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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Michael Talley; Jonesboro Police Department; And City of Jonesboro, Arkansas v. Carolyn Johnson, Michael Johnson, and Hailey Johnson (Now Boyd)

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. App. 177

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 177
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-24-802

                                          Opinion Delivered March 11, 2026

MICHAEL TALLEY; JONESBORO APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND CITY OF COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, WESTERN
JONESBORO, ARKANSAS DISTRICT
APPELLANTS [NO. 16JCV-19-426]

V. HONORABLE BENTLEY E. STORY,
JUDGE
CAROLYN JOHNSON, MICHAEL
JOHNSON, AND HAILEY JOHNSON
(NOW BOYD)

                          APPELLEES       REVERSED

                          KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

   This appeal arises from a traffic accident that occurred on May 3, 2017, when a patrol

car driven by appellant Michael Talley of the Jonesboro Police Department collided with a

car being driven by appellee Carolyn Johnson with appellees Michael Johnson and Hailey

Johnson (now Boyd) riding as passengers (collectively “the Johnsons”). The Johnsons filed a

complaint against Talley and the City of Jonesboro (the City) alleging that Talley was

negligent and seeking damages for their injuries. The Johnsons later filed an amended

complaint alleging new claims against Talley for felony battery and felony aggravated assault.

   The City and Talley filed a joint counterclaim for interpleader admitting liability with

respect to the negligence claim and requesting permission to pay $50,000 into the court’s
registry, which represented the limit of the City’s statutorily mandated liability-insurance

coverage. The City and Talley contemporaneously filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

they should be discharged from any further liability because they are entitled to tort

immunity.

   The trial court entered an order that accepted the City’s request to interplead the

$50,000 maximum limit of the City’s liability exposure. In that order, the trial court also

denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the Johnsons had alleged acts by Talley which

they asserted go beyond immunity and that it was for a jury to determine whether Talley’s

conduct was intentional. The trial court also found in the order that the interpleader will

not affect any claims the Johnsons might have against Talley for any proved acts that were

outside the scope of his employment.

   Talley now appeals from the order denying his motion to dismiss.1 Talley argues that

the trial court erred in denying him immunity under Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301 and Ark.

Code Ann. § 21-9-303(b). Talley argues further that the trial court erred in denying him

qualified immunity. We agree that Talley was entitled to immunity from any tort liability

beyond the limit of the mandated insurance coverage, and we therefore reverse.

   1
   The order was immediately appealable under Ark. R. App. P.–Civil 2(a)(10), which

provides that an appeal may be taken from “[a]n order denying a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment based on the defense of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a
government official.”

                                         2
                             I. Facts and Procedural History

   This litigation began on May 2, 2019, when the Johnsons filed a complaint against

Talley and the City. In the complaint, the Johnsons alleged that Talley was operating his

patrol car southbound during the course and scope of his employment on the afternoon of

May 3, 2017, when he struck the Johnsons’ car, which was traveling westbound, in an

intersection. The complaint alleged that Talley was negligent in failing to keep a proper

lookout, failing to keep his vehicle under reasonable control, failing to drive at a reasonable

speed, failing to stop at the stop sign, and failing to exercise ordinary care under the

circumstances. The complaint alleged further that, as a result of Talley’s negligence, all three

occupants in the Johnsons’ car suffered physical injuries and should be awarded damages.

   On September 13, 2019, Talley and the City filed an answer to the complaint

acknowledging that there was a collision between the vehicles but generally denying liability.

Talley and the City also alleged that they were entitled to tort immunity under Ark. Code

Ann. § 21-9-301, which provides:

       (a) It is declared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all counties,
   municipal corporations, school districts, public charter schools, special improvement
   districts, and all other political subdivisions of the state and any of their boards,
   commissions, agencies, authorities, or other governing bodies shall be immune from
   liability and from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be covered by liability
   insurance.

       (b) No tort action shall lie against any such political subdivision because of the
   acts of its agents and employees.

                                             3

(Emphasis added.) Talley and the City also asserted that they were entitled to tort immunity

for any damages in excess of the statutory limit established by Ark Code Ann. § 21-9-303,

which provides in relevant part:

       (a) All political subdivisions shall carry liability insurance on their motor vehicles
   or shall become self-insurers, individually or collectively, for their vehicles, or both,
   in the minimum amounts prescribed in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
   § 27-19-101 et seq.

       (b) The combined maximum liability of local government employees, volunteers, and the
   local government employer in any action involving the use of a motor vehicle within the scope
   of their employment shall be the minimum amounts prescribed in the Motor Vehicle Safety
   Responsibility Act, § 27-19-101 et seq.[2]

(Emphasis added.)

   Five years later, on April 29, 2024, the Johnsons filed an amended complaint against

Talley and the City. In the amended complaint, the Johnsons alleged:

   1.     All previous Complaints are incorporated by reference herein.

   2.     While recklessly travelling at a high rate of speed too fast for conditions in a
          police car, Talley was on his phone and distracted in violation of Paul’s Law
          which caused Plaintiffs to be injured. This conduct rendered the patrol car a
          deadly weapon.

   3.     The accident itself happened close to 2:50 PM on a rainy Wednesday, May 2,
          2017 at the intersection of Flint Street and West Huntington Avenue in
          Jonesboro. Patrolman Talley, 28 at the time, was driving his 2009 Ford Crown
          Victoria south on Flint Street. He was not in hot pursuit.

   4.     Talley approached the intersection but didn’t stop. He ran the stop sign and
          entered the intersection as a 1998 Toyota RAV4 was coming down West
          Huntington. The RAV4 slammed into the front-side of the patrol car, totaling

   2
  Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-19-605(a) (Repl. 2022) sets the minimum

amount at $50,000 for an accident that causes bodily injury to two or more persons.

                                            4
             the SUV and bending the SUV’s front end sideways. The two vehicles collided
             a second time as both spun in opposite directions from the impact, with the
             rear of the vehicles making contact. The patrol car then struck a fire hydrant
             so hard, it sent the steel projectile flying through a business’s front door. The
             SUV slammed into a utility pole.

   5.        Carolyn Johnson, 66, suffered a broken wrist and three cracked or fractured
             ribs. Michael Johnson, who was a juvenile at the time, suffered a fractured
             ankle. The third occupant, Haley Johnson (now Boyd), 21, had her spine
             fractured by the wreck.

   6.        Johnson has lost all use of her legs. Muscle atrophy has set in. She can barely
             use her arms. She can barely even stay seated in a wheelchair.

   7.        Talley committed common law battery,[3] felony second degree battery in
             violation of A.C.A. § 5-13-202, and felony aggravated assault in violation of
             ACA 5-13-204 because he was not acting within the course and scope of his
             duty as a law enforcement officer while using the phone and driving too fast
             for conditions.

   8.        Talley was suspended for two days.

(Emphasis added.) In the amended complaint, the Johnsons sought compensatory and

punitive damages exceeding $10 million as well as attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. §

16-118-107 (Repl. 2016), which provides in relevant part:

      (a)(1) Any person injured or damaged by reason of conduct of another person that
   would constitute a felony under Arkansas law may file a civil action to recover
   damages based on the conduct.

   ....

      (3) If the person who is injured or damaged prevails, he or she shall be entitled to
   recover costs and attorney’s fees.

   3
       The Johnsons later voluntarily dismissed their claim for common-law battery.

                                             5
   On May 20, 2024, Talley and the City filed an answer to the amended complaint. In

their answer, they again alleged that they were entitled to tort immunity pursuant to Ark.

Code Ann. § 21-9-301 and again asserted that they were entitled to tort immunity for any

damages in excess of the statutory limit established by Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-303. Talley

and the City stated, “Defendants have previously offered, and stand ready to proffer, the

state law required maximum limit of $50,000 to the Plaintiffs in this matter.”

   On May 20, 2024, Talley and the City also filed a counterclaim for interpleader. In

the counterclaim, Talley and the City admitted liability with respect to the negligence claim

and requested permission to pay $50,000 into the court’s registry, which represented the

limit of the City’s statutorily mandated liability-insurance coverage and the combined

maximum liability of both defendants.4 On May 20, 2024, the City and Talley also filed a

motion to dismiss, arguing that they should be discharged from any further liability because

they are entitled to tort immunity.

   On May 28, 2024, the Johnsons filed an answer to the counterclaim, arguing that

there is no immunity for intentional torts. On May 29, 2024, the Johnsons filed a response

to the motion to dismiss, again asserting that there is no immunity for intentional torts and

asking that the motion to dismiss be denied.

   4
     The City and Talley attached the affidavit of the mayor of Jonesboro, who stated that

at the time of the accident, the City of Jonesboro did not have insurance coverage for any
amount in excess of the minimum requirements prescribed by Arkansas law.

                                           6
   On August 29, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the City and Talley’s

counterclaim for interpleader and motion to dismiss. The parties argued their respective

positions, and the trial court took the matters under advisement.

   On September 8, 2024, the trial court entered an order that accepted the City’s

request to interplead $50,000 as the maximum limit of the City’s statutory liability exposure

but denied the motion to dismiss. In the order, the trial court made these findings:

           14. The Defendants seek to interplead $50,000.00 into the registry of the
   court, this amount being the limit for which it is liable for the underlying traffic
   accident. They argue that Mr. Talley is entitled to tort immunity and that he should
   be dismissed from the lawsuit. The Plaintiffs have argued that Mr. Talley committed
   . . . felony second degree battery in violation of A.C.A. § 5-13-202 and felony
   aggravated assault in violation of A.C.A. § 5-13-204; consequently, he was not acting
   within the course and scope of his employment as a police officer. . . . While Mr.
   Talley may not have to answer to the criminal authorities, his actions could be
   considered as intentional torts.

           15. The Plaintiffs have alleged certain acts on the part of Mr. Talley which they
   assert go beyond his immunity as an agent of the City of Jonesboro. The allegations
   are for a jury to determine if Mr. Talley’s conduct was intentional or rises to the
   inference of an intentional tort.

          16. Based on the above, this court denies the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

            17. The City of Jonesboro requests that it be allowed to interplead the
   $50,000.00 of maximum liability exposure into the Registry of the Court. A.C.A. §
   21-9-301 and § 21-9-303, in conjunction with the other statutes, limit the City’s
   liability exposure to $50,000.00. It is willing to pay this amount and wishes to do so.
   It is this court’s opinion, and ruling, that the City may do so. This interpleader will
   not affect any claims the Plaintiffs may have against Mr. Talley for any proven liability
   acts which were outside his scope of employment.

   ....

         19. The trial in this case is scheduled for September 23, 2024. The trial
   remains scheduled for the remaining issue, that being whether Mr. Talley’s actions

                                           7
   were outside his scope of employment which would allow the Plaintiffs to recover
   from Mr. Talley personally.

Talley timely appealed from the September 8, 2024 order denying his motion to dismiss.

                                 II. Standard of Review

   In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss, we treat the facts alleged

in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. McGhee

v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 360 Ark. 363, 201 S.W.3d 375 (2005). We focus only

on the allegations in the complaint and not to matters outside the complaint. Id. We resolve

all reasonable inferences in the complaint’s favor and construe the pleadings liberally.

Monsanto Co. v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 2019 Ark. 194, 576 S.W.3d 8. Furthermore, the issue

of whether a party is immune from suit is purely a question of law and is reviewed de novo.

City of Sherwood v. Bearden, 2023 Ark. App. 67, 661 S.W.3d 213.

                                     III. Discussion

   Talley’s first argument, which is dispositive of this appeal, is that his motion to dismiss

should have been granted because he was immune from any liability beyond the $50,000

statutory maximum based on the application of Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301 and Ark. Code

Ann. § 21-9-303(b). Section 21-9-301 provides that all municipal corporations and governing

bodies “shall be immune from liability and from suit for damages except to the extent that

they may be covered by liability insurance.” Our supreme court has held that this statute

provides city employees with immunity from civil liability for negligent acts but not for

intentional acts. Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005). Talley argues that

                                            8

section 21-9-301 affords him tort immunity because the Johnsons did not allege that he acted

intentionally in causing the accident. Talley relies further on section 21-9-303(b), which

provides, “The combined maximum liability of local government employees, volunteers, and

the local government employer in any action involving the use of a motor vehicle within the

scope of their employment shall be the minimum amounts prescribed in the Motor Vehicle

Safety Responsibility Act, § 27-19-101 et seq. [$50,000].” Talley states that the City

interpleaded the $50,000 limit, which, under this statute, is the maximum combined liability

of the City and Talley and the limit of the Johnsons’ recovery. We agree.

   The extent of tort immunity provided by Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301 was illustrated

in Sledge v. City of Pine Bluff, 2022 Ark. App. 23. In Sledge, a severe thunderstorm downed

numerous trees, and after being notified of a tree blocking a public street, the police failed

to take any measures to protect the public such as monitoring the area, closing the road, or

erecting a barrier. In the darkness of night, a vehicle hit the downed tree, killing a passenger

in the vehicle, and the decedent’s estate sued the municipality and related entities. The

plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ conduct constituted gross negligence, a reckless

indifference to the consequences of a known risk of an abnormally dangerous condition,

willful and wanton neglect, and total disregard for the health and safety of the decedent.

The city defendants asserted the defense of tort immunity under Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-

301, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis. The

trial court found that, although the plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts to establish a prima

facie case of utter indifference and conscious disregard, this statute granted the defendants

                                           9

immunity from liability and from suit, and the allegations of gross negligence and reckless

indifference did not create an exception. On appeal in Sledge, this court stated that section

21-9-301 provides city employees with immunity from civil liability for negligent acts but not

for intentional acts. In Sledge, we affirmed the trial court’s finding that the City of Pine Bluff

and other city officials were entitled to immunity under section 21-9-301 because Sledge did

not allege any intentional acts by the appellees, only gross negligence and reckless

indifference.

   The Johnsons’ original complaint alleged only negligent conduct by Talley in that he

was driving too fast and failed to exercise ordinary care when he ran the stop sign. The

Johnsons’ amended complaint incorporated the allegations in the amended complaint and

added some additional factual allegations, including that Talley was on his phone and

distracted, and alleged that Talley’s conduct would have constituted felony second-degree

battery and felony aggravated assault.5 However, the amended complaint specifically alleged

that “[w]hile recklessly traveling at a high rate of speed too fast for conditions in a police car,

Talley was on his phone and distracted . . . which caused plaintiffs to be injured.” (Emphasis

added.)

   5
     A person commits second-degree battery if the person recklessly causes serious physical

injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon. Ark Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(3)(A)
(emphasis added). A person commits aggravated assault if, under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life, he or she purposely engages in conduct that
creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person. Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-13-204(a)(1).

                                            10
   The Johnsons further allege that Talley’s conduct would have constituted the offense

of second-degree battery and was therefore intentional. However, a review of Ark. Code

Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2023) shows that a person commits second-degree battery if

the person recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly

weapon. (Emphasis added.) This argument is easily dispensed with because, regardless of

whether a patrol car might be considered a deadly weapon under some circumstances,

second-degree battery includes the element of reckless—and not intentional—conduct.

   Further, a person commits aggravated assault if, under circumstances manifesting

extreme indifference to the value of human life, he or she purposely engages in conduct that

creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person. Ark. Code

Ann. § 5-13-204(a)(1) (Supp. 2023). A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct

when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1). Here again, the Johnsons’ allegations fall short of intentional

conduct. The Johnsons cite Colvin v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 757, where we held that there

was sufficient evidence to support an aggravated-assault conviction where the appellant,

while attempting to evade the police, accelerated his vehicle without headlights toward an

officer’s patrol car and struck the driver’s side of the patrol car. The facts there were as

follows:

          McDermott, joined by other officers, chased appellant at speeds in excess of
   100 miles per hour. Eventually, appellant extinguished his headlights, drove through
   the front lawn of a business, jumped a curb, and made a U-turn in the parking lot.
   Soon thereafter, McDermott arrived in the parking lot. McDermott testified that,
   instead of stopping, appellant accelerated his vehicle and drove toward McDermott’s

                                         11
   patrol unit. McDermott stated that he knew that appellant was about to hit him, so
   McDermott tried to position the patrol car to allow the push bar on the front of the
   vehicle to receive the impact. McDermott testified, however, that he was not able to
   complete that maneuver in time and that appellant’s vehicle struck the patrol car on
   the front quarter panel of the driver’s side with such force that the entire wheel
   assembly collapsed. Although McDermott’s vehicle was disabled, the other officers
   continued the pursuit of appellant. Ultimately, appellant stopped his vehicle in a
   shopping center, and the police apprehended him after a foot chase.

Colvin, 2009 Ark. App. 757, at 2. We held in Colvin that the appellant’s actions manifested

an extreme indifference to the value of human life and created a substantial danger of death

or serious physical injury. This case is completely distinguishable from Colvin because here,

the allegations against Talley are generally that he caused a motor vehicle accident because

he was on his cell phone while operating his patrol car. Even viewing the facts alleged in the

amended complaint in the light most favorable to the Johnsons as we are required to do in

reviewing a motion to dismiss, Talley’s conduct did not rise to the level of consciously

engaging in conduct that manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life and

created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury. The Johnsons’ bare

allegation of an aggravated assault under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-204(a)(1) is insufficient to

defeat statutory immunity without facts to support the claim that Officer Talley acted

intentionally in causing their injuries.

   The Johnsons’ argument is more refined in their appellate brief where they argue:

“Talley’s conduct was not accidental—it was reckless in the truest legal sense. He knew, or

should have known, that speeding through a residential intersection while texting on a rainy

day created a grave risk of harm.” This argument only accentuates the fact that Talley was

                                         12

not alleged to have acted intentionally in causing the accident but was instead alleged to have

acted recklessly, which does not create an exception to tort immunity.

   The Johnsons also argue in their brief that Talley may not avail himself of Ark. Code

Ann. § 21-9-303(b) because Talley was not operating the vehicle within the scope of his

employment as required by that statute. However, it is undisputed that Talley was on duty

and driving a marked patrol car when the accident occurred. In the Johnsons’ original

complaint, they expressly alleged that “Michael Talley is an employee of the Jonesboro Police

Department and was operating the vehicle during the course and scope of his employment.”

(Emphasis added.) In the Johnsons’ amended complaint, they alleged that Talley was “not

acting within the course and scope of his duty as a law enforcement officer while using the

phone and driving too fast for conditions” and noted that Talley was not in hot pursuit.

Even if Talley was driving his patrol car in a negligent manner, as alleged in the original

complaint and in the amended complaint, Talley was within the scope of his employment as

a police officer when the accident occurred.

   Because Talley was operating the patrol car within the scope of his employment with

the Jonesboro Police Department when the accident occurred, and the Johnsons did not

allege that the accident was the result of an intentional act, we conclude in our de novo

review that Talley was entitled to tort immunity, and the Johnsons were subject to the

$50,000 liability limit interpleaded by the City pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §§ 21-9-301 and

-303. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Talley’s motion to dismiss,

                                           13

and we reverse. Because we reverse on Talley’s first point on appeal, we need not consider

his remaining argument that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

   Reversed.

   KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and TUCKER, J., agree.

   Harringson, Miller, Kieklak, Eichmann & Brown, P.A., by: Thomas N. Kieklak, R. Justin

Eichmann, and Susan Keller Kendall, for separate appellant Michael Talley, in his individual

capacity.

   Sutter & Gillham, P.L.L.C., by: Luther Oneal Sutter, for appellees.

                                          14