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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Brandon Lamont French v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25A-CR-01906
• Judges: May, Weissmann, Felix

• Disposition: Reversed

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (17.2K)

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Disposition

Reversed

Combined Opinion

                        by Judge May

IN THE

        Court of Appeals of Indiana
                              Brandon Lamont French,                       FILED
                                    Appellant-Defendant                Mar 11 2026, 9:46 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                               v.                         Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

                                     State of Indiana,
                                      Appellee-Plaintiff

                                       March 11, 2026
                                Court of Appeals Case No.
                                      25A-CR-1906
                        Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                    The Honorable Jennifer Prinz Harrison, Judge
                                   Trial Court Cause No.
                                    49D20-2501-F6-846

                              Opinion by Judge May
                        Judges Weissmann and Felix concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026 Page 1 of 9
[1] Brandon Lamont French appeals his five convictions of Class A misdemeanor

  Invasion of Privacy. 1 The parties raise four issues, but we find one issue

  dispositive: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain French’s

  convictions. We reverse.

  Facts and Procedural History                          2

[2] On November 19, 2024, the State charged French with a variety of offenses

  under cause number 49D20-2411-F1-033242 (“Cause 33242”), including Level

  1 felony rape, 3 Level 3 felony kidnapping, 4 and Level 3 felony criminal

  confinement. 5 The alleged victim in Cause 33242 was C.R., who was French’s

  girlfriend. In connection with Cause 33242, the trial court entered a no contact

  order. The title of the order stated: “NO CONTACT ORDER WHILE IN

  JAIL, UPON RELEASE FROM CUSTODY, ON BAIL OR PERSONAL

  RECOGNIZANCE[.]” (Ex. Vol. I at 18) (formatting in original). The body of

  the order provided:

  1
      Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(5) (2023).
  2
   We held oral argument on this case on February 24, 2026, at Vincennes University in Vincennes, Indiana.
  We commend counsel on the quality of their advocacy, and we thank Vincennes University for its
  hospitality.
  3
      Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(b) (2022).
  4
      Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(b)(3) (2019).
  5
      Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(3) (2019).

  Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026                             Page 2 of 9
          1. THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO HAVE NO
          CONTACT WITH:

          [C.R. and others], in person, by telephone or letter, through an
          intermediary, or in any other way, directly or indirectly, except
          through an attorney of record, while released from custody
          pending trial. This includes, but is not limited to, acts of
          harassment, stalking, intimidation, threats, and physical force of
          any kind.

  (Id.) (formatting in original). French did not post bail in Cause 33242, and he

  remained incarcerated in the Marion County Jail (“MCJ”) while that case was

  pending.

[3] French used his jail-provided tablet to exchange electronic messages and

  pictures with C.R. In addition, French placed several phone calls to a friend,

  who would initiate three-way calls with C.R. During these phone calls, French

  talked with C.R. about her statements to the police and the allegations against

  him in Cause 33242. He spent large portions of the calls insulting C.R. and

  accusing her of lying. He also discussed the consequences for him if he was

  found guilty in Cause 33242. When the jail restricted French’s calls, he utilized

  the accounts of other inmates to place calls. French also used third parties to

  indirectly convey messages to C.R.

  Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026           Page 3 of 9

[4] On January 9, 2025, the State charged French with three counts of Level 6

  felony attempted obstruction of justice 6 and five counts of Class A

  misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The State later amended the charges to

  include three counts of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice 7 and an

  allegation that French was a habitual offender. 8 The trial court held a jury trial

  beginning on June 11, 2025, and the jury returned a verdict finding French

  guilty of the five counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and not

  guilty of the three counts of Level 6 felony attempted obstruction of justice.

  The trial court sentenced French to one year on each count of invasion of

  privacy and ordered four of the sentences to be served consecutively for an

  aggregate term of four years.

  Discussion and Decision

[5] French asserts the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his five

  convictions. 9 Our standard of review regarding such claims is well-settled:

  6
      Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(1)(D) (2023) & Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (2014).
  7
      Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(b) & Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1.
  8
      Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.
  9
   The State contends French is estopped from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
  convictions. The State notes that during French’s closing argument, his counsel stated:
           Now, I believe in being perfectly candid. Some of them, [C.R.] was on the line, and in listening
           to the jail calls, to me, it’s pretty apparent that [French] did violate the no contact order. And as
           I’m standing here right now, I’m telling you that he, in fact, is guilty of Counts II, III, V, VII,
           and VIII. There are five Counts of Invasion of Privacy. Invasion of Privacy is the offense that’s
           charged if somebody violates a no contact order or a protective order. And it’s pretty apparent,
           listening to those jail calls, Brandon did that. He violated those. And I, as his attorney, it
           appalls me to say it, but it looks like you guys should convict him of those Five Counts.

  Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026                                       Page 4 of 9
           Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims . . . warrant a deferential
           standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
           witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence
           supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn
           from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is
           substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a
           reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty
           beyond a reasonable doubt.

  Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted).

[6] The State charged French with violating Indiana Code section 35-46-1-

  15.1(a)(5). Indiana Code section 35-46-1-15.1(a)(5) states: “A person who

  knowingly or intentionally violates . . . a no contact order issued as a condition

  of pretrial release, including release on bail or personal recognizance, or pretrial

  diversion, and including a no contact order issued under IC 35-33-8-3.6[,]”

  which specifies that a no contact order is automatically a condition of bail if a

  (Tr. Vol. II at 239.) Therefore, the State argues French cannot now argue the State failed to present sufficient
  evidence to sustain his convictions.
  We disagree. French’s counsel couched his statement as his personal opinion of French’s guilt. (See, e.g., Tr.
  Vol. 2 at 239) (“to me, it’s pretty apparent”) & (“it looks like you guys should”). French did not personally
  admit guilt after a colloquy ensuring that such an admission was knowing and voluntary. See Davis v. State,
  675 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (Ind. 1996) (“A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of constitutional rights and this
  waiver requires a trial court to evaluate the validity of every plea before accepting it. For the plea to be valid,
  the defendant’s decision to plead guilty must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”) (internal citation
  omitted). Nor did the trial court remove the question of French’s guilt on the invasion of privacy counts from
  the jury. Before sending the jury to deliberate, the trial court instructed the jury that “[s]tatements made by
  attorneys are not evidence” and “[y]our verdict should be based on the law and the facts as you find them.”
  (Tr. Vol. 2 at 247-48.) See Collins v. State, 366 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (noting “‘counsel for the
  defendant in a criminal case may, in the course of the proceedings, make an admission of fact voluntarily and
  purposely to avoid the necessity of proving it,’” but “‘[s]uch admission . . . is properly made to the court and
  a record is made of it as such. Then the court conveys to the jury such admission, through its instructions,
  and it becomes a judicial admission.’”) (quoting State v. Thomas, 15 P.2d 723, 725-26 (Kan. 1932)).
  Therefore, we hold that French’s counsel’s comments do not estop French from challenging the sufficiency of
  the evidence the State presented to sustain his conviction.

  Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026                                     Page 5 of 9
  defendant is charged with a violent crime that resulted in a bodily injury and

  the defendant is released from custody without a bail hearing.

[7] French contends that, although the State charged him with violating the no

  contact order entered in Cause 33242 by calling C.R. from jail, “the no contact

  order, by its explicit terms, only prohibited French from contacting C.R. ‘while

  released from custody pending trial.’” (Appellant’s Br. at 27) (quoting Ex. Vol.

  1 at 18). Because all his alleged contact with C.R. occurred while he was in the

  MCJ, French argues, the State failed to prove he violated the no contact order.

  We recently found French’s argument persuasive in another case that also

  originated in Marion County.

[8] In Cruz v. State, we reversed Cruz’s conviction of Class A misdemeanor

  invasion of privacy because Cruz contacted his son while incarcerated but the

  no contact order in effect at the time prohibited Cruz from contacting his son

  only when released from custody. Cruz v. State, 25A-CR-1308, 2025 WL

  3764745 at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2025) (mem.). 10 The no contact order

  entered against Cruz used substantially the same language as the no contact

  order entered in Cause 33242. It stated:

          [A]s a condition of the Defendant’s release from custody pending
          trial[,] . . . the Defendant is ordered to have no contact with . . .
          [Cruz’s son] . . ., in person, by telephone or letter, through an

  10
     While Cruz is an unpublished, memorandum decision, we may consider it for its persuasive value because
  it was issued after January 1, 2023. See Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D) (“a memorandum decision issued on or
  after January 1, 2023, may be cited for persuasive value to any court by any litigant”).

  Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026                             Page 6 of 9
          intermediary, or in any other way, directly or indirectly, except
          through an attorney of record, while released from custody pending
          trial.

  Id. (emphasis and all but third pair of brackets in Cruz). We explained that even

  though Cruz had spoken with his son in at least a dozen calls from jail, “Cruz

  was not ‘released from custody’ when any of those contacts occurred.

  Therefore, the contacts did not violate the express terms of the order.” Id.

  (internal citation omitted). While the no contact order in Cruz, like the no

  contact order entered in Cause 33242, was entitled “No Contact Order While in

  Jail Upon Release From Custody on Bail or Personal Recognizance,” id. (italics

  in Cruz), we noted that “the substance of the order, not its caption, is

  controlling.” Id. (citing Hunter v. State, 60 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App.

  2016) (holding document constituted a plea agreement even though it was titled

  “Recommendation of Plea”), trans. denied).

[9] The State notes that Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(4) allows a trial court

  to “require the defendant to refrain from any direct or indirect contact with an

  individual . . . including if the defendant has not been released from lawful

  detention.” Thus, the trial court in Cause 33242 could have ordered French not

  to have contact with C.R. while in custody, and Indiana Code section 35-46-1-

  15.1(a)(11) provides that a person who knowingly violates an order issued

  under Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.2 commits Class A misdemeanor

  invasion of privacy. However, the no contact order issued in Cause 33242 did

  not include the language prohibiting French from contacting C.R. while in

  Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026           Page 7 of 9
   custody, and we therefore hold the State presented insufficient evidence to

   sustain his convictions. 11 See, e.g., McNary v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1245, 1252 (Ind.

   Ct. App. 2025) (reversing convictions because the State failed to present

   sufficient evidence), trans. denied.

   Conclusion

[10] The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain French’s convictions for

   invasion of privacy because even though French contacted C.R. several times

   while incarcerated, the no contact order the State alleged he violated only

   prohibited him from contacting C.R. while released from custody pending trial.

   We reverse and vacate French’s convictions.

[11] Reversed.

   Weissmann, J., and Felix, J., concur.

   11
        This opinion has no effect on the proceedings in Cause 33242.

   Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026          Page 8 of 9

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Peter Laramore
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Kathy Bradley
Steven Hosler
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1906 | March 11, 2026 Page 9 of 9