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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re PVF Industrial Supply, Inc. v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 06-26-00021-CV
• Nature of Suit: Mandamus

• Disposition: Conditionally Granted

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (35)

• PDF

Disposition

Conditionally Granted

Lead Opinion

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

              No. 06-26-00021-CV

    IN RE PVF INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC.

         Original Mandamus Proceeding

  Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

   Relator, PVF Industrial Supply, Inc., has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking

relief against Respondent, the Honorable Craig L. Henry, presiding judge of the Bowie County

Court at Law, due to his denial of PVF’s motion for leave to designate a responsible third party

in the underlying lawsuit. Because PVF’s motion should have been granted, and because PVF

does not have an adequate appellate remedy, we conditionally grant PVF’s petition for a writ of

mandamus.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

   This matter involves a personal injury lawsuit. On April 26, 2022, Faith Lawson, the

driver of a United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) delivery van, was struck while she was parked by a

truck driven by Christopher J. Hudspeth, Jr. Hudspeth was acting within the course and scope of

his employment with PVF during the accident. On February 23, 2024, Lawson sued Hudspeth

and PVF before the statute of limitations expired on April 26, 2024.

   PVF’s initial disclosures were not due until after the statute of limitations passed.

Because discovery was pending, PVF’s initial disclosures stated that it believed the parties in the

lawsuit were correctly named. However, during discovery, PVF learned that Lawson was parked

partially in the street and within the lane of travel during the collision, even though she allegedly

had sufficient room to pull into the driveway of the business she was delivering packages to.

During Lawson’s July 30, 2025, deposition, which was not certified until August 13 by the court

reporter, PVF learned that Lawson was not provided with any written training materials but

parked where she did due to her training.

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    On October 2, 2025, PVF filed a motion to designate UPS as a responsible third party and

alleged that UPS negligently trained and supervised Lawson in “failing to instruct its employees

not to park in the lane of traffic in violation of the Texas Transportation Code and failure to

establish safety and risk management protocols and procedures when safe parking is not

available.” PVF also supplemented its initial disclosures to identify UPS as a potential party.

Lawson objected to PVF’s designation motion on the ground that the statute of limitations

expired on April 26, 2024.

    On November 18, 2025, the trial court denied PVF’s motion because it “did not list any

responsible third party in its initial disclosures.”

II. Standard of Review

    “Mandamus relief is warranted when a trial court clearly abuses its discretion and the

relator has no adequate remedy by appeal.” In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. 2022)

(per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36

(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). When a trial court errs by denying a motion for leave to

designate a responsible third party, mandamus relief is appropriate because “[a]llowing a case to

proceed to trial despite erroneous denial of a responsible-third-party designation ‘would skew the

proceedings, potentially affect the outcome of the litigation, and compromise the presentation of

[the relator’s] defense in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record.’” In re Coppola,

535 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (second alteration in original)

(quoting In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig.

proceeding [mand. denied])).

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III. Analysis

    “By special definition, a ‘responsible third party’ is ‘any person who is alleged to have

caused or contributed to causing in anyway the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.’”

Id. at 508 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.011(6)).

    A defendant may seek to designate a person as a responsible third party by filing a
    motion for leave to designate that person as a responsible third party. The motion
    must be filed on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds
    good cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later date.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(a). Here, because no trial date has been set, PVF’s

motion was timely.

    “A court shall grant leave to designate the named person as a responsible third party

unless another party files an objection to the motion for leave on or before the 15th day after the

date the motion is served.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(f). Even when an

objection is filed,

    the court shall grant leave to designate the person as a responsible third party
    unless the objecting party establishes:

            (1)    the defendant did not plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged
            responsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading requirement of the
            Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; and

            (2)     after having been granted leave to replead, the defendant failed to
            plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to
            satisfy the pleading requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(g) (emphasis added).

                                              4
   Here, Lawson’s objection to PVF’s motion did not argue that PVF failed to plead

sufficient facts concerning UPS’s alleged responsibility. Instead, Lawson argued that PVF could

not designate a responsible third party due to the language of Section 33.004(d), which states,

   A defendant may not designate a person as a responsible third party with respect
   to a claimant’s cause of action after the applicable limitations period on the cause
   of action has expired with respect to the responsible third party if the defendant
   has failed to comply with its obligations, if any, to timely disclose that the person
   may be designated as a responsible third party under the Texas Rules of Civil
   Procedure.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(d). Yet, the plain language of Section 33.004(d)

shows that it did not apply. This is so because PVF did not fail to comply with its obligations

regarding timely disclosure. Its initial disclosures were not due until after the statute of

limitations expired, and its supplemental disclosures identifying UPS as a responsible third party

were based on what it learned during discovery.

   In In re Mobile Mini, Inc., the Supreme Court of Texas held that Section 33.004(d) does

not deprive a defendant of its statutory right to designate a potential responsible third party

where its discovery responses are due after limitations have run on the plaintiff’s claims. In re

Mobile Mini, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 781, 784–87 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding). The

Supreme Court of Texas explained,

   Because a timely disclosure in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil
   Procedure is all that is required of the defendant under the statute, requiring an
   earlier disclosure in suits filed mere days before the expiration of the statute of
   limitations is repugnant to the statutory language, unfairly burdens defendants,
   and skews the legislatively determined balance of interests.

Id. at 786–87.

                                              5
    Also, Section 33.004(d) does not apply here for another reason. The “Legislature’s

goal—evident from the statutory text—[is to] prevent[] a defendant from delaying a third-party

designation beyond the limitations period in order to deprive the plaintiff of an opportunity to

sue the third party.” In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 809. UPS is a subscriber to workers’

compensation, and “[r]ecovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an

employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage . . . for . . . a work-related

injury sustained by the employee.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a). Lawson received

workers’ compensation benefits. The Supreme Court of Texas has found that there is “no

applicable limitations period for the plaintiff to join [a] third-party employer as a defendant on

[a] tort cause of action [where the employer’s] exclusive remedy . . . was workers’

compensation.” In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 807.1 As a result, Section 33.004(d) does not bar

a third-party designation against UPS.

    We find that PVF has met the requirements to obtain mandamus relief from the trial

court’s order denying its motion for leave to designate a responsible third party.

1
When asked for a response to PVF’s petition for a writ of mandamus, Lawson wrote that, in light of In re YRC Inc.,
she finds a “motion for rehearing more appropriate, and would have consented to the same.” As a result, Lawson’s
response “prays for an order granting relief for which this Court deems appropriate.”
6
IV. Conclusion

   We conditionally grant the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to

vacate its November 18, 2025, order denying PVF’s motion for leave to designate a responsible

third party. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply with this Court’s directive.

                                           Charles van Cleef
                                           Justice

Date Submitted: March 10, 2026
Date Decided: March 11, 2026

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