Com. v. Roman, J. - Non-Precedential Court Opinion
Summary
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued a non-precedential decision in the case of Commonwealth v. Roman, J. The court affirmed the judgment of sentence for Javion Dwayne Roman, who was convicted of first-degree murder and related firearms offenses.
What changed
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has issued a non-precedential opinion affirming the judgment of sentence for Appellant Javion Dwayne Roman. Roman was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a minor, firearms not to be carried without a license, and two counts of recklessly endangering another person. The appeal stemmed from the denial of his motion to transfer the case to juvenile court and subsequent trial proceedings.
This document represents a final appellate decision in a criminal case. For legal professionals and courts, it serves as a record of the proceedings and the appellate court's affirmation of the lower court's judgment. There are no new compliance requirements or deadlines imposed by this opinion, as it pertains to a specific criminal case outcome.
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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Com. v. Roman, J.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 186 MDA 2025
- Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Judges: King
Combined Opinion
by King
J-S42026-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAVION DWAYNE ROMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 186 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 8, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0001842-2022
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2026
Appellant, Javion Dwayne Roman, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, following his
jury trial convictions for first degree murder, possession of firearm by a minor,
firearms not to be carried without a license, and two counts of recklessly
endangering another person.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the aforementioned offenses in
connection with the shooting of M.B. (“Victim”). Appellant retained private
counsel to represent him. William Graff, Esquire, entered his appearance on
Appellant’s behalf on April 25, 2022. There were several procedural delays in
Appellant’s case due to pending motions. Specifically, Appellant filed a motion
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6110.1(a), 6106(a), and 2705, respectively.
J-S42026-25
to transfer the matter to juvenile court because Appellant was 17 years old at
the time of the shooting. Upon Appellant’s request, the court ordered that
Appellant undergo a psychological evaluation prior to ruling on the motion to
transfer. After the evaluation was completed, the court conducted a hearing
and denied Appellant’s motion to transfer on March 13, 2023.
On April 17, 2023, Appellant requested a continuance to review further
discovery, which the court granted. On June 19, 2023, Appellant requested
another continuance for additional time to discuss a plea deal with the
Commonwealth. Again, the court granted a continuance. The court scheduled
a trial date certain to commence on February 12, 2024. On February 7, 2024,
the Commonwealth filed a motion requesting a status hearing, informing the
court that the shell casings involved in Appellant’s case were a potential match
to a gun recovered in another case. At the status hearing, Appellant requested
that trial be continued pending the results of additional lab testing on the shell
casings and the gun. The court granted Appellant’s request. On June 6, 2024,
the court scheduled a trial date certain to commence on October 21, 2024.
At a pretrial hearing on October 9, 2024, Attorney Graff informed the
court that he was ready and prepared to proceed to trial, but Appellant wished
to request a continuance so that he could hire another attorney. The court
asked Appellant to state his reasons for his request. Appellant stated that he
wanted to hire a new attorney but needed additional time to accumulate
sufficient funds to do so. The court noted that Appellant had sufficient time
to hire an attorney of his choice as his case had been pending for two and half
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J-S42026-25
years, and denied Appellant’s request for a continuance. On October 17,
2024, Appellant sent a handwritten motion to the court, asserting that
Attorney Graff failed to: properly communicate with Appellant, provide
Appellant with all relevant discovery, file any omnibus pretrial motions, and
develop a strategic plan for trial. Appellant further alleged that Attorney Graff
had behaved inappropriately with female members of Appellant’s family.
On October 21, 2024, prior to jury selection, the court addressed
Appellant’s request. The court allowed Appellant to state his concerns
regarding Attorney Graff’s representation on the record. Appellant stated that
he did not feel safe with Attorney Graff representing him and did not feel that
he was prepared to proceed to trial that day. The court noted that Appellant
had ample time to discuss his concerns with Attorney Graff, review the
evidence, and prepare for trial. Appellant responded that Attorney Graff had
not consistently met with Appellant to facilitate such preparation. The court
specifically inquired whether Attorney Graff had met with Appellant and
reviewed the case with him. Appellant acknowledged that Attorney Graff had
done so but stated, “that was probably the only time since this year, ever.”
(N.T. Trial, 10/21/24, at 6).
The court then asked Attorney Graff to respond to Appellant’s
allegations. Attorney Graff stated that he had met with Appellant a number
of times and discussed trial strategies with him. During these meetings,
Appellant had provided conflicting directives on which trial strategy he wished
to pursue. Nevertheless, Attorney Graff stated that he had reviewed the
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J-S42026-25
discovery, reviewed the case with Appellant, and was prepared to proceed to
trial. Attorney Graff further reported that he had sent Appellant all available
discovery in a timely manner. Attorney Graff specified that he emailed the
discovery in eight parts to Appellant on March 10, 2023 and March 11, 2023.
This did not include the reports from the subsequent lab tests that were
conducted. Attorney Graff emailed those reports to Appellant on October 14,
- The only discovery that Appellant had not received was a compilation
of video footage that Attorney Graff had only received a few days prior to trial.
The court then stated that Attorney Graff was privately retained and
Appellant could have fired him at any point if he was dissatisfied with Attorney
Graff’s representation. The court further noted that trial had been scheduled
for a date certain since July 6, 2024. Appellant responded that he was
unaware that trial was scheduled until the pretrial hearing on October 9, 2024.
The court inquired of Attorney Graff whether he had met with Appellant since
trial had been scheduled and Attorney Graff confirmed that he had. The court
asked Appellant what steps he had taken to replace Attorney Graff. Appellant
stated that he had been trying to procure enough funds to hire another
attorney. The court inquired whether Appellant had applied for an attorney
from the public defender’s office if he felt that he was unable to afford another
private attorney. Appellant acknowledged that he had not done so. The court
ultimately denied Appellant’s request for a continuance to find alternative
counsel. The court informed Appellant that trial would commence that day
and Appellant could elect to continue with Attorney Graff’s representation or
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J-S42026-25
proceed pro se with Attorney Graff as standby counsel. Appellant elected to
have Attorney Graff represent him at trial.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented witness testimony and video
evidence that Appellant fired multiple shots at Victim at a public park on March
23, 2022.2 Victim sustained a gunshot wound to the head and died as a result.
Appellant did not testify or present any witnesses in his defense. The jury
found Appellant guilty of all charges. On January 8, 2025, the court sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate term of 38½ years to life imprisonment. After
acquiring new counsel, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on February
7, 2025. On February 11, 2025, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
and Appellant timely complied on March 4, 2025.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in denying
[Appellant’s] request for a continuance to obtain new
counsel for his trial on charges including first-degree
murder, as the court fixated almost exclusively on the age
of the case and moving forward denied [Appellant] the
opportunity to obtain counsel of his choice and left him with
irreconcilable differences with his counsel?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Appellant asserts that when he asked for a continuance two weeks prior
to trial, the court focused solely on the length of time that the matter had
2 The details of the evidence set forth at trial are not relevant to the issues on
appeal. Therefore, we do not discuss them in detail here.
-5-
J-S42026-25
been pending without adequately considering the basis for Appellant’s
request. Appellant claims that the prior continuances in Appellant’s case were
for legitimate and reasonable grounds and should not have been held against
Appellant. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to articulate any
reasons why a delay in the proceedings would have been prejudicial.
Appellant contends that the court failed to properly consider Appellant’s claims
that Attorney Graff had not communicated with him, had not prepared
adequately or developed a trial strategy. Appellant concludes that the court
abused its discretion in denying his pre-trial and day-of-trial requests for a
continuance, effectively depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
of his choice, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.
“The matter of granting or denying a continuance is within the discretion
of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663, 671
(Pa.Super. 2013). “[T]rial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude
in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the
witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this
burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons.” Id.
(internal citation omitted). “Accordingly, a trial court exceeds its
constitutional authority only when it exercises its discretion to deny a
continuance on the basis of an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Id. at 671-72
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
-6-
J-S42026-25
With respect to the right to counsel, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has stated:
The right to counsel is guaranteed by both the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article
I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In addition to
guaranteeing representation of the indigent, these
constitutional rights entitle an accused “to choose at his own
cost and expense any lawyer he may desire.”
Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 213, 150 A.2d
102, 109, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 882, 80 S.Ct. 152, 4
L.Ed.2d 118 (1959). The right to “counsel of one’s own
choosing is particularly significant because an individual
facing criminal sanctions should have great confidence in his
attorney.” Moore v. Jamieson, 451 Pa. 299, 307-08, 306
A.2d 283, 288 (1973).
We have held, however, that the constitutional right to
counsel of one’s choice is not absolute. Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 468 Pa. 575, 592–93 & n. 13, 364 A.2d 665, 674
& n. 13 (1976). Rather, “the right of the accused to choose
his own counsel, as well as the lawyer’s right to choose his
clients, must be weighed against and may be reasonably
restricted by the state’s interest in the swift and efficient
administration of criminal justice.” Id. at 592, 364 A.2d at
674 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, this Court has
explained that while defendants are entitled to choose their
own counsel, they should not be permitted to unreasonably
“clog the machinery of justice or hamper and delay the
state’s efforts to effectively administer justice.”
Commonwealth v. Baines, 480 Pa. 26, 30, 389 A.2d 68,
70 (1978). At the same time, however, we have explained
that “‘a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face
of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to
defend with counsel an empty formality.’” Robinson, 468
Pa. at 593-94, 364 A.2d at 675 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite,
376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)).
Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 541-42 (Pa.Super. 2009)
(quoting Commonwealth v. McAleer, 561 Pa. 129, 136-37, 748 A.2d 670,
673-74 (2000)).
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J-S42026-25
A defendant’s right to choose private counsel “must be exercised at a
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.” Commonwealth v. Rucker,
563 Pa. 347, 350, 761 A.2d 541, 542-43 (2000) (citation and emphasis
omitted). In evaluating a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance to
obtain private representation, this Court must consider the following factors:
(1) whether the court conducted an extensive inquiry into
the underlying causes of defendant’s dissatisfaction with
current counsel; (2) whether the defendant’s dissatisfaction
with current counsel constituted irreconcilable differences;
(3) the number of prior continuances; (4) the timing of the
motion for continuance; (5) whether private counsel had
actually been retained; and (6) the readiness of private
counsel to proceed in a reasonable amount of time.
Commonwealth v. Broitman, 217 A.3d 297, 300 (Pa.Super. 2019).
Irreconcilable differences must be more than simply a “strained” relationship
with counsel, lack of faith in counsel, a difference of opinion regarding trial
strategy or a brevity of pretrial communications. Commonwealth v. Floyd,
937 A.2d 494, 497-98, 500 (Pa.Super. 2007). “Where … the defendant and
his counsel offer competing contentions as to the readiness of defense counsel
for trial, it is for the trial court to decide whose portrayal of defense counsel’s
degree of preparedness is more accurate.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 597
Pa. 572, 612, 952 A.2d 594, 618 (2008).
Instantly, the court examined Appellant’s reasons for wanting new
counsel and found that a continuance was not warranted at such a late stage
in the proceedings. In making this determination, the court did not solely
focus on the length of the case but considered it as a significant factor in the
-8-
J-S42026-25
totality of the circumstances. At the pretrial hearing on October 9, 2024, the
court inquired of Appellant why he wished to seek new counsel and Appellant
reported that he was securing additional funds to acquire new counsel. In
response, the court noted that the case had been pending for two and a half
years and Appellant had more than adequate time to retain counsel of his
choosing. See Rucker, supra; Prysock, supra.
On October 17, 2024, four days before trial was scheduled to begin,
Appellant raised concerns about Attorney Graff’s representation in a letter sent
to the court. The court addressed these issues before jury selection. The
court permitted Appellant to assert his claims on the record and Appellant
reported that he did not feel Attorney Graff had adequately prepared for his
trial. Upon further inquiry, Appellant acknowledged that Attorney Graff had
met with him and reviewed the case with him. Further, Attorney Graff refuted
Appellant’s claims, stating that he had met with Appellant several times and
reviewed the discovery and trial strategies with Appellant. Counsel further
reported that he had sent Appellant all available discovery, specifying the
dates on which he sent the files to Appellant. Although Attorney Graff
acknowledged that the meetings with Appellant were often fruitless because
Appellant wanted to pursue conflicting trial strategies, Attorney Graff
reaffirmed to the court that he had reviewed Appellant’s case thoroughly and
was prepared to proceed to trial. The court credited Attorney Graff’s
statements and did not find that Appellant’s concerns about Attorney Graff
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J-S42026-25
amounted to irreconcilable differences.3 See Cook, supra; Floyd, supra.
The court further found that other factors weighed against granting
Appellant a continuance in the days before trial. See Broitman, supra.
Specifically, the case had been pending for two and a half years, and Attorney
Graff had been representing Appellant since its inception. The court had also
granted Appellant several continuances, including one continuing a prior trial
date certain. Regardless of the reasons for these continuances, Appellant had
more than adequate time to retain alternate counsel if he was dissatisfied with
Attorney Graff’s representation. Nevertheless, Appellant did not inform the
court until two weeks before trial of any dissatisfaction with Attorney Graff.
The court also did not find credible Appellant’s claim that he was unaware that
trial had been scheduled because Attorney Graff confirmed that he had met
with Appellant after the trial date certain was scheduled.
Additionally, Appellant failed to demonstrate that he had taken any
significant steps towards acquiring alternate counsel. Appellant explained that
he was attempting to gather sufficient funds to retain new counsel.
Nevertheless, knowing that trial was scheduled and he did not have sufficient
funds to retain alternate private counsel, Appellant failed to apply with the
3 In his letter, Appellant also alleged that Attorney Graff had behaved
inappropriately with female members of Appellant’s family. While the court
did not specifically inquire into this allegation, Appellant did not raise this issue
or expound upon it when the court permitted Appellant to state his concerns
regarding Attorney Graff on the record prior to jury selection. As such, there
is no support for this claim on the record.
- 10 - J-S42026-25
public defender’s office to obtain its services. Based on the foregoing, the
court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to a continuance to seek new
counsel. On this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in
denying Appellant’s requests for a continuance. See Broitman, supra;
Sandusky, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/10/2026
- 11 -
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