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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Shariapanahi v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B334515

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (11.2K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/10/26 Shariapanahi v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

HAMID SHARIATPANAHI, B334515
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. BC710903)

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael E. Whitaker and Anne Hwang, Judges.
Affirmed.
The Severo Law Firm and Michael V. Severo for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs and Timothy Martin, Deputy City
Attorneys, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Hamid Shariatpanahi (appellant)
appeals from the judgment following defendant and respondent
City of Los Angeles’s (City) successful motion for summary
judgment. Appellant contends there are triable issues of material
fact as to whether the City was entitled to the design immunity
defense, had a duty to light an unmarked crosswalk, or was liable
for failing to warn of a dangerous condition. As the City met its
burden on the motion and no triable issues of material fact exist,
we affirm.

BACKGROUND
The accident
On August 31, 2017, at approximately 10:05 p.m., appellant
walked up a ramp using the Los Angeles River bike path and
attempted to cross Corbin Avenue. Corbin Avenue spans a bridge
over the Los Angeles River Flood Control Channel. The bike path
runs east and west along the channel’s south side and passes
beneath the bridge structure for Corbin Avenue. As appellant
moved west across Corbin Avenue from the east sidewalk, he was
struck by a vehicle travelling southbound at approximately 30
miles per hour. The traffic collision report indicated appellant
suffered lacerations to his face and left calf, as well as partial
amputation of his right pinky finger.
At the place appellant crossed, there were no crosswalk
markings or breaks in the street striping suggesting an intention
for pedestrians to cross. The east side of Corbin Avenue had a
streetlight that was then inoperative. There were streetlights on
the bike path, but they too were not functioning.

2
The complaint
In June 2018, appellant filed a lawsuit against the City, the
driver and owner of the vehicle.1 The complaint asserted causes
of action for negligence and dangerous condition on public
property. Appellant alleged the City designed and maintained the
Los Angeles River bike path in a manner that created an
unreasonable risk of injury to pedestrians using due care and
acting in a reasonably foreseeable manner. The ramps from the
bike path leading up to Corbin Avenue allegedly created an
unmarked crosswalk giving the impression it was safe to cross
the street in the middle of the block. Further, the complaint
alleged the streetlights were not functioning at the time,
rendering the area completely dark and substantially increasing
a pedestrian’s injury risk.
Appellant also alleged the driver was driving in an unsafe
manner when appellant attempted to cross the street. Allegedly
the driver was distracted at the time and driving at a high rate of
speed. Appellant claims to have suffered injuries to his brain,
body, and nervous system, resulting in substantial pain and
suffering. The complaint sought general damages of $20 million,
medical and incidental expenses, and loss of earnings and
earning capacity.
The motion to continue trial
The initial trial date was December 20, 2019. The parties
stipulated to continue the trial to June 23, 2020. In April 2020,
the court continued the trial to September 9, 2021, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. In August 2021, the trial date was

1 Appellant settled his claims against the driver and the
owner of the vehicle, both of whom are not parties to this appeal.

3
continued again to July 29, 2022, at appellant’s request, with
which the City agreed.
In April 2022, the City sought to reserve a hearing date for
its summary judgment motion. However, the earliest hearing
date available for the City’s motion was June 29, 2023, nearly a
year after the then-scheduled trial date. The City filed an ex
parte application to advance the hearing date that was denied
under the court’s standing order.2
On April 15, 2022, the City filed a motion to continue trial
on the ground the earliest date to hear its summary judgment
motion was nearly a year after the trial date. The City argued the
interests of justice required the trial to be continued because the
City had a statutory right to have its motion heard. In opposition,
appellant asserted that service of the motion for continuance was
defective, and there was no good cause to continue trial because
the City was not diligent in filing the summary judgment motion.
On May 9, 2022, the trial court granted the motion to
continue the trial and rescheduled it for August 1, 2023. The
court found the City’s service of the motion for continuance was
defective, but appellant was not prejudiced because he timely
filed an opposition fully briefing the merits of the motion. The
court considered the City’s reasons for a continuance and found it

2 The standing order stated: “The PI Courts have no capacity
to hear multiple ex parte applications or to shorten time to add
hearings to their fully booked motion calendars. The PI Courts do
not regard the Court’s unavailability for timely motion hearings
as an ‘immediate danger’ or threat of ‘irreparable harm’ justifying
ex parte relief. Instead of seeking ex parte relief, the moving
party should reserve the earliest available motion hearing date
(even if it is after the scheduled trial date) and file a motion to
continue trial.”

4
had shown good cause to continue the trial. The court indicated
appellant’s arguments opposing the motion were not persuasive.
The motion for summary judgment
In April 2023, the City moved for summary judgment, or
alternatively summary adjudication, on three issues. First, the
City contended it had no duty to maintain or operate streetlights
and was therefore not liable for failing to do so. The City further
argued appellant’s case did not fall within the exception to this
general rule because no evidence showed the streetlighting was
necessary to obviate a dangerous condition known to the City, the
failure to maintain the streetlight created a risk greater than the
risk from the total absence of a streetlight, or that appellant
relied on the streetlight operating and forewent other protective
actions.
Second, the City asserted it was immune from liability for
the design of the roadway pursuant to Government Code section
830.6.3 The City maintained it was entitled to the design
immunity defense because there was a causal relationship
between the City’s plan and appellant’s injury. Also, the City
posited there was discretionary approval of its plan prior to
construction and substantial evidence supported the plan’s
reasonableness.
Finally, the City contended it was not liable for a
dangerous condition of public property pursuant to section 835
because the roadway’s design, construction, or maintenance did
not contribute to the accident. The City also argued it had no
notice of any dangerous conditions on the roadway as there had

3 All undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.

5
been no similar incidents in the location for 10 years prior to the
accident.
In opposition, appellant asserted the City had a duty to
provide lighting because the unmarked crosswalk was a peculiar
condition that required lighting. Appellant explained the City’s
own standard called for lighting and the failure to install a
streetlight created a false sense of safety for a pedestrian crossing
at the surface level rather than using the undercrossing. In
addition, appellant maintained the City was not entitled to the
design immunity defense because the unmarked crosswalk was
not part of the approved design. Appellant claimed none of the
City’s witnesses established who had discretionary authority to
approve plans. Appellant argued the City’s own traffic engineer
indicated it was not illegal to cross in the area of the collision,
and the City failed to provide substantial evidence supporting the
design plans’ reasonableness.
Appellant also asserted the City was liable for a dangerous
condition of public property because it failed to warn motorists
and pedestrians of the existence of the unmarked crosswalk,
explaining the design immunity defense did not shield the City
from liability based on negligence, independent of design.
Appellant argued the City failed to follow its own guide, since the
crossing location needed signage, markings, and lighting in place
to warn of approaching drivers.
In July 2023, the trial court heard and granted the motion
for summary judgment, finding there were no triable issues of
material fact as to the negligence and dangerous condition causes
of action against the City. As to the negligence cause of action,
the court found the City was entitled to immunity because

6
appellant failed to allege a specific statute upon which the City
would be liable for negligence.4
As to the dangerous condition claim, the trial court found
the City had no general duty to light its streets, and appellant’s
evidence failed to show he fell within the three-part exception.
The court explained appellant demonstrated only it was prudent
to light unmarked crosswalks, not that the City had an
affirmative legal obligation to do so. The court added appellant
offered no evidence how the failure to maintain the streetlight
created a “false sense of safety” or that appellant relied on the
streetlight functioning.
The trial court also found there were no triable issues of
material fact regarding the application of the design immunity
defense. The court initially noted the parties did not dispute the
first prong of the defense regarding a causal relationship between
the City’s design and the accident. But as to the second prong
concerning discretionary approval of the plan or design, the court
concluded, “Article 6, Sec. 22.343 of the [Administrative Code]
and Article 2 [of Chapter VI] of the Municipal Code vest the City
Engineer with considerable discretion to oversee and approve the
construction of streets and sidewalks within the City.” On its own
motion, the court took judicial notice of the City of Los Angeles’s
City Charter, Administrative Code, and Municipal Code pursuant
to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (b). The court found
appellant presented nothing challenging the City’s evidence that
its design plan, including the alleged unmarked crosswalk, was

4 It appears appellant does not challenge the summary
judgment motion as to his negligence claim against the City as
this issue was not addressed in the opposition to summary
judgment or in the opening brief on appeal.

7
approved by a senior transportation engineer. As to the third and
final prong regarding substantial evidence of the design’s
reasonableness, the court concluded the City’s experts presented
such evidence.
Lastly, as to the City’s liability for failure to warn of a
dangerous condition, the trial court found appellant provided no
evidence demonstrating the location qualified as a concealed trap.
The court also determined appellant presented no evidence
showing the absence of a warning was a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury.
Judgment was entered on September 4, 2023. Appellant
timely appealed.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Appellant asserts four main arguments. First, appellant
contends the City is not entitled to the design immunity defense
because it presented no evidence showing the unmarked
crosswalk was part of the design it approved. Appellant further
argues there is insufficient evidence the City’s design was
approved by someone with discretionary authority to give such
approval or that the design was reasonable. Appellant also
maintains the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the
City’s Administrative Code and Municipal Code because neither
party made such a request and appellant was given no notice.
Second, appellant asserts the City had a duty to light the
unmarked crosswalk because functioning streetlights were
necessary to provide the illumination required under the City’s
own street design guide. Appellant posits the failure to maintain
streetlights created a false sense of safety to the pedestrian using

8
the path and the midblock crossing over the underpass was a
peculiar condition requiring lighting.
Third, appellant asserts the City was liable for failing to
warn of a dangerous condition because the City failed to follow its
own street design guide. Appellant maintains there is a triable
issue of fact because pedestrian crossing at the location was legal
and use thereof was unexpected, requiring signing or markings to
warn approaching drivers. Appellant posits the City had
constructive notice of the dangerous condition because the
physical attributes of the site were not hidden and the City had
engaged in various other activity on Corbin Avenue.
Finally, appellant maintains the trial court abused its
discretion by continuing trial for a year to allow the City to file its
motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues service of the
motion to continue trial was defective and the City was not
diligent in filing its summary judgment motion.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review and applicable law
“The standard of review for an order granting a motion for
summary judgment is de novo.” (Ryan v. Real Estate of Pacific,
Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 637, 642.) “We need not defer to the
trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary
judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its
rationale.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 889.) “We resolve any
evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in favor of the party opposing
summary judgment.” (Ibid.) “The appellant, however, still ‘has
the burden of showing error, even if he did not bear the burden in

9
the trial court.’” (640 Octavia, LLC v. Pieper (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 1181, 1189 (640 Octavia).)
“Summary judgment is generally appropriate ‘if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact’ and that it ‘is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.’” (640 Octavia, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1188–1189.) “[A]
plaintiff can seek summary judgment by contending there is ‘no
defense’ to the action, and it proves there is ‘no defense’ by
establishing every element of its causes of action.” (Paramount
Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226,
239–240.) “Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the defendant to ‘set forth the specific facts showing that
a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a
defense thereto.’” (640 Octavia, supra, at p. 1189.) “There is a
triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor
of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the
applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
II. Respondent met its burden on summary judgment
and there are no triable issues of material fact
A. Appellant’s evidence fails to show a triable issue
exists as to the design immunity defense
“Section 830.6, commonly referred to as ‘design immunity,’
precludes liability for any injury caused by ‘the plan or design
of . . . , or an improvement to, public property.’” (Tansavatdi v.
City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 653
(Tansavatdi).) “[D]esign immunity requires that a public entity
establish three elements: ‘(1) a causal relationship between the
plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the

10
plan or design prior to construction; and (3) substantial evidence
supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design.’” (Ibid.)
“The rationale for design immunity is to prevent a jury
from second-guessing the decision of a public entity by reviewing
the identical questions of risk that had previously been
considered by the government officers who adopted or approved
the plan or design.” (Cornette v. Department of Transportation
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 69.) “‘“[T]o permit reexamination in tort
litigation of particular discretionary decisions where reasonable
men may differ as to how the discretion should be exercised
would create too great a danger of impolitic interference with the
freedom of decision-making by those public officials in whom the
function of making such decisions has been vested.”’” (Cameron v.
State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 326.)
As to the first element regarding causal relationship, it is
undisputed there was causation. Appellant contends, however,
the City presented no evidence the unmarked crosswalk was part
of the design it approved. Under Vehicle Code section 275,
subdivision (b), marked crosswalks are defined as “[a]ny portion
of a roadway distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines
or other markings on the surface.” Otherwise, crosswalks are
“[t]hat portion of a roadway included within the prolongation or
connection of the boundary lines of sidewalks at intersections
where the intersecting roadways meet at approximately right
angles, except the prolongation of such lines from an alley across
a street.” (Veh. Code, § 275, subd. (a), italics added.) “An
‘intersection’ is the area embraced within the prolongation of the
lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of
the roadways, of two highways which join one another at
approximately right angles or the area within which vehicles

11
traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may
come in conflict.” (Veh. Code, § 365, italics added.) Thus, an
unmarked crosswalk may only exist at an intersection of
highways.
Appellant asserts Corbin Avenue intersects a bike path at
the collision site. A bike path is not a highway. “A ‘bicycle path’ or
‘bike path’ is a Class I bikeway . . . .” (Veh. Code, § 231.5.) “[A]
Class I Bikeway does not qualify as a street or highway.”
(Farnham v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1097,
1101.) Class I bikeways “provide a completely separated right-of-
way designated for the exclusive use of bicycles and pedestrians
with crossflows by motorists minimized.” (Sts. & Hy. Code,
§ 890.4, subd. (a).) “A bicycle is not considered a vehicle. (Veh.
Code, §§ 231, 670.) A class I bikeway, by definition, is not open to
vehicular traffic.” (Farnham, supra, at p. 1101.) Accordingly, it
cannot be concluded the location at which appellant crossed is a
crosswalk as a matter of law because there is no intersection of
highways as the bike path is not a highway.
As to the second element concerning discretionary
authority, appellant posits the City’s experts’ declarations do not
provide competent evidence showing discretionary authority to
approve design plans.5 “To prove discretionary approval, a public
entity ‘must show that the design was approved “in advance” of
the construction “by the legislative body of the public entity or by
some other body or employee exercising discretionary authority to

5 Appellant asserts the trial court sustained his objections to
the declarations of the City’s experts with respect to this issue.
But the court only sustained the objections to the extent the
experts provided statements as to the legal effect of the City’s
Administrative Code, City Charter, and Municipal Code.

12
give such approval . . . .”’” (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos
Verdes (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 423, 435.) “A public entity may
prove the decision maker’s authority to approve a plan or design
by pointing to governing law. [Citation.] Alternatively, the entity
may provide testimony by the decision maker or another person
familiar with the entity’s approval process.” (Id. at pp. 435–436.)
The City presented the declaration of Brian Gallagher, the
principal transportation engineer for the District Operations
Bureau at the Los Angeles Department of Transportation
(LADOT). Gallagher authenticated the design plans for Corbin
Avenue and provided statements of the senior transportation
engineers who approved the plans. Gallagher indicated a senior
transportation engineer or someone with a higher level of
authority had discretionary authority under LADOT’s manual of
policies and procedures as well as its custom and practice.
Gallagher attested a senior transportation engineer would not
have approved the plan had the traffic control plan not met
appropriate engineering standards.
In addition, the Los Angeles Administrative Code section
22.343 provides “[t]he City Engineer shall have all the powers
and perform all the duties imposed upon the City Engineer by the
Charter, the ordinances of the City, the general laws of the State
and orders of the Board of Public Works.” Municipal Code section
62.105, subdivision (a) states in relevant part: “No person shall
lay, construct, reconstruct or repair in any street or in, over or
through any property or right of way owned by or under the
control of the City, any curb, sidewalk, gutter, driveway,
approach, roadway surface, pavement, sanitary sewer, sewage
works, storm drain, culvert, stairway, retaining wall or similar
structure, building or improvement, or perform any grading or

13
filling, . . . without first obtaining approval of plans and
specifications and the lines and grades therefor from the City
Engineer.”
Accordingly, Gallagher’s declaration and the governing law
demonstrate the design plans for Corbin Avenue were approved
by employees exercising discretionary authority to give such
approval. Gallagher’s declaration shows the City’s senior
transportation engineers approved the design plans for the
location and exercised discretion in determining the plans met
appropriate engineering standards. Gallagher’s declaration also
demonstrates the engineers exercised discretion pursuant to the
LADOT’s manual of policies and procedures and its custom and
practice. Further, the City’s Administrative Code and Municipal
Code establish the engineers were authorized to exercise
discretion in approving the plans because their approval was
required before construction or repair of a roadway, sidewalk, or
similar structure.
Appellant identifies no evidence directly challenging
Gallagher’s foregoing statements. Instead, appellant argues the
City’s Administrative Code, City Charter, and Municipal Code
only vest the City Engineer with discretion to oversee
construction of streets and sidewalks, not discretion to approve
the design thereof. As discussed above, however, this argument
lacks merit because the abovementioned provisions clearly
demonstrate the City Engineer’s approval of the design plan was
required before construction or repair of a roadway, sidewalk, or
similar structure. (L.A. Admin. Code, § 22.343; L.A. Mun. Code, §
62.105, subd. (a).)
Appellant also contends the trial court improperly, without
notice to appellant, took judicial notice of the City’s

14
Administrative Code, City Charter, and Municipal Code on its
own motion. “[T]he court may take judicial notice on its own
volition.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 743, 752.) While there was no opportunity to object
to the judicial notice, appellant fails to show reversible error
based on the matters being improperly judicially noticed. “The
court may take judicial notice of a city charter or municipal code.”
(The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 841, 852.) The matters the court judicially noticed
were clearly relevant to this issue and the parties’ contentions
thereto. Thus, the court did not improperly take judicial notice of
the City’s Administrative Code, City Charter, or Municipal Code.
Appellant therefore fails to show reversible error.
Finally, we conclude there are no triable issues as to the
third element regarding substantial evidence of the design plan’s
reasonableness. “Resolution of the third element . . . is a matter
for the courts, not the jury, to decide.” (Tansavatdi, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 653.) “Generally, a civil engineer’s opinion regarding
reasonableness is substantial evidence sufficient to satisfy this
element. [Citation.] Approval of the plan by competent
professionals can, in and of itself, constitute substantial evidence
of reasonableness. [Citation.] That a plaintiff's expert may
disagree does not create a triable issue of fact.” (Grenier v. City of
Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 941 (Grenier).) “The statute
does not require that property be perfectly designed, only that it
be given a design which is reasonable under the circumstances.
By deciding on a ‘reasonableness’ standard, the Legislature
intended that government officials be given extensive leeway in
their decisions concerning public property.” (Ramirez v. City of
Redondo Beach (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 515, 525.)

15
Here, the City’s experts support and explain why the
design plans for the location are reasonable. Traffic engineering
expert, Rock Miller, attested to the reasonableness of the
roadway design features as they met or exceeded prevailing
design standards and guidelines in use at the time of its
construction. Miller opined the design is also generally
appropriate and consistent with roadway standards in use today.
Miller added there is no notice of changed conditions or collision
history that would call into question the appropriateness of the
plans’ approval. Miller indicated the design of the roadway and
traffic controls, including geometric plans for signing and
striping, conform to the City’s applicable standards and the
California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Miller
concluded the design is an excellent, detailed engineering design
and is beyond reasonable. In addition, Gallagher provided
supporting statements that the LADOT’s work orders
implementing the design and the LADOT staff approving them
are reasonable.
The fact the design plans were approved by competent
engineers also establishes the plans are reasonable. (See Grenier,
supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) Appellant fails to show the
City’s experts’ declarations are not competent evidence. While
appellant raises his own expert’s declaration and attempts to
identify weaknesses in the City’s experts’ statements, this is
insufficient to establish a triable issue as to this element of the
defense. Appellant reiterates the approved design does not
include the pedestrian crossing, but this assertion lacks merit
since, as discussed above, the location at which appellant crossed
is not a crosswalk. The City’s engineers needed only to give an
opinion as to the design plans’ reasonableness. The City’s experts

16
provided statements demonstrating the area’s plans are
reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, there are no
triable issues here because the City presented substantial
evidence supporting the reasonableness of Corbin Avenue’s
design.
In short, we conclude there are no triable issues of material
fact as to the design immunity defense. The parties do not
dispute the first element of the defense regarding causal
relationship. Appellant contends the design plans do not include
the pedestrian crossing, but the area at which appellant crossed
is not a crosswalk, as a matter of law, as there is no intersection
of highways. As to the second element, the City’s transportation
engineering expert and the governing law show Corbin Avenue’s
design plans were approved by employees who were properly
exercising discretionary authority to give such approval.
Appellant asserts the trial court erroneously took judicial notice
of the governing law on this issue, but appellant fails to show he
was prejudiced. As to the third element, the City’s engineering
experts provided statements demonstrating the area’s plans to be
reasonable under the circumstances, which is the only
requirement on summary judgment for this element.
B. Appellant’s evidence fails to show a triable issue
exists as to the City’s liability for failing to
maintain lights
“[T]he general rule is that, ‘“In the absence of a statutory or
charter provision to the contrary, it is generally held that a
municipality is under no duty to light its streets even though it is
given the power to do so, and hence, that its failure to light them
is not actionable negligence, and will not render it liable in
damages to a traveler who is injured solely by reason thereof. . . .

17
A duty to light, and the consequent liability for failure to do so,
may, however, arise from some peculiar condition rendering
lighting necessary in order to make the streets safe for travel.”’”
(Plattner v. City of Riverside (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1444
(Plattner).)
To establish liability for inoperable streetlights, the
claimant must show (1) the installation of the streetlight was
necessary to obviate a dangerous condition; (2) the failure to
maintain an installed streetlight created a risk greater than the
risk created by the total absence of a streetlight; and (3) the
injured party relied on the operation of the streetlight, forgoing
other protective actions, e.g., a pedestrian chooses a particular
route home in reliance on the available streetlighting when he or
she would have taken another route or means of transportation
in the absence of lighting. (See White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 442, 451–452 .)
Here, appellant does not dispute the City generally has no
duty to light its streets. Appellant argues, however, evidence was
presented establishing the exception set forth in White. We
disagree.
No evidence was presented demonstrating appellant relied
on the streetlights functioning in the area, foregoing other
protective actions. “This exception to the general rule of
nonliability anticipates a pedestrian who has taken a particular
route based on the belief the route is lighted and does not
discover otherwise until it is too late to take a different route.”
(Plattner, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1446.) Appellant did not
submit his own declaration to support his case. Indeed, appellant
provided no statements from anyone with personal knowledge of

18
the actual events of the accident other than the driver, whose
statements were used only to establish his driving speed.
There is no evidence appellant chose the route in reliance
on the available streetlighting. Further, appellant failed to
submit evidence he would have taken a different route or means
of transportation had he known the streetlights were not
functioning that night. No evidence was presented showing it was
“too late” for appellant to turn around and cross underneath the
overpass once he saw there was no lighting. Accordingly, there is
no evidence appellant forewent protective actions in reliance on
functioning streetlights.
Because appellant failed to present evidence as to an
essential element of this exception, we need not consider the
remaining elements involving the necessity and relative risk of
the streetlights. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2) [“A
defendant . . . has met that party’s burden of showing that a
cause of action has no merit if the party has shown . . . that there
is a complete defense to the cause of action. . . . [T]he burden
[then] shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one
or more material facts exists . . . .”].) As discussed above, the City
generally has no duty to light its streets. (See Plattner, supra, 69
Cal.App.4th at p. 1444.) While there is an exception to this
general rule as discussed in White, appellant did not provide
evidence showing each element of the exception. There is no
triable issue of material fact as to the City’s liability for failure to
light the area in question because appellant failed to show he
chose the particular route in reliance on the streetlights
functioning, forgoing other protective actions.

19
C. Appellant’s evidence fails to show a triable issue
exists as to the City’s liability for failing to warn
of a dangerous condition
“[D]esign immunity does not categorically preclude failure
to warn claims that involve a discretionarily approved element of
a roadway.” (Tansavatdi, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 647.) “[W]here
the state is immune from liability for injuries caused by a
dangerous condition of its property because the dangerous
condition was created as a result of a plan or design which
conferred immunity under section 830.6, the state may
nevertheless be liable for failure to warn of this dangerous
condition where the failure to warn is negligent and is an
independent, separate, concurring cause of the accident.”
(Cameron v. State of California, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 329.)
However, “such claims may be subject to a separate, more limited
form of statutory immunity: Signage immunity set forth in
section 830.8. That provision precludes government liability for
failing to provide ‘traffic or warning signals’ (§ 830.8), except
when ‘necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which would
not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been
anticipated by, a person using the highway with due care’
[citation].” (Tansavatdi, supra, at p. 660.)
“[S]ection 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which
a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous
condition of public property.” (Brown v. Poway Unified School
Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829.) “‘To establish liability under
section 835, a plaintiff must show: “(1) ‘that the property was in a
dangerous condition at the time of the injury’; (2) ‘that the injury
was proximately caused by the dangerous condition’; (3) ‘that the
dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the

20
kind of injury which was incurred’; and (4) either (a) that a public
employee negligently or wrongfully ‘created the dangerous
condition’ or (b) that ‘[the] public entity had actual or
constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section
835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures
to protect against the dangerous condition.’”’” (Kabat v.
Department of Transportation (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 651, 660.)
“[W]hile Cameron generally permits claims for failure to
warn of a dangerous traffic condition that is subject to design
immunity, a plaintiff pursuing such a claim must nonetheless
prove various elements that are not present when pursuing a
claim alleging a public entity created that dangerous condition:
(1) the public entity had actual or constructive notice that the
approved design resulted in a dangerous condition (see §§ 835,
subd. (b), 835.2 [defining ‘notice’ within the meaning of § 835,
subd. (b)]); (2) the dangerous condition qualified as a concealed
trap, i.e., ‘would not [have been] reasonably apparent to, and
would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care’
(§ 830.8); and (3) the absence of a warning was a substantial
factor in bringing about the injury.” (Tansavatdi, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 661–662.)
Appellant contends there is a triable issue as to this claim
because the collision site required signing or markings since the
pedestrian crossing was legal and use thereof was unexpected.
Appellant maintains the evidence shows the City had
constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
But no evidence was submitted showing the absence of
warnings of the unmarked crosswalk was a substantial factor in
bringing about his injury. To show lack of causation, the City
presented a declaration from its traffic engineering expert,

21
Miller. Miller concluded with reasonable certainty that, based on
his inspection of the collision site and documents in the case, the
physical condition of Corbin Avenue and the traffic controls in
place in the vicinity did not cause or contribute to the accident.
Thus, the City met its burden by providing evidence challenging
this element of the claim.
In opposition, appellant provided a declaration from traffic
engineering expert, Mike Blankenship, to challenge Miller’s
statements. Blankenship opined the crossing location should
have had signing and markings in place to warn approaching
drivers and to provide visibility for pedestrians. But Blankenship
provided no opinion as to causation. Blankenship concluded only
that the lack of appropriate traffic control and lighting in the
area created a dangerous condition without adequate warnings to
pedestrians and motorists. Blankenship offered no opinion that
the conditions at the crossing location was a substantial factor in
bringing about appellant’s injury. The mere fact a dangerous
condition was created does not show the condition was a
substantial factor in bringing about appellant’s harm.6

6 In reply appellant posits there is evidence of causation for
his failure-to-warn claim because it can reasonably be inferred
from the driver’s statements to the police that the darkness at
the location hampered his vision when he struck appellant.
However, the lack of lighting at the collision site goes to the issue
of the City’s liability for failure to maintain streetlighting, of
which there are no triable issues as discussed herein. Further, we
note appellant never cited the driver’s statements to the police
when responding to the City’s separate statement of undisputed
material facts on this issue. (See Whitehead v. Habig (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 896, 901 [“‘Each material fact contended by the
opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to
the supporting evidence. Failure to comply with this requirement

22
Since an essential element of this claim is unsupported,
appellant fails to show a triable issue of material fact exists
here.7 No evidence was submitted challenging the City’s evidence
that the collision site’s condition and traffic controls did not cause
or contribute to appellant’s injury. Accordingly, we need not
consider the remaining issues regarding whether the City had
notice the approved design resulted in a dangerous condition.8

of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the
court’s discretion, for granting the motion.’”].)
7 Appellant asserts the trial court erred in shifting the
burden on this issue because the City never raised the “concealed
trap” and causation elements of the claim. While the City did not
raise the “concealed trap” element, causation was raised in the
notice of motion and the corresponding separate statement of
undisputed material facts. Appellant responded to the City’s
separate statement and supporting evidence on this issue.
Accordingly, we conclude the court properly considered the
element of causation and the evidence presented thereto. (See
Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1210 [“The requirement of a
separate statement from the moving party and a responding
statement from the party opposing summary judgment serves
two functions: to give the parties notice of the material facts at
issue in the motion and to permit the trial court to focus on
whether those facts are truly undisputed.”].)
8 The City also argues appellant forfeited his failure-to-warn
claim because he did not address the trial court’s conclusions as
to the “concealed trap” and causation elements. Further, the City
posits the the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.)
bars appellant’s unmarked-crosswalk and failure-to-warn claims
because his government tort claims alleged no facts about these
issues, which the City requests for the first time on appeal that
this court consider. We conclude these issues need not be

23
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
continuing trial to allow the City to file its summary
judgment motion
Finally, appellant argues the trial court abused its
discretion by granting the City a one-year continuance to allow it
to file its motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
“An order granting or denying a continuance is reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Such decisions
will be upheld unless a clear abuse is shown, amounting to a
miscarriage of justice.” (Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehicles
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 858, 863.) “‘“On an appeal from the
judgment (the order itself being nonappealable) it is practically
impossible to show reversible error in the granting of a
continuance.”’” (Id. at p. 863, fn. 1.)
We conclude the trial court acted reasonably within its
discretion by continuing the trial date to allow the City to file its
summary judgment motion. The record shows the earliest
hearing date for the City’s motion, June 29, 2023, was nearly a
year after the July 9, 2022 trial date. The City sought to advance
the hearing date but was denied under the court’s standing order.
The standing order indicated the personal injury courts had no
capacity to shorten time for hearings due to their fully booked
motion calendars. The standing order also directed moving
parties seeking relief to reserve the earliest available hearing
date, even if it was after the trial date, and to file a motion to
continue trial. Appellant argues the City’s service of its motion
for continuance was defective. But appellant fails to show he was

considered here because we have determined appellant has not
established a triable issue of material fact as to his causes of
action.

24
prejudiced as he timely opposed and fully briefed the merits of
the motion. (See Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697
[“‘It is well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing
of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits
is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion.
[Citations.] This rule applies even when no notice was given at
all.’”].)
Calendar management is within the trial court’s province.
(Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1084–1085.) Given the court’s highly
congested calendar, there was good cause to require a
continuance rather than allow the shortening of time to hear the
motion. A trial court must have the discretion to determine how
to fairly and properly schedule the plethora of matters it faces.
The standing order applied to everyone seeking a hearing date.
Appellant fails to show the trial continuance prejudiced his
opposition to the summary judgment motion. (See Hoyt v. Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d
534, 538–539 [“Error in and of itself does not necessarily require
the reversal of a judgment. Prejudice resulting from the error
must be shown and that such prejudicial error under the
circumstances justifies a reversal.”].) Nothing shows appellant
was unable to obtain crucial evidence or there were any other
circumstances impeding him from effectively presenting his
opposition to summary judgment due to the continuance.
Indeed, Sentry Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 526, 529 (Sentry), shows a trial court may not refuse
to hear a summary judgment motion filed within the applicable
time limits. The trial court in that case was directed to continue
trial and allow the motion to be heard. (Id. at p. 530.) The facts in

25
Sentry are similar to those here. The petitioners in that case
attempted to file a summary judgment motion, but the first
available hearing date was after the deadline for hearing the
motion. (Id. at p. 528.) The court denied the petitioners’ attempt
to shorten the time to hear the motion and their subsequent
motion to continue trial. (Id. at pp. 528–529.) The petitioners
filed a petition for extraordinary relief with the Court of Appeal,
and the trial court was directed to continue the trial date and
hear the summary judgment motion. (Id. at pp. 528, 530.)
Appellant maintains the circumstances here are
distinguishable because the City had not filed its summary
judgment motion at the time it sought a hearing date and was
not diligent. But the petitioners in Sentry also had not filed their
motion, since a writ was issued in that case directing the trial
court to file and hear the motion. (See Sentry, supra, 207
Cal.App.3d at pp. 528, 530.) And as discussed above, appellant
ultimately does not show he was prejudiced by the continuance.
Accordingly, we conclude the court here did not abuse its
discretion in granting the motion to continue trial.

DISPOSITION
The September 4, 2023 judgment is affirmed. Each side is
to bear its own costs of appeal.

CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:

LUI, P. J. RICHARDSON, J.

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