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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Grivner, M., Sr.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 507 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Bowes

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Mary Janes Bowes](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8225/mary-janes-bowes/)

J-S07004-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL JAMES GRIVNER, SR. :
:
Appellant : No. 507 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 27, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-40-CR-0002684-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2026

Michael James Grivner, Sr., appeals from the sentence of six months of

probation and fines arising from his convictions of simple assault, harassment,

and disorderly conduct. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual background of this matter thusly:

On July 19, 2023, at approximately 4:00 p.m., the victim, Daniel
McCoy, was in the parking lot of the Gateway Shopping Center
near the Goodwill Store. Mr. McCoy observed a shopping cart full
of items that appeared to be abandoned. As he was about to
return the cart to the store, [Appellant] confronted Mr. McCoy and
told him not to touch the cart. Although Mr. McCoy asked
[Appellant] if it was his cart at least ten times, [Appellant] would
not confirm that it was his. As Mr. McCoy attempted to return the
cart to the store, [Appellant] ran towards him and [sucker]
punched him in the face [from behind. See N.T. Trial, 6/17/24,
at 29]. Mr. McCoy did not retaliate. He did call 911 to report the
incident.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/25, at 1.
J-S07004-26

Appellant was subsequently charged with the above-reference offenses.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial as to simple assault, with the trial court

to render a decision concerning the summary offenses. The Commonwealth

called Mr. McCoy, who attested in accordance with the above. Pertinently, he

indicated that the punch from Appellant “hurt” and caused minor swelling

under his beard, but he did not lose any teeth and could not tell if it caused

bruising beneath his facial hair. See N.T. Trial, 6/17/24, at 30, 32. He did

not receive medical treatment.

Mr. McCoy also stated that while he was on the phone with 911,

Appellant began to reapproach him, but backed off when Mr. McCoy expressed

that he was willing to defend himself. Mr. McCoy informed the jury that his

reason for moving the cart was to return it to the Goodwill store, since he did

not believe that the business generally allowed patrons to take carts outside.

Another Commonwealth witness, William Kennedy, recounted that he was

present at Goodwill on the date in question and witnessed Appellant striking

the victim once.

Appellant testified in his defense. On cross-examination, he initially

denied hitting Mr. McCoy in the face, but later relented, indicating that he did

so a single time because he believed the victim was taking his belongings.

Appellant generally attested that he had no intent to cause any injury to Mr.

McCoy, but rather was seeking to protect the items he purportedly purchased

from Goodwill and were in the cart. Appellant stated that the cart was left

near his wife’s vehicle while he waited for her to finish shopping.

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J-S07004-26

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of simple

assault and the trial judge likewise convicted him of harassment and disorderly

conduct. The court subsequently sentenced Appellant as indicated

hereinabove. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents a single issue for our review: “Did the

Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that [Appellant] caused bodily injury and took a substantial step toward

with [sic] the intent to cause or recklessly caused bodily injury to [Mr.] McCoy

under 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a) and 2701(a)(1)?” Appellant’s brief at 2 (citation

altered).

We consider Appellant’s position mindful of the following well-settled

standard:

When reviewing a [sufficiency] claim, we face a question of law.
Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the
verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this lens, we must
ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of the elements
of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any
doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that,
as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances.

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J-S07004-26

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Pa.Super. 2023)

(cleaned up).

On appeal, Appellant challenges only his conviction for simple assault,

which occurs if a person “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or

recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). The

Crimes Code defines “bodily injury” as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or

substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.

Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove either bodily

injury to Mr. McCoy or any attempt by Appellant to cause the same. See

Appellant’s brief at 8-17. Since we find it dispositive, we focus on the latter

requirement, i.e., Appellant’s attempt. In that regard, we have stated:

The Commonwealth need not establish that the victim actually
suffered bodily injury; rather, it is sufficient to support a
conviction if the Commonwealth establishes an attempt to inflict
bodily injury. This intent may be shown by circumstances which
reasonably suggest that a defendant intended to cause injury.

To show an “attempt” to inflict bodily injury, it must be shown that
the actor had a specific intent to cause bodily injury. A person
acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense
if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or
to cause such a result.

Commonwealth v. Hatch, 314 A.3d 928, 932 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned

up).

Appellant contends that “[t]he facts here suggest the opposite of intent

to inflict bodily injury: the purpose was protection of property, not infliction

of harm.” Appellant’s brief at 14. He highlights his own testimony at trial that

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J-S07004-26

he believed Mr. McCoy was attempting to steal his merchandise, as well as

the facts that Appellant only used force against him once to stop him and that

the incident did not progress further. Id. Appellant additionally avers that

“assuming arguendo that [Appellant] struck [Mr.] McCoy, the alleged act of

striking [him] is not the kind of substantial step that demonstrates an attempt

to cause bodily injury.” Id. at 15. He maintains that this matter is “[u]nlike

cases where defendants [hit] more than once, wielded objects, or shoved

victims into walls, [since] there was no continued movement by [Appellant]

that would naturally or probably result in bodily injury.” Id. Appellant

concludes:

The Commonwealth’s evidence failed to demonstrate that
[Appellant] possessed the specific intent to inflict bodily injury or
that his conduct amounted to a substantial step toward that end.
His actions were directed at reclaiming his property, not at
harming [Mr.] McCoy. At most, the evidence established a
solitary, impulsive blow delivered in the course of a property
dispute. That act, unaccompanied by evidence of continued
aggression, serious risk of harm, or circumstances strongly
corroborating a purpose to injure, falls short of establishing an
attempt to cause bodily injury. The Commonwealth’s proof
supports, at most, harassment—not an attempted assault.

Id. at 17.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court posited that even if the punch

in question did not cause bodily injury to Mr. McCoy, “there is no doubt that

[the strike] was an attempt to cause bodily injury.” Trial Court Opinion,

6/2/25, at 6. It further explained that this intent was demonstrated by the

fact that the punch occurred in the face without warning. Id. at 6-7.

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J-S07004-26

For its part, the Commonwealth likewise maintains that there is

sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting an intent to cause bodily injury.

Specifically, it notes that while Mr. McCoy was on the phone with 911,

Appellant “advanced towards him again, stopping only when Mr. McCoy said

he would defend himself.” See Commonwealth’s brief at 8. The

Commonwealth argues:

If Appellant’s intent was merely to get the cart back, he had
accomplished that goal when Mr. McCoy moved away to call 911.
Instead, Appellant showed his true colors, and his true intent, by
advancing on Mr. McCoy while he was on the phone and would be
somewhat defenseless. Therefore, sufficient evidence supports
Appellant’s conviction.

Id.

Upon review, we conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial

evidence supporting the conviction for simple assault. Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the testimony bore out that

Appellant attempted to cause bodily injury to Mr. McCoy during the altercation.

That Appellant “sucker punched” the victim, striking him in the face from

behind, provided the jury with grounds to conclude that Appellant intended to

cause such injury. Indeed, a single punch of that nature, under certain

circumstances, may constitute the more momentous crime of aggravated

assault, which requires an attempt to cause serious bodily injury. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 662 (Pa.Super. 2007); 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2702. Furthermore, striking someone, even once, satisfies the requisite act

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J-S07004-26

in furtherance of that goal, regardless of whether bodily injury was actually

inflicted. See Hatch, 314 A.3d at 932.

While Appellant devotes a significant portion of his brief to arguing that

his intent was actually to stop a perceived theft, that is not enough to defeat

the conviction. Simply, the jury was free to disbelieve Appellant’s account.

See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa.Super. 2009) (“It is

for the fact-finder to make credibility determinations, and the finder of fact

may believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony.” (citation omitted)).

This is especially plausible in light of the fact that Appellant initially testified

on the stand that he never struck the victim in the face, despite the victim

and an unrelated eyewitness witnesses directly contradicting him, and then

reversed course. Further, Mr. McCoy attested that during the incident, he

asked Appellant at least ten times if the merchandise belonged to him, and

Appellant refused to answer the question before attacking from behind.

In sum, we conclude that the Commonwealth adduced sufficient

evidence to sustain a conviction for simple assault. Therefore, we affirm the

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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J-S07004-26

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/10/2026

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