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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Morton, D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1417 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Bowes

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Mary Janes Bowes](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8225/mary-janes-bowes/)

J-S07011-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DEIONNE MORTON :
:
Appellant : No. 1417 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 19, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-41-CR-0000054-2025

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2026

Deionne Morton appeals from the judgment of sentence of twenty-five

to fifty months of incarceration imposed following her guilty plea to

endangering the welfare of children (“EWOC”). We affirm.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with three counts of EWOC after

Lycoming County Children and Youth caseworkers, when responding to an

allegations of neglect in December 2024, found her living with her three

children in unsafe, deplorable conditions. Nine additional EWOC counts were

added to the information at the preliminary hearing. After Appellant’s

application to treatment court was denied, she entered an open guilty plea to

one count of EWOC, graded as a first-degree felony, and the remaining

charges were dismissed. Following a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”), the

court sentenced Appellant as indicated above.
J-S07011-26

At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth proffered Abigail Hess to

detail the conditions in which the children-victims were found by Lycoming

County Children and Youth caseworkers when responding to an allegation of

neglect:

Caseworker Hess testified upon entering the residence, a
strong odor of feces was noted, and upon further inspection, feces
were caked into the carpet and noticeable on the walls and floors
of each room, indicating that it was present for a long period of
time, as well as fresh feces in the same locations. Caseworker
Hess stated that Appellant and her three children were seated on
the floor when she entered. The children were approximately
aged three years, four years, five years at the time. The children
were not clothed, except one who was only wearing a shirt. The
caseworkers noted that the floors also had food present and there
was not much food in the house for the children to eat. While in
the home, the caseworkers observed the children picking items up
from the floor, which led to the concern that the children were
ingesting the feces present on the residence’s surfaces. Illegal
substance paraphernalia was observed around the home and was
within the children’s reach.

Upon inquiry, caseworker Hess was informed that the
children sleep on the floor of one of the bedrooms and there was
a string on the door handle. It was later discovered that the string
was used to keep the children enclosed in their bedroom when left
home alone. The bedroom was also littered with feces and there
were no beds for the children substantiating the concern that the
children were sleeping amongst feces on the floor. Additionally,
one of the children presented with a hard substance caked in her
hair. Appellant reported to the caseworkers that it was either
mustard or yogurt. However, the hard consistency of the
substance and the fact that the child’s head had to be shaved to
remove the substance indicated that she endured a long period of
time without anyone attempting to wash the substance out of her
hair. None of the children were verbal. The four-year-old child
was able to speak limitedly, for example “up” and “hair.”

Caseworker Hess concluded by stating that of the hundreds
of homes she has entered in her capacity as an assessment
worker, this situation was of the most dire. Additionally, when the

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children were presented with food they ravished whatever food
was provided. The child who had food caked in her hair really
enjoyed being provided proper hygienic care. Due to the mental
states of the children, caseworker Hess stated that it is difficult to
understand exactly what occurred within the home, but based on
the direct observations made she could infer that the living
situation and maltreatment of the children was significant.
Appellant ultimately consented to the termination of her parental
rights for all three children.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/25, at 3-4.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of

her sentence, which the court denied without a hearing. This appeal followed.

Appellant sua sponte filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained

of on appeal, and the trial court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant presents one question for our review: “Whether the trial court

abused its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive and unduly harsh

sentence without sufficiently considering the fundamental norms underlying

the sentencing process.” Appellant’s brief at 4 (capitalization altered).

Appellant presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of her

sentence.1 The following governs our consideration of this issue. “An

appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the discretionary

---

1 While the entry of a guilty plea usually results in waiver of all claims other

than the court’s jurisdiction, the validity of the plea, and the legality of the
sentence, a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a non-negotiated
sentence imposed following an open plea is not precluded. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 n.5 (Pa.Super. 2005).

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aspects of a sentence as of right.” Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d

730, 762–63 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (cleaned up).

Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of [her]
sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine
whether the appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering
the following four factors: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely
notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3)
whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there
is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id. at 763 (cleaned up).

Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal following a timely post-

sentence motion alleging that her aggravated-range sentence was unduly

harsh in light of her treatment needs and other mitigating factors. See Post-

Sentence Motion, 8/27/25, at 3. Although she has not included in her brief a

statement of the reasons to allow the discretionary-aspects challenge

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), we may overlook that deficiency because the

Commonwealth has not objected and “the presence or absence of a substantial

question can easily be determined from [her] brief.” Commonwealth v.

Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1017 (Pa.Super. 2003).

Appellant asserts that her aggravated-range sentence is excessive and

inconsistent with the sentencing code given the mitigating factors of her

youth, her difficult upbringing, her mental health struggles, her amenability

to treatment, and her acknowledgment, through voluntary relinquishment of

her parental rights to the three children-victims, of her inability to be a proper

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parent. See Appellant’s brief at 11-12. We have held that the “claim that the

court erred by imposing an aggravated range sentence without consideration

of mitigating circumstances raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth

v. Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc).

Thus, we proceed to consider the merits of her claim, mindful of the

following. When reviewing sentencing matters, this Court must accord the

sentencing court great weight as it is in the best position to view the

defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the

overall effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194

A.3d 625, 637 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). “We cannot re-weigh the

sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing

court.” Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009).

Thus, we review the trial court’s sentencing determination for an abuse of

discretion.

In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly
unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa.Super. 2014).

Although its discretion is broad, “the trial court’s discretion is not

unfettered.” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 144 (Pa.Super.

2011). The sentence imposed “should call for confinement that is consistent

with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

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impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). “Where the sentencing court

had the benefit of a [PSI report] we can assume the sentencing court was

aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

Further, “[a] sentencing court may consider any legal factor in

determining that a sentence in the aggravated range should be imposed.”

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 592-93 (Pa.Super. 2005). So

long as “the sentencing judge’s statement of reasons on the record” reflects

consideration of proper aggravating factors, “the sentencing judge’s decision

regarding the aggravation of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a

manifest abuse of discretion.” Id.

Here, the sentencing guidelines indicated a standard range sentence of

sixteen to twenty-two months, with a mitigated or aggravated range of,

respectively, minus or plus six months. Hence, Appellant received a sentence

in the middle of the aggravated range. The trial court addressed Appellant’s

contentions that such was unduly harsh thusly:

Here, Appellant offers no support from the record that the
court did not consider the mitigating factors. Rather, the court
aptly considered the evidence provided from both the
Commonwealth and Appellant in fashioning the sentence imposed,
including the letter from pretrial services and the presentence
investigation report. The court explained on the record that
Appellant took actions prior to sentencing that were of a self-
serving nature to improve her condition and in an attempt to

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minimize the consequences for the circumstances in which she
permitted her children to live, such as voluntarily terminating her
parental rights, working toward her GED, and completing
parenting programs.

Next, the court did give weight to Appellant’s mental health
issues and commended her for taking steps to work toward
treatment for her indicated mental health concerns. However,
Appellant’s mental health concerns neither excuse nor negate the
actions and inactions she maintained toward the care of her three
children over the course of their young lives. The children’s ages
alone placed them in a vulnerable position added with their special
needs related to their autism spectrum disorders and their inability
to adequately communicate the harms they sustained.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/25, at 7 (capitalization altered, some articles

omitted). Further, the court highlighted the following reasoning for an

aggravated-range sentence offered at the sentencing hearing:

The court understands and appreciates the steps [Appellant] has
taken now to try to get help for herself and to be in a better
position to move forward. The court is also very concerned by
just everything that underlies this case, the nature and extent of
the harm done to these children at a very young age; and they
were exceptionally vulnerable with them also having some
personal troubles being on the spectrum and not being able to
necessarily assert even at their young age that they needed help.

The court, also reading through the reports, there is some concern
that [Appellant] is still focused solely on herself in crafting her
steps and words to try to minimize her consequences. It is hard
to think of a harder situation than a parent who allows neglect to
rise to this level.

It is hard to fathom the trauma that it has imposed on these
children.

Id. at 9 (quoting N.T. Sentencing, 8/19/25, at 13) (cleaned up).

We perceive no abuse of discretion. Not only does the court’s review of

the PSI report give rise to the presumption that it was aware of all relevant

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J-S07011-26

factors, but the above discussion makes it readily apparent that the court

properly undertook its duty to weigh the mitigating factors against “the gravity

of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the

community.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Appellant has not identified, and we have

not discerned, any reliance upon an improper basis for finding that a sentence

within the middle of the aggravated range of the guidelines is appropriate

here.

In sum, Appellant has not shown that the court’s weighing of the factors

was manifestly unreasonable or based upon “partiality, prejudice, bias or ill

will.” Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 760. Rather, she merely asks us to substitute

our judgment for that of the sentencing court and reweigh sentencing factors,

which we cannot do. See Macias, 968 A.2d at 778. Since Appellant has not

failed to establish that the court abused its discretion in imposing her

sentence, we have no cause to disturb it.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/10/2026

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