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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Ogrosky, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 418 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Stevens

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (617)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Correale F. Stevens](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8248/correale-f-stevens/)

J-S01038-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JEREMY O'GROSKY :
:
Appellant : No. 418 WDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 10, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003943-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: March 10, 2026

Appellant Jeremy O’Grosky files this pro se appeal from the order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County denying his petition pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 Appellant raises numerous claims

of the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. After careful review, we affirm.

Appellant was charged with the June 17, 2014 armed robbery of the

First Commonwealth Bank in Salem Township. The factual background

presented at Appellant’s jury trial was previously summarized as follows:

Alicia Aiello testified that she was working as a teller at First
Commonwealth Bank on June 17, 2014. She stated that during
her shift at approximately 2 p.m., she noticed a male enter the
bank who “was dressed like it was winter” despite the warm
temperature that day. He was wearing a turtleneck sweater, coat,
hat, and sunglasses. This struck Aiello as odd, and she testified
that “my first thought was he was a robber.” At that point, he

---

• Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S01038-26

approached her teller station and had money in hand as if he was
prepared to make a deposit. He then began to “fumble” around in
a messenger bag, pull out a folder, and place it on the counter.
He then opened the folder and “was stuttering a little bit.” At that
point, Aiello noticed that the man was pointing a gun at her. He
demanded that Aiello give him all of the money at her station. She
obliged, and gave him all of the money in her drawer. Aiello
described the gun as black in color and “very similar in the shape
and size of a Glock.” She also testified that the man appeared to
be under the influence of drugs. Aiello stated that his skin color
also struck her as odd. She testified:

... my first thought it was very unusual because of the color
of his skin. He just didn't look normal. It looks like he was
... African American but he didn't have the features. He just
was very odd to me. It stuck out to me. He had facial hair
on his face but it just didn't look normal to me, like, either
it looked like it was almost painted on or to cover up. If he
is robbing a bank he doesn't want people to see his features.
I get that. That's what it appeared to me, that it was put
there and it was not normal.

She also testified that the man had “the beginning markings” of a
tattoo on his left hand. Aiello stated that she handed the man
approximately 700 dollars. She estimated his height as “average,
maybe a little taller.” She stated that she was frightened during
the robbery, and she felt that she would be hurt if she did not
comply with his demands.
....

Alesha McGough testified that on June 17, 2014, she was
employed as a drug and alcohol treatment counselor at Mon-
Yough Community Services [“Mon-Yough”]. On that date,
[Appellant] was scheduled for an appointment with McGough at
2:30 p.m. McGough testified that [Appellant] did not arrive until
2:45 p.m. When he arrived, he was wearing a “wife-beater” shirt
and brown cargo pants and was wearing flip flops. She testified
that when he arrived, he informed the front desk staff that he
wanted to meet with McGough. McGough met him in the front
lobby.

[Appellant] informed her that he could not stay to formally meet
with her because his girlfriend was waiting for him outside and he
had to leave because he had been working all day. She stated that
he appeared to be “rather agitated, kind of hyper ... he wouldn't

-2-
J-S01038-26

sit down in the lobby, he was kind of pacing around.” She testified
that while he was “usually kind of hyper,” his behavior that day
was “more over the top.” She then walked him to the front door,
and observed him entering the passenger side of a silver-gray
four-door sedan. McGough estimated that in total, [Appellant] was
at the facility for less than [five] minutes. She stated that she did
not observe any discoloration to his skin on that day, and that he
“looked like he was clean.”

Amanda Crusan testified that she had a romantic relationship with
[Appellant] for approximately [one] year, which began in May
2013. In January 2014, Crusan and [Appellant] moved into an
apartment together in Clairton, Allegheny County. During their
relationship, Crusan was a heroin user, and would use [five to ten]
stamp bags of heroin per day. Crusan testified that as of the time
of trial, she was no longer was using heroin. She also testified that
while the pair were living together, both of them were unemployed
and were struggling financially. Crusan testified that [Appellant]
was also a heroin user, and that they both purchased heroin from
a man named Malcolm.

In June 2014, Crusan stated they owed a drug debt to Malcolm,
and their utilities had been shut off as they had not been paid. To
solve their financial issues, [Appellant] suggested to Crusan that
they should rob a bank. At first, Crusan did not take his suggestion
seriously, until he suggested it again a few weeks later.
[Appellant] told Crusan that he would have to alter his appearance
using makeup so that there would be a possibility that “he could
get away with it.” Although the two did not discuss what bank they
were to rob, they traveled to Walgreen's in Lower Burrell
approximately one week prior to the robbery. [Appellant] stole
concealer, makeup applicators, and mascara.

At that point, their plan to rob a bank began to fully form.
[Appellant] stated that they should use a rental car, and after the
robbery, he would lay in the trunk so that he could remove the
makeup, shave his beard, and change his clothes. Crusan
purchased a gallon of water, razors, and makeup remover at Wal-
Mart approximately [two] days before the robbery. Around that
time, [Appellant] decided that he would rob First Commonwealth
Bank in Salem Township. [Appellant] and Crusan slept at
[Appellant's] father's home on the nights leading up to the
robbery. They returned to their apartment on the morning of June
17, 2014 to prepare for the robbery. Crusan testified:

-3-
J-S01038-26

... we started getting prepared for him to rob a bank. We
put on the concealer, covered up his neck and his face and
then used mascara to change the color of his hair. He ...
wore a black windbreaker suit, pants with matching coat and
white shirt underneath it, and he had wrapped, I don't know
if it was a white shirt or tank top, around his neck to conceal
the tattoos on his neck.

Crusan stated that she applied mascara to his hair and beard, and
ensured that all of his exposed skin was covered with makeup.
[Appellant] also was wearing sunglasses before he left the
residence. Crusan stated that she was already in possession of a
rental car, a silver Kia, as she had crashed her car approximately
two weeks prior to that date. [Appellant] was also in possession
of a black BB gun when he left the residence, although she did not
believe that he would use it during the commission of the robbery.

When Crusan and [Appellant] arrived at the bank, Crusan testified
that she parked in a parking lot of a McDonald's adjacent to the
bank. At that point, Crusan made a phone call to 9-1-1 using a
cell phone that was no longer in service. She stated that “I had
called and I said that my name was Sara and ... my neighbor was
threatening to shoot my dog and that I needed police assistance.”
When the 9-1-1 operator asked Crusan for her phone number, she
hung up and removed the battery from the phone. At some point
during the phone call, [Appellant] exited the vehicle and walked
in the direction of the bank.

When [Appellant] returned to Crusan's vehicle, he entered the
trunk. He remained in the trunk for approximately 20-25 minutes.
When [Appellant] climbed back into the front seat from the trunk,
Crusan stated that she was on SR 30 in North Versailles, Allegheny
County. Crusan stated that [Appellant] had changed his clothes
and was wearing plaid shorts and a white tank top. He had shaved
his head and face, and removed the makeup. He was also wearing
flip-flops. [Appellant] counted the money he had recovered at the
bank, and relayed to Crusan that he had recovered approximately
700 dollars.

Crusan stated that they eventually arrived at the drug and alcohol
counseling center for [Appellant's] appointment. [Appellant]
entered the facility and returned approximately [five] minutes
later. Crusan then drove [Appellant] to his mother's house in
Elizabeth, Allegheny County. Crusan testified that she believed
that [Appellant] disposed of the clothing he used in the

-4-
J-S01038-26

commission of the robbery at his mother's house. [Appellant] also
met with Malcolm, who sold him heroin, and paid him the debt
which was owed to him. Crusan stated that [Appellant] gave all of
the money he received during the robbery to Malcolm.

A few days after the robbery, Crusan spoke to Trooper Gross [in
an interview following a] traffic stop. Trooper Gross showed her
photographs taken from surveillance footage during the robbery.
When Trooper Gross asked her whether she knew who had robbed
the bank, Crusan replied that it was probably a hitchhiker that she
had picked up earlier in the day on June 17, 2014. She informed
Trooper Gross that she (sic) had picked up the hitchhiker at
Sheetz on Mosside Boulevard in Monroeville. She stated that after
she picked up the hitchhiker, she drove toward Vandergrift to visit
her children. She told the trooper that the hitchhiker “looked like
a Muslim.” She also stated that she dropped the hitchhiker off at
the McDonald's in Delmont. She told the trooper that [Appellant]
had been at his mother's house at the time of the robbery because
he had a drug and alcohol appointment later that day. She told
Trooper Gross that she never made it to Vandergrift, and turned
around to pick up [Appellant] for his appointment. She testified at
trial that she told Trooper Gross that the hitchhiker was Muslim
for the following reason:

... we had discussed what had happened at the bank [and]
[Appellant] told me that he used ... an accent that would
have - that somebody was Muslim would have sounded like,
like, somebody from - I don't [know], like, Iraq or
Afghanistan, like, that area. He said he sounded like that.
That's why I said he was Muslim.

Crusan said that when she talked to Trooper Gross, nothing in her
story was the truth.

After “a substantial period of time,” Crusan went back to the
police, though neither she nor [Appellant] had been charged with
the bank robbery. Crusan stated: “At that point I was clean and
my mind was clear. I had a lot of time to think about it, about my
family, about my kids, and it was the right thing to do.” She
traveled to the Vandergrift Police Department and spoke with
Corporal Fennell of the Pennsylvania State Police and informed
him of what transpired.
....

Brian Gross, retired Trooper for the Pennsylvania State Police,
testified that the first time he spoke with Amanda Crusan [she]

-5-
J-S01038-26

had informed him that she picked up a Muslim hitchhiker the day
of the bank robbery. When Gross asked her [to] repeat her story,
she again told him about the Muslim hitchhiker.

Gross stated that he conducted searches of [Appellant] and
Crusan's vehicles and the pair's residence on June 21, 2014. From
Crusan's vehicle he recovered aviator sunglasses and a backpack.
He also located a disposable razor in the driver side door, and on
the floor. At the residence, Gross recovered dark-colored makeup
and a black messenger bag.

The parties agreed to the following stipulation:

On the afternoon of June 19, 2014, Patrolman Nathan Rigatti of
the Vandergrift Police Department conducted a traffic stop of a
silver Kia Forte. The vehicle had been rented by Amanda Crusan
and was being operated by [Appellant] with Amanda Crusan in the
passenger seat.2 The Vandergrift Police notified the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole of the traffic stop, and then later
notified the Pennsylvania State Police at Kiski.

Joyce Douglass, state parole agent, testified that in June 2014,
she was supervising [Appellant]. As a result of the traffic stop
involving [Appellant] on June 19, 2014, Douglass conducted a
parole search at [Appellant's] residence on the same date. Upon
arrival, she recovered a CO2 pistol from [Appellant]'s living room.
Douglass explained the pistol resembled a Glock pistol. Douglass
later learned that the CO2 pistol had been destroyed so that it was
unavailable at trial.

Commonwealth v. Ogrosky, 1705 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 4997960, at *1–4

(Pa.Super. Oct. 16, 2018) (unpublished memorandum) (quoting Trial Court

Opinion (T.C.O.), Trial, 10/25/17, at 2-9 (footnote and citations omitted)).

---

2 During the June 19, 2014 traffic stop, Appellant and Crusan were taken into

custody after they were found to be in possession of a significant amount of
heroin. While the jury deciding Appellant’s robbery charges in the instant case
was not informed of this separate criminal case against Appellant and Crusan,
these circumstances are relevant to some of Appellant’s claims on appeal as
discussed infra.

-6-
J-S01038-26

On April 5, 2017, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial in which he was

represented by Attorney Marc Daffner (“trial counsel”). At the conclusion of

the trial, the jury convicted Appellant of robbery, conspiracy to commit

robbery, and theft by unlawful taking. On July 6, 2017, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of ten to twenty years’

imprisonment.3 On October 16, 2018, this Court affirmed the judgment of

sentence. Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal.

On July 14, 2019, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. Although

Appellant was appointed counsel, he then privately retained Tim Dawson, Esq.

(“Attorney Dawson”), who filed multiple amended PCRA petitions. Appellant’s

petitions predominately contain ineffectiveness claims against trial counsel.

The PCRA court set forth the following procedural history of Appellant’s

representation throughout the collateral proceedings:

Multiple PCRA Evidentiary Hearing[s] were also held before
[the PCRA] Court. Throughout the litigation of the instant PCRA
petition, objections were raised regarding [Appellant’s] attempts
at hybrid representation. [The PCRA court] agreed that
[Appellant] was not entitled to hybrid representation resulting in
[Appellant] at times deciding to represent himself.

The first PCRA Evidentiary Hearing occurred on March 15,
2022. At that hearing, [Appellant] testified regarding [trial
counsel’s] representation of him throughout his case. [Appellant]
was represented by Attorney Dawson throughout the hearing.

A second PCRA Evidentiary Hearing occurred on August 11,
2022. Based on [Appellant’s] wishes, Attorney Dawson was

---

3 The Commonwealth sought the imposition of this mandatory sentence
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9714(a)(1) given that Appellant had a prior
conviction for a crime of violence.

-7-
J-S01038-26

appointed as standby counsel, and [Appellant] represented
himself. The Commonwealth presented testimony from
Magisterial District Judge Rebecca Tyburski (“MDJ Tyburski”) and
[trial counsel] at the hearing.

A third PCRA Evidentiary Hearing occurred on December 13,
2022. At that hearing, [Appellant] indicated that he wished to
have Attorney Dawson appointed as counsel again. [The PCRA
court] agreed, and [Appellant’s] case was continued.

A fourth PCRA Evidentiary Hearing occurred on April 27,
2023. At that hearing, the parties continued with the testimony
of [Appellant] and [trial counsel]. [Appellant] was represented by
Attorney Dawson during the hearing.

A fifth and final PCRA Evidentiary Hearing occurred on
August 29, 2023. At that hearing, [Appellant] intended to present
testimony from his sister, Lauren Ogrosky, for purposes of
admitting the video recorded interview pertaining to his alibi
witness claim that was taken after trial of his deceased mother,
Terri Ogrosky. [The PCRA court] ultimately did not allow the video
to be admitted into evidence since it contained inadmissible
hearsay.

[Appellant’s] case was taken under advisement at the
conclusion of the hearing, and briefs were ordered. Both parties
submitted briefs to [the PCRA court], however, [Appellant]
submitted both pro se and counseled briefs that were conflicting.
On August 22, 2024, [the PCRA court] ordered [Appellant] to
submit a final brief from Attorney Dawson including all of
[Appellant’s] claims. [Appellant] thereafter indicated that he
wished to represent himself. A Grazier hearing was held before
[the PCRA] Court on October 15, 2024, and [Appellant] was
permitted to proceed pro se. He indicated that he wished for [the
PCRA] Court to review his pro se brief that was already filed of
record. The Commonwealth thereafter submitted a Supplement
to its Brief in Opposition to [Appellant’s] PCRA Petition on
December 10, 2024.

PCRA Court Opinion (P.C.O.), 3/10/25, at 4-5.

On March 10, 2025, the PCRA court entered an order and opinion

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.

-8-
J-S01038-26

On April 29, 2025, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant did not file a Rule 1925(b) statement, but instead filed a pro se

correspondence indicating that he had not received any of the PCRA court’s

orders at SCI Greene, where he is currently incarcerated. Appellant averred

that family members had informed him that court documents in this case were

being sent to the former residence of his deceased mother.

We note that the PCRA court’s 1925(b) order states that it would be sent

to Appellant at SCI Greene. However, the docket sheets in this case do not

contain any indication that the Rule 1925(b) order was sent to Appellant, who

had elected to represent himself at that point in the litigation. Instead, the

docket sheets show the Rule 1925(b) order was sent to Attorney Dawson, who

was no longer representing Appellant.

Our Court has stated that “[i]f the [trial court] docket does not show

that notice of the entry of a Rule 1925(b) order was provided to an appellant,

then we will not conclude that the appellant's issues have been waived for

failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement.” Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213

A.3d 1004, 1009–1010 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505,

510 (Pa.Super. 2007)). As the docket in this case does not show that

Appellant was provided notice of the Rule 1925(b) order, we decline to

penalize Appellant for his failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

-9-
J-S01038-26

1. Did the PCRA court err where counsel failed to present evidence
   of Appellant’s tattoos, size/weight, and other physical
   characteristics to contradict eyewitness descriptions of the
   robber?

2. Did the PCRA court err in denying relief where trial counsel
   failed to investigate, subpoena, and present exculpatory
   physical evidence (drug tests, logbook, maps, photographs,
   vehicle specifications) directly contradicting the
   Commonwealth’s theory?

3. Did the PCRA court err in denying relief where trial counsel
   failed to investigate and present alibi witnesses (Appellant’s
   mother, now deceased) and corroborating records such as the
   Mon-Yough logbook?

4. Did the PCRA court err where trial counsel failed to file and
   litigate a suppression motion concerning an affidavit of
   probable cause that contained false statements and omissions,
   and where no search warrant was produced despite repeated
   judicial inquiry?

5. Did the PCRA court err where counsel failed to cross-examine
   and impeach key Commonwealth witness Amanda Crusan with
   letters and contradictory prior statements?

6. Did the PCRA court err where counsel failed to protect
   Appellant’s right to testify and abruptly rested without
   presenting any defense evidence?

7. Did the PCRA court err in denying relief despite the cumulative
   effect of counsel’s errors, which rendered the verdict unreliable
   under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6 (reordered for ease of review).4

---

4 We initially note that Appellant’s brief fails to comply with our rules of
appellate procedure. Although Appellant’s statement of the questions
presented raises the aforementioned seven issues, the argument section of
his appellate brief contains a mixed discussion of numerous arguments
Appellant wishes to raise. Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (“[t]he argument shall be divided
into as many parts as there are questions to be argued”). Although we
acknowledge the challenges pro se litigants face in representing themselves
on appeal, this Court has long recognized that we “must demand that pro se
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 10 - J-S01038-26

We address the propriety of the PCRA court’s denial order as follows:

[O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is
limited to examining whether the PCRA court's determination is
supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
error. The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when
supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal
conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Miranda, 317 A.3d 1070, 1075 (Pa.Super. 2024)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super.

2019)).

Appellant has raised multiple ineffectiveness of counsel claims. In

reviewing these arguments, we are guided by the following principles:

It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided
effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and
proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of
arguable merit; (2) counsel's action or inaction lacked any
objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's
interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a
reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel's
error. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d
973, 975–76 (1987); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The PCRA court may
deny an ineffectiveness claim if “the petitioner's evidence fails to
meet a single one of these prongs.” Commonwealth v.
Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (2000)....
Because courts must presume that counsel was effective, it is the
petitioner's burden to prove otherwise. See Pierce, supra;

---

litigants comply substantially with our rules of procedure.” Commonwealth
v. Spuck, 86 A.3d 870, 874 (Pa.Super. 2014).
Nevertheless, as we can discern Appellant’s claims for relief, we will not
quash the appeal and will limit our discussion to the claims set forth in
Appellant’s statement of questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“[n]o
question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions
involved or fairly suggested thereby”).

• 11 - J-S01038-26

Commonwealth v. Holloway, 559 Pa. 258, 739 A.2d 1039,
1044 (1999).

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Natividad, 595 Pa. 188, 207-208, 938 A.2d

310, 321 (2007)).

We begin with Appellant’s allegation that trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to present multiple pieces of physical evidence to show he was not the

perpetrator of the robbery. Appellant first argues that trial counsel should

have presented photographs of Appellant at the time of the robbery to show

his physical appearance did not match the robbery suspect. Appellant points

out that eyewitnesses had described the robber as a slender African-American

male, whereas Appellant described himself as an overweight Caucasian man

that weighed approximately 220 pounds at the time of the robbery. Appellant

contends that “[h]ad jurors seen images of Appellant’s build, they would have

doubted the eyewitness identifications.” Appellant’s Brief, at 10.

We note that trial counsel did highlight this discrepancy by eliciting

testimony from Trooper Gross on cross-examination that three eyewitnesses

at the bank had identified the robber as a 5’9” African-American male with a

slender build. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), Trial, 4/5/17 - 4/7/17, at 185-86.

In closing arguments, trial counsel used this point to Appellant’s advantage

by emphasizing to the jury that the Commonwealth declined to present the

testimony of any of the eyewitnesses that reported that the robber had a

“slender build.” Id. at 221.

• 12 - J-S01038-26

We also note that the jury was able to make their own comparison of

Appellant’s and the suspect’s physical characteristics as the Commonwealth

presented video footage and still images from bank surveillance cameras

which showed the perpetrator of the robbery. Id. at 68-76. The video footage

corroborated Crusan’s testimony regarding the robbery itself and the robber’s

escape from the scene. Trial counsel was also able to have Crusan confirm

on cross-examination that Appellant was approximately 5’8” and had the same

build at trial that he did at the time of the robbery. Id. at 166. Alicia Aiello,

the bank teller who had the opportunity to observe the robber closely, testified

that she believed that the robber’s skin color was unusual such that she

believed his African-American skin tone was “painted on.”

Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that Appellant could have

testified on his own behalf and introduced evidence of his specific height,

weight, and other physical characteristics, but ultimately advised Appellant

not to testify as the Commonwealth could have introduced Appellant’s prior

armed robbery conviction in response. Trial counsel believed that the jury

was presented with sufficient evidence of Appellant’s physical characteristics

at the time of the robbery without having Appellant testify. As such, Appellant

has not shown that trial counsel lacked a reasonable basis in failing to present

photographs of Appellant’s appearance at the time of the robbery.

Similarly, Appellant argues that trial counsel should have presented

photographs of his arms to show that he had no tattoos on his hands at the

time of the robbery. As noted above, the bank teller that was held up at

• 13 - J-S01038-26

gunpoint reported that the robber had “the beginning markings” of a tattoo

on his left hand exposed from underneath his sleeve.

The PCRA court dismissed this claim finding that Appellant had not

presented photographic evidence of the lack of tattoos on his hands with

corresponding proof of when such photos were taken. The PCRA court also

found that Appellant had not shown he had provided trial counsel with any

such photographs prior to trial. Moreover, we again note that trial counsel

was reluctant to have Appellant testify to introduce such evidence as it would

open the door to allow the Commonwealth to impeach Appellant with his prior

armed robbery conviction. As such, such ineffectiveness claim fails.

Appellant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

present evidence of the specifications of the trunk of Crusan’s rental car to

disprove Crusan’s allegation that Appellant had jumped in the trunk after the

robbery and rode in this confined space while shaving his head and face and

removing makeup. However, we agree with the trial court’s finding that

Appellant did not develop this claim by presenting the PCRA court with such

specifications to assess Appellant’s claim that Crusan’s trunk narrative was

implausible. As such, Appellant has not shown that this claim has arguable

merit. We decline to review it further.

In addition, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to present evidence that at the time of the robbery, he was gainfully

employed and that he had passed multiple drug tests during parole

supervision. Appellant asserts this evidence was relevant to impeach Crusan’s

• 14 - J-S01038-26

testimony that Appellant committed the robbery because he was addicted to

heroin and struggling financially, supplying his motive for the robbery.

Appellant claims trial counsel could have admitted this information through

his parole officer.

We first note that Appellant did not present the PCRA court with any

evidence showing clean drug screenings at the time of the robbery. Further,

the PCRA court also highlighted that trial counsel was reluctant in attempting

to delve into certain aspects of his parole supervision as it could have “opened

the door” to the admission of more inculpatory evidence. Trial counsel wanted

to avoid allowing the prosecution to inform the jury of the negative aspects of

Appellant’s parole supervision, including the fact that he had a prior armed

robbery conviction as well as pending criminal charges related to the June 19,

2014 traffic stop that occurred two days after the robbery in which Appellant

and Crusan were found to be in possession of a significant amount of heroin.

See N.T., PCRA hrg., 8/11/22, at 11-14. We cannot find that Appellant is

entitled to relief on this claim given that he has failed to show that trial counsel

lacked a reasonable basis for failing to present this evidence.

Appellant also claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

present an alibi defense as his mother, Terri Ogrosky, could have testified that

he was at her home at the time of the robbery. In reviewing similar claims,

our courts have recognized that:

[w]hen raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call a
potential witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance and
prejudice requirements of the Strickland test by establishing

• 15 - J-S01038-26

that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to
testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known
of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to
testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of
the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a
fair trial. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d
523, 536 (2009); Commonwealth v. Clark, 599 Pa. 204, 961
A.2d 80, 90 (2008). To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, a
petitioner “must show how the uncalled witnesses' testimony
would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case.”
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1134
(2008). Thus, counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to
call a witness unless the petitioner can show that the witness's
testimony would have been helpful to the defense.
Commonwealth v. Auker, 545 Pa. 521, 681 A.2d 1305, 1319
(1996).

Commonwealth v. Sneed, 616 Pa. 1, 22–23, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108–1109

(2012).

Appellant claims that he informed trial counsel that his mother could

provide alibi testimony as Appellant was at his mother’s residence before he

went to his meeting with Alesha McGough at the drug treatment center on the

day the robbery occurred. At one of his PCRA evidentiary hearings, Appellant

attempted to admit a video recorded statement from his mother confirming

this alibi testimony since his mother had passed away several months earlier.

Nevertheless, the trial court found trial counsel testified credibly that

Appellant had not informed him that Terri Ogrosky could offer alibi testimony

based on Appellant’s presence at her house at the time the robbery occurred.

While trial counsel recalled speaking to Terri, trial counsel testified that he was

not aware that Appellant had an alibi defense. Trial counsel averred that he

would have filed an alibi notice had Appellant informed him that his mother

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was a potential alibi witness. Trial counsel also recalled that Terri Ogrosky did

not attend Appellant’s trial. We note that Crusan testified at trial that she and

Appellant went to Terri Ogrosky’s house after the robbery to pay a drug dealer

with the proceeds of the robbery.

We defer to the PCRA court’s finding that trial counsel credibly testified

that neither Appellant nor Terri Ogrosky had informed him that Terri could

offer alibi testimony to show Appellant was at her residence at the time of the

robbery. As such, this ineffectiveness claim fails.

Appellant asserts that trial counsel should have presented other

evidence to corroborate his alibi defense claiming that Appellant was at his

mother’s home at the time of the robbery. Appellant argues that trial counsel

could have shown that Crusan’s claim that she drove Appellant from the bank

to the Mon-Yough counseling center after the robbery was implausible based

on her timeline of the events in question. Appellant asserts that trial counsel

should have admitted the logbook from Mon-Yough to corroborate the time

that he signed in for his appointment as well as maps showing the distance

and projected travel time from the bank to Mon-Yough.

We agree with the PCRA court’s finding that Appellant has not shown he

was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to admit the logbook and maps

showing the projected travel time to the counseling center. Trial counsel

cross-examined the Commonwealth’s witnesses as to the timeline between

the departure of the getaway vehicle from the bank and Appellant’s arrival at

the Mon-Yough counseling center. Video surveillance captured Crusan’s

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vehicle picking up an individual that left the bank after the robbery.

Appellant’s counselor, McGough, confirmed that Appellant arrived at the

center and informed her immediately in the lobby that he could not stay for

his appointment, because his girlfriend was waiting outside. McGough

observed that Appellant left the center in a vehicle that appeared to be the

same one captured in the bank surveillance video. N.T., Trial, at 106-108. As

such, Appellant has not shown prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to present

the logbook or maps, such that there was a reasonable probability of a

different outcome in the trial.

Appellant next claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a

suppression motion based on inaccuracies in the affidavit of probable cause

that accompanied his arrest warrant. Specifically, Appellant argues that the

affidavit misstated the timeline of when Appellant was identified as a suspect,

claimed eyewitnesses descriptions matched Appellant despite stark

differences in appearance, and failed to disclose exculpatory contradictions.

However, the issue of whether there was probable cause to arrest

Appellant became moot after a preliminary hearing was held in which the trial

court found there was probable cause to believe that Appellant committed the

charged offenses. “[A]ny issue concerning a defect in the affidavit of probable

cause becomes moot upon the district justice's finding at the preliminary

hearing that a prima facie case has been established.” Commonwealth v.

Chamberlain, 612 Pa. 107, 177, 30 A.3d 381, 423 (2011) (citing

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Commonwealth v. Abdul–Salaam, 544 Pa. 514, 678 A.2d 342 (1996)). As

such, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Appellant also argues that trial counsel should have filed a suppression

motion arguing that the Commonwealth conducted a warrantless search of

the residence he shared with Crusan on June 21, 2014. Appellant contends

that the record shows that officers did not obtain a warrant to search the

shared residence. We disagree.

At trial, Trooper Gross testified that the officers obtained a warrant to

search Appellant and Crusan’s home on June 21, 2014. N.T., Trial at 178-80.

Thereafter, at one of Appellant’s PCRA hearings, trial counsel testified that he

had reviewed the affidavit of probable cause associated with the relevant

search warrant and concluded that there were no grounds to file a suppression

motion regarding the validity of the search. Although trial counsel agreed that

Appellant was not a suspect at the time that troopers searched the home, he

recalled that the search warrant was targeted at Crusan in connection with

her suspected involvement in the bank robbery. N.T., PCRA hearing, 8/11/22,

at 36-37.

We note that Appellant limits this argument to assert that trial counsel

should have claimed that the officers searched his home without a warrant.

The PCRA court disagreed with Appellant’s assertion that the search warrant

did not exist. Appellant did not make any attempt to argue that he was still

entitled to relief even if the warrant did exist; Appellant’s failure to develop

an alternative argument with additional analysis or citation to relevant

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authority precludes our review. Our courts “will not develop an argument on

an appellant's behalf.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 323 A.3d 611, 640–41

(Pa. 2024) (citing Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 377 (Pa.

2023)).

Appellant next claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to protect

Appellant’s right to testify and abruptly resting the defense’s case without

presenting any evidence. Appellant claims that trial counsel did not advise

him of his absolute right to take the stand or secure a waiver of Appellant’s

right to testify on the stand. Appellant claims that his own testimony was

necessary to impeach Crusan’s credibility and allow him to present his own

defense evidence.

This claim is clearly belied by Appellant’s own statements at trial in

which he participated in an oral colloquy confirming that he understood he had

the right to testify but declined to do so to avoid the Commonwealth admitting

evidence of Appellant’s prior armed robbery conviction. See N.T., Trial, at

206-209. Appellant also agreed that he was waiving his right to present

character testimony for the same reason. See id. at 209-211. At the

conclusion of these colloquies, the trial court found that Appellant had made

knowing and voluntary waivers of his rights to testify and present character

evidence. Appellant cannot make arguments on appeal that contradict his

own statements at trial. As such, this ineffectiveness claim fails.

Lastly, Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s

alleged errors rendered the verdict unreliable. While no number of failed

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ineffectiveness claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so

individually, when the failure of individual claims is grounded in lack of

prejudice, the cumulative prejudice from those individual claims may properly

be assessed. Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 225-26, 36 A.3d

121, 161 (2012). In assessing all of Appellant’s claims on appeal in which we

have found did not individually prejudice Appellant, we cannot conclude that

they prejudice him when considered in the aggregate.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 03/10/2026

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