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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.G.

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 25-0128

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Cynthia J. Bailey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0128
FILED 03-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD42831
The Honorable Glenn A. Allen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Davida G., Phoenix
Appellant

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Advisory Counsel for Appellant Davida G.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Yu-Shan Kuo
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee A.G.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Davida G. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
terminating her parental rights to A.G. (“Child”). See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).
For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
superior court’s order. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547,
549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶3 Mother and Ricardo G. (“Father”) are the biological parents
of Child, who was born in 2023.1 Shortly after Child was born, the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) petitioned the superior court to find
Child dependent as to Mother, alleging Mother had a significant history of
substance abuse; gave birth to Child substance-exposed to
methamphetamines, amphetamines, and gabapentin; neglected Child; and
was “unable or unwilling to provide proper and effective parental care.”
Previously, Mother’s parental rights to three other children were
terminated, and she “lost custody” of two other children in 2021. Child was
placed with paternal grandmother, where two of Mother’s other children
are also in out-of-home placement.

¶4 In April 2023, the superior court found Child dependent
“based on [M]other’s failure to provide [Child] with a safe and appropriate
home environment free from illicit substances.”

¶5 In January 2025, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental
rights based upon her substance abuse and Child’s time in an out-of-home
placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (B)(8)(b).

¶6 At the termination adjudication hearing, a case manager
testified that DCS offered Mother “supervised visits, substance abuse

1 The superior court also terminated Father’s parental rights to Child, but

he is not a party to this appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

services, [F]amily [C]onnections, [and] [N]urturing [P]arenting” services.
However, in the months leading up to trial, Mother did not participate in
treatment services. A progress report showed that three services were
closed based on Mother’s disengagement between November 2020 and
November 2023.

¶7 The DCS case manager also testified Mother was referred to
twice-weekly random urinalysis testing but failed to test with the providers
DCS referred her to. Individual screening reports demonstrated Mother
did not attend drug testing between September 2024 and July 2025.
Although Mother emailed DCS stating that she was “consistently doing
[her urinalysis tests] and attending classes,” DCS received only one
negative drug test from Mother. And despite her counsel’s claim that
Mother had completed a self-referred online substance abuse program,
Mother provided no such documentation.

¶8 The case manager also testified Mother had her rights
terminated to three other children, in part, because of her substance abuse,
stating Mother had abused methamphetamine for at least ten years.

¶9 At the close of evidence, Mother entered a no-contest plea to
the termination petition.

¶10 In August 2025, the superior court granted DCS’s motion to
terminate Mother’s parental rights on both alleged grounds.

¶11 Mother’s court-appointed counsel filed a Notice and Avowal
in Lieu of an Opening Brief under Arizona Rule of Juvenile Procedure
607(e)(1)(B), stating that a diligent inspection of the record found no non-
frivolous grounds for appeal. Mother then timely filed an opening brief pro
se.

¶12 We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 We would normally treat Mother’s failure to provide record
citations and supporting legal authorities in her opening brief as waiver of
her arguments on appeal. See Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure
(“ARCAP”) 13(a)(7) (requiring briefs to contain “citations of legal
authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on
which the appellant relies”); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 607(b) (applying ARCAP 13
to juvenile appeals). But we exercise our discretion to address the merits of

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

Mother’s arguments because a child’s best interests are at issue. See Nold v.
Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (noting that the child’s best
interests trump the discretionary doctrine of waiver).

¶14 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find a
statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence,
and that termination is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of
the evidence. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018).
When a parent pleads no contest, the superior court determines only
“whether a factual basis exists” to support termination. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
353(e)(3).

¶15 We review the superior court’s termination order for an abuse
of discretion. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8
(App. 2004). Because the superior court “is in the best position to weigh the
evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve
disputed facts,” we will affirm an order terminating parental rights if
supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223
Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).

I. The Alleged Typographical Error

¶16 Mother first contends her birthday was “incorrectly recorded
within the [DCS]’s system,” which she argues was a “vital error” that
“potentially prejudiced [her] case.” Mother cites no authority suggesting a
typographical error warrants relief from an order terminating parental
rights, and on this record, we find no basis for reversal. See Ariz. Const. art.
6, § 27 (“No cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or
proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial
justice has been done.”)

¶17 Moreover, Mother’s argument is moot. Although DCS
incorrectly alleged Mother’s date of birth in its original dependency
petition, the court later ordered the dependency petition be amended “to
reflect . . . [M]other’s correct date of birth.” And at the termination
adjudication hearing, DCS’s case manager testified to Mother’s correct
birthday. Further, the order terminating Mother’s parental rights also
correctly identified her birthday. Nonetheless, Mother requests a
“thorough review of [her] case, with particular attention paid to the critical
error” (the incorrect birthday). But we will not conduct an Anders review
of a case appealing an order terminating parental rights. In re C.J., __ Ariz.
__, 572 P.3d 597, 603, ¶ 28 (App. 2025).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

II. History of Chronic Abuse Ground

¶18 Mother alleges that “DCS failed to provide documentation to
the court of [her] progress” and that “DCS failed to provide proof of
[urinalysis tests] that [were] documented in the court[’]s system.” To the
extent Mother is challenging the court’s finding under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)
for prolonged substance abuse, reasonable evidence supports the court’s
finding.

¶19 The superior court may terminate parental rights under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) if “the parent is unable to discharge parental
responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs,
controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate
period.” A parent’s substance abuse “need not be constant to be considered
chronic.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 16
(App. 2010). Whether a “statutory factor is supported by the mandated
quantum of evidence will not be disturbed unless the appellate court
determines as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the
evidence to be clear and convincing.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 479, ¶ 31 (2023) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

¶20 Here, the record shows Mother failed to test for drugs
throughout the dependency. At the termination adjudication hearing, DCS
produced individual screening reports showing that Mother did not attend
drug testing between September 2024 and July 2025. And DCS testified
Mother failed to test with the service provider it referred her to. DCS
further testified that Mother’s rights were terminated as to three of her other
children because of her “underlying issues of substance abuse.”

¶21 The record also shows Mother made no effort to establish
sobriety, despite DCS providing services to help her overcome her
substance use and parenting deficits. Although Mother’s counsel asserted
Mother had self-referred to a substance abuse program and “ha[d] many
days of sobriety under her belt,” the DCS case manager testified Mother
provided no documentation to support these claims.

¶22 Meanwhile, DCS presented evidence that “[s]upervised
visits, substance abuse services, [F]amily [C]onnections, [and] [N]urturing
[P]arenting” services were offered to Mother. Additionally, the case
manager testified Mother was referred to parenting and substance abuse
programs but did not participate. Indeed, DCS submitted a progress report

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.
Decision of the Court

that showed three of the services were closed because of Mother’s
disengagement.

¶23 Thus, reasonable evidence shows Mother was unable to
discharge parental responsibilities due to her substance abuse, and that her
abuse would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period. See A.R.S. §
8-533(B)(3); see also Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 382-83, ¶¶ 24-29. Because
reasonable evidence supports the factual basis underlying the superior
court’s statutory finding under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), the superior court did
not abuse its discretion.

¶24 Because we affirm based on Mother’s history of chronic
substance abuse, we do not address her argument challenging termination
on the fifteen months’ out-of-home placement ground. See Jesus M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (“If clear and convincing evidence
supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the [superior] court
ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other
grounds.”).

III. Best Interests

¶25 Although unclear from Mother’s brief, to the extent that she
challenges the superior court’s best-interests determination, reasonable
evidence supports the court’s finding. Termination is in a child’s best
interests if the child will either benefit from termination or be harmed if
termination is denied. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13.

¶26 The record supports the superior court’s finding that
terminating Mother’s parental rights would serve Child’s best interests by
freeing her to be adopted by paternal grandmother. Paternal grandmother
has cared for Child since she was a newborn, is the “only parent the child
has ever known,” and has provided Child with safety and stability. As the
court properly found, adoption would also benefit Child as it would allow
her to live with her siblings and “maintain relationships with extended
family members.” On this record, the superior court did not abuse its
discretion by finding that termination was in Child’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: TM

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