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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kuigoua v. Sacks CA2/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B345468

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/10/26 Kuigoua v. Sacks CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ARNO KUIGOUA, B345468

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV19534)
v.

ADAM MICHAEL SACKS et al.,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.

Arno Kuigoua, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Adam Michael Sacks, in pro. per.; and Law Office of Adam
Michael Sacks for Defendant and Respondent.

---

Arno Kuigoua (appellant) appeals from an order denying
his motion to set aside the dismissal of his case against Adam
Michael Sacks and the Law Offices of Adam Michael Sacks
(respondent).1 We affirm the order.

BACKGROUND
On May 21, 2020, appellant filed an action against
respondent alleging (1) professional negligence, (2) breach of
fiduciary duty, and (3) promissory fraud. Respondent is an
attorney who represented appellant in a family law matter.
Appellant also approached respondent with a request to
represent him in an employment law matter. Appellant alleged
respondent orally promised to provide legal representation in the
employment matter in exchange for monetary payment. The
action arose from respondent’s alleged failure to appear at an
eight-day hearing in the employment matter.
On March 14, 2022, appellant’s then-attorney of record,
Michael Labrum, filed a “Notice of Settlement and Request for
Dismissal” in the professional negligence matter against
respondent, which was granted.

1 Appellant also purports to appeal from the court’s denials
of his two motions for reconsideration of the court’s order denying
his motion to set aside the dismissal, which are not appealable
orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g).) However, because the
order that was the subject of the motions for reconsideration is
appealable, the denials of the motions for reconsideration are
reviewable as part of this appeal. (Ibid.)
All further unattributed statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

2
On January 7, 2025, appellant filed a “Notice of Motion and
Motion to Set Aside Dismissal Based on Extrinsic Fraud and
Lack of Attorney Authority.” Appellant claimed he never
authorized the settlement or dismissal of the case, which was
done without his consent and through the alleged wrongful
conduct of his attorney, Labrum, and respondent. Appellant
further asserted he was excluded from all settlement negotiations
and never received any payment. He sought reinstatement of the
case.
Appellant asserted he was first informed of the allegedly
unauthorized dismissal of his case against respondent in April
2022, but Labrum informed him the dismissal was irreversible.
Because of this alleged misrepresentation, appellant did not file a
motion under section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)) within
six months of the dismissal. Appellant alleged he reasonably
relied on his attorney’s misrepresentations and trusted his
attorney to provide accurate advice.
Respondent opposed the motion, arguing it was untimely
and appellant made no showing of mistake, surprise,
inadvertence or excusable neglect in support of the motion.
Because appellant had not met the statutory requirements of
section 473(b), respondent argued the motion must be denied as
legally and factually impossible.
In his opposition, respondent asserted the professional
negligence matter was settled and “reduced to a written
agreement which was signed by [appellant], [appellant’s
attorney] and [respondent] on March 2, 2022.” The settlement
fully resolved the case and all issues related thereto.2 Appellant’s

2 The settlement agreement was referenced as “Exhibit A” to
respondent’s opposition but was not attached to the opposition.

3
counsel filed a notice of settlement with the court on March 14,
2022. On the same date, appellant’s counsel filed a request for
dismissal, which was entered on March 15, 2022. Respondent
pointed out appellant’s present motion failed to include an
affidavit of fault and argued appellant’s remedy, if any, was
against his former counsel, Labrum. Because nearly three years
passed since the matter was settled and dismissed, respondent
argued all remedies for appellant against respondent had long
lapsed or expired.
Appellant’s motion was heard on February 10, 2025.
Appellant appeared in propria persona, as did respondent. In a
written order filed the same date, the court denied the motion,
noting appellant presented no credible evidence the settlement
was entered into without his consent. Moreover, the court had no
authority to excuse appellant’s noncompliance with the inflexible
time limit set forth in section 473(b). (Citing Arambula v. Union
Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 344.) The court found
appellant’s claims regarding his former attorney did not affect
the finality of the judgment.
On February 13, 2025, appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court’s order denying his motion to set
aside the dismissal. Appellant argued that while section 1008,
subdivision (a) (section 1008(a)) governs motions for
reconsideration generally, it does not limit the court’s equitable
power to set aside judgments or dismissals obtained by extrinsic
fraud. Appellant argued the court should exercise its equitable
power to set aside the dismissal due to his former attorney’s

Instead, a note read, “Redacted due to confidentiality clause will
release by court order as necessary.”

4
unauthorized settlement and dismissal of the matter. Appellant
argued the court’s order overlooked the extrinsic fraud argument.
Appellant attached a declaration detailing his version of the
events leading up to the filing of his motion, as well as a copy of a
complaint, filed January 7, 2025, against his former attorney
Labrum. Respondent opposed the motion for reconsideration.
On March 7, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying
appellant’s motion for reconsideration. The court acknowledged
it had the power to grant relief on equitable grounds after the six-
month period for statutory relief has passed. (Citing Manson,
Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 47.) However, in
order to have a final order set aside on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, a party must show that he or she has a meritorious case, a
satisfactory excuse for not presenting this defense to the original
action and that he or she has exercised diligence in seeking to set
aside the order once the fraud had been discovered. (Citing
Hudson v. Foster (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 640, 664.)
The trial court found appellant failed to meet the
requirements for equitable relief. Appellant focused on extrinsic
fraud by Labrum, without discussion of the merits of the legal
malpractice case against respondent. In addition, appellant
failed to demonstrate diligence in seeking relief. Appellant
admitted he learned of the purportedly unauthorized settlement
in March or April 2022 and last heard from Labrum that the
dismissal was irreversible in March 2023. Appellant made a
vague statement that he later learned this was untrue, which
was insufficient to warrant equitable relief.
On March 11, 2025, appellant filed a second request for
reconsideration of the court’s denial of his motion to set aside the
dismissal. Appellant asserted he was unfairly deprived of his

5
opportunity to litigate his meritorious case. Appellant remained
vague about his own diligence, stating “it was not until 2024”
that he discovered the “full extent” of Labrum’s alleged deception.
Respondent opposed the motion.
On April 2, 2025, the trial court filed a written order
denying appellant’s second motion for reconsideration. The court
noted appellant presented no authority allowing him to move for
reconsideration twice on the same grounds. Moreover, the
motion was filed more than 10 days after the challenged order, in
violation of the time requirements set forth in section 1008(a). In
addition, the court found the motion suffered from the same
defects as the previous motion. Appellant failed to demonstrate
diligence in seeking relief and offered no new facts or
circumstances, only realleging facts the court had previously
deemed insufficient. The court found the motion “both
procedurally improper and substantively meritless.”
On April 2, 2025, appellant filed his notice of appeal from
the orders denying his motion to set aside the dismissal and his
motions for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
The discretionary relief provided in section 473(b) allows a
court to “relieve a party . . . from a judgment, dismissal, order or
other proceeding taken against the party through the party’s
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” A request
for relief under section 473(b) must be made “within a reasonable
time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment,
dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” Our review of the
trial court’s order denying relief under the discretionary portion

6
of section 473(b) is “highly deferential” and will not be disturbed
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. (McClain v. Kissler
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 413.)
“[E]ven where relief is no longer available under statutory
provisions, a trial court generally retains the inherent power to
vacate a . . . judgment or order on equitable grounds where a
party establishes that the judgment or order . . . resulted from
extrinsic fraud . . . .” (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228.) “In order to set aside a final order
based on extrinsic fraud, ‘the moving party must demonstrate
that he or she has a meritorious case, that [they have] a
satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original
action and that [they] exercised diligence in seeking to set aside
the default once the fraud had been discovered.’” (Hudson v.
Foster (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 640, 664.) An order denying
equitable relief is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at
p. 661.) In reviewing such an order, “‘we determine whether the
trial court’s factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence [citation] and independently review its statutory
interpretations and legal conclusions [citations].’” (Ibid.)
An order denying a motion for reconsideration under
section 1008(a) is generally not appealable. (Association for Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 166
Cal.App.4th 1625, 1632–1633.) “However, if the underlying order
that was the subject of reconsideration is appealable, the denial
of reconsideration is reviewable as part of an appeal from the
underlying order.” (Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 35, 51.)

7
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying relief
Appellant argues the trial court erred in applying the six-
month deadline found in section 473(b) instead of using its
inherent equitable power to vacate the dismissal on the ground of
extrinsic fraud.
The record shows the trial court considered appellant’s
claims of extrinsic fraud, despite appellant’s failure to meet the
statutory deadline set forth in section 473(b). In addressing the
issue of extrinsic fraud, the trial court correctly applied the three-
part test requiring the moving party to demonstrate he or she has
a meritorious case, a satisfactory excuse for not presenting the
defense to the original action, and that he or she exercised
diligence in seeking to set aside the default once the fraud had
been discovered. (Hudson v. Foster, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
p. 664.)
The record supports the trial court’s determination that
appellant failed to meet these requirements. First, the court
noted appellant failed to demonstrate the underlying case against
respondent had merit. Instead, the motion was focused on
appellant’s claims of extrinsic fraud by Labrum. Further, the
court found appellant failed to demonstrate diligence. He
presented no facts surrounding his discovery of Labrum’s alleged
fraud. Instead, he provided only a vague statement that he later
learned Labrum’s representations that the dismissal was
irreversible were untrue.
Appellant’s second motion for reconsideration, filed
March 11, 2025, was filed more than 10 days after service upon
appellant of the court’s ruling denying his motion to set aside the
dismissal, therefore it was untimely. (§ 1008(a).) Further, as the

8
trial court noted, appellant cited no authority allowing him to
move for reconsideration twice on the same grounds. As the
second motion for reconsideration raised issues identical to those
set forth in the first motion for reconsideration and failed to raise
new or different material facts, circumstances, or law, it failed to
comply with the restrictions of section 1008. (§ 1008, subds. (a),
(b).)
Although the trial court had discretion to consider
appellant’s claims of extrinsic fraud, we note appellant’s more
extensive allegations in the second motion for reconsideration
still failed to meet the requirements to set aside a judgment on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud. Appellant repeated the vague
representation that at some point after March 12, 2023, he
learned Labrum’s representations were untrue. Appellant failed
to describe the way he learned of Labrum’s alleged fraudulent
misrepresentations or the precise date he learned of such alleged
misrepresentations. The trial court did not err in denying
reconsideration where appellant filed an untimely, repetitive
motion and continued to provide only vague information
concerning his own diligence.
Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the trial
court’s ruling will not be disturbed “‘“except on a showing the
trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
of justice.”’” (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 46.) The record
supports the trial court’s determination that appellant failed to
meet the requirements of a claim of extrinsic fraud, therefore the
trial court’s ruling will stand.3

3 As respondent points out, appellant has cited three
apparently nonexistent or miscited cases in his opening brief.

9
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs of
appeal.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

While this court is permitted to impose sanctions for relying on
nonexistent legal authority (Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P.
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 436), we decline to do so as
appellant’s opening brief was otherwise comprehensible.
However, we caution appellant that any subsequent cases
containing miscites will likely result in sanctions.

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