewed the differences between adoption and KLG with B.Y. and

A-3651-24
13
she "testified that she wants to adopt [Charlie], which if granted would result

in [Charlie] continuing to live with [B.Y.] and his older siblings." B.Y. was

"unwilling to be a KLG" because she did not want to "continually have to be

involved in issues regarding visitation." The court also found "[m]any other

relatives were explored for placement and were unwilling, unable, or ineligible

to take custody of [Charlie]."

As a result, the court determined there were "no viable alternatives to

TPR" and it was "significant that [B.Y.] already has had custody of [Charlie]

for nearly two years, and also has custody of his older siblings." Having

reviewed the record, we are convinced the court did not treat B.Y.'s preference

as dispositive and properly determined that KLG was not a viable alternative

to TPR.

C.J.'s claim that the court erroneously determined adoption was in

Charlie's best interests because B.Y. "stopped therapy for Charlie shortly after

he was removed" lacks merit. After Charlie's removal, the Division arranged

for counseling services through a counseling service for children who are in

crisis. Charlie participated in eight weeks of counseling, after which the

therapist determined counseling was no longer necessary. In November 2024,

B.Y. "decided [Charlie] needed to go back in therapy" after he started to

exhibit behavioral issues. By January 2025, Charlie was again receiving in-

A-3651-24
14
home counseling. C.J.'s claim that B.Y. terminated Charlie's therapy is not

supported by the record.

IV.

Prong four requires the court to determine whether TPR "will not do

more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). "[T]he fourth prong

'serves as a fail-safe against termination even where the remaining standards

have been met.'" R.G., 217 N.J. at 559 (quoting E.P., 196 N.J. at 108). "The

question is 'not whether a biological mother or father is a worthy parent, but

whether a child's interest[s] will best be served by completely terminating the

child's relationship with that parent.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting

E.P., 196 N.J. at 108).

This analysis "cannot require a showing that no harm will befall the

child as a result of the severing of biological ties." In re Guardianship of

K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 355 (1999). Instead, "[t]he question . . . is whether,

after considering and balancing the two relationships, . . . child[ren] will suffer

a greater harm from the termination of ties with [their] natural parents than

from the permanent disruption of [their] relationship with [the] foster parents."

Ibid. Courts have "long considered a child's relationship with the resource

family . . . when [it] applie[s] the fourth prong." D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 23.

A-3651-24
15
Vital under prong four is consideration of "[a] child's need for

permanency." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 281

(2007) (citing K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 357-58). "Ultimately, a child has a right to

live in a stable, nurturing environment and to have the psychological security

that his [or her] most deeply formed attachments will not be shattered." F.M.,

211 N.J. at 453. Critically, children should not "languish indefinitely" in a

resource placement while a parent attempts to correct parenting difficulties.

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 209 (App. Div.

2007).

Based on our review of the record, we are convinced the court correctly

applied prong four and determined TPR would not do more harm than good.

For more than two years, Charlie has been thriving in a stable and loving home

supported by his grandparents. In contrast, defendants have long struggled

with substance abuse, domestic violence, and contact with the criminal justice

system, and have not demonstrated they will be able to remedy these issues in

the future. The court's finding that the Division proved prong four by clear

and convincing evidence is amply supported by the record.

A.T.'s contention that Dr. Swanson agreed TPR would cause more harm

than good is incorrect. To the contrary, Dr. Swanson testified Charlie's

A-3651-24
16
grandparents would be able to ameliorate any harm and TPR would not do

more harm than good.

V.

We are not persuaded by C.J.'s claims, raised for the first time on appeal,

that the law guardian failed to represent Charlie's interests by advocating for

TPR and provided Charlie with ineffective assistance of counsel for several

reasons.

First, C.J. lacks standing to assert these claims. The law guardian is

statutorily empowered "to represent minors in alleged cases of child abuse or

neglect and in termination of parental rights proceedings." N.J.S.A. 9:6–8.21.

"The basic role of the law guardian is to serve as an advocate for the minor

child." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 332 n.4 (2013). The law guardian's

obligation is to advocate for the child's position in the manner the law guardian

finds to be in the child's best interests. See Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.

Robert M., 347 N.J. Super. 44, 70 (App. Div. 2002) ("Law guardians are

obliged . . . to make recommendations as to how a child client's desires may

best be accomplished, [and] to express any concerns regarding the child's

safety or well-being"), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 39 (2002).

The law guardian did not represent C.J. and could not have breached any

professional duties or obligations owed to him. The law guardian represented

A-3651-24
17
Charlie alone and any claims that the law guardian failed to represent Charlie's

interests or provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel belong to

Charlie. To the extent there were any alleged deficiencies in the law

guardian's representation of Charlie, the appropriate mechanism to raise those

concerns was through a timely application to the trial court for the appointment

of a guardian ad litem (GAL).

Rule 5:8B provides, "[i]n all cases in which custody or parenting

time/visitation is an issue, a [GAL] may be appointed . . . if the circumstances

warrant such an appointment." The basic role of a GAL is to be "an

independent factfinder who works to determine what action is in the ward's

best interests and makes that recommendation to the court." Vill. Apartments

of Cherry Hill, N.J. v. Novack, 383 N.J. Super. 574, 579 (App. Div. 2006). A

GAL must "determine[] . . . what action is in the ward's best interests and

advocate[] for that position" and "serve[] the court on the ward's behalf." Ibid.

Second, because C.J. failed to timely request the appointment of a GAL

before or during trial, his arguments are waived. "Generally, an appellate

court will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised

[with the trial court]." State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012). "For sound

jurisprudential reasons, with few exceptions, 'our appellate courts will decline

to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an

A-3651-24
18
opportunity for such a presentation is available.'" State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409,

419 (2015) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)). We do not

"consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an

opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so raised

on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great

public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)

(quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App.

Div. 1959)).

Finally, even if C.J. had standing to assert these claims and timely raised

them, the claims lack merit. There is no support for C.J.'s argument that the

law guardian failed to represent Charlie's interests by advocating for TPR. The

law guardian is not obligated to blindly advocate for the wishes of a child. As

our Supreme Court held in E.P., 196 N.J. at 113:

children's wishes may often not be in their own best
interests. For example, children may want to return to
their abusive or neglectful natural parents, who have
endangered and continue to endanger their lives. In
such cases, it may be not only futile, but contrary to a
child's best interests to solicit his or her opinion.

Although Charlie told Dr. Swanson he "wanted to be with his mommy

and daddy," she specifically noted Charlie was "not old enough or mature

enough to make that kind of determination for what [was] truly in his best

interest[s]." We are satisfied the law guardian properly considered all the

A-3651-24
19
evidence in the case in determining how best to represent Charlie's interests

and did not fail to represent his interests by advocating for TPR. C.J.'s

disagreement with the law guardian's decision to take a position adverse to him

is not a basis to find the law guardian violated any obligations to Charlie as his

attorney.

C.J.'s claim that the law guardian provided ineffective assistance of

counsel to Charlie is similarly unconvincing. In New Jersey Division of Youth

& Family Services v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 309 (2007), our Supreme Court

adopted the two-part test set forth in Strickland for ineffective assistance of

counsel claims in guardianship cases.2 To establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, a defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's

performance was objectively deficient. B.R., 192 N.J. at 307. To make that

showing, defendant must show counsel's performance fell "outside the broad

range of professionally acceptable performance." Ibid. Second, defendant

must establish prejudice. Ibid. That is, "there must be 'a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceedings would have been different.'" Ibid.

A defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence,

that he or she is entitled to the requested relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518,

2
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

A-3651-24
20
541 (2013) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). To sustain that

burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide the

court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell,

126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992). Defendants must do more than make "bald

assertions" of ineffective assistance. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154,

170 (App. Div. 1999).

C.J. first argues the law guardian "failed to diligently communicate with

Charlie and learn what his wishes were." This is nothing more than a bald

assertion of ineffective assistance. C.J. does not provide any support for such

a claim. Moreover, as discussed previously, the law guardian was obligated to

advocate for what the law guardian determined was in Charlie's best interests

even if that was inconsistent with Charlie's expressed desire.

C.J.'s claim that the law guardian elicited "false testimony from [Dr.

Trott] that [he] had no bond with [his] child . . . because the expert did not

complete a bonding evaluation" lacks merit. Dr. Trott testified that C.J.

refused to participate in the bonding evaluation after he questioned whether

C.J. was under the influence of substances. It was not improper for the law

guardian to elicit that testimony.

C.J.'s claims that the law guardian "manipulated" Dr. Trott by providing

him with selective evidence and "inappropriately elicited testimony" from Dr.

A-3651-24
21
Trott that he used "a Kinetic Family Drawing test" with C.J. are unavailing.

The fact that C.J. disagrees with Dr. Trott's opinions and the basis for his

opinions does not establish that the law guardian's performance was

objectively unreasonable. To the extent Dr. Trott allegedly testified based on

unreliable or incomplete data, he was subject to cross-examination and any

weaknesses in his testimony could have been exposed at trial. C.J.'s arguments

are based on nothing more than bald assertions and are insufficient to support

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

VI.

C.J.'s claim that the court "considered prejudicial and inadmissible

hearsay statements that fentanyl was found in [Charlie's] toys

and . . . dynamite was found in [the] kitchen cupboard" is without merit.

At trial, the Division called Detective Bruce Sanderson of the NJSP to

testify regarding the November 2023 search of defendants' residence and the

contraband that was seized. Specifically, he testified they found "[f]entanyl,

methamphetamine, various paraphernalia . . . [and] quart[er] or half sticks of

dynamite" in the home. A.T. objected to the detective's testimony because it

was "prejudicial to [A.T.] while the criminal matter is pending." Because C.J.

did not object to the testimony, much less raise an objection based on hearsay,

his claim that the court improperly considered any alleged hearsay statements

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is waived. See Galicia, 210 N.J. at 383 (stating arguments raised for the first

time on appeal are deemed waived).

To the extent defendants objected to the testimony as "prejudicial," we

review the court's decision to admit Detective Sanderson's testimony for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) ("When a trial

court admits or excludes evidence, its determination is entitled to deference

absent a showing of an abuse of discretion"). Of course, evidence is not

inadmissible because it is merely "prejudicial." Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403,

evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is substantially outweighed

by the risk of . . . undue prejudice." There is no basis for us to determine the

court's decision to admit the detective's testimony regarding the contraband

found in defendants' residence was a misuse of its discretion.

Affirmed.

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