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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Dunkowski, C.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1220 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Beck

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (617)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Beck

J-S47031-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTINE R. DUNKOWSKI :
:
Appellant : No. 1220 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 1, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0000248-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED MARCH 9, 2026

Christine R. Dunkowski (“Dunkowski”) appeals pro se from the order

entered by the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas dismissing her second

petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 Because we

conclude that her claims are either not cognizable under the PCRA or lack

merit, we affirm.

The PCRA court aptly summarized the facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

[On August 27, 2019,] Officer Scott Patrick (“Officer
Patrick”) was on patrol when he noticed a vehicle parked in the
very rear of the parking lot of the Woodbourne Train Station,
located in Middletown Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. He
called for additional Officers—Officer Samantha Weed (“Officer
Weed”) and Officer Christopher Viscardi (“Officer Viscardi”)—and
as they approached, Officer Patrick noticed [Dunkowksi’s

---

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S47031-25

husband, Albert Dunkowski (“Albert”)] lying face-down in the
grass, about ten to fifteen yards away. … Officer Patrick then came
across [Dunkowski]. She sat slumped over in the front passenger
seat with three children laying in the rear seats of the vehicle,
which was cluttered with trash, personal items, clothing, food, and
debris. As the officers opened the door to speak with
[Dunkowski], they immediately smelled a strong odor of urine,
soiled diapers, stale cigarettes, and rotting food. It was then that
they noticed a fourth child on the floor, completely covered in
trash. Officer Weed also discovered a cat in the back trunk of the
vehicle.

Alarmed at the children’s emaciated state, the officers
immediately called Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) to the
scene. They testified that the children, later identified as N.D.,
J.D., L.D. (“Female L.D.”) and L.D. (“Male L.D.”), looked gravely
ill, were covered in feces, urine, and bugs, and appeared
malnourished. When EMS arrived, [Dunkowski] refused to let
them take the children to the hospital for treatment. Officer
Patrick and EMS had no choice but to take protective custody of
the children, and they were immediately transported to St. Mary’s
Medical Center (“St. Mary’s”).

At St. Mary’s, treating physicians made the following
assessments: N.D., who suffered from cerebral palsy, was
thirteen years old and weighed about ninety pounds. She was
nonverbal, had a feeding tube, and started to develop bedsores
from remaining in the same position for a significant amount of
time. J.D. was four years old and weighed about forty pounds.
She was still in diapers as she was not yet trained to go to the
bathroom on her own and she needed extensive dental work—a
root canal, a crown, and three fillings. Female L.D. was five years
old and weighed about forty-eight pounds. She was also still in
diapers and needed nine root canals, nine crowns, one filling, and
four teeth pulled. She had never been to school. Male L.D. was
nine years old and weighed about sixty pounds. He had bilateral
clubfeet (meaning his legs and feet were turned inwards) as well
as undescended testicles (which normally descend before age
one). Both required procedures—several to improve Male L.D.’s
clubfeet and one to surgically descend his testicles. Male L.D. also
had such a severe, significant amount of dried, caked-on fecal
matter on his diaper that when the doctor pulled it back, Male
L.D.’s skin became raw and red. Dr. Torradas, the physician who
treated the children, testified that, over the course of his lengthy

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J-S47031-25

career, he had never seen anything like what he saw on August
27, 2019.

That same day, [Dunkowski and Albert] spoke with
Detective Brian Hyams (“Detective Hyams”) and told him that
none of the four children found were enrolled in school. Detective
Hyams asked if they had any additional children and they provided
the names of three more minors in their care. They relayed that
one child, R.M., was staying with a friend at the time, but neither
[Dunkowski nor Albert] could provide any contact information to
get in touch with her. Authorities eventually found R.M. and
discovered that she missed almost the entire 2018-2019 school
year and had an abscess in her tooth that rendered her unable to
chew and required significant dental surgery. …

Shortly thereafter, Detective Hyams discovered that
[Dunkowski and Albert] had an eighth minor child—S.D.—they did
not mention when previously asked. After some investigation,
Detective Hyams located S.D. and [Dunkowski and Albert] agreed
to turn her over to authorities in a McDonald’s parking lot. S.D.
appeared to be very thin, small, disheveled. Her hair was very
short as if it wasn’t growing, or falling out. Her eyes were puffy
underneath. She was very, very quiet, almost like she was
lethargic. Doctors later determined she weighed about forty-two
pounds. S.D. was unable to walk because her legs were bent and
stuck in a seated position. She also still needed diapers—at
thirteen years old—because [Dunkowski and Albert] never taught
her how to use the bathroom. Authorities immediately took
protective custody of S.D. and transported her to St. Mary’s with
the other children.

From St. Mary’s, all five children were transported to St.
Christopher’s Hospital for Children (“St. Christopher’s”). While at
St. Christopher’s, Bucks County Children and Youth Caseworker
Sarah Santin (“Santin”) met with the children to investigate
allegations of abuse and neglect. Santin noted that N.D., similar
to S.D., could not fully extend her legs and had severely chapped
lips. She testified that all the children appeared thin, had fine and
thinning hair, and had severe dry skin. Two of the children, N.D.
and S.D., remained admitted to St. Christopher’s for several
weeks. S.D. required intensive physical therapy to regain the
ability to walk. Ultimately, doctors determined that S.D.’s and
N.D’s issues were a result of chronic neglect—i.e., neglect over
months. Therefore, Santin believed that the children were unsafe

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J-S47031-25

with [Dunkowski and Albert] and petitioned … to take emergency
custody of the children. That petition was granted and the
children were placed in foster homes.

[Dunkowski and Albert were] charged with six counts of
endangering the welfare of children [(“EWOC”)] and [their] jury
trial began on October 4, 2021 and lasted for three days.
However, [Dunkowski and Albert] both failed to appear [for the
third day of trial], and a bench warrant was issued on October 6,
2021. After defense counsel and the Commonwealth made
numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact [Dunkowski and
Albert] using all available resources, [the trial court] ruled that
the trial would continue in absentia. Later that same day, the jury
found [Dunkowski and Albert] guilty of three of the six counts of
[EWOC]—all felonies of the third degree.

Over four months later, authorities found [Dunkowski] in
Delaware[.]

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/20/2025, at 1-3 (formatting modified, citations

omitted).

On June 28, 2022, the trial court sentenced Dunkowski to consecutive

terms of two-and-a-half to seven years in prison on two of her EWOC

convictions and another consecutive term of three to seven years in prison on

her third EWOC conviction, for an aggregate term of eight to twenty-one years

of incarceration. This Court affirmed Dunkowski’s judgment of sentence on

July 7, 2023, see Commonwealth v. Dunkowski, 1990 EDA 2022, 2023 WL

4397323 (Pa. Super. July 7, 2023) (non-precedential decision), and our

Supreme Court denied her petition for allowance of appeal on December 6,

1. See Commonwealth v. Dunkowski, 308 A.3d 1250, 401 MAL 2023

(Pa. 2023).

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J-S47031-25

… On May 20, 2024, [Dunkowski] filed her first PCRA
petition. Counsel was appointed and on August 14, 2024, an
amended PCRA petition was filed and raised a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel as trial counsel did not request that [the trial
court] determine that [Dunkowski] be [Recidivism Risk Reduction
Incentive (“RRRI”)] eligible. On August 19, 2024, after the
Commonwealth agreed with [Dunkowski]’s allegation of error,
[the PCRA court] issued an order granting [Dunkowski]’s amended
PCRA petition and amending the judgment of sentence to reflect
that [she] is eligible for RRRI program. This order resolved the
sole claim in [Dunkowski]’s amended PCRA petition.

On January 24, 2025, [Dunkowski] filed a pro se second
[timely] PCRA petition, alleging trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the discretionary aspects of [her] sentence.
The Commonwealth filed its response to [Dunkowski]’s petition on
February 28, 2025, and on March [11], 2025, [the PCRA court]
issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
On March 17, 2025, [Dunkowski] filed an objection to the notice
of intent to dismiss. On April 1, 2025, [the PCRA court] formally
dismissed [Dunkowski]’s pro se second PCRA petition. On May 7,
2025, [Dunkowski] filed [a pro se] notice of appeal to the Superior
Court.[2]

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/20/2025, at 4 (formatting modified).

---

2 Our rules of appellate procedure provide that an appeal must be filed within
thirty days after entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. Pa.R.A.P.
903(a). Generally, an appellant’s failure to timely appeal an order “divests
the appellate court of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Commonwealth v.
Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014)(citation omitted). Under the
prisoner mailbox rule, however, “a pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed
on the date he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.” Commonwealth
v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “[A]ny
reasonably verifiable evidence of the date that the prisoner deposits the
document with prison authorities” is acceptable to satisfy this rule.
Commonwealth v. Perez, 799 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation
omitted). Here, the record reflects that Dunkowski dated the notice of appeal
April 15, 2025, and that the notice of appeal envelope is postmarked April 16,
2025. See Notice of Appeal, 4/16/2025. Accordingly, we conclude Dunkowski
timely filed the notice of appeal from the order dismissing her PCRA petition.

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J-S47031-25

Dunkowski presents the following issues for review:

1. Trial court gave excessive sentencing and abused its discretion
   failing to consider relevant factors that should have received
   significant weight. [Dunkowski]’s rehabilitative needs and the
   mitigating circumstances. Honorable Wallace Bateman Jr
   states “[Dunkowski]’s most significantly need for
   rehabilitation.” Failing to consider [Dunkowski]’s history and
   characteristics and no prior convictions sentencing
   [Dunkowski] outside the guidelines framework is considered a
   variance. Irizarry v [U.S.,] 553 U.S. 708. Also failing to
   consider Dr. Tapper[’]s recommendation report for [severe]
   opioid use disorder of [Dunkowski]. And treatment in the State
   Drug Treatment Program 61 Pa.C.S. § 4102.

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel on PCRA petition. Counsel
   Partick McMenamin Jr only filed for [RRRI] Program which was
   amended without a hearing. [Dunkowski]’s PCRA petition
   asked for running sentences concurrent and or merger of
   sentences 42 Pa.C.S § 9765 since crimes arise from a single
   criminal act and all statutory elements of the offenses are
   included in the statutory elements of the other.

Dunkowski’s Brief at 4 (formatting modified; reordered for ease of review).

“We review the denial of PCRA relief by examining whether the PCRA

court’s conclusions are supported by the record and free from legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 979 (Pa. 2023). “[W]e defer to

the factual findings of the post-conviction court, which is tasked with hearing

the evidence and assessing credibility.” Id. Our standard of review of a PCRA

court’s legal conclusions, however, is de novo. Id.

In her first issue, Dunkowski argues that the trial court imposed an

excessive sentence and that it erred in imposing her sentences consecutively

as opposed to concurrently. See Dunkowski’s Brief at 14-17. Specifically,

Dunkowski asserts that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors,

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J-S47031-25

such as her opioid addiction at the time of her offenses, or her rehabilitative

needs, including that she was unlikely to reoffend, in determining her

sentence. See id.

Dunkowski’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence.

See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez–Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 597-98 (Pa.

Super. 2010) (explaining that a claim that the trial court erred in imposing

consecutive sentences is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a

sentence); Commonwealth v. Lee, 876 A.2d 408, 411 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(stating that claim that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence

is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence). It is well settled,

however, that a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not

cognizable under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287,

1289 (Pa. Super. 2007). On that basis, her first claim fails.

In her second issue, Dunkowski argues that counsel appointed to

represent her for her first PCRA petition was ineffective for only arguing that

she was RRRI-eligible and for failing to challenge other aspects of her

sentence. Dunkowski’s Brief at 13. Specifically, she asserts that PCRA counsel

should have argued that her sentences for her three EWOC convictions should

have merged for purposes of sentencing because they all arose “from a single

criminal act.” Dunkowski’s Brief at 13. Dunkowski also again argues that

PCRA counsel should have argued that the trial court erred in ordering her

sentences to run consecutively instead of concurrently. Id.

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J-S47031-25

It is well[]settled that counsel is presumed to have been effective
and that the petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel’s
alleged ineffectiveness. To overcome this presumption, a
petitioner must establish that: (1) the underlying substantive
claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel did not have a reasonable
basis for his or her act or omission; and (3) the petitioner suffered
prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance, that is, a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s act or omission, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 259 A.3d 395, 405 (Pa. 2021) (quotation marks

and citation omitted). Importantly, a PCRA petitioner must address each of

these three prongs not only before the PCRA court but also on appeal, as the

petitioner bears the burden of pleading that counsel provided ineffective

assistance. Id. This Court, however, need not review the elements pertaining

to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in any particular order, as the

law is clear that “[a] petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal

to the claim.” Id.

“A claim that crimes should merge for sentencing purposes raises a

nonwaivable challenge to the legality of the sentence[.]” Commonwealth v.

Edwards, 256 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. 2021). Regarding merger and

sentencing, section 9765 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code provides:

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes
arise from a single criminal act and all … the statutory elements
of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other
offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court
may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. As our Supreme Court has explained, section 9765

prohibits merger “unless two distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise

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J-S47031-25

from a single criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the

offenses are included in the statutory elements of the other.”

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. 2009).

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines EWOC as follows: “[a] parent,

guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of

age, or a person that employs or supervises such a person, commits an

offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty

of care, protection or support.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has opined that “in resolving the issue of

whether a single act which injures multiple victims can be the basis for

multiple sentences, our task is to simply determine whether the legislature

intended that each injury constitute a separate offense.” Commonwealth v.

Frisbie, 485 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. 1984). In Frisbie, our Supreme Court

determined that convictions for recklessly endangering another person

(“REAP”) do not merge where the defendant endangered several people by

committing a single act. Id. The Court explained that the REAP statute

provides that, “[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he

recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in

danger of death or serious bodily injury.” Id. (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705;

emphasis in original).

In the instant case, the definition of EWOC similarly refers to

endangering the welfare of “a child” or “the child.” See 18 Pa.C.S. §

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J-S47031-25

4304(a)(1). Accordingly, pursuant to Frisbie, a defendant commits separate

offenses of EWOC for each child whose welfare was endangered by his or her

conduct and those offenses do not merge for purposes of sentencing. See

Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100.3 We therefore conclude that this claim lacks

arguable merit and that PCRA counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it

in her first PCRA petition. See Reid, 259 A.3d at 405.

Finally, regarding her claim that PCRA counsel should have argued that

the trial court erred in ordering her sentences to run consecutively instead of

concurrently, as established above, Dunkowski’s underlying claim challenges

the discretionary aspects of her sentence. See Lee, 876 A.2d at 411. As

such, this claim is not cognizable under the PCRA, and we cannot fault PCRA

counsel for declining to raise this claim on Dunkowski’s behalf in her first PCRA

petition. See Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014)

(stating that “counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a

meritless claim”). Thus, this argument likewise fails.

As Dunkowski has failed to raise a claim that entitles her to relief, we

affirm the order denying her second PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

---

3 Moreover, Dunkowski’s argument that her abuse and neglect of several of
her children over a substantial period constituted a single act is tenuous at
best.

• 10 - J-S47031-25

Date: 3/9/2026

• 11 -