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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Fred N. Bollinger D/B/A Fnb Farms; Fred N. Bollinger, Jr.; Bollinger Lone Oak, Inc.; And Bollinger Partners, Inc. v. Farm Credit Midsouth, Pca

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. App. 167

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 167
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-24-85

FRED N. BOLLINGER D/B/A FNB Opinion Delivered March 11, 2026

FARMS; FRED N. BOLLINGER, JR.;
APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
BOLLINGER LONE OAK, INC.; AND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
BOLLINGER PARTNERS, INC.
[NO. 18CV-09-414]
APPELLANTS

                                              HONORABLE PAMELA HONEYCUTT,

V.
JUDGE

FARM CREDIT MIDSOUTH, PCA REVERSED AND REMANDED
APPELLEE

                              BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

   This is the fourth appeal in this long-running case between appellants, the estate of

Fred Bollinger, Sr. (Bollinger Sr.’s Estate), his son Fred Bollinger, Jr. (Bollinger Jr.), and his

farming entities (collectively, the “Bollingers”); and their creditor, appellee Farm Credit

Mid-America PCA, successor in interest by merger to Farm Credit Midsouth PCA (“Farm

Credit”). In the current appeal, the Bollingers appeal an October 2023 order and judgment

in which the circuit court vacated a prior order and awarded attorneys’ fees to Farm Credit.

For reversal, the Bollingers argue that (1) the circuit court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees

to Farm Credit pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999); (2)

the circuit court abused its discretion by setting aside its December 2016 order on

judgment; (3) the circuit court erred in failing to award Bollinger Sr.’s Estate and Bollinger
Jr. reasonable attorney’s fees under section 16-22-308 given that they prevailed on a

collateral claim; (4) the circuit court erred in denying Bollinger Sr.’s Estate and Bollinger Jr.

prejudgment interest from February 17, 2012, on the $169,742.98 they were compelled to

pay in fees and escrow; and (5) the circuit court erred in finding that Bollinger Jr.,

Bollinger Lone Oak, and Bollinger Partners were jointly and severally liable for Farm

Credit’s attorneys’ fees that it accumulated for defending separate tort counterclaims. We

reverse on the first point and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                       I. Background Facts and Procedural History

   This litigation has been ongoing for more than fifteen years. The background facts

and procedural history are set out in detail in this court’s opinions in the previous three

appeals, Farm Credit Midsouth, PCA v. Bollinger, 2018 Ark. App. 224, 548 S.W.3d 164

(“Bollinger I”), Farm Credit Midsouth, PCA v. Bollinger, 2020 Ark. App. 36, 595 S.W.3d 3

(“Bollinger II”), and Bollinger v. Farm Credit Midsouth, PCA, 2021 Ark. App. 112, 619 S.W.3d

398 (“Bollinger III”). Thus, we have included the facts only as necessary for an

understanding of the issues in this appeal.

   Beginning in 2003, Farm Credit made a series of agricultural loans to the

Bollingers, which were secured by various security agreements and mortgages. After the

Bollingers defaulted on those loans, Farm Credit filed a foreclosure and replevin action in

the Crittenden County Circuit Court in 2009. The Bollingers filed a counterclaim

asserting multiple tort causes of action. In 2011, the circuit court granted Farm Credit’s

motion for summary judgment on its complaint as to liability but withheld entry of a final

                                           2

summary judgment until after trial of the Bollingers’ counterclaim when the value of all

the claims could be determined. Several defaulted loans between the Bollingers and Farm

Credit were resolved during the pendency of the circuit court case, a condition of which

the Bollingers agreed to pay $119,742.98 for legal fees accrued by Farm Credit to date and

also to escrow an additional $50,000.00 to cover future fees. The counterclaims were then

tried before a jury over several days. The circuit court granted a directed verdict in favor of

Farm Credit on certain claims, but the jury found in favor of the Bollingers on others and

awarded them a judgment of approximately $1.5 million. The circuit court also granted the

Bollingers’ request for prejudgment interest totaling $173,867.45. Farm Credit appealed to

this court, and the Bollingers filed a cross-appeal. This court reversed as to most of the

Bollingers’ tort counterclaims, which resulted in a reduction in the Bollingers’ award from

a total of more than $1.6 million to only $89,776.65. See Bollinger I, 2018 Ark. App. 224,

548 S.W.3d 164.

   While the appeal in Bollinger I was pending, Farm Credit filed a motion for

attorneys’ fees in circuit court on December 23, 2015. It asserted that it was entitled to

fees pursuant to contractual provisions in its promissory notes with the Bollingers and

pursuant to section 16-22-308 as the prevailing party in its foreclosure claims asserted

against the Bollingers. The Bollingers objected and filed cross-motions for the return of the

$169,742.98 previously paid for attorneys’ fees and escrow plus prejudgment interest on

these funds and an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 16-22-308. On July 25,

2016, the circuit court entered an order finding that although Farm Credit prevailed on its

                                          3

claims on the promissory notes, a money judgment was never actually entered due to the

pending counterclaim against it. It further found that the amount awarded to the

Bollingers on their tort claims greatly exceeded that awarded to Farm Credit. The order

stated that “considering there can be but one prevailing party overall, the Court finds that

overall Bollingers are the prevailing party, even though Farm Credit won on the Breach of

Contract claim.” It nonetheless found that because the Bollingers’ recovery sounded in

tort, section 16-22-308 was inapplicable because that statute applies to contracts. The

circuit court further found that, because of the language in some of the promissory notes,

Farm Credit was entitled to attorneys’ fees reasonably required to reach summary judgment

on the notes, but it withheld an actual fee award pending documentation as to time spent

on the case. Finally, it ruled that the $50,000 held in escrow should be refunded to the

Bollingers.

   The Bollingers moved for reconsideration of the July 2016 order, claiming that the

promissory notes did not expressly provide for attorneys’ fees for seeking recovery on them.

The circuit court entered an order on December 16, 2016, granting the motion for

reconsideration and finding that

   the court’s letter opinion dated July 21, 2016, is revised to reflect that Farm Credit
   is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to contract language. This is
   because the contract language in the promissory notes/loan agreements does not
   provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses in enforcing the promissory
   notes the Bollingers executed in favor of Farm Credit. Instead, this contract
   language only entitles Farm Credit, upon a borrower’s default, to recover reasonable
   attorney’s fees and legal expenses in enforcing its remedies as to collateral, which is
   personal property and fixtures, as a secured party pursuant to the Uniform
   Commercial Code.

                                          4

It also reaffirmed its earlier ruling that Farm Credit could not recover attorneys’ fees

pursuant to section 16-22-308 because it was not the prevailing party in its overall litigation

with the Bollingers. Finally, it ordered that the Bollingers should jointly recover judgment

from Farm Credit for the $119,742.98 (representing sums previously paid by the Bollinger

parties) to be apportioned as follows: $96,273.36 to Bollinger Sr. Estate and $23,469.62 to

Bollinger Jr. It also ruled that $40,200.00 of escrowed funds held in the registry of the

court be paid to Bollinger Sr.’s Estate and $9,800.00 to Bollinger Jr. The circuit court

deferred ruling on the issue of prejudgment interest.

   Farm Credit appealed the December 2016 order. This court ultimately dismissed

that appeal for lack of a final order because, in the order, the circuit court had expressly

retained jurisdiction over the award of prejudgment interest. Bollinger II, 2020 Ark. App.

36, 595 S.W.3d 3. However, the Bollinger II opinion included the following footnote:

“Because the circuit court has jurisdiction over the attorney’s-fees issues and did not have

the benefit of our opinion in Bollinger I, the court may wish to reconsider both the

Bollingers’ request and Farm Credit’s request for fees.” Id. at 3 n.2, 595 S.W.3d at 5 n.2.

   On February 7, 2020, Farm Credit moved for reconsideration of the December

2016 order. It argued that this court’s decision in Bollinger I reduced the Bollingers’ award

from $1.6 million to only $89,776.65. In light of Bollinger I, Farm Credit argued that the

circuit court’s previous finding that it was not the prevailing party and, thus, not entitled to

recover attorneys’ fees under section 16-22-308 “is simply incorrect.” It sought attorneys’

                                           5

fees totaling $351,050.50 pursuant to section 16-22-308 for prosecuting its claims against

the Bollingers and for defending against their tort counterclaims. The Bollingers filed a

cross-motion for attorney’s fees.

   On October 16, 2023, the circuit court entered an order and judgment setting aside

and vacating the December 16, 2016 order. It incorporated previous letter opinions it had

entered on August 26, 2021, and June 20, 2022. In those letter opinions, the circuit court

made findings that the nature of the case sounded in contract and that Farm Credit was

the prevailing party considering the case as a whole; as such, Farm Credit was entitled to

attorneys’ fees under section 16-22-308 and Kinkead v. Union National Bank, 51 Ark. App.

4, 907 S.W.2d 154 (1995), for pursuing its contract claims and defending against the tort

counterclaims. After reviewing the factors established by the supreme court in Chrisco v.

Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990), for determining a fee award as

well as the fee statements submitted by Farm Credit and objections submitted by the

Bollingers, the circuit court awarded Farm Credit $318,740.00 in attorneys’ fees. It ruled

that the $50,000.00 the Bollingers had previously deposited into the court registry to cover

Farm Credit’s future attorneys’ fees (and accrued interest) was to offset the fee award and

be turned over to Farm Credit. It further ruled that Farm Credit was allowed to keep the

$119,742.98 previously paid by the Bollingers for its attorneys’ fees and that this amount

was also to offset the fee award. Finally, it rejected the Bollingers’ claim for fees under

                                         6

section 16-22-308 because they were not the prevailing party under the statute. The

Bollingers filed a notice of appeal on November 9, 2023, and this appeal followed. 1

                                 II. Points on Appeal

   The Bollingers assert the five points on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred in

awarding attorneys’ fees to Farm Credit pursuant to section 16-22-308 and in relying on

this court’s previous opinion in Kinkead, 51 Ark. App. 4, 907 S.W.2d 154, to do so; (2) the

circuit court abused its discretion by setting aside its December 2016 order on judgment as

to the return of the $169,742.98 previously paid by the Bollingers; (3) the circuit court

erred in failing to award Bollinger Sr.’s Estate and Bollinger Jr. reasonable attorney’s fees

under section 16-22-308 given that they prevailed on a collateral claim; (4) the circuit court

erred in denying Bollinger Sr.’s Estate and Bollinger Jr. prejudgment interest from

February 17, 2012 on the $169,742.98 they had been compelled to pay in fees and escrow;

and (5) the circuit court erred in finding that Bollinger Jr., Bollinger Lone Oak, and

Bollinger Partners were jointly and severally liable for Farm Credit’s attorneys’ fees that it

                         ––
   1
    The third appeal in this case involved an ancillary matter between the Bollingers

and Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America (“Travelers”). In that appeal, the
Bollingers challenged the circuit court’s denial of their request for judgment against
Travelers as surety on an appeal bond posted by Farm Credit when Farm Credit appealed
the judgment entered against it leading to Bollinger I. Bollinger III, 2021 Ark. App. 112, at
1–2, 619 S.W.3d at 399. They also challenged the circuit court’s denial of their request for
a 12 percent statutory penalty, interest, and attorneys’ fees against Travelers. Id. at 5, 619
S.W.3d at 401. This court held that the appeal-bond issue was moot and that the
Bollingers failed to preserve the penalty, interest, and fees issue for appeal. Id. at 6–8, 619
S.W.3d at 401–02.

                                          7

had accumulated for defending tort counterclaims brought by the individual

defendants/counter-claimants.

                    A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

   The decisions to award attorney’s fees and the award amount are discretionary and

will be reversed only if the appellant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Folkers v.

Buchy, 2019 Ark. App. 30, at 9, 570 S.W.3d 496, 501–02. Where the issue is one of law,

however, our review is de novo. Vowell v. Waldrip Lands, LLC, 2025 Ark. App. 523, at 6,

722 S.W.3d 806, 810. Appellate courts give no deference to circuit courts on matters of

law. Freeman v. Rushton, 360 Ark. 445, 447, 202 S.W.3d 485, 487 (2005).

            B. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees under Section 16-22-308

   In their first point, the Bollingers argue that the circuit court erred in awarding

attorneys’ fees to Farm Credit pursuant to section 16-22-308 and in relying on this court’s

previous opinion in Kinkead to do so. It is well established that attorney’s fees are not

allowed except when authorized by statute. Chrisco, 304 Ark. at 229, 800 S.W.2d at 718.

Assuming fees are authorized by statute, a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny

attorney’s fees, and in what amount, lies within the sound discretion of the court, and the

appellate court will not reverse absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Patton Hosp. Mgmt.,

LLC v. Bella Vista Vill. Coopershares Owners Ass’n, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 281, at 10, 493

S.W.3d 798, 805. The fee statute at issue in this appeal is Arkansas Code Annotated

section 16-22-308, which provides:

                                         8
   In any civil action to recover on an open account, statement of account, account
   stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the
   purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services, or breach
   of contract, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject
   matter of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee
   to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.

That statute does not permit an award of attorney’s fees in tort actions. Stein v. Lukas, 308

Ark. 74, 83, 823 S.W.2d 832, 837 (1992). However, where both contract and tort claims

are advanced, an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party is proper only when the

action is based primarily in contract. Meyer v. Riverdale Harbor Mun. Prop. Owners

Improvement Dist. No. 1 of Little Rock, Ark., 58 Ark. App. 91, 93, 947 S.W.2d 20, 22 (1997).

We have held that it is not sufficient to base a fee award under section 16-22-308 upon a

finding that a contract claim is a “substantial issue.” Id.

   Here, the circuit court found that Farm Credit was entitled to recover fees under

section 16-22-308 for both prosecuting its breach-of-contract claims and for defending

against the tort counterclaims. In doing so, it found that:

   [T]he current action sounds primarily contract because the case began as a contract
   and foreclosure case and Bollingers’ tort claims were counterclaims pled for offset.
   Further the amounts found to be owing on the promissory notes far exceeded the
   final amount for the tort claims.

          As an action sounding in contract, A.C.A. § 16-22-308 may be applied to the
   issue of attorney fees in this case.

          This Court finds that Farm Credit is the prevailing party herein both,
   because they won on more causes of action, and because the amount they were due
   on the notes far exceeded the verdict received on the tort claims.

          As the “prevailing party” Farm Credit is entitled to recover its attorney fees
   related to the notes. Pursuant to the Kinkead and Loewer opinions[,] Farm Credit

                                            9
   may also be awarded attorney fees for successfully defending against the
   counterclaims.

The Bollingers argue that the circuit court court’s fee award under section 16-22-308 was

erroneous for two reasons: (1) the circuit court erred in finding that this case sounded

primarily in contract because the bulk of the litigation was in tort, and most of Farm

Credit’s attorneys’ time was spent defending against tort counterclaims; and (2) the Kinkead

court misinterpreted Loewer v. National Bank of Arkansas, 311 Ark 354, 844 S.W.2d 329

(1992), to authorize fees under section 16-22-308 for defending counterclaims in tort.

   This point requires us to determine, as a threshold matter, whether section 16-22-

308 authorized Farm Credit’s fee award for bringing its contract action and defending

against the tort counterclaims. The circuit court found that “[a]s an action sounding in

contract, [section] 16-22-308 may be applied to the issue of attorney fees in this case.” The

circuit court based its ruling that the case sounded primarily in contract on two things—the

case began as a contract and foreclosure case, and the amounts due on the promissory

notes far exceeded the final amount for the tort claims. We are not convinced that either

of these factors is dispositive. In DWB, LLC v. D & T Pure Tr., 2018 Ark. App. 283, 550

S.W.3d 420, for example, this court affirmed a fee award under section 16-22-308 although

substantially more money was awarded for tort claims than for breach-of-contract claims. In

doing so, we held that “this fact is not dispositive of whether the action was based primarily

in tort or in contract.” Id. at 14, 550 S.W.3d at 430. Instead, our inquiry was focused on

whether the “bulk of the litigation” was in contract or tort. We held that

                                         10
   we do not agree that the bulk of the litigation was based on tort claims. Notably,
   breach-of-contract claims accounted for six of the eight causes of action in which
   damages were awarded to appellees. Additionally, several of appellants’ requests for
   declaratory relief were based in contract. It was not error to decide that this action
   was based primarily in contract and to award fees based on Arkansas Code
   Annotated section 16-22-308.

Id. Nor do we view timing (i.e., which party files their claim first) as dispositive on the issue

of whether a case sounds primarily in contract or tort. Instead, our inquiry should focus on

whether the “bulk of the litigation” was in contract or tort. See id.

   Looking to the present case, the “bulk of the litigation” was in tort, not contract.

Farm Credit’s 2009 foreclosure and replevin action sought judgment on five different

loans. The last of those was paid by the Bollingers in 2012. The Bollingers initially brought

eleven broad counterclaims against Farm Credit. Although Farm Credit was granted

summary judgment on several counterclaims, others proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in

2015 at which a jury found in favor of the Bollingers and awarded damages on their claims

of promissory estoppel and deceit related to the 2008 soybean crop, interference with

contractual relations, and negligence and breach of fiduciary duty relating to the handling

of a 2008 crop-insurance claim. Additionally, the entire appeal and cross-appeal in Bollinger

I was about circuit court’s rulings and jury verdicts on the tort counterclaims. See Bollinger I,

2018 Ark. App. 224, at 23, 548 S.W.3d at 179. The result of that appeal—the reversal of

several jury verdicts—does not change that the bulk of the litigation was in tort.

                                           11
   In fact, in the circuit court’s August 2021 letter opinion in which it conducted its

attorney-fee analysis, it suggested that the bulk of the litigation and the bulk of the

attorneys’ fees were related to the tort counterclaims. Specifically, it found:

   Time and labor required. This case was filed in 2009, and though the last of the
   notes was paid in June 2012, the case continued with numerous pre-trial hearings, a
   seven (7) day jury trial, and numerous post trial hearings and briefs. However, the
   Court also considers that the last of the notes were paid in full in June 2012, so the
   majority of fees after that date were in defense of the tort claims.

   The amounts involved in the case and the results. Plaintiff received summary
   judgment rulings for approximately ($798,792.00) and successfully defended many
   of the tort claims. However, more of their fees were related to the tort claims.

Although the circuit court ultimately found that this case sounded primarily in contract,

several of its statements undermined that finding. We hold that the circuit court erred in

its determination that this case sounded primarily in contract.

   But our analysis does not stop there. This is not a typical mixed contract/tort case

where a prevailing party has advanced (or defended against) contract and tort claims.

Compare Patton Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 2016 Ark. App. 281, at 11, 493 S.W.3d at 805–06

(“[W]here multiple claims are advanced—including a breach-of-contract claim—an attorney’s

fee award is proper when the action is primarily based in contract.”). In those cases, our

courts have held that fees are proper under the statute only when the action is based

primarily in contract. Id. Here, however, Farm Credit’s action was based solely in contract

and resolved in 2012. Section 16-22-308 expressly permits an award of fees to prevailing

parties in contract actions. Farm Credit’s original action was in contract, and “the

prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and

                                           12

collected as costs.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.2 Thus, as the prevailing party of the action

as a whole and of the contract claims specifically, we hold that the circuit court did not err

in determining that Farm Credit was entitled to recover fees under section 16-22-308

related to its contract claims.

   Despite that holding, we must also consider Farm Credit’s fee award under section

16-22-308 for defending against the Bollingers’ tort counterclaims. The circuit court

addressed the tort-counterclaim fees separately from the contract fees and found that

“pursuant to the Kinkead and Loewer opinions[,] Farm Credit may also be awarded attorney

fees for successfully defending against the counterclaims.” We are unconvinced by the

circuit court’s reliance on Loewer and Kinkead.

   In Loewer, 311 Ark. at 361, 844 S.W.2d at 334, the supreme court affirmed a fee

award of $50,000 to the prevailing party, National Bank of Arkansas, who brought an

action to recover on two promissory notes and defended against a counterclaim for

conversion. In challenging the fee award on appeal, Loewer argued, in part, that recovery

of attorney’s fees on promissory notes is limited to 10 percent of the principal plus interest,

relying on Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-56-101 (Repl. 1991). Id. The supreme court

rejected that argument, holding that
––
2
The prevailing party is determined by who comes out “on top” at the end of the
case. See Dark Knight Vending, LLC v. Luckily Diced Amusement, Inc., 2025 Ark. App. 455, at
5, 721 S.W.3d 825, 829. The circuit court determined that Farm Credit was the prevailing
party at the end of the case “because they won on more causes of action, and because the
amount they were due on the notes far exceeded the verdict received on the tort claims.”
On the facts as recounted above, we see no error in the circuit court’s prevailing-party
determination.

                                          13
   [t]his section simply recognizes that a provision in a promissory note for the
   payment of a reasonable attorney’s fee, not to exceed 10% of the amount of
   principal plus interest, may be enforceable as a contract of indemnity. We cannot
   interpret the Statute to limit the amount of attorney’s fees which can be awarded in
   an action to recover on a promissory note. Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp.
   1991) clearly authorizes attorney’s fees to be awarded in an action such as this one.

Id. at 361, 844 S.W.2d at 334.

   Subsequently, in Kinkead, 51 Ark. App. 4, 907 S.W.2d 154, Union National Bank

brought a foreclosure action against an insurance company on its note and mortgages. The

insurance company’s owners, the Kinkeads, counterclaimed on various tort theories and

under a federal statute. A trial was held on the foreclosure complaint and the tort

counterclaims, at the conclusion of which the circuit court granted Union National Bank

judgment on its complaint and all counts of the tort counterclaim. Id. at 10, 907 S.W.2d at

1. It also awarded attorney’s fees to the bank as the prevailing party. Id. On appeal, the

Kinkeads argued that the bank may have been entitled to receive fees on its foreclosure

action, but it was not entitled to a fee for defending the counterclaims based in tort. This

court disagreed. Relying on the language in Loewer that section 16-22-308 “clearly

authorizes attorney’s fees to be awarded in an action such as this one,” the Kinkead court

held that although the Kinkeads “made unsubstantiated allegations of tort in their

counterclaim, the trial was basically an action for foreclosure.” Id. at 18, 907 S.W.2d at 162

(quoting Loewer, 311 Ark. at 361, 844 S.W.2d at 334). Thus, it affirmed the entire fee

award, including fees for defending against the tort counterclaim. Id.

                                         14
   Here, like in Kinkead, Farm Credit brought a contract action and defended against

tort counterclaims, but Kinkead is otherwise distinguishable from this case. Unlike in

Kinkead, where the trial encompassed contract and tort claims, the litigation on the

Bollingers’ tort counterclaims in this case continued for years after the easily separable

contract claims had been resolved. Further, the trial in this case involved only the tort

counterclaims, and unlike in Kinkead, we cannot say those claims were “unsubstantiated,”

given that a jury returned verdicts in favor of the Bollingers on several counterclaims, and

the crop-insurance-counterclaim verdicts were affirmed by this court on appeal. Bollinger I,

2018 Ark. App. 224, at 23, 548 S.W.3d at 179. The circuit court’s reliance on Kinkead to

award Farm Credit fees under section 16-22-308 for defending against the tort

counterclaims was misplaced.3

   Additionally, it is important to note that this does not appear to be a case where

time spent on the contract action was so intertwined with time spent defending the tort

counterclaims that the two cannot be separated for fee purposes. Cf. Patton Hosp. Mgmt.,

LLC, 2016 Ark. App. 281, at 11, 493 S.W.3d at 806 (upholding fee award under section

                        ––
   3
    The Bollingers urge this court to overrule Kinkead, arguing that Kinkead

misinterpreted the supreme court’s opinion in Loewer and that Loewer did not support
Kinkead’s holding that fees could be awarded under section 16-22-308 for defending
counterclaims in tort. Arkansas courts do not lightly overrule cases and apply a strong
presumption in favor of the validity of prior decisions. Helton v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A.,
102 Ark. App. 364, 369, 285 S.W.3d 676, 680 (2008). As a matter of public policy, it is
necessary to uphold prior decisions unless a great injury or injustice would result. Id.
Because we can easily distinguish Kinkead, it is not necessary that we overrule it in order to
determine that its holding does not govern this case.

                                         15

16-22-308 where resolution of noncontract claims hinged on the interpretation of two

contracts); Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Davenport, 2017 Ark. App. 105, at 6–7, 513 S.W.3d

880, 885 (upholding entire fee award under section 16-22-308 where the circuit court

noted that tort counterclaim was “intertwined” and an “integral part” of prevailing party’s

successful defense against a breach-of-contract claim). In Davenport, the contract and tort

claims were so intertwined that “to clearly separate the time spent for pursuing the

counterclaim versus what was spent for defending the complaint [was] almost impossible.”

Id. at 6, 513 S.W.3d. at 884. That is not the case here. Although the circuit court did not

separate the attorneys’ fees for time spent on pursuing the breach-of-contact action versus

defending against the tort counterclaims, it could easily do so on remand. We therefore

hold that the fees awarded to Farm Credit’s attorneys for defending against the tort

counterclaims were not prescribed by section 16-22-308.

   We reverse the circuit court’s award of fees for Farm Credit’s defense against the

tort counterclaims, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Because we reverse on the first point, and that reversal may affect the remaining points, we

decline to address the Bollingers’ remaining arguments for reversal.

                                   III. Conclusion

   For the reasons stated above, we reverse the circuit court’s October 16, 2023 order

and judgment and remand for further proceedings.

   Reversed and remanded.

   HARRISON and BARRETT, JJ., agree.

                                         16
   Rogers & Coe, Attorneys, by: Joe M. Rogers, for appellants.

   Waddell, Cole & Jones, PLLC, by: Ralph W. Waddell, Kevin W. Cole, and Justin E.

Parkey, for appellee.

                                           17