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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Karen McDermott v. City of Plainfield

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1765-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (25.6K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1765-24

KAREN MCDERMOTT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF PLAINFIELD
and DANIEL LONGO, in his
professional and individual
capacity as an Inspector for
the CITY OF PLAINFIELD,1

Defendants-Respondents.

---

Submitted February 4, 2026 – Decided March 11, 2026

Before Judges Mayer and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Docket No. L-1314-19.

Krakower DiChiara LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Michael R. DiChiara, on the briefs).

1
Defendant Daniel Longo died during the pendency of this litigation. Plaintiff
signed a February 19, 2025 stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to her
claims against Longo.
Rainone Coughlin Minchello, LLC, attorneys for
respondent City of Plainfield (Frank J. Dyevoich, on
the brief).

Mason Griffin & Pierson, PC, attorneys for amicus
curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of
New Jersey (Elizabeth Zuckerman, of counsel and on
the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Karen McDermott appeals from a November 27, 2024 order

granting summary judgment to defendant City of Plainfield (City). We affirm.

The following facts are derived from statements made to officers with the

Plainfield Police Department related to an alleged sexual assault of plaintiff by

defendant Daniel Longo,2 the police reports following an investigation into the

incident, and deposition testimony.

Incident during electrical inspection of plaintiff's home

Residents are required to allow City inspectors into their homes to obtain

a certificate of compliance once they complete work for which the City issued a

permit. On April 17, 2017, Longo worked as a licensed electrical inspector for

the City's building and construction department. He conducted an electrical

inspection of plaintiff's home on that date.

2
Plaintiff's interaction with the police on April 17, 2017, and her responses to
the officers' questions were captured video through a body-worn camera.
A-1765-24
2
Longo arrived at plaintiff's home before noon on April 17. At the time,

plaintiff was on the phone with her boyfriend. According to plaintiff, Longo

stated she failed the inspection. Plaintiff's boyfriend allegedly overheard Longo

telling plaintiff that she failed the inspection.

Plaintiff said Longo requested her phone number, which plaintiff

presumed related to completion of paperwork associated with the inspection. At

her deposition, plaintiff was unable to remember many of the details regarding

the incident with Longo but specifically denied Longo propositioned her for

sexual favors in return for a passing inspection. However, plaintiff subsequently

claimed Longo conditioned the outcome of the inspection on her performing

sexual favors.

During the inspection, plaintiff remained on the phone with her boyfriend.

The boyfriend purportedly heard a struggle between plaintiff and Longo. He

testified that plaintiff said Longo sexually assaulted her. The boyfriend then

called the City's building and construction department to report the incident.

The supervisor for the City's building and construction department called the

police and requested they investigate a reported assault.

The police arrived at plaintiff's home and asked her questions regarding

the reported assault. Plaintiff explained that Longo conducted an electrical

A-1765-24
3
inspection as part of the City's issuance of a certificate of compliance. After the

inspection, plaintiff said she gave Longo a "friendly hug" and thanked him

because "he was a nice guy."

In her statement to the police, plaintiff said Longo assaulted her after he

completed his inspection. According to plaintiff, "Longo pushed [her] against

a [kitchen] countertop, bit her breast, and put his hand between [her] legs." She

did not recall having any conversation with Longo before, during, or after the

alleged assault. Plaintiff told the officers she rebuffed Longo by telling him

"no" and "stop." According to plaintiff, her dog chased Longo out of the house.

Plaintiff also told the police she knew her home passed the electrical

inspection. Longo issued a sticker confirming plaintiff's home passed the

electrical inspection before he left the house on April 17. In their report, the

police noted the presence of an inspection sticker reflecting the electrical

inspection approval.

Plaintiff further told the police that Longo called her twice after leaving

the house to apologize for making her feel uncomfortable. At her deposition,

plaintiff did not recall having any conversations with Longo after he left her

home.

A-1765-24
4
The police then spoke to Longo. The police also recorded their interaction

with Longo through a body-worn camera. Longo claimed plaintiff hugged him

tightly and kissed his neck after he completed the inspection. He denied

touching her breasts or placing his hand inside her pants. He admitted calling

plaintiff twice after he left the home to check on her because she appeared to be

under the influence or drunk during his inspection.

After speaking with plaintiff and Longo, the investigating officers

concluded there was some type of "physical interaction." However, the officers

did not believe plaintiff was being "completely truthful" because of

"inconsistencies in [her] statement of events."

City's policies governing employees

The City has written policies applicable to its employees addressing

sexual harassment, harassment, discrimination and disability accommodation,

and violence prevention. The City also has a procedure for reporting employee

complaints and investigating employee complaints. Additionally, the City

mandates criminal background checks for its employees. Despite these policies,

plaintiff asserted the City lacked a policy specifying how its inspectors were

required to conduct themselves during home inspections.

A-1765-24
5
Approximately seven months prior to inspecting plaintiff's home, Longo

passed an extensive background check under the auspices of the New Jersey

Department of Community Affairs (DCA), qualifying him to serve as a licensed

construction official. Additionally, Longo completed the City's mandatory

sexual harassment training within the year preceding his inspection of plaintiff's

home.

Other than the incident with plaintiff, Longo had no reports of any

misconduct with homeowners. The only disciplinary action against Longo

happened well after the incident with plaintiff. In that one instance, the City

disciplined Longo for using his personal cellphone at work and "taking too long

to perform inspections." Despite this disciplinary action, the City reported

Longo was "a model employee" and it "had zero cause for concern about his

competency, demeanor, and continued employment."

Plaintiff's complaint

In January 2023, plaintiff sued Longo and the City. In her complaint,

plaintiff alleged the City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to properly

supervise Longo and infringing on her constitutional right to bodily integrity

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Additionally, plaintiff asserted the City violated the New Jersey Law Against

A-1765-24
6
Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, because the City's building and

construction department constituted a "place of public accommodation" and

Longo's misconduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to materially alter the

terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment and to create a discriminatorily

abusive environment." Plaintiff also claimed the City was negligent because it

"had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect [her] from foreseeable harm while

[Longo] entered her house to conduct an inspection" and "had a duty to exercise

reasonable care to prevent Longo from using his position as an employee, and/or

agent of the City . . . to target, assault, and/or sexually assault [her]." Plaintiff

further contended the City "negligently, carelessly, and recklessly, failed and

omitted to properly, hire, retain and failed to supervise Longo, giving him access

to residents, and failed to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety

to residents, and particularly to [her]."

At the close of discovery, the City moved for summary judgment.

Plaintiff opposed the motion.

A-1765-24
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Summary judgment decision

On November 22, 2024, the judge heard argument on the City's motion.

In a November 27, 2024 amended order and written statement of reasons, the

judge entered summary judgment for the City.

Giving plaintiff every favorable inference, including that Longo said

plaintiff's home failed to pass the electrical inspection, the judge found Longo's

alleged misconduct conduct fell outside the scope of his employment with the

City. The judge rejected plaintiff's argument for expansion of liability beyond

situations between an employer-employee to hold the City liable for Longo's

purported intentional act. The judge concluded "there [wa]s no evidence to

support an assertion that . . . Longo's tortious act advanced an interest of the

City." To the extent there was a sexual assault, the judge found Longo's actions

served only his personal interest.

Regarding plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the judge, citing Monell v. New York

City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), noted plaintiff

"failed to show that a violation of 'her constitutional right to bodily integrity'

was a direct result of the City's policies or customs." Additionally, citing

Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990), the judge stated

plaintiff's "argument that a lack of a specific policy as to how inspectors should

A-1765-24
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conduct themselves in a home at best amounts to 'proof of the mere existence of

an unlawful policy or custom,' which is insufficient to maintain a cause of action

under § 1983."

The judge highlighted the City's "robust policies surrounding anti-

discrimination, general anti-harassment, anti-sexual harassment, violence

prevention, and prohibited behaviors," finding "no evidence indicating that there

were any previous complaints made against . . . Longo, that other residents were

assaulted by any City employees, or that any other course of conduct

surrounding sexual assault against homeowners was unofficially endorsed by

the City." Based on the City's "competent evidence of the policies and

procedures in place," the judge found plaintiff's "mere assertion that a lack of

policy, without more, is insufficient for a trier of fact to find [the City] is liable

under § 1983."

The judge also rejected plaintiff's "state-created danger" argument. The

judge held the facts in plaintiff's case were distinguishable from the facts

presented in Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72 (2014). The Gormley case

involved a lawsuit by an attorney who was assaulted by a patient while visiting

a psychiatric facility. Id. at 89-90. The psychiatric facility had an extensive

history of assaults committed by patients against visitors and staff. Id. at 88.

A-1765-24
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The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the "defendants affirmatively used

their authority to create a danger that made [the plaintiff] more vulnerable to the

assault." Id. at 108-09. Unlike the plaintiff in Gormley, the judge found plaintiff

failed to show sufficient "severity or pervasiveness of a danger . . . to conclude

that the City created a danger that made plaintiff vulnerable."

Additionally, the judge dismissed plaintiff's intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim, finding "no evidence that . . . Longo was acting in the

scope of his employment when the tort occurred" and explaining "[s]uch

evidence [wa]s crucial to attaching liability to the City." Based on plaintiff's

statement to the police recorded on body-worn camera footage, the judge found

the alleged assault occurred "after the completion of the electrical inspection."

Regarding plaintiff's LAD claims, even accepting plaintiff's argument that

the City's building and construction department was a "place of public

accommodation" under the LAD, the judge concluded plaintiff's claims failed

on the merits. Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency (Am. L. Inst. 1958)

(Restatement), § 219, the judge explained the City could be liable for plaintiff's

quid pro quo or hostile work environment claims under the LAD if plaintiff met

any of the following tests:

A-1765-24
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(1) A[n employer] is subject to liability for the torts of
his [employees] committed while acting within the
scope of their employment.

(2) A[n employer] is not subject to liability for the torts
of his [employees] acting outside the scope of their
employment, unless:

(a) the [employer] intended the conduct or the
consequences, or

(b) the [employer] was negligent or reckless, or

(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the
[employer], or

(d) the [employee] purported to act or to speak on
behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon
apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the [employment] relation.

[Restatement, § 219(1)-(2).]

Under the first prong, the judge found "the record indicate[d] [Longo] was

not acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the alleged assault ."

She further held the City could not be liable because the alleged assault occurred

after completion of the inspection. The judge specifically concluded plaintiff

could not satisfy any of the prongs to hold the City vicariously liable because

"Longo was subject to and informed of anti-discrimination, harassment, sexual

harassment, and violent behavior policies." Therefore, the judge held the City

was not vicariously liable for Longo's purported actions under the LAD.

A-1765-24
11
The judge also rejected plaintiff's argument that the training Longo

received was insufficient because it did not include any policies specifically

addressing sexual harassment of homeowners. The judge found "it [wa]s plainly

apparent that . . . Longo's training was meant to encompass all persons whom

City employees encountered" and the City's "failure to include the phrase

'homeowners' in the various policies d[id] not create a genuine issue of material

fact."

Additionally, the judge dismissed plaintiff's hostile work environment

claim. The judge concluded plaintiff was never an employee of the City and,

therefore, could not assert a hostile work environmental claim. Further, even if

she were a City employee, the judge rejected plaintiff's contention that this

single incident rose to the requisite level of severity, from the perspective of a

reasonable person, to demonstrate the working environment was hostile. The

judge expressly found Longo's alleged assault "was a single and isolated

incident."

In dismissing plaintiff's negligence claims, the judge reiterated the City

could not be liable under traditional negligence theories because Longo was not

acting within the scope of employment at the time of the alleged assault.

A-1765-24
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Regarding plaintiff's negligent hiring claim, the judge stated that the City

"did not know or have reason to know of . . . Longo's dangerous characteristics

at the time of hiring or during his employment." Based on evidence in the

record, the judge found there were "no previous complaints made by any

residents regarding . . . Longo." The judge also explained Longo "passed an

extensive background check" by the DCA prior to receiving his construction

official license and underwent "an additional mandatory background check

policy" by the City before he became an employee. Further, based on the facts

adduced in the record, the judge determined "Longo did not lack adequate

training" or "[need] additional supervision on the job." The judge explained that

Longo's being disciplined by the City for "taking too long to perform inspections

and . . . using his personal cellphone during work hours" did not create a genuine

issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's negligent supervision claim.

After considering the evidence, the judge concluded plaintiff failed "to

establish that the City could have reasonably known that defendant Longo was

dangerous and capable of putting members of the public, such as plaintiff, at

risk of harm and failed to act on such knowledge." Thus, the judge entered

summary judgment in favor of the City and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with

prejudice.

A-1765-24
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On appeal, plaintiff contends the judge erred in granting summary

judgment to the City because there were genuine issues of material fact

regarding the City's liability for Longo's purported misconduct. Plaintiff asserts

the City should be vicariously liable under § 219 of the Restatement even if

Longo was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the

alleged assault. Additionally, plaintiff argues the City's building and

construction department constitutes a "place of public accommodation" and,

therefore, should be vicariously liable for Longo's purported misconduct under

her theory of liability premised on quid pro quo or hostile work environment.

On October 22, 2025, the National Employment Lawyers Association

(NELA) moved to appear as amicus curiae in support of plaintiff's appeal. In a

November 7, 2025 order, we granted NELA's application. NELA submitted a

brief addressing the viability of plaintiff's harassment claim against the City

under the LAD.

We reject the arguments presented by plaintiff and NELA.

When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply the same

standard as the trial court. Boyle v. Huff, 257 N.J. 468, 477 (2024). A trial

court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

A-1765-24
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Gayles by

Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2021)

(quoting Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of

Pittsburgh, 244 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)). A genuine issue of material fact exists

"only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by

the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom

favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier

of fact." Ibid. (quoting Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24

(2017)). "If 'the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter

of law,' summary judgment is proper." Meade v. Twp. of Livingston, 249 N.J.

310, 327 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520,

540 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We first consider whether the judge erred in finding the City could not be

vicariously liable to plaintiff for Longo's alleged misconduct. We find no error

in the judge's determination.

Plaintiff does not contend Longo was acting within the scope of his

employment when he purportedly assaulted her. Rather, plaintiff argues the City

is vicariously liable for Longo's conduct because "an employer may be held

A-1765-24
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liable even under circumstances where it appears that an employee's misconduct

was not necessarily motivated by a desire to benefit the employer."

Employers may be held vicariously liable for an employee's misconduct

under § 219(2) of the Restatement. See also Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225

N.J. 400, 414 (2016). Section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement provides: "A master

is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of

their employment, unless: . . . (b) the master was negligent or reckless." Section

219(2)(d) of the Restatement imposes vicarious liability against an employer if

the employee acted with apparent authority and was aided in accomplishing the

sexual assault through his position as the employee. We agree with the judge

that plaintiff's proofs are insufficient to establish vicarious liability against the

City under § 219(2)(b) or (d) of the Restatement.

Under § 219(2)(b) of the Restatement, to assert vicarious liability against

an employer, a plaintiff must establish "that an employer was negligent by its

failure to have in place well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies,

effective formal and informal complaint structures, training, and/or monitoring

mechanisms." Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 621 (1993). A court

should consider "[t]he means employed by an institution to deter harassment[]

and the enforcement of those means," such as policies and training programs,

A-1765-24
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when "assessing that institution's vicarious liability for the actions of an

individual over whom the institution exercises control." Godfrey v. Princeton

Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 200 (2008).

Plaintiff asserts the City "failed to provide any training to employees such

as Longo concerning sexual harassment and homeowners[,] . . . failed to

implement any policies concerning how inspectors like Longo were to conduct

themselves inside of someone's home," and lacked a complaint procedure for

homeowners to report sexual harassment or sexual assault. Having reviewed the

record, we are satisfied the City produced documents evidencing policies

prohibiting discriminatory and harassing conduct by City employees when

interacting with the public.

Additionally, the judge found Longo received training on the City's anti-

discrimination and anti-harassment policies the same year as the alleged assault.

The judge found "a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the City

intended for . . . Longo to allegedly commit sexual assault [and] that the City

was negligent or reckless in training Longo on these policies." Plaintiff failed

to present any evidence identifying City employees who violated the City's

policies regarding interactions with homeowners aside from her allegation

against Longo.

A-1765-24
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On these facts, the judge did not err in finding Longo received anti-

discrimination and anti-harassment training from the City. Based on the

implementation of policies and training governing its employees, the City was

not negligent or reckless under Section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement to be

vicariously liable for Longo's alleged misconduct.

Nor is the City liable for Longo's actions under § 219(2)(d) of the

Restatement. Under that section, plaintiff argues an employer may be held liable

if the employee "could not perform the acts with[out] the aid of their employer."

She asserts the City should be held liable for Longo's actions because the alleged

assault occurred during a City-mandated inspection for the issuance of a

certificate of compliance.

Because the alleged sexual assault was unrelated to Longo's duties and

activities as a City electrical inspector, plaintiff's argument fails on its merits.

Based on the evidence, the judge concluded Longo was not acting within the

scope of his duties because the alleged assault occurred after Longo completed

the inspection. The judge held Longo's alleged misconduct did not act or speak

for the City under § 219(d)(2) of the Restatement. We are satisfied the judge

correctly concluded any alleged assault by Longo occurred after he completed

A-1765-24
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the inspection and, therefore, the purported assault was unrelated to the City-

required inspection of plaintiff's home.

We next consider plaintiff's argument that the judge erred in concluding

the City could not be vicariously liable for Longo's alleged sexual harassment

under the LAD. We disagree.

The LAD's "overarching purpose is to eradicate discrimination in society"

and "was enacted 'to protect the public's strong interest in a discrimination -free

workplace.'" Savage v. Twp. of Neptune, 257 N.J. 204, 216 (2024) (citation

omitted) (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600). "The LAD should be construed

liberally." Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 371 N.J. Super. 333, 345 (App. Div. 2004)

(citing Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort, 333 N.J. Super. 206, 217 (App. Div.

2000)).

Plaintiff, construing the LAD liberally, argues the City's building and

construction department qualifies as a "place of public accommodation." Based

on her assertion, plaintiff claims the judge erred in granting summary judgment

to the City on her quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims.

N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1) states "[i]t shall be . . . unlawful discrimination . . .

[f]or any . . . agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation directly

or indirectly to refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the

A-1765-24
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accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof . . . on account of

the . . . sex . . . of such person." N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(l) identifies a non-exclusive

list identifying "place[s] of public accommodation." Importantly, the statute

states: "Nothing herein shall be construed to include or to apply to any

institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature

distinctly private." Ibid.

"To help decide whether an entity qualifies as a public accommodation,

courts examine 'whether the entity engages in broad public solicitation,

maintains close relationships with the government or other public

accommodations, or whether it is similar to enumerated or other previously

recognized public accommodations.'" Ptaszynski, 371 N.J. Super. at 346

(quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 160 N.J. 562, 589 (1999)). "Interaction

with the public is a key factor in determining whether an entity qualifies as a

public accommodation under the statute." Ibid.

Here, giving plaintiff every favorable inference in opposition to the City's

motion, the judge presumed the City's building and construction department

constituted a "place of public accommodation" even though the alleged assault

occurred in a private home. Notwithstanding the judge's presumption that

plaintiff's private home could be deemed a "place of public accommodation,"

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the judge concluded the City was not vicariously liable for Longo's alleged

sexual harassment under the LAD.

"[S]exual harassment in a place of public accommodation constitutes

discrimination 'on account of . . . sex 'in the furnishing' of 'any of the

accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges' of 'any place of public

accommodation.'" C.V. by & through C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255

N.J. 289, 309 (2023) (quoting N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)). Under New Jersey law,

there are

two types of actionable sexual harassment: (1) "[q]uid
pro quo sexual harassment," "when an employer
attempts to make an employee's submission to sexual
demands a condition of . . . employment"; and (2)
"[h]ostile work environment sexual harassment,"
"when an employer or fellow employees harass an
employee because of . . . sex to the point at which the
working environment becomes hostile."

[Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Lehmann, 132
N.J. at 601).]

"[I]n cases of supervisory sexual harassment, whether the harassment is

of the quid pro quo or the hostile work environment type, the employer is

directly and strictly liable for all equitable damages and relief." Lehmann, 132

N.J. at 617.

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Quid pro quo sexual harassment "involves an implicit or explicit threat

that if the employee does not accede to the sexual demands, he or she will lose

his or her job, receive unfavorable performance reviews, be passed over for

promotions, or suffer other adverse employment consequences." Id. at 601.

While these actions traditionally involved employer-employee relationships,

New Jersey courts have expanded the scope of actionable quid pro quo conduct

to encompass general business relationships. See J.T.'s Tire Serv., Inc. v. United

Rentals N. Am., Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 236, 242 (App. Div. 2010) (finding quid

pro quo harassment claim proper where the defendant refused to buy from or

contract with the plaintiff absent the plaintiff's female owner acceding to sexual

demands from the defendant's branch manager).

Because the judge determined Longo was not acting within the scope of

his employment at the time of the alleged assault, the judge declined to address

plaintiff's quid pro quo claim. Even if the judge had addressed plaintiff's quid

pro quo claim on the merits, we are satisfied plaintiff is unable to prevail on

such a claim. Quid pro quo claims require an employer-employee work

relationship or refusal to enter into a contract or termination of a contract based

on sex. Here, the parties had no such relationship at the time of the alleged

A-1765-24
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assault. Thus, the judge did not err in dismissing plaintiff's quid pro quo claim

under the LAD.

Nor did the judge err in finding the City could not be vicariously liable

for creating a hostile work environment under the LAD. To succeed on a hostile

work environment sexual harassment claim, "a plaintiff must allege conduct that

'(1) would not have occurred but for the employee's gender'; and that 'was (2)

severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable woman believe that (4 ) the

conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or

abusive.'" C.V., 255 N.J. at 309 (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603-04)

(emphasis omitted). "Severe or pervasive" means "whether a reasonable person

would believe that the conditions of employment have been altered and that the

working environment is hostile." Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr.,

174 N.J. 1, 24 (2002) (citing Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 604).

Plaintiff cannot prevail on her hostile work environment claim under the

LAD because she lacked a work relationship with the City or Longo at the time

of the alleged assault. To establish a hostile work environment claim, there must

have been a working relationship. Because there was no working relationship

between plaintiff and the City or between plaintiff and Longo, the judge did not

err in rejecting plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.

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To avoid rejection of her hostile work environment claim, plaintiff and

NELA suggest substitution of the term "work environment" with "place of

public accommodation." However, neither plaintiff nor NELA identified any

New Jersey case law to support their argument.

While New Jersey courts have expanded the Lehmann standard beyond

workplace relationships, the case law as expanded is expressly limited to school

settings. See C.V., 255 N.J. at 311 ("[T]he Lehmann standard should apply in

the workplace and in the school setting" because "[s]tudents in the classroom

are entitled to no less protection from unlawful discrimination and harassment

than their adult counterparts in the workplace.") (second alteration in original)

(quoting L.W. ex rel. L.G. v. Toms River Reg'l Schs. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381,

405-06 (2007)). Plaintiff and NELA cited no New Jersey cases expanding the

Lehmann test beyond the workplace and school settings. Thus, the judge did

not err in rejecting plaintiff's LAD arguments and granting summary judgment

in favor of the City.

To the extent we have not addressed any of the arguments presented by

plaintiff or NELA, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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