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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Meredith L. Lawrence v. Bingham, Greenebaum, Doll, LLP, Renamed Dentons Bingham Greenebaum, LLP

Kentucky Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-SC-0445
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: OPINION AND ORDER VACATING IN PART

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.8K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION AND ORDER VACATING IN PART

Combined Opinion

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT RAP 40(D) THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE HOWEVER
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1 2003 MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL IE SET OUT AS AN]
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION
fiupreme (Lauri 11f fienhxrkg
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2025 SC 0445 D
(2023 CA 1446 2024 CA 0572)

MEREDITH LAWRENCE ET AL MOVANTS

GALLATIN CIRCUIT COURT
V 14 CI 00055

BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP RESPONDENT
RENAMED DENTONS BINGHAM
GREENEBAUM LLP

OPINION AND ORDER

Th1s Court granted d1scret10nary review to consider Lawrence’s cla1m

that the Court of Appeals improperly restricted his ab11ity to file future appeals

Upon review, we vacate the final three paragraphs of the Court of Appeals’

September 12 2025 Order

In its September 12, 2025 Order (hereinafter “Sanctions Order”), the

Court of Appeals COHSldCI‘ed Bingham Greenebaum Doll’s motion for RAP 1 1

sanctions against Lawrence BGD argued that Lawrence’s appeals were

fr1volous because they sought to relitigate the validlty of BGD’s mortgage,

which was finally adjudicated in Bmgham Greenebaum Doll LLP 1) Cut N Shoot
LLC 1 The appellate panel agreed W1th BGD’s contention that Lawrence’s

appeals were frivolous and ordered Lawrence to pay the costs and attorney’s

fees that BGD incurred on appeal $11 010 50

Although BGD requested no other rehef, the Court of Appeals sua sponte

proceeded to enter orders restricting Lawrence’s ability to file future appeals

In the final three paragraphs of the Sanctions Order, the Court of Appeals

adopted a process for reviewing Lawrence’s future appeals That rev1ew

process (1) enjoins Lawrence from filing appeals from Kenton Circuit Case No

13 CI 01620 or any related cases l1tigating the same issues that have been

addressed in prior appeals; (2) tasks the Clerk of the Court of Appeals with

reviewmg Lawrence’s new appeals; and (3) instructs the Clerk to reject

Lawrence’s new appeals without filing them if they violate the injunction’s

terms Although Lawrence does not provide detailed arguments, he asserts

that the appellate court’s review process violates his right to appeal, right to

access the courts, and the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure We agree

Members of this Court have prev1ously expressed doubts regarding the

legality of filing restrictions In Lee U George, this Court considered a pro se

litigant’s claim that the trial court improperly required him to pay a $7,500

bond before filing future mot1ons in his divorce case 2 The majority of this

Court found that the litigant failed to clearly seek relief from the bond

1 2020 CA 1131 MR 2022 WL 4587681 (Ky App Sept 30 2022)

2 369 S W 3d 29 35 (Ky 2012)
requirement in his writ petition; therefore, it declined to deCide whether the

bond was proper 3 In a concurring opinion, Justice Noble agreed with the

majority’s result but raised concerns about filing restrictions 4 She wrote

The question then would be whether this type of bond is an
“appropriate sanction” available to Kentucky courts to be used
against pro se litigants Under CR 11, by signing a document filed
with the court, a party affirms that the pleading or motion is
grounded in fact and law and that it is not being filed for “any
improper purpose,” such as harassment, unnecessary delay, or
“needless increase in the cost of litigation ” The rule applies to
both lawyers and self represented litigants who Sign documents
filed With the court If a filing Violates this rule, the court “upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred/ because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee ” CR 1 1 (emphaSis added) It should be
noted, however, that any sanctions are post filing, not a prior
restraint

The right of access to the courts is fundamental to our system of
justice Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution prov1des “All
courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay ” This provision has appeared in each of
Kentucky s Constitutions Ky Const of 1850 art XIII § 15 Ky
Const of 1799 art X § 13' Ky Const of 1792 art XII § 13
(statements of Robert Rodes)

It appears that a Kentucky appellate court has not addressed the
use of a “contempt bond,” but in cases about similar restrictions,
Kentucky courts have recognized the importance of access to the
courts See Collins v Combs 320 S W 3d 669 (Ky 2010) (affirming
order prohibiting litigant from phySically entering certain courts
because of his threatening behaVior in the past, but noting that the
order did not impede his ability to file pleadings With the court

3 Id at 35 36

4 Id at 36 37 (Noble J concurring)
because the clerk was directed to accept pleadings by mail fax, or
email) Lattanzzo v Joyce 308 S W 3d 723 726 27 (Ky App 2010)
(reversing trial court’s order that litigant could only proceed under
supervision of a licensed attorney and recognizmg importance of
right to represent oneself in court)

Because of the fundamental nature of the right of access to the
courts, restrlctions on a litigant’s ability to file motions must be
approached with great caution

I recognize that the trial court’s order was motivated by its
understandable frustration with Appellant’s Willingness to file
repetitive and frivolous motions, with the fact that the $70,000 in
attorney fees that had already been awarded to [Appellant’s ex
w1fe] apparently had no effect on Appellant’s approach to the
lltigation, with the negatlve effects of Appellant’s tactics on his
children (such as the interruption of their therapy because of
Appellant’s unfounded compla1nts against the1r therapist), and
w1th the waste of the court’s and [Appellant’s ex w1fe]’s resources
But 1t is important to note that the trial court has the ability to
respond to any abuses and to protect the court’s resources by
using other sanctions under CR 11 and the court’s contempt
powers For example, the trial court could find that by filing a new
frivolous or repetitious motion, Appellant violated CR 1 1, and the
court could 1mpose a monetary fine and hold the Appellant in
contempt 1f he did not pay it

It may seem easier and cleaner to prevent Appellant from filing any
more motions unless a bond is posted But the right of litigants to
present claims to a court, and the danger of foreclos1ng a
meritorious claim must always be considered The trial courts are
well equipped to deal with frivolous filings without the use of a
prospective bond requirement In this case, for example, it
appears that the large majority of Appellant’s motions were
merltless and could be denied outright by the court Such mot1ons
W111 not take up much of the court’s resources [5]

5 Id at 37 38 (Noble J concurring)
We are persuaded by Justice Noble’s concurrence and find that filing

restrictions generally confllct with the Kentucky Constitution and our

procedural rules Although the instant case involves a d1fferent filing

restriction an injunction as opposed to a bond and a higher court the

Court of Appeals as opposed to a trial court—Justice Noble’s reasoning applies

With equal force That is because the Kentucky Constitution protects the right

to appeal and the right to access the courts in Sections 115 and 14

respectively Additionally, the Rules of Appellate Procedure contain an

analogue to CR 11 RAP 1 1 RAP 1 1 sets forth the parties obligations to

certify that their appeals are filed in good faith and the procedures for dealing

w1th frivolous filings

(A) Obhgation of Counsel and Self Represented Partles

(1) A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
Sign the party’s filing and state the party’s address The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification
that the s1gnatory has read the fil1ng that to the best of the
signatory’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded 1n fact and is
warranted by ex1st1ng law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that
it is not 1nterposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of 11t1gation

(B) Fr1volous Filings An appeal or motion 1s frivolous if the court
finds that it is so totally lacking in merit that it appears to have
been taken in bad faith If an appellate court determlnes that an
appeal or appellate filing is frivolous, it may impose an
appropriate sanction, including but not limited to

(1) Striking of filings or briefs or portions thereof;
(2) A dismissal of the appeal or denial of the motion;

(3) Awarding Just monetary sanctions and single or double costs to
the opposing party;

(4) Imposition of fines on counsel of not more than $1,000; and

(5) Such further remedies as are specified in any applicable rule

While courts “have inherent power to prescribe rules to regulate their

proceedings and to facilitate the administration of justice[,]” absent

extraordinary circumstances, we believe that courts should avOid imposing

filing restrictions to deal With vexatious litigants 6 Instead, courts should use

our existing procedural rules The review process adopted in the Court of

Appeals’ Sanctions Order runs afoul of RAP 11(B) in several ways First, the

Order prohibits Lawrence from filing appeals in the Kenton Circuit Case and

related cases Nothing in RAP 11(B) authorizes the prohibition of future

appeals as a sanction for prior frivolous appeals Second, the Sanctions Order

tasks the Clerk With evaluating the frivolousness of Lawrence’s future appeals

However, the plain language of RAP 1 1(B) requires the “appellate court” to

determine whether an appeal is frivolous Third and finally, the Sanctions

Order requires the Clerk to re] ect withoutfilzng—any appeal by Lawrence from

the Kenton Circuit Case and related cases 7 RAP 1 1 does not authorize the

6 Collins 1) Combs 320 S W 3d 669 675 (Ky 2010)

7 The pre filing rejection of Lawrence’s appeals could also create review problems In
the event that Lawrence challenged the Court of Appeals decision to reject his appeal,
this Court would not have any official record of what Lawrence attempted to file
Clerk to refuse to file Lawrence’s appeals as a sanction for frivolousness The

closest remedy authorized by RAP 1 1(B) is dismissal, which occurs after filing

with an order of the court

While this Court shares the Court of Appeals’ frustratlon with Lawrence’s

tactics, we should not allow a difficult litigant to compromise our adherence to

the rule of law Because the Sanction Order’s final three paragraphs violate

Lawrence’s right to appeal, right to access the courts, and RAP 11, those

paragraphs are vacated 8 Importantly, we observe that the Court of Appeals is

not Without adequate recourse under RAP 11 In 2024 CA 0571, another

appeal 1nvolving Lawrence and BGD, the Court of Appeals adopted a review

process that occurs after Lawrence files a new appeal The process set out in

the appellate court’s July 1, 2024 Order, requires the Clerk to present

Lawrence’s future appeals from Gallatin Circuit Case 23 CI 00123 to a three

judge motion panel The three Judge panel reviews the notice of appeal and

any supporting documents for fr1volousness and determines Whether the

appeal should proceed on the merits or be summar1ly dlsmissed That review

process comports with RAP 1 1 and protects Lawrence’s r1ght to appeal and

access the courts

Based on the foregoing, the final three paragraphs of the Court of

Appeals’ September 12, 2025 Order are vacated

8 To be entirely clear, the final three paragraphs of the Sanctions Order beginnmg
with the first full paragraph on page 6 (“And, because this ”) and ending with the
first full paragraph on page 7 (“These orders shall ”) are vacated No further
proceedings are necessary in the Court of Appeals
All Sltting All concur

ENTERED March I I 2026

CHIEF JUSTICE