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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re M.G. CA5

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: F089940

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/10/26 In re M.G. CA5

              NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re M.G., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF F089940
HUMAN SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. JD145479-00)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

                v.                                                                  OPINION

T.M.,

       Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie

Canales Norris, Judge.
Beth A. Sears, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kendra L. Graham, Interim County Counsel, and Elizabeth M. Giesick, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
T.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders of legal guardianship made
at a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 with respect
to her now 17-year-old son, M.G. (son). Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order
denying placement of son with a maternal uncle. She also contends the Kern County
Department of Human Services (department) failed to comply with the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) by not asking a paternal relative
about son’s possible Indian ancestry. We conclude mother does not have standing to
challenge the denial of relative placement, but we agree with mother that the department
failed in its initial duty of inquiry. Accordingly, we will conditionally reverse and
remand for the department to conduct the appropriate ICWA inquiry.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Mother and her then 15-year-old son came to the department’s attention in
February 2024, when the department received a referral that mother was sexually abusing
son. Son was taken into protective custody, and an emergency protective order was
granted protecting son from mother.
Mother reported to the social worker investigating the referral that son had type II
diabetes, which was treated with pills and insulin injunctions, and his glucose levels
needed to be checked. Mother stated son was diagnosed as developmentally delayed
when he was a baby, and he had an individualized educational plan at his school, where
he was in the ninth grade. Mother reported son’s father was K.G. (father), but he passed
away two years ago.3 According to mother, son did not know father and did not have a
relationship with him. The social worker asked about father’s family and if he had any

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 We summarize only those facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
3 The department’s family finding social worker confirmed that father passed away
in March 2022.

                                         2.

Indian heritage, but mother did not know anything about his family as father was
adopted.
The Dependency Petition and Detention Hearing
A dependency petition was filed alleging son came within the provisions of
section 300, subdivisions (d) (sexual abuse) and (g) (no provision for support). At the
detention hearing, mother testified about son’s paternity. She identified K.G. as son’s
father. She had never been married, did not live with father when she became pregnant
or during the pregnancy, father never lived with son, and father is not listed on son’s birth
certificate.4 Mother stated father was present at son’s birth and told family son was his.
Mother denied that there were other possible fathers.
Mother denied that anyone in her family claimed to have Native American or
Alaskan-Eskimo heritage, was an enrolled member of an Indian tribe, received tribal
benefits, or lived on a reservation. The juvenile court asked maternal aunt, who was
present at the hearing, whether her responses would be the same as mother’s regarding
Native American or Alaskan-Eskimo heritage; she answered in the affirmative. The
juvenile court detained son from mother and ordered that he have no contact with her as
contact would be detrimental.
The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings
A contested jurisdictional hearing was held on May 14, 2024. A social study
report for the jurisdiction hearing identified father as a biological father.5 Son, who had
speech and learning issues, was in special education classes at his high school and he was
a Kern Regional Center client. After receiving testimony and argument, the juvenile

4 A photocopy of son’s certified birth certificate was provided, which showed no
father was listed.
5 It does not appear from the record that the juvenile court ever made a finding
concerning father’s status as either a biological, alleged, or presumed father.

                                         3.

court dismissed the section 300, subdivision (g) allegation without prejudice at the
department’s request and found the section 300, subdivision (d) allegation true. The
disposition hearing was continued to June 13, 2024.
The social study for the disposition hearing identified father as the biological
father and stated that he was son’s father. Son was placed in a resource family home in
Bakersfield. The social study stated that son had no Native American or Alaskan-Eskimo
ancestry. The family finding social worker searched numerous databases under the
names of father, paternal grandmother, who was deceased, and paternal grandfather for
paternal relatives, but was unable to locate any additional relatives. On February 16,
2024, the family finding social worker mailed an “AB 938” letter to paternal grandfather,
along with pamphlets entitled “ ‘Important Information for Relatives Considering
Placement of a Child’ ” and “ ‘Your Rights,’ ” and sent the same information to maternal
relatives. The department recommended bypass of family reunification services for
mother and that a section 366.26 hearing be set.
A supplemental report for the disposition hearing disclosed that a social worker
spoke with son on May 10, 2024. Son told the social worker he was seeing his girlfriend
at school. He felt comfortable living with the caretaker, but he wanted to be placed with
his uncle and aunt and have visits with his cousins.
At the June 13, 2024 disposition hearing, maternal uncle Donald M. (uncle)
appeared via telephone. Mother’s attorney asked that uncle be evaluated or assessed as
son’s guardian, stating that he had a bedroom that would be appropriate for son, son had
spent time with uncle and his cousins, and uncle did not have any convictions that would
prevent him from being a legal guardian. Uncle, who lived in Northern California, had
not reached out to the department because he was unsure whom to contact. County
counsel stated the social worker spoke with uncle that morning and he had not applied for
placement. Uncle confirmed to the juvenile court that his intention was to become son’s

                                         4.

guardian. The court told uncle a department representative would contact him on how to
apply for placement. Son’s attorney stated son would like uncle to be assessed and he
also wanted contact with his aunt. The court asked the department to set up a visit with
aunt and a virtual visit with uncle. The disposition hearing was continued to July 25,
2024, so uncle could be assessed for guardianship.
A supplemental report for the disposition hearing stated the family finding social
worker submitted a resource family approval assessment to Solano County on uncle’s
behalf on June 14, 2024. Solano County resource family approval provided an update on
uncle’s application on July 16, 2024. Uncle and his fiancé were enrolled in a preapproval
training module scheduled for that week and the next training date would be scheduled
after they completed the module. The department social worker spoke with uncle the
same day. Uncle stated he had been preparing to care for son as he knew there was a
possibility son would end up in his care. Uncle planned on adopting son and was looking
into adult facilities for him. Uncle, who stated he would protect son from mother, wanted
to have contact with son but had not had any telephone or virtual visits. The department
continued to recommend bypass of family reunification services for mother and setting of
a section 366.26 hearing.
At the uncontested disposition hearing held on July 25, 2024, mother objected but
did not provide any evidence or argument. The juvenile court adjudged son a dependent
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d), removed him from mother’s custody, denied
mother reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), and set a
section 366.26 hearing for November 20, 2024. The court ordered that the son have no
contact with mother, finding it to be detrimental.
The Events Leading to the Relative Placement and Section 366.26 Hearings
In a social study prepared for the November 20, 2024 section 366.26 hearing, the
department recommended that the juvenile court appoint a legal guardian for son. The

                                         5.

report contained a section on the department’s ICWA inquiry efforts, including that
mother and maternal aunt denied Indian ancestry. A family finding social worker, who
was assigned to conduct ICWA inquiries on February 9, 2024, closed the family finding
effort portion of the case on October 31, 2024, after identifying six relatives, five of
whom received “AB938 letters.” At the time of closure, son was placed in a resource
family home and there was no relative application pending. There was not enough
information known about father to locate and contact paternal relatives. An attempted
contact was made with paternal grandfather, but he did not respond. On November 6,
2024, a social worker submitted a request to the family finding unit asking them to
contact any maternal relatives, including maternal uncle, regarding ICWA.
Son was placed in the resource family home on May 9, 2024. Uncle applied for
placement on July 23, 2024, but the application was pending as of November 7, 2024.
Son’s caregiver reported that son was very friendly and childlike—he liked everyone and
enjoyed school to be around his friends. Son had a difficult time in school; he was unable
to read or write, had difficulty communicating, and he stuttered a lot. The social worker
observed that son had a good relationship with his caregiver and the social worker
believed son was comfortable in the home and liked it there. Son, who was in the tenth
grade, had an individualized educational plan for his intellectual disability and speech
and language impairment and was in special education classes. The caregiver was
committed to guardianship.
Son visited with uncle via FaceTime occasionally and had an in-person visit with
uncle since being in protective custody. The social worker spoke with son on October
29, 2024. Son stated he liked his current placement and living with his caregiver. The
social worker was unsure if son had a good understanding of adoption or guardianship,
and believed son had difficulty understanding what he was being asked or
comprehending certain questions or information. Son, whose diabetes was stable, saw an

                                          6.

endocrinologist at Valley Children’s Hospital every three months. He enjoyed going to
school and interacting with his friends. He attended an afterschool day care facility
through Kern Regional Center. He was childlike for his age and needed constant
redirection, prompting, and supervision. The department recommended a plan of
guardianship, as son was not considered generally adoptable, but the caregiver was
committed to a plan of guardianship.
In a supplemental report, the department provided an update on the ICWA
inquiries of maternal relatives. The family finding social worker called maternal great
aunt, maternal uncle, and maternal aunt, who all denied Indian ancestry, and
unsuccessfully attempted to reach maternal grandmother. The social worker noted there
was not enough information known about father to locate and contact paternal relatives.
At the November 20, 2024 hearing, son’s attorney asked for a continuance as the
attorney had asked the department to consider uncle as the legal guardian. The attorney
had spoken with uncle, who said everything was finished on his end and he was advised
he needed a home evaluation. Mother’s attorney stated she had a text conversation with
uncle who remained dedicated and committed to becoming son’s legal guardian, and the
attorney was informed uncle and his wife had passed the background check and finished
the resource family assessment process. The juvenile court granted the request for
continuance and continued the hearing to January 7, 2025.
In a supplemental report, the department reported that on December 16, 2024, the
adoption social worker, who was checking on the status of uncle’s application, learned
that a Solano County social worker was attempting to schedule a home assessment and
complete interviews and a written report. On January 2, 2025, the adoption social worker
learned the assessment would be completed the following week, but there was no
timeline for approval.

                                        7.
   The report stated that ICWA inquiries had been conducted on all maternal

relatives and there was not enough information known about father to locate and contact
paternal relatives. Maternal grandmother reported Native American ancestry, stating
maternal great-grandmother was West Indian and her family was from the Virgin Islands.
The social worker asked the family finding unit to obtain further identifying information
about maternal great-grandmother from other maternal relatives. The department
continued to recommend appointing the current caregiver as son’s legal guardian.
Mother and uncle appeared by phone at the January 7, 2025 hearing. Mother’s
attorney asked to continue the matter so uncle’s home inspection could be completed.
The attorney asked the court to either place son with uncle or order the department to go
to uncle’s home to certify it. Son’s attorney agreed with the request. County counsel did
not oppose a continuance but did object to the department being ordered to go to uncle’s
home. Uncle confirmed the home evaluation was scheduled for later that week. The
juvenile court granted the request for continuance but denied the request to order the
department to assess the home, as it seemed that Solano County dropped the ball. County
counsel asked the court “to make an ICWA finding.” The court agreed and found there
was no reason to know the child is an Indian child. The court continued the hearing to
February 20, 2025.
In a supplemental report for the February hearing, the department provided an
update on the status of uncle’s relative application. The adoption social worker spoke to
a Solano County social worker on February 6, 2024, and discussed what she knew of
son’s background and life with mother. The Solano County social worker asked about
son’s needs, because certain things came up that uncle was not sure about. The Kern
County social worker responded that she spoke with uncle when she first received the
case, as did the court intake worker, and explained to him about son’s needs.

                                        8.
   The Kern County social worker explained son’s needs to the Solano County social

worker, as she was concerned about the attention son requires and his medical needs.
Son is diabetic and requires insulin, and his blood sugar must be checked before breakfast
and dinner. The results are set up on the caregiver’s phone and go directly to his doctor.
Son is on a strict diet and cannot eat a bunch of junk food. Son has special needs and
attends an after-school program with Kern Regional Center. Son is very childlike and
easily manipulated. While he looked like a regular teen, he talked like a young child.
Son needed constant supervision and monitoring, and he could not be left alone at home.
Son visited with his aunt and cousins, who live in Bakersfield, over the holidays, and the
caregiver let son talk to his biological family and would supervise visits between them.
Son had visited uncle maybe twice when uncle was passing through Bakersfield, and
uncle would “call here and there.”
The family evaluation and written reports were completed by February 14, 2025,
and the report was expected to be approved the following week. Mother and uncle
appeared by phone at the February 20, 2025 hearing. County counsel asked that the
hearing be continued so the report could be received and a child family team meeting
held regarding placement. The juvenile court granted the request and continued the
hearing to April 8, 2025.
In a supplemental report, the department stated it received a resource family
approval certificate for uncle and his spouse from Solano County on March 12, 2025. A
staffing was held on March 26, 2025, to discuss possible placement with uncle and his
spouse. The department wanted to confirm uncle’s long-term commitment to son given
his extensive needs, clarify the care arrangement plan for son, as uncle reported working
full time, and assess uncle’s ability to protect son from mother, as uncle reportedly had
frequent contact with mother. A child family team meeting was scheduled for April 7,
2025, to discuss uncle’s commitment and a possible placement change.

                                         9.
    At the April 8, 2025 hearing, which uncle attended virtually, county counsel

requested a continuance, as the child family team meeting was held on April 7, 2025, and
it was decided that son would have an extended visit with uncle from April 11 to April
21, 2025. The juvenile court granted the request to continue the section 366.26 hearing to
May 1, 2025, and set a relative placement hearing pursuant to section 361.3 for the same
date.
In a supplemental report for the May 1, 2025 hearing, the department stated that an
action plan was developed at the April 7, 2025 child family team meeting, which
included the extended visit. The adoption social worker talked to the caregiver and met
with son on April 23, 2025. The caregiver stated that during the extended visit uncle
contacted her a few times about son’s medication; he accidentally put one of son’s
medications in the freezer and the machine on son’s arm came off. The caregiver noted
the machine sometimes came off and she told uncle he could use the other machine that
took blood sugar levels. Son mentioned to the caregiver that all he did during the visit
was go to work with uncle. The caregiver asked son what he did for Easter, and he said,
“ ‘[n]othing.’ ” Son mentioned that he got to see his grandmother and she was happy.
The caregiver did not have any concerns, but she felt son worked with uncle most of the
time and did nothing else.
Son told the social worker that they did not do anything for Easter. Son confirmed
he saw his grandmother, but he did not see his cousins as they were at school. When
asked what he did at his uncle’s house, he said they worked, went to the gym, and went
home, and denied doing anything else. The social worker asked how he felt about living
with uncle and he shrugged his shoulders and “made a face like not really.” The social
worker asked if son would rather stay with the caregiver and visit uncle or go with uncle
and visit the caregiver. Son responded that he wanted to stay with the caregiver. When

                                        10.

asked why, he responded because he would miss his friends and girlfriend. When asked
what friends, son mentioned “life house and school.”
The social worker again spoke to the caregiver, who noted uncle called about the
insulin because they were out until 8:30 in the evening. The caregiver stated that son
really did miss his friends from life house, because he spends a lot of time there. The
caregiver was willing to allow visits with uncle and family if son were left with her. The
caregiver noted son loved school and his friends, whom he would do anything for.
The adoption social worker spoke with uncle on April 24, 2025. Uncle stated the
extended visit went well, and they went to work and to the gym. Uncle noted that during
the meeting everyone kept saying son was doing well in school, but when he gave son
$100, he could not count it.6 The social worker asked if uncle’s wife worked, as it was
noted at the child family team meeting that she would be son’s primary caregiver. Uncle
responded she was not presently working, and she only took jobs when she wanted to
work. Uncle stated he could take son to work with him as his schedule was flexible and
they were trying to integrate son into his home and their lives.
The social worker asked uncle if there were any issues with son’s medications.
Uncle noted everything went well, but he accidentally put the insulin or weight loss
medication in the freezer. Uncle thought son was able to give himself medication, but he
needed to be reminded to take them. The social worker advised uncle that son needed
supervision.
The department continued to recommend that the juvenile court appoint the
current caregiver as son’s legal guardian. The department did not recommend a change
of placement because: (1) son had established friendships, as well as established

6 The social worker noted that son was doing well in his special education classes,
and at the child family team meeting they discussed that he had an individualized
educational plan.

                                        11.

medical, mental health, and regional center services; (2) he was stable in his current
placement; (3) he required a higher level of care and redirection; (4) his caregiver was
meeting all his needs and was open to visits with uncle and family; and (5) son wanted to
remain in his current placement.
The Combined Relative Placement and Section 366.26 Hearing
At the May 1, 2025 hearing, uncle appeared via video communication. The
juvenile court began with the relative placement hearing. Mother’s attorney made an
offer of proof, which the parties accepted, that uncle would testify: (1) son and uncle’s
family had an Easter dinner; (2) he and son went shopping and spent about two hours at a
guitar store where son expressed interest in learning to play the guitar; (3) uncle delayed
his marriage until the resource family assessment process and the home assessment were
completed; and (4) son was not able to meet his cousins because of the short notice for
the visit and the cousins had other plans.
Mother’s attorney argued that uncle was fully aware of the dedication required to
be a guardian, which he demonstrated by completing the relative placement process and
consistently appearing at the hearings. The attorney believed uncle would be able to
provide and assist son with reaching his potential and helping him through life.
Son’s attorney acknowledged that son had significant developmental delays, but
asserted placement with uncle would be the most permanent and stable plan for son and
son deserved to have extended family permanently in his life. The attorney wanted son to
stay where he was until the end of the school year and then transition to uncle’s home and
asked the court not to adopt the department’s recommendations but rather exercise its
discretion to place son with uncle.
County counsel argued the department’s position was for son to remain with the
current caregiver, as he had established medical, mental health, and regional center
services in the area and was doing very well in the placement. In addition, son wanted to

                                         12.

remain with the caregiver, who was open to continued visits with family. County counsel
asserted it was in son’s best interest to leave son in his current placement.
In making its ruling, the juvenile court addressed the factors under section 361.3
as follows: (1) mother, uncle, and the whole family supported placement with uncle,
while son supported placement with his current caregiver; (2) there was nothing to
indicate that uncle did not have good moral character, which weighed in uncle’s favor;
(3) uncle had a strong commitment to provide legal permanency for son, which weighed
in uncle’s favor, and while he presumably had a relationship with son since his birth, the
strength of that relationship was unknown; (4) it was clear that uncle could provide a
home and the necessities of life and a secure and stable environment, but there was not
much evidence regarding uncle’s insight into son’s diabetes diagnoses or the implications
of son’s intellectual disability, and based on the evidence, the court was not very
confident in uncle’s level of knowledge on these issues; and (5) uncle’s home was safe,
as he passed a background check.7
Finally, the juvenile court considered son’s best interest, which it did not believe
weighed in uncle’s favor. The court gave significant weight to son’s desire to stay with
the caregiver. The court also gave great weight to the fact that son was already linked up
with services in the area, including the regional center, school, and his friends.
Considering the section 361.3 factors and based on the evidence before the court, the
court decided not to order placement with uncle. The court did not believe a change of
placement was in son’s best interest at the time, as he had been in a stable placement
since May 9, 2024, and the court was not confident that uncle could meet son’s special
educational, emotional, and physical needs.

7 The juvenile court did not give any weight to factors concerning the proximity of
the parents to the placement, as the case was not in reunification and there was a no
contact order with mother, and the placement of siblings or half-siblings in the home.

                                         13.
   Turning to the section 366.26 hearing, which was uncontested, the juvenile court

found there was not clear and convincing evidence son was likely to be adopted and
ordered guardianship as the permanent plan and appointed the caregiver as son’s legal
guardian. The juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction, while retaining
jurisdiction over son pursuant to section 366.4.
DISCUSSION
I. The Relative Placement Order
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying placement
with uncle. She argues that the juvenile court erroneously assessed the evidence of
uncle’s ability to meet son’s needs, as there was evidence showing he was able to do so,
and there was no evidence that son’s services could not be replicated in Solano County.
She asserts son’s desire to remain with the caretaker was insufficient to support the
juvenile court’s decision. We conclude she lacks standing to raise this issue on appeal.
A. Appealability
As a threshold matter, we address the appealability of the order denying uncle’s
placement request. The notice of appeal, which mother’s trial counsel filed on June 5,
2025, stated mother was appealing from the findings and orders of the court made on
May 1, 2025. Under the “order appealed from” section of the form, mother marked the
boxes for “Section 366.26” and “Appointment of guardian.” The notice of appeal
contained no reference to the May 1, 2025 order denying uncle’s request for placement.
The department contends in its respondent’s brief that we do not have jurisdiction to
review the denial of uncle’s placement request because the notice of appeal does not
identify that order.
Filing a notice of appeal vests jurisdiction in the appellate court and terminates the
jurisdiction of the lower court. (Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975)
15 Cal.3d 660, 666.) A timely and proper notice of appeal is essential to vest the

                                         14.

reviewing court with appellate jurisdiction. (Associated Lumber & Box Co. v. Superior
Court (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 577, 581.) Under California Rules of Court, rule
8.405(a)(2),8 the appellant must file a notice of appeal signed by either the appellant or
his or her attorney. (In re Malcolm D. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 904, 909.) A notice of
appeal is to be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. (Rule 8.405(a)(3); In re
Daniel Z. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017.) Rule 8.405(a)(3) provides: “The notice of
appeal must be liberally construed, and is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment
or order being appealed.” (See D’Avola v. Anderson (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 358, 361.)
While ordinarily a notice of appeal will not be considered adequate if it
completely omits any reference to an order being appealed (In re Josiah S. (2002)
102 Cal.App.4th 403, 418), we will liberally construe a notice of appeal to include an
omitted order when the appeal would be timely as to that order. (In re Madison W.
(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1450–1451 [liberally construing a parent’s notice of appeal
from an order terminating parental rights to encompass the earlier denial of the parent’s
section 388 petition where the notice of appeal was filed within 60 days of the denial].)
Here, although mother did not refer to the denial of uncle’s request for relative
placement in her notice of appeal, the notice specified that she was appealing the
“findings and orders” of May 1, 2025, which included the order denying uncle’s
placement request. Because the orders denying relative placement and appointing a
guardian were made on the same date at the same hearing, and the denial of relative
placement was a precondition to the guardianship order, we liberally construe the notice
of appeal to include the denial of uncle’s placement request. (In re Madison W., supra,
141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449; In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 77–79 & fn. 4
[disagreeing with Madison W.’s broad rule but stating that liberal construction is

8 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                         15.

appropriate where orders were issued simultaneously, and it was reasonably clear the
parent intended to appeal from both orders].) Accordingly, we construe mother’s notice
of appeal as being from the appealable orders entered on May 1, 2025, to include the
order denying relative placement. (In re Daniel Z., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.)
B. Standing
The department contends mother lacks standing to raise the relative placement
issue where her reunification services had been terminated, and she was not aggrieved by
the juvenile court’s order. (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035
(Cesar V.); In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 499; In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231,
236.) We agree.
“Not every party has standing to appeal every appealable order. Although
standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts are resolved in its favor, only a
person aggrieved by a decision may appeal. [Citations.] An aggrieved person, for this
purpose, is one whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the decision in an
immediate and substantial way, and not as a nominal or remote consequence of the
decision.” (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 236.) “Accordingly, it has been held that a
parent generally does not have standing to raise placement issues on appeal where the
parent’s reunification services have been terminated. This is because decisions
concerning placement of the child do not affect the parent’s interest in reunification when
the parent is no longer able to reunify with the child.” (In re J.Y. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th
712, 717.) While there are exceptions to this general rule “when the placement may
affect the decision whether to terminate parental rights (see In re H.G. (2006)
146 Cal.App.4th 1; In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042), such is not the
case here.” (In re J.Y., at p. 718.)
Here, mother was never provided with reunification services as they were
bypassed at the June 13, 2024 disposition hearing. Thus, while mother’s parental rights

                                         16.

have not been terminated, son’s placement in this case does not affect mother’s interest in
reunification. Moreover, his placement did not have the potential to alter the juvenile
court’s determination regarding the appropriate permanent plan or otherwise affect
mother’s interest in her legal status with respect to son because there was no question that
guardianship was the appropriate plan, whether with the caregiver or uncle. (See In re
J.Y., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 718 [parent who retained parental rights over her child
did not have standing to challenge her child’s change in placement where her
reunification services were terminated long before the placement decision and tribal
customary adoption had been selected as the permanent plan].)
For this reason, this case is distinguishable from those that mother relies on, In re
H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1 and In re Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1042.
As our Supreme Court explained, in both cases the appellate courts “concluded that
parents whose rights had been terminated were aggrieved by, and thus did have standing
to appeal, pretermination orders concerning their children’s placement, because the
possibility existed that reversing those orders might lead the juvenile court not to
terminate parental rights.” (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 237.) From these cases,
the Supreme Court derived the rule that a parent’s appeal from a judgment terminating
parental rights confers standing to appeal a placement order “only if the placement
order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument against terminating parental rights.”
(Id. at p. 238.)
Here, mother offers no argument that the juvenile court’s order affected any of her
legal rights. Mother’s parental rights have not been terminated, and she does not assert
that placement with uncle would lead to a permanent plan other than guardianship.
Mother argues she preserved her right to contest the denial of placement with uncle
because at both the disposition and relative placement hearings she requested that son be
placed with him under a guardianship and the juvenile court was obligated to consider her

                                         17.

wishes under section 361.3, subdivision (a)(2).9 Comparing her case to In re H.G.,
supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1, mother asserts she has standing because she retains a
“fundamental interest in [son]’s companionship, custody, management and care.” (In re
H.G., at p. 9.)
While mother correctly states that she maintains an interest in son because her
parental rights have not been terminated, she does not explain how she is aggrieved by
the juvenile court’s order. (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 236; In re D.S. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 671, 674 [to have standing, “appellant must show how the denial of a
modification petition filed by the mother … affected his interests”].) As we have stated,
this is not a case like In re H.G., where the parent had standing to challenge the
placement decision because reversing that decision might lead the juvenile court not to
terminate parental rights. (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 237.)10
Mother asserts that in a case she contends is like the instant one, In re N.J. (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 96, the appellate court did not question the parent’s standing to appeal a
relative placement order. But that case did not address the issue of standing, and cases

9 Section 361.3, subdivision (a) provides that when a child is removed from a
parent’s physical custody, preferential consideration shall be given to a relative’s request
for placement, and in determining whether such placement is appropriate, the social
worker and court shall consider a list of factors. One of those factors is “[t]he wishes of
the parent, the relative, and the child, if appropriate.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(2).)
10 In In re H.G., the appellate court concluded that the parents, whose parental rights
had not been terminated, had a legally cognizable interest in their child’s placement with
relatives because they retained a fundamental interest in their child’s companionship,
custody, management, and care, which principle was reflected in the juvenile court’s
obligation to consider the parent’s wishes when determining whether relative placement
was appropriate. (In re H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 9–10.) The appellate court
held this interest was injuriously affected because the placement decision could alter the
court’s determination of the child’s best interests and the appropriate permanent plan and
thereby affect the parents’ interest in their legal status with respect to the child. (Id. at
p. 10.) In contrast here, mother concedes the appropriate permanent plan is the one the
juvenile court ordered, i.e., guardianship, because son is arguably not adoptable.

                                         18.

are not authority for propositions not considered. (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th
494, 502, fn. 1.) Moreover, because the parent in In re N.J. appealed from an order
terminating parental rights (In re N.J., at p. 114), the case arguably fell under the
exception articulated in In re K.C. that confers standing when reversal of the placement
order would advance the parent’s argument against termination of parental rights. (In re
K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 238.)
Because mother has not established her legal rights or interests have been
injuriously affected by the order denying uncle’s request for placement, she lacks
standing to contest the order on appeal.
II. ICWA Inquiry
Mother contends the juvenile court’s section 366.26 orders must be reversed and
the matter remanded because its finding ICWA did not apply was not supported by
substantial evidence. Specifically, mother contends the department failed to comply with
its initial ICWA inquiry duties because it did not ask paternal grandfather whether son
had Indian ancestry. We agree the department failed to comply with the initial duty of
inquiry and that limited remand is necessary.
ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum
federal standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow before removing
an Indian child from his or her family. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Isaiah W. (2016)
1 Cal.5th 1, 7–8.) The Indian child, Indian custodian, and the Indian child’s tribe have
the right to intervene in any “proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination
of parental rights to, an Indian child” (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)), and may petition the court to
invalidate any foster care placement of an Indian child made in violation of ICWA
(25 U.S.C. § 1914; see § 224, subd. (e)).

                                         19.
   For purposes of ICWA, an “Indian child” is an unmarried individual under 18

years of age who is either (1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, or (2) is
eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a
member of a federally recognized tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) & (8); see § 224.1,
subd. (a) [adopting federal definitions].)
The department’s initial duty of inquiry to determine whether a child is an Indian
child, includes “asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended
family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child
abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the
parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The juvenile court must
ask the participants in a dependency proceeding upon each party’s first appearance
“whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child, whether they know or have reason to
know that the child is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (c)), and “[o]rder the parent … to
complete Parental Notification of Indian Status ([California Judicial Council] form
ICWA-020).” (Rule 5.481(a)(2)(C), italics omitted). The parties are instructed to inform
the court “if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child
is an Indian child.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2020); see § 224.2, subd. (c).)
Here, the evidence showed that mother stated at the outset of the case when asked
about whether father had Indian heritage that she did not know anything about father’s
family because he was adopted. The department searched numerous databases for
paternal relatives but the only living relative it could locate was paternal grandfather.
The social worker mailed a letter and pamphlets to paternal grandfather, which also were
sent to maternal relatives, which apparently addressed relative placement, but since a
copy of the letter and pamphlets are not in the record, it is unknown whether they also
asked about Indian heritage. In the social study prepared for the November 20, 2024
section 366.26 hearing, the department reported it did not know enough information

                                         20.

about father to locate and contact paternal relatives, and while the department attempted
to contact paternal grandfather, he did not respond. At that time, the social worker asked
the family finding unit to contact maternal relatives regarding ICWA, but did not ask the
unit to contact paternal grandfather. The department later reported that the maternal
relatives who were called denied Indian ancestry, while maternal grandmother reported
ancestry from outside the United States. Based on this evidence, the juvenile court found
that there was no reason to know son was an Indian child.11
The department contends it made a meaningful effort to locate and interview son’s
extended relatives. There is no evidence in the record, however, that paternal grandfather
was ever asked about possible Indian ancestry. The department recognizes the only
contact was the letter sent to paternal grandfather in February 2024, but there is no
evidence that the letter asked about Indian ancestry.12 Because there is no evidence the
department asked paternal grandfather about whether son was possibly an Indian child, as
required by section 224.2, subdivision (b), the juvenile court’s finding ICWA did not
apply was not supported by substantial evidence.
The department argues inquiry of paternal grandfather was not required because
father was an alleged father since there was no finding he was the presumed or biological
father of son. The department asserts that as an alleged father, father cannot satisfy the
definition of parent under ICWA since, “[u]ntil biological paternity is established, an
alleged father’s claims of Indian heritage do not trigger any ICWA notice requirement

11 Mother does not challenge the adequacy of the inquiry of maternal relatives into
son’s possible Indian ancestry.
12 We note that ICWA may apply even though father was adopted. (In re B.R.
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 773, 785 [minors may meet definition of an Indian child where
minors are biologically related to their father and father was potentially a member of an
Apache tribe via his adoptive relationship with the minors’ grandfather].)

                                        21.

because, absent a biological connection, the child cannot claim Indian heritage through
the alleged father,” citing In re E.G. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533 (E.G.).
We are not persuaded by the department’s argument as the case it relies on, E.G.,
is inapposite. There, one of two alleged fathers claimed Indian ancestry, but the agency
did not send ICWA notice to the tribes from which the alleged father claimed he was
descended. (E.G., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1532.) The alleged father was excluded
as the minor’s biological father after the court ordered both alleged fathers to participate
in paternity testing. (Ibid.) The appellate court found no error in failing to provide
ICWA notice to the identified tribes because ICWA defines an Indian child as one who
has a biological tie to a tribe, and the alleged father was excluded as the biological parent.
(E.G., at p. 1533.)
In contrast here, father was never excluded as the biological parent. Rather,
mother claimed he was the biological father and asserted there were no other possible
fathers. The department appeared to recognize her claim of biological paternity when it
identified father as a biological father. Since father was deceased, he could not seek to
establish his biological connection or presumed father status.
We note “[t]he purpose of ICWA and related California statutes is to provide
notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine whether the child is an Indian child,
and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the proceedings.” (In re N.G. (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 474, 484.) We also note the California Supreme Court has emphasized it
is preferable to err on the side of examining thoroughly whether a minor may be an
Indian child. (See In re Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 15.)
As such, we decline to hold that just because the court had not established father’s
status, we should disregard evidence on the record that father had a biological
relationship with son. A limited remand is necessary for the court and department to
adequately inquire into whether son is an Indian child.

                                         22.
                                  DISPOSITION
   The orders appointing a legal guardianship and terminating dependency

jurisdiction are conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with
instructions to order the department to make reasonable efforts to interview paternal
grandfather about the possibility of son’s Indian ancestry and to report to the court the
results of those efforts. Nothing in this disposition precludes the court from ordering
additional inquiry of others having an interest in the child. Based on the information
reported, if the court determines that ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate the
orders appointing a legal guardian and terminating dependency jurisdiction. If further
inquiry (§ 224.2, subd. (e)) or notice to any identified tribes (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a);
§ 224.3) is warranted, the court shall make all necessary orders to ensure compliance with
ICWA and related California law.

                                                                        DESANTOS, J.

WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

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