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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Washington, K.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 515 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Panella

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Jack A. Panella](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8243/jack-a-panella/)

J-S01026-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KEITH WASHINGTON :
:
Appellant : No. 515 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 14, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000631-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: March 10, 2026

Keith Washington appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on

November 14, 2024, for his convictions of driving under the influence (“DUI”),

careless driving, and driving on roadways laned for traffic.1 Washington

asserts there was insufficient evidence for his DUI conviction. The

Commonwealth concedes it presented insufficient evidence. We agree with

both parties and therefore reverse the conviction for DUI, vacate the judgment

of sentence, and remand for resentencing.

We obtained the following factual and procedural history from the

certified record. On May 2, 2023, Washington suffered a blow out to one of

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• Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2), 3714(a), and 3309(1), respectively.
J-S01026-26

his tires. He went to the Pittsburgh International Airport for assistance, as his

cell phone was not working properly. Allegheny County Police Officer Eric

Speakman, around 3:11 a.m., was dispatched to the security gate where

Washington stopped his vehicle. Officer Speakman saw the blown tire and

asked Washington if he wanted him to call a tow truck. Washington said yes,

and Officer Speakman called a tow truck. The tow truck operator assisted

Washington in changing the blown tire. A spare, also called a donut tire, was

put in its place. Officer Speakman did not smell marijuana or notice any signs

of intoxication during his encounter with Washington. Washington left the

airport around 4 a.m., driving on the spare tire.

Approximately two hours later, somewhere around 6:00 to 6:30 a.m.,

Trooper Vincent White was dispatched to an accident on Turnpike Toll Road

1. Trooper White explained that “if you were leaving the airport, and you

went on [Road 576] … I believe it was in the area of [mile marker] 1.5.” N.T.

Suppression/Trial, 10/24/24, at 6. The vehicle involved in the accident was

found up against the roadside barrier wall. It appeared the vehicle had hit the

median barrier wall and then came to rest against the roadside barrier wall.

The driver was not at the scene of the accident.

Trooper White continued to drive down Road 576 and found Washington

about a mile away. Washington’s hand was bandaged and he explained to

Trooper White that his hand was injured in the accident. Washington told

Trooper White he lost control of the vehicle because of the spare tire about

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J-S01026-26

two hours prior to Trooper White finding him. During this conversation,

Trooper White smelled marijuana on Washington. Trooper White further

noticed Washington had glassy, bloodshot eyes. As the conversation

progressed, Washington became agitated and seemed confused at times.

Trooper White searched Washington then had him perform field sobriety

tests. Trooper White requested another trooper respond to conduct Advanced

Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (“ARIDE”) sobriety tests. Corporal

Tanner Barnhart responded and had Washington complete two more tests. At

the conclusion of the tests, both troopers believed Washington was under the

influence to a degree he could not safely drive a vehicle. Trooper White placed

Washington under arrest and requested he submit to a blood draw.

Washington refused the blood draw.

Trooper White charged Washington by criminal complaint on December

22, 2023, with DUI and related charges. Washington filed a motion to suppress

an illegal search of his person on October 14, 2024. Washington proceeded to

a suppression hearing on October 24, 2024. After the conclusion of the

suppression hearing, the trial court granted the suppression motion.

Immediately thereafter, the trial court proceeded to a bench trial,

incorporating the testimony from the suppression hearing. At the conclusion

of the bench trial, the court took the matter under advisement. On November

14, 2024, the trial court found Washington guilty as noted above and

sentenced him on the DUI conviction to 30 days of house arrest with electronic

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monitoring and a concurrent 6 months of probation. No further penalty was

imposed for careless driving and driving on roadways laned for traffic.

Washington filed a post-sentence motion on November 19, 2024,

asserting the evidence was insufficient to sustain the DUI conviction and,

alternatively, that the verdict as to DUI was against the weight of the

evidence. An order denying the post-sentence motion by operation of law was

filed on May 1, 2025.2 Washington filed his notice of appeal that same date.

The trial court ordered Washington to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, and he

complied. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court authored its Rule 1925(a)

opinion on August 18, 2025.

Washington raises one issue for our review:

Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient as a matter of law
to sustain Mr. Washington’s conviction for [DUI] where the
Commonwealth failed to prove that Mr. Washington was under the
influence at the time he drove his vehicle?

Appellant’s Brief, at 3.

---

2 A post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law if not ruled upon “within

120 days[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). “When a post-sentence motion is
denied by operation of law, the clerk of court shall forthwith enter an order on
behalf of the court … that the post-sentence motion is deemed denied.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). Here, that order was not entered until May 1,
2025, 163 days after the post-sentence motion had been filed. “This Court has
found that a court breakdown occurs when the clerk of court fails to enter an
order notifying the appellant that his post-sentence motion was denied by
operation of law.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 35 n.9 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (citation omitted). We therefore find there was a breakdown in
court operations and the notice of appeal filed on May 1, 2025, was timely
filed.

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J-S01026-26

Washington argues the Commonwealth failed to prove when the

accident occurred, only that it was sometime between 4:00 and 6:00 a.m.

See id. at 10-11. Washington notes that the evidence presented shows he

was not intoxicated when he left the airport at 4:00 a.m. after getting

assistance changing his tire. See id. at 11. Washington claims Trooper White

did not come upon Washington until over two hours later, outside of his

crashed vehicle, approximately one mile away, and there was no evidence

presented as to when he used marijuana. See id. at 11-12.

The Commonwealth concedes they did not present sufficient evidence.

See Appellee’s Brief, at 11. The Commonwealth comments on the trial

evidence as follows:

[T]he evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that [Washington]
had ingested a controlled substance prior to driving his vehicle.
While the evidence established that [Washington] was the driver
of the vehicle at the time of the accident, there was no evidence
presented at trial regarding his driving between the time he left
the airport and the accident. Moreover, it is unclear how much
time elapsed between when [Washington] left the airport and the
accident, or between the time of the accident and when Trooper
White encountered him walking down the median in the road.

Id. at 17. We agree with both parties, and commend the Commonwealth for

its candor in addressing this issue.

Our standard of review is well-established:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts
and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not

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J-S01026-26

preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of
the factfinder to determine the weight to be accorded to each
witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the offense by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
the evidence and substitute our [judgment] for that of the
factfinder.

Commonwealth v. Luberto, 344 A.3d 41, 45 (Pa. Super. 2025) (brackets

and citation omitted).

Washington was convicted of DUI under subsection 3802(d)(2), which

provides:

An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following
circumstances:

---

(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or combination
of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability to safely
drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of
the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).

The Commonwealth was required to prove three elements: “1) that the

defendant drove; 2) while under the influence of a controlled substance; and

3) to a degree that impair[ed] the defendant’s ability to drive safely.”

Commonwealth v. Marberger, 344 A.3d 403, 411 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The issue here is with the

second element. The Commonwealth did not present evidence as to whether

Washington drove while under the influence of a controlled substance.

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J-S01026-26

The evidence established that Washington was driving his vehicle. His

tire blew out while driving near the airport, so he stopped for assistance.

Between approximately 3:11 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., Officer Speakman

interacted with Washington. Officer Speakman did not notice any signs of

impairment and did not smell an odor of marijuana. Sometime after the tire

was changed to a spare donut tire Washington was in an accident. This

accident occurred sometime between 4:00 and 6:00 a.m. There is no further

evidence as to when this accident occurred. Washington told Trooper White

the accident occurred approximately two hours prior to their interaction.

When Trooper White found Washington, not near his vehicle, Trooper

White noticed the odor of marijuana and asked Washington to submit to field

sobriety tests. After those tests, Trooper White opined that Washington was

under the influence of a controlled substance. As such, the Commonwealth

only proved the first and third elements: that Washington drove, and at some

point later he was under the influence of a controlled substance that impaired

his ability to drive. However, the Commonwealth did not establish that

impairment was before or during the time Washington drove his vehicle.

We note that an accident can constitute circumstantial evidence of

impairment. See Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 880 (Pa. 2009).

Yet, here, there was evidence as to the cause of the accident: Washington told

Trooper White the spare tire, a donut tire, that was recently put on caused

him to lose control of the vehicle. There was evidence supporting the fact that

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J-S01026-26

the spare tire was recently put on the vehicle and that, at that time,

Washington was not under the influence of a controlled substance. We

therefore agree with both parties that the evidence was insufficient to convict

Washington of DUI and we reverse that conviction. However, because our

decision may upset the overall sentencing scheme, we remand for a new

sentencing hearing. See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (“If our disposition upsets the overall sentencing scheme of the

trial court, we must remand so that the court can restructure its sentence

plan.”) (citation omitted). We note that due to the sentence on the DUI, the

trial court did not sentence Washington on the careless driving and driving on

roadways laned for traffic convictions, both summary offenses.

Judgment of sentence vacated, DUI conviction reversed, case remanded

for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 03/10/2026

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