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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

City of Detroit v. Lloyd Joseph Simpson Jr

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 369523
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.8K)

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Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF DETROIT, UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 10:16 AM

V No. 369523
Wayne Circuit Court
LLOYD JOSEPH SIMPSON, JR., LC Nos. 23-002157-01-AR; 23-
002158-01-AR
Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and TREBILCOCK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Lloyd Simpson, Jr., appeals as on leave granted1 the circuit court order
reversing the district court’s order granting Simpson’s motion to dismiss for violation of his right
to a speedy trial. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the circuit court order.

I. BASIC FACTS

Simpson was arrested on July 10, 2020, during a protest. Approximately one month later,
he was charged with disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor under Detroit’s City Ordinances. See
Detroit Ordinances, § 31-5-1. In January 2021, that case was dismissed as a result of a motion
filed by the City of Detroit (the City). Approximately three months later, in May 2021, the City
filed a new complaint, charging Simpson with two different misdemeanors arising from the same
protest incident: interference with a government employee performing their duty, Detroit
Ordinances, § 31-2-2, and loitering—impeding pedestrian or vehicular traffic, Detroit Ordinances,
§ 31-5-7.

1
Detroit v Simpson, ___ Mich ___; 20 NW3d 541 (2025).

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While the case was pending, Simpson made multiple demands for a jury trial. He was not
incarcerated while awaiting trial. Instead, he has been enrolled in a Ph.D. program at the
University of Michigan, and, according to his brief on appeal, he is employed as a teaching
assistant in the University of Michigan’s Department of History.

On April 5, 2023, approximately 33 months after his arrest, Simpson filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the delay in bringing his case to trial violated his constitutional right to a
speedy trial. Following a hearing on the motion, the district court dismissed the charges against
him. The City filed an appeal in the circuit court, which reversed the district court and reinstated
the charges. Simpson eventually filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in this Court, which
we denied.2 Thereafter, Simpson filed an application for leave to appeal in our Supreme Court,
which was remanded to us for consideration as on leave granted.

II. SPEEDY TRIAL

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Simpson contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated. We review de novo issues
of constitutional law, including whether a defendant was denied his or her right to a speedy trial.
People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). The court’s factual findings related
to a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds are reviewed for clear error. Id. “Clear error exists
if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
People v Stone, 269 Mich App 240, 242; 712 NW2d 165 (2005).

B. ANALYSIS

The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Michigan
Constitution. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. In Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530;
92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court identified four factors to
consider when evaluating speedy-trial claims: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3)
defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. Michigan courts have
adopted Barker’s balancing test to evaluate claims that a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial. People v Smith, ___ Mich App __, _; __ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No.
362114); slip op at 3 n 1. We consider each factor in turn.

1. LENGTH OF DELAY

The first factor, which considers the length of the delay, is “to some extent a triggering
mechanism.” Barker, 407 US at 530. The particular circumstances of a case dictate what length
of delay necessitates an inquiry into the other factors. Id. However, prejudice is presumed after a
delay of eighteen or more months, “and the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that there was

2
Detroit v Simpson, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 19, 2024 (Docket
No. 369523).

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no injury.” Williams, 475 Mich at 262. “The time for judging whether the right to a speedy trial
has been violated runs from the date of the defendant’s arrest.” Id. at 261.

Simpson contends, that, as of the time that he filed his brief on appeal, the length of the
delay has increased to almost 60 months and that it will continue to increase throughout the
appellate process. However, “time reasonably consumed on appeal cannot be considered as in
derogation of a speedy trial.” People v Chism, 390 Mich 104, 113; 211 NW2d 193 (1973).
Simpson has identified no portion of the appellate process that has led to an unreasonable delay.
And, because each application for leave to appeal was filed by Simpson, any such delay would
certainly be attributable to the defense, not the prosecution. Accordingly, the relevant time period
runs from Simpson’s arrest in July 2020 until the court dismissed his case for the second time in
April 2023. The parties agree that the length of the delay was approximately 33 months. Because
the delay is greater than 18 months, the City bears the burden of overcoming the rebuttable
presumption of prejudice, and we must consider the remaining Barker factors. See Williams, 475
Mich at 262.

1. REASON FOR THE DELAY

Under the second Barker factor, different reasons for delay are to be weighed differently.
Barker, 407 US at 531. “In assessing [the reason for the delay], reviewing courts may consider
which portions of the delay were attributable to each party . . . and may attribute unexplained
delays—or inexcusable delays caused by the court—to the prosecution.” Smith, ___ Mich App at
__; slip op at 3. Delays between a dismissal without prejudice and the reinstatement of charges
“should not be attributed to either [the prosecution or the defense] because there [were] no charges
pending against [the] defendant” during the period between the dismissal and the reinstatement of
charges. People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 111; 503 NW2d 701 (1993). “[D]elays inherent
in the court system, e.g., docket congestion, are technically attributable to the prosecution, [but]
they are given a neutral tint and are assigned only minimal weight in determining whether a
defendant was denied a speedy trial.” Williams, 475 Mich at 263 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are not attributable to the prosecution.
Smith, __ Mich App at ___; slip op at 1. Delays caused by requests for adjournments should be
attributed to the party that requests the adjournment. See People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 113;
605 NW2d 28 (1999) (weighing delays caused by the defense’s requests for adjournments against
the defense).

The trial court found that up to six months of delay were caused by Simpson’s requests for
an adjournment. On appeal, Simpson contends that, contrary to two entries in the register of
actions, he did not request any adjournments. He directs this Court to the transcripts related to the
two entries on the register of actions. However, contrary to his assertion on appeal, the transcripts
do not unambiguously refute his claim that he did not request an adjournment at the hearings held
on September 23, 2021, and March 29, 2022.

Instead, at the September 23, 2021, hearing, Simpson’s lawyer stated that there had been
an off-the-record discussion before the hearing began. She stated that she understood that a pretrial
would be set for December 8, 2021, and the matter was on track for a jury trial. Nothing in the
transcript contradicts the entry in the register of actions stating that Simpson’s lawyer requested
an adjournment and was seeking a 2022 jury trial. The fact that the request was not made on the

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record is not definitive proof that the defense did not request an adjournment during the off-the-
record discussion. In turn, the transcript of the March 29, 2022, hearing reflects that the matter
was set for pretrial on June 7, 2022. Simpson’s lawyer responded by acknowledging the date,
thanking the judge, and offering her apologies. Again, there is no mention on the record as to
whether Simpson’s lawyer did or did not request an adjournment. But, considering that she
thanked the judge for setting the new pretrial date, and offered apologies, it is reasonable to infer
that the judge was accommodating her in some way. Regardless, the transcripts for both hearings
are silent on the matter of whether the defense requested an adjournment, and, as a result, they do
not contradict the entries in the register of actions stating that the defense requested an adjournment
on both occasions. The trial court, accordingly, did not clearly err by relying upon the entries in
the register of actions to conclude that the defense requested two adjournments in the case.

We note that the trial court’s finding that there were two defense requests for an
adjournment is consistent with the initial arguments of Simpson’s lawyer. During the hearing in
the district court on the motion to dismiss, the City’s lawyer argued that Simpson had contributed
to the delay by requesting two adjournments. In response, Simpson’s lawyer stated that “[e]ven
assuming arguendo that we attribute the five-month delay to Mr. Simpson, there’s still an
additional 28-month delay that weighs in favor [of dismissal], but its attributable to the
prosecution.” She did not deny requesting the adjournments. Instead, in response to the City’s
appeal, Simpson’s lawyer expressly acknowledged that the defense “requested two adjournments
during the pendency of the proceedings.” She went on to argue in a brief that the delay caused by
those defense requests only resulted in “12 % of the total delay.” Given that Simpson has had the
same lawyer for the entirety of the proceedings, we conclude that her representations in both the
district court and the circuit court regarding the defense requests for an adjournment provide
further support for the veracity of the entries in the register of actions.

The trial court found that the delay caused by the adjournment requests was approximately
six months. That six-month delay is, therefore, properly attributed to Simpson.

The circuit court also found that a portion of the delay was caused by the COVID-19
pandemic. In doing so, the court took judicial notice of “the effects and consequences of the
COVID phenomenon.” The court found:

Courts shuts down during 2020, the last nine months of 2020, and in substantial
ways access to the court was not permitted and few, very few cases went to trial in
2021. Witnesses were not allowed in buildings. Jurors were not allowed in
buildings.

We agree that at least part of the delay in this case is properly attributable to the COVID-19
pandemic and its impact on court administration. Again, “delays caused by the COVID-19
pandemic are not attributable to the prosecution for purposes of a speedy-trial claim. Unlike delays
inherent in the court system which are attributable to the prosecution, delays resulting from
emergency public-health measures during an unprecedented global pandemic are anything but.”
Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5 (citation and emphasis omitted). The record is poorly
developed as to the exact length of delay in Simpson’s case that is properly attributable to the
COVID-19 pandemic. However, the circuit court in this case took judicial notice of the impact of
COVID-19, noting that “[c]ourts shut down during 2020, the last nine months of 2020, and in

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substantial ways access to the court was not permitted and few, very few cases went to trial in
2021.” On appeal, Simpson acknowledges that it is “true” that “jury trials were halted for much
of 2020, and to some extent” jury trials were affected “in 2021.”3 Additionally, the City has
similarly stated that, because of the pandemic, the court was “shut down from March to June of
2020, and also from November 2020 to January 2021.” Consequently, we conclude that the period
of time when jury trials were suspended, and the delay caused by “the ensuing accumulation of
cases awaiting trial,” greatly contributed to the 18-month delay between Simpson’s July 2020
arrest and the beginning of 2022. See id. at ___; slip op at 6.

Moreover, we would be remiss to not recognize that there were other reasons for the delay
during that same timeframe. First, the original charges were dismissed on January 29, 2021, and
different charges stemming from the same protest were charged on May 3, 2021. Because there
were no charges pending against Simpson for approximately three months, that period of delay is
not attributable to either the prosecution or the defense. See Wickham, 200 Mich App at 111.
Second, the defense’s first request for an adjournment occurred on September 23, 2021, which was
in the timeframe when, according to the circuit court in this matter, jury trials were still being
impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. That delay is attributable to the defense, notwithstanding
the fact that the court’s COVID-19 response was still negatively impacting jury trials during the
same timeframe.

We next consider the period of delay between the start of 2022 until Simpson filed his
motion to dismiss in April 2023. Approximately three months of that delay is attributed to the
defense as a result of the March 2022 request for an adjournment. The remainder of the delay
appears to be related to the fact that Simpson’s case was assigned at least three times between
April 2022 and February 2023. It is possible these reassignments were caused by pandemic-related
court administration issues, but the record does not provide an explanation. Consequently, these
unexplained reassignments may be “ ‘technically attributable to the prosecution’ ” but should be “
‘assigned only minimal weight.’ ” Williams, 475 Mich at 263 (citations omitted).

In sum, a substantial portion of the delay was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and
its impact on court administrations. That portion of the delay seems to total approximately 18
months (July 2020 until January 2022). In that 18-month period, approximately three months of
delay were caused by the dismissal of the original charge and then the issuance of new charges.
Another three months were attributed to a defense motion for an adjournment. That means that 15
months during that 18-month period are not accountable to either the prosecution or the defense.
The remaining period of delay, after January 2022, is not insubstantial. Rather it accounts for
approximately another 15 months of delay. Approximately three months of that 15-month period
is attributable to the defense. That leaves approximately 12 months of delay, which appear to be
the result of congestion in the court and repeated judicial reassignments. That period of delay is

3
Notwithstanding that acknowledgment, Simpson maintains that his case appears “to be relatively
unaffected by the pandemic.” His position ignores the backlog created by suspended and limited
court operations throughout the pandemic. It would be inaccurate to suggest that “delays caused
by the COVID-19 pandemic” excludes all delays that accrued during closures and required
resolution after court operations resumed. Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5.

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counted against the prosecution, but is given “minimal weight.” However, considering that it
accounts for more than twice the period of delay that is attributed to the defense, on balance, this
factor appears to favor neither the prosecution nor the defense.

1. ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

The next factor considers the defendant’s assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial.
Barker, 407 US at 531. It is defendant’s responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial, and such
an assertion is assigned “strong evidentiary weight.” Id. “[The] failure to assert the right will
make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Id. at 532.
Additionally, it is important to discern between asserting the right to a jury trial and asserting the
right to a speedy trial. In Barker, the United States Supreme Court distinguished the right to a
speedy trial from other rights, including the right to demand a jury trial, in its discussion of waiver,
noting a “speedy trial is unique in its uncertainty as to when and under what circumstances it must
be asserted or may be deemed waived.” Id. at 529. In contrast, the right to a jury trial “must be
exercised or waived at a specific time or under clearly identifiable circumstances.” Id. A demand
for a jury trial, therefore, is not synonymous with a demand for a speedy trial.

On appeal, Simpson claims that he first asserted the right on January 22, 2021, when he
filed a motion to dismiss the original charge against him.4 He also argues the register of action
entries from September 23, 2021, and March 29, 2021, reflect that he asserted his right to a speedy
trial. However, the register of actions indicates that Simpson asserted his right to a jury trial on
those dates. There is nothing to support a finding that he simultaneously asserted his right to a
speedy trial. Rather, having considered the entirety of the record, we conclude that there is no
indication that Simpson asserted his right to a speedy trial until his April 5, 2023, motion to
dismiss.

In Williams:

The trial court weighed the third prong of the Barker test heavily against defendant.
As of the final pretrial conference, defendant had not objected to any of the delays.
Moreover, he accepted the January 9, 2002, trial date offered by the court. Further,
defendant did not assert a speedy trial violation until the day before trial. Thus, the
trial court did not clearly err in weighing this factor heavily against defendant. See
[People v] Collins, [388 Mich 680,] 692-694[; 202 NW2d 769 (1972)] (the

4
That motion was made six months after Simpson’s arrest and applied to the original charge,
which was dismissed on January 29, 2021. The motion was also made before the present charges
were filed on May 13, 2021. Simpson has not explained how a motion to dismiss made six months
after his arrest relating to a separate charge that was dismissed, functions as an assertion of his
right to a speedy trial regarding the current charges. “An appellant may not merely announce his
position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he
give only cursory treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People
v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).

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prejudice prong weighed heavily against a defendant who did not assert his right to
a speedy trial until the day before trial). [Williams, 475 Mich at 263.]

Here, Simpson had no objections to the trial date when it was scheduled for 2022. He did not
object to adjourning that date in 2022, nor did he object to the trial being held in January 2023.
And he voiced no objections to it being held in February 2023. Yet, when it looked as if the trial
would now be held at the end of April 2023, Simpson finally decided to raise a speedy-trial claim
just weeks before that trial date was to begin. All of this seems fairly similar to Williams. Simpson
had not once objected to the delays in this case until trial truly looked imminent. As such, this
factor weighs heavily against a finding that Simpson’s right to a speedy trial was violated.

1. PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT

Finally, we must consider the fourth Barker factor: prejudice to the defendant. See Barker,
407 US at 521. Because prejudice is presumed in this case, the City has the burden of disproving
prejudice. See Williams, 475 Mich at 261. “[D]eprivation of the right to a speedy trial does not
per se prejudice the accused’s ability to defend himself.” Barker, 407 US at 521. Relevant to this
case, the right was designed “to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused” and limit possible
impairment of the defense. Id. at 532. However, “anxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial
violation.” Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6, citing People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442,
462; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).

Here, Simpson claims he has been personally prejudiced because he experienced anxiety
throughout the proceedings “from the possible long-term implications of criminal charges and
wrongful conviction.” In support, Simpson offers evidence of his enrollment at a Ph.D. program
at the University of Michigan. Yet, it is difficult to see how his continued enrollment in a Ph.D.
program is evidence that he has been “plagued by anxiety” without some indication that his grades
suffered or that he sought mental health resources. That being said, it is axiomatic that there is
some anxiety inherent in being charged with a crime and having to await trial. Yet, it is also
axiomatic that the anxiety suffered by a defendant who is not incarcerated and who is only facing
misdemeanor charges is less than that of an incarcerated defendant facing more serious charges.
Accepting that Simpson has suffered some minimal anxiety, we nevertheless conclude that such
anxiety, without more, is insufficient to establish a violation of his speedy-trial right. See Gilmore,
222 Mich App at 462.

Next, the City contends that Simpson has suffered no prejudice to his defense because no
witnesses became unavailable and body-camera footage of his arrest was preserved and is available
to refresh memories on both sides. And, although the City has added a sixth witness to its witness
list, it notes that Simpson has only had one witness listed for the duration of the proceedings.
Simpson’s argument that there were many people at the protest but only one witness remained
available is not persuasive. He has not specifically identified any of those potential witnesses who

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have allegedly been lost.5 On this record, the City has met its burden to prove that no prejudice
was caused by the loss of witnesses.

Still, Simpson maintains the addition of a sixth witness—another police officer—puts him
at a disadvantage because he has only one witness to testify in his defense and police testimony
tends to be viewed as trustworthy. However, in Barker, 407 US at 521, the Supreme Court noted
that delay can benefit a defendant: “As the time between the commission of the crime and trial
lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable, or their memories may fade. If the witnesses
support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so.” Here, the memories
of the City’s witnesses may have faded, and because there are six of them, there is a chance for
inconsistencies in their testimony that diminishes credibility. Moreover, the number of witnesses
a defendant presents does not determine his guilt or innocence. People v Phillips, 112 Mich App
98, 109-110; 315 NW2d 868 (1982) (“The number of witnesses which a party garners is quite
irrelevant in determining where the truth lies.”).

Finally, several mentions of video footage have been made. Simpson contends that this
footage is not included in the record and may not be considered by this Court, citing People v
Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 557; 496 NW2d 336 (1992). In that case, the defendant “improperly
submitted affidavits and other documentary evidence not presented in the trial court” and this
Court did not consider that evidence because “review is limited to the lower court record.” Id. at
556-557. It is true the footage is not contained in the record, but it is referenced in the record at
least three times. There is no suggestion the footage was improperly submitted, and while review
is limited to the record, the record reflects that video footage is available to refresh recollections
at trial.

III. CONCLUSION

Having weighed the four Barker factors, we conclude that Simpson’s right to a speedy
trial was not violated. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court order.

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock

5
In Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7, the defendant conceded he could not specify which
witnesses became unavailable because of the delay, and this Court found the defense was not
prejudiced.

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