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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Donna Davis v. Ronald Scott Baldini

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 373696

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (11.8K)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

DONNA DAVIS, FOR PUBLICATION
March 10, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 1:25 PM

v No. 373696
Wayne Circuit Court
RONALD SCOTT BALDINI, LC No. 23-015369-NI

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and TREBILCOCK, JJ.

M. J. KELLY, J.

Plaintiff, Donna Davis, appeals as of right the trial court order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant, Ronald Baldini, on her negligence claim for noneconomic
damages. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1

I. BASIC FACTS

This case arises from a motor vehicle crash at the intersection of Merriam Road and Van
Born Road in Detroit. Davis had been driving through the intersection when Baldini, who had a
red light, drove straight through the intersection and crashed into the driver’s side of her vehicle.
Davis claimed that she was injured in the crash, and she filed a complaint against Baldini alleging
negligence and seeking both economic and noneconomic damages.

The record reflects that Davis’s daughter was the title owner of the vehicle that Davis was
driving at the time of the crash. The vehicle was covered by a no-fault automobile insurance policy
issued by Falls Lake National Insurance Company, but Davis was expressly listed as an excluded
driver on that policy.

1
Because Davis does not challenge the trial court’s grant of summary disposition of her negligence
claim for economic damages, that aspect of the court’s order is not affected by this opinion and
remains intact.

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At her deposition, Davis testified regarding her use of her daughter’s vehicle. In doing so,
she explained that her daughter worked at the airport. Although Davis’s daughter had initially
driven herself to and from work, Davis eventually started dropping her daughter off and picking
her up at the airport doors. She said that the reason for doing this was so that her daughter did not
have to use the airport shuttle to get to and from where she parked. Davis explained that her
daughter would drive on the way to work and on the way back home after work. This occurred
four times per week.

After dropping her daughter off, Davis would drive straight home and would remain there
until it was time to pick her daughter up after work. Davis testified that she had “full use” of the
vehicle when taking her daughter to work, but she explained that she only used it for the trip to
and from work. She stressed that she “never” used it for any other purpose. After returning from
dropping her daughter off, the vehicle just “sat there” until it was time to pick her daughter up.
Davis further explained that if she had to go somewhere while her daughter was at work, her other
daughter would pick her up and drive her to her destination. Similarly, when she went to her own
place of employment, she would be dropped off at work and would receive a ride home with a co-
worker. Davis “always waited until” her daughter was off work to do “shopping and everything
[else] together.” Still, Davis admitted that she did not have to request permission to use the vehicle.
She also agreed that she had the keys to the vehicle while her daughter was at work. She clarified
that she only used her daughter’s keys and did not have her own set of keys. Further, she did not
put gasoline into the vehicle or take it in for any repairs.

Following discovery, Baldini moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and
(10). He argued that because Davis was an excluded driver on the insurance policy covering the
vehicle, she was precluded from recovering personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. See
MCL 500.3113. Baldini argued that, because Davis was not entitled to PIP benefits, she could not
bring a claim under MCL 500.3135(3)(c) to recover economic damages because the statute only
allows for the recovery of benefits in “excess” of PIP benefits. Further, Baldini asserted that, based
upon Davis’s deposition testimony, she was a constructive owner of the vehicle under the
definition of “owner” stated in MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i). He maintained that, because Davis was
the constructive owner of the vehicle and was operating it without insurance, she was precluded
from recovering noneconomic damages from him by MCL 500.3135(2)(c). Lastly, he asserted
that Davis had failed to establish a serious impairment of an important body function. In response,
Davis generally argued that being an excluded driver under the insurance policy did not bar her
tort claim, that she did not constructively own the vehicle, and that she had, in fact, sustained a
serious impairment of an important body function.

Following oral argument on the motion, the trial court first determined that as a result of
Davis being a specifically excluded driver under the policy covering the vehicle, she could not
recover “excess” damages under MCL 500.3135(3)(c) because she was not entitled to recover any
PIP benefits. Next, the court determined that Davis was a constructive owner of the vehicle given
her testimony that she had access to the vehicle’s keys, drove the vehicle regularly, did not have
to ask permission to drive it, and had driven it for months. The court reasoned Davis was,
therefore, the owner of an uninsured vehicle and was not entitled to recovery under MCL
500.3135(2)(c). As a result, the court entered an order granting summary disposition to Davis’s

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negligence claims for economic and noneconomic damages. Thereafter, Davis moved for
reconsideration, which the court denied.2 This appeal follows.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Davis argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing her tort claim for non-
economic damages because she is not a constructive owner of the vehicle. We review de novo a
trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates
Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). When deciding
a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court “must consider all evidence submitted by the
parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” El-Khalil v Oakwood
Healthcare Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).

B. ANALYSIS

Damages recoverable for noneconomic loss caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use
of a motor vehicle are statutorily limited. As relevant to the issue raised on appeal, under MCL
500.3135(1), a plaintiff may not recover such damages unless he or she sustained a threshold
injury, i.e., death, serious impairment of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.3
However, under MCL 500.3135(1)(2)(c), “[d]amages must not be assessed in favor of a party who
was operating his or her own vehicle at the time the injury occurred and did not have in effect for
that motor vehicle the security required by section 3101(1) at the time the injury occurred.” Here,
Davis was an excluded driver under the no-fault insurance policy in effect for the vehicle that she
was driving at the time of the motor vehicle crash. “[A] validly excluded driver’s act of driving
the insured vehicle at the time of the accident renders the vehicle uninsured.” Bronson Health

2
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Davis submitted an affidavit from her daughter. On
appeal, Davis does not challenge the trial court’s decision to deny her motion for reconsideration
without addressing her daughter’s affidavit. “[A] motion for reconsideration is a vehicle to identify
‘a palpable error’ in the prior ruling.” Yachcik v Yachcik, 319 Mich App 24, 42; 900 NW2d 113
(2017), citing MCR 2.119(F)(3). As a result, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it
denies “a motion for reconsideration that rests on testimony that could have been presented the
first time the issue was argued.” Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App 223, 233; 611 NW2d
333 (2000). Indeed, “a court has full discretion to decline to consider evidence presented with a
motion for reconsideration that could have been presented the first time the issue was argued.”
Yachcik, 319 Mich App at 42 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the affidavit was
not presented the first time the issue was argued and because the trial court did not exercise its
discretion to consider the affidavit on reconsideration, we will not consider the affidavit when
evaluating whether the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in this matter.
3
Davis maintains that, as a result of the crash, she sustained a serious impairment of a body
function. Although Baldini challenged that assertion in the trial court, the court did not reach the
issue. Accordingly, whether she sustained a threshold injury is not an issue currently before this
Court.

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Care Group, Inc v State Auto Prop & Cas Ins Co, 330 Mich App 338, 348; 948 NW2d 115 (2019)
(quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Thus, as to Davis, who was a validly excluded
driver, the “security required by section 3101(1)” was not in effect for the vehicle at the time of
the crash.

Her ability to maintain a claim for noneconomic benefits, therefore, turns on whether she
was an “owner” of the vehicle she was driving at the time that the crash occurred. As a general
rule, “[t]he question of ownership is one of fact that is to be decided by the factfinder.” Botsford
Gen Hosp v Citizens Ins Co, 195 Mich App 127, 133; 489 NW2d 137 (1992). The statutory
definition of “owner” includes “a person renting a motor vehicle or having the use of a motor
vehicle, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days.” MCL
500.3101(3)(l)(i).

In Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 690-691; 593 NW2d 215 (1999), this Court
interpreted the phrase “having the use” of a motor vehicle as meaning “using the vehicle in ways
that comport with concepts of ownership.” The Ardt Court reasoned:

The provision does not equate ownership with any and all uses for thirty days, but
rather equates ownership with “having the use” of a vehicle for that period. Further,
we observe that the phrase “having the use thereof” appears in tandem with
references to renting or leasing. These indications imply that ownership follows
from proprietary or possessory usage, as opposed to merely incidental usage under
the direction or with the permission of another. [Id.]

There was a question of fact in Ardt about whether the injured claimant was an “owner” of the
motor vehicle he was driving at the time of the accident given “the spotty and exceptional pattern
of [the claimant’s] usage” of the motor vehicle to which one witness testified “may not be sufficient
to render [the claimant] an owner of the truck,” whereas “the regular pattern of unsupervised
usage” to which another witness testified “may well support a finding that [the claimant] was an
owner for purposes of the statute.” Id.

In contrast, in Chop v Zielinski, 244 Mich App 677, 682; 624 NW2d 539 (2001), this Court
determined that the plaintiff was an “owner” based upon her deposition testimony. Specifically,
the plaintiff testified

during her deposition that she kept the car parked at her apartment complex, which
was a residence she kept separate from her ex-husband, drove the car to and from
work on a daily basis, and used the car for other personal errands. Plaintiff’s use
of the car in such a manner was possessory use that comports with the concepts of
ownership. There is no indication that plaintiff used the car under the specific
direction of her ex-husband or with her ex-husband’s permission. Indeed,
plaintiff’s own testimony regarding her regular use of the car reveals that she
exercised ownership rights over the vehicle. . . . [Id. at 681.]

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Further, the plaintiff in Chop believed that she had been awarded the car under a judgment of
divorce. Id. at 681-682.

Baldini maintains that Davis’s use of the vehicle was possessory and proprietary. In
support, he directs this Court to her testimony that she drove the vehicle when helping her daughter
get to and from work, that she had been doing it for months before the crash, that she had “full
use” of the vehicle while her daughter was at work, that she had the keys, and that she did not have
to ask for permission to use it. He asserts that this evidence shows that Davis had “unrestricted,
regular daily use of” the vehicle in the months leading up to the crash. We agree that is one
possible interpretation of the evidence.

Yet, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Davis, the non-moving party, there
remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Davis’s use was proprietary or
possessory. Unlike the plaintiff in Chop, Davis lived with her daughter, the title owner of the
vehicle. Baldini’s reference to Davis’s testimony that she had “full use” of the vehicle is
misplaced, given that, in context, Davis testified such full use only occurred when she was using
the vehicle to help her daughter get to and from work. Indeed, Davis testified that she only used
the vehicle when dropping her daughter off at work and then returning home after doing so. She
denied any other uses of the vehicle. In particular, Davis testified that if she had to do something
while her daughter was at work, her other daughter would come and pick her up and drive her to
her destination in another vehicle. Additional personal errands, including shopping, were done
with her daughter when she got home from work. Further, unlike the plaintiff in Chop, Davis did
not use the vehicle to get to or from her own employment or for any other personal business.

Davis’s testimony, ultimately, reflects that she only used the vehicle for her daughter’s
benefit. As noted above, her daughter worked at the airport. When she drove herself to work, she
had to use the shuttle to get to and from the parking lot. It is reasonable to infer that such an added
step was inconvenient to Davis’s daughter and that the process of being dropped off at the airport
doors and then picked up made her daily commute far easier. The fact that Davis kept her
daughter’s keys while her daughter was at work is also not that dispositive. Davis explained that
there was only one set of keys. Thus, in order to actually return home after dropping her daughter
off, Davis had to retain possession of the keys. The fact that Davis did not have her own set is
indicative that her use was not proprietary or possessory. Rather, it was for the limited purpose of
facilitating her daughter’s commute to and from work. Likewise, the mere fact that she did not
have to ask permission to use the vehicle is not dispositive given that Davis’s actual use of the
vehicle allows for the reasonable inference that such permission was unnecessary given that the
use was only for her daughter’s benefit.

In sum, we conclude that, viewing Davis’s deposition testimony in the light most favorable
to her, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her use of the vehicle was
proprietary or possessory so as to constitute constructive ownership under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i).
Because there was a question of fact as to whether Davis was an owner of the vehicle under MCL
500.3101(3)(l)(i), summary disposition as to Davis’s claim for noneconomic damage was not
appropriate. Reversal and remand for further proceedings is, therefore, required. On remand, the
trial court should consider whether Davis’s claim is barred based upon her alleged failure to
establish that she sustained a threshold injury under MCL 500.3135(1).

-5-
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Davis may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock

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