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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Sands CA1/5

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A173582

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/11/26 P. v. Sands CA1/5

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173582
v.
PHILIP LEO SANDS, (San Francisco City & County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. Nos. CRI-02131939,
SCN184929, SCN195209)

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION1

   Philip Leo Sands was 24 years old when he committed,

among other crimes, first degree murder to prevent a witness to a
crime from testifying (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd.
(a)(10)).2 In 2005, he was sentenced to a prison term of life
without the possibility of parole for special circumstance murder.
A different panel of this division affirmed the judgment on direct
appeal. (People v. Sands (Oct. 31, 2008, A112684) [nonpub.
opn.].)

  In 2020, Sands filed a postjudgment motion in the superior

court, seeking to develop a record of mitigating circumstances for

   We resolve this appeal by a memorandum opinion
    1

pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration,
standard 8.1, and the First Appellate District Local Rules, rule
19.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                            1

an eventual youth offender parole hearing (see §§ 1203.01, 3051;
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin)). The trial
court denied that motion, explaining that Sands was statutorily
ineligible (§ 3051, subds. (b)(4), (h)) because he was over the age
of 18 when he committed a crime for which he was sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole. In People v. Sands (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 193, 197 (Sands II), this Division rejected Sands’s
equal protection argument and affirmed the trial court’s order.3
A few years later, our Supreme Court held that section 3051’s
exclusion of youth life-without-parole offenders does not violate
equal protection, “either on its face or as applied to [those]
serving life without parole sentences for special circumstance
murder” generally. (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 839
(Hardin).)

  Notwithstanding our Sands II opinion or our high court’s

Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834 decision, Sands filed at least two
more motions seeking to relitigate his entitlement to the same
relief—a Franklin hearing and/or to amend the abstract of
judgment to reflect his purported eligibility for parole after
serving 25 years. We agree with the trial court that these
motions were effectively motions for reconsideration. Sands
appeals from the trial court’s order denying his most recent
motion, wherein the trial court explained reconsideration was
inappropriate because Sands had not provided any previously
unavailable information or presented any other change in
circumstance.

  Sands’s appointed counsel on appeal filed a brief raising no

issues but seeking our independent review of the record, citing
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. But, because the
instant appeal is from an order denying postjudgment relief

  3 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our Sands

II, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 193 opinion and its underlying record.
(See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
2
rather than a first appeal as of right from a criminal conviction,
we are not required to undertake an independent review of the
record in search of arguable issues. (Id. at pp. 226, 232.) After
Sands’s appointed counsel on appeal filed a brief raising no
issues, Sands himself submitted a supplemental brief. He
suggests that the superior court erred by denying his
reconsideration motion because, at some point in between our
Sands II decision and our Supreme Court’s Hardin opinion, a
Franklin hearing took place and that his abstract of judgment
must be amended to reflect his purported eligibility for parole
after he has served 25 years in prison. We have evaluated the
arguments raised in Sands’s supplemental brief (see Delgadillo
at p. 232 [“the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific
arguments presented in [the defendant’s supplemental] brief and
to issue a written opinion”]) but conclude we lack jurisdiction to
address them and dismiss the appeal.

   The challenged order denying Sands’s most recent motion

for reconsideration is not an appealable order. A criminal
defendant has the statutory right to appeal “from a final
judgment of conviction.” (§ 1237, subd. (a).) A defendant may
also appeal “[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (Id., subd. (b).) However, our
Supreme Court recognizes a qualification to this broadly stated
rule. (People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 527.) An order
made after judgment is not appealable where the underlying
motion merely seeks to have the trial court vacate or overrule its
earlier judgment or other order—which itself could have been
reviewed on appeal. (Id. at p. 527 [order denying motion to
vacate judgment of conviction is not appealable]; In re Jeffrey P.
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1550, fn. 2 [“[a]n order denying a
motion for reconsideration is [generally] not an appealable
order”]; People v. Rick (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 410, 412 [“[a]n order
made after judgment is not appealable where the motion merely

                             3

asked the court to repeat or overrule a former ruling on the same
facts”].)

  “In such a situation appeal from the judgment is an

adequate remedy; allowance of an appeal from the order denying
the motion to vacate would virtually give defendant two appeals
from the same ruling and . . . would in effect indefinitely extend
the time for appeal from the judgment.” (People v. Thomas,
supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 527.)

   Here, Sands raised essentially the same argument in his

original motion requesting a Franklin hearing as he did in his
subsequent motions for reconsideration. The issue was
conclusively decided against Sands when he appealed from the
original (2020) order and we determined, in Sands II, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at pages 197, 201, and 205, that he was not eligible
for a Franklin hearing (or youth offender parole hearing)—under
section 3051 or equal protection principles. (See People v. Joseph
(1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 548, 551 [“the doctrine of res judicata
applies to prevent the relitigation of issues determined by a final
judgment in a prior action between the same parties”].) Allowing
Sands’s current appeal would give him more than one
opportunity to appeal from the same ruling and indefinitely
extend the period in which to appeal beyond 60 days (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.308(a)).

  Sands’s appeal must be dismissed because the most recent

order denying his motion for reconsideration is not appealable.

                      DISPOSITION

  The appeal is dismissed.

                             4
                            BURNS, J.

WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.
People v. Sands (A173582)

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