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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Haldeman, M. v. Haldeman, E.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 853 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Kunselman

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (262)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Kunselman

J-A28008-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MELVIN R. HALDEMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
E. BONNIE HALDEMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 853 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 15, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Civil Division at No(s):
2023-0-1066

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2026

E. Bonnie Haldeman (Bonnie) appeals from the judgment entered in

favor of Melvin R. Haldeman (Melvin) in this civil action. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history as

follows:

In this matter, [Melvin] sought to evict his ex-wife,
[Bonnie], from property he had purchased at a sheriff’s sale on
June 17, 2015. The parties had owned the property during their
marriage, and Bonnie retained the property after the parties’
divorce. When the property was scheduled for sheriff’s sale,
Melvin agreed to purchase it and allow Bonnie to continue living
there. Thereafter, Bonnie made monthly payments in various
amounts. Bonnie testified that the monthly payments were
intended to first pay off a $30,000.00 loan to Melvin and, that
after that amount had been paid, she would make payments
toward the price Melvin paid at the sheriff sale to purchase the
property from him. Melvin testified that the monthly payments
were intended to be rent.

By order and opinion entered October 8, 2024, [the trial
court] found that Bonnie had failed to prove the existence of an
J-A28008-25

agreement for the sale of the property and directed that she
vacate the property. Bonnie filed an appeal of that order to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court quashed the
appeal and remanded [so] that Bonnie could file post-trial
motions.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/25, at 1-2 (excess capitalization omitted).

Following remand, Bonnie filed post-trial motions asserting that the trial

court erred in finding no oral contract for the sale of the property existed and

that the parties operated under a landlord-tenant relationship. By opinion and

order entered May 30, 2025, the trial court denied Bonnie’s post-motions.

This appeal followed. Because our review of the docket entries revealed that

no judgment had been entered upon the trial court’s decision, we directed

Bonnie to praecipe for entry of judgment. She did so, and judgment was

entered upon the verdict on September 25, 2025. Both Bonnie and the trial

court have complied with Appellate Rule 1925.

Bonnie raises the following four issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused their discretion by
   finding that a landlord and tenant relationship existed between
   [Bonnie and Melvin] such that [Melvin] was entitled to have
   [Bonnie] evicted from the [property]?

2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused their discretion by
   finding that [Melvin] is entitled to possession of the [property]
   and that [Bonnie] shall be ordered to vacate said premises,
   under the facts and circumstances in this case, which support
   a finding or a valid agreement of sale?

3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused their discretion in
   failing to find the existence of a valid agreement of sale, using
   the factors under the standard set forth in Kurland v. Stolker,
   533 A.2d 1370 (Pa. 1987), with regards to the part
   performance exception to the requirement that an agreement
   for the sale of real estate be in writing?

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J-A28008-25

1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused their discretion by failing to properly apply the facts in this matter to the holding in Firetree, Ltd. v. Dept. of General Services, 978 A.2d 1067, 1074 (Pa. Commw. 2009), as the record shows that [Bonnie] had paid compensation for the property, that [Bonnie] took possession of the property, that [her] harm cannot be compensated in damages, and that the rescission here by [Melvin] would be manifestly unfair to [Bonnie]?

Bonnie’s Brief at 5 (excess capitalization omitted).1

On May 9, 2024, the trial court held a bench trial at which Melvin and

Bonnie testified. Our scope and standard of review are as follows:

This Court’s scope of review for cases tried without a jury is
limited to a determination of whether the findings of the trial court
are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
committed error in the application of law. When this Court reviews
the findings of the trial judge, the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the victorious party below and all evidence and
proper inferences favorable to that party must be taken as true
and all unfavorable inferences rejected. Findings of the trial judge
in a non-jury case must be given the same weight and effect on
appeal as a verdict of a jury and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent error of law or abuse of discretion.

Manack v. Sandlin, 812 A.2d 676, 679-80 (Pa. Super. 2002) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). An abuse of discretion takes one of

three forms: 1) an error of law; 2) the exercise of judgment in a manifestly

unreasonable manner; or 3) a decision resulting from partiality, prejudice,

bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record. Hutchinson v.

---

1 We note with displeasure Bonnie’s supporting argument for these four issues

consists of only two sections, thereby violating Appellate Rule 2119 (providing
that an appellant’s “argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued”).

-3-
J-A28008-25

Verstraeten, 304 A.3d 1268, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quotation marks and

citation omitted). An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because

the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion. Adkins v.

Johnson & Johnson, 231 A.3d 960, 964-65 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

In order to understand the trial court’s legal conclusions, as well as the

parties’ arguments, we reproduce the trial court’s discussion of the evidence

in detail. Regarding Melvin’s evidence, the trial court summarized:

Melvin testified that after he purchased the property, he and
Bonnie entered an oral agreement by which she would live on the
property and pay him monthly rental of $1,000.00. Although
Bonnie was consistent with making payments in the beginning,
the payments eventually tapered off. For the part of the year
Melvin owned the property in 2015, he received $8,000.00 from
Bonnie. He received $10,400.00 in 2016 and $6,300.00 in 2017.
After that, the payments dropped dramatically. In 2019, he
received only $400.00 and[,] in 2020, he received only $1,200.00.
Melvin explained that the arrangement for the $1,000.00 monthly
rental had never been renegotiated and that he did not take action
to evict Bonnie out of the goodness of his heart.

Melvin produced a number of receipts for the payments he
received from Bonnie. Bonnie always filled out the information on
the receipts and Melvin would initial and date them after she filled
in the information. She would indicate that the payment was
“towards a loan,” referring to the $30,000.00 loan. Melvin
explained that Bonnie had said she wanted to pay back the money
she owed him. However, the receipts also indicated that the
payment was “for rent.” Melvin testified that “I never honored
that towards a loan because it’s rent and my income tax filing
[has] always claimed a rent.” He never claimed anything on his
income taxes for repayment of a loan.

Melvin explained that he wanted to sell the property to [the
parties’] daughter and son-in-law and he explained his plan to
Bonnie in April 2023. He hand-delivered an eviction notice to

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J-A28008-25

Bonnie on June 7, 2023 which gave her 45 days to vacate the
property and read the terms to her. Bonnie failed to move out
within the 45 days indicated in the notice.

Melvin acknowledged that Bonnie had mentioned to him that
she wanted to remain living on the property and suggested the
possibility of entering a rent-to-own agreement. However, he had
always avoided her questions when she mentioned such an
arrangement. He testified that the two had never discussed a
purchase price, a term, an itemization schedule or any specifics to
suggest that they were entering [into] a rent-to-own agreement.
When asked whether he understood that Bonnie intended to live
on the property for the rest of her life, Melvin responded: “Well
correct. But in time, I wanted to sell this place and rent it and
that wasn’t going to work out that way.”

On cross-examination, Melvin explained that when the
property went up for sheriff’s sale, he informed Bonnie that he
was interested in purchasing it. At first, he denied that Bonnie
asked him to purchase it so that she could continue to live there.
However, he later acknowledged that Bonnie went to the sale with
him and informed him that she wanted to remain on the property
and asked him to purchase it. He acknowledged that he bought
the property at the sale for $171,500.00 and that the property is
now worth approximately $300,000.00.

Melvin acknowledged that the last check he received from
Bonnie was in the amount of $700.00. Bonnie indicated on the
check that it was the final payment on the $30,000.00 loan and
that, from that time, payments would go toward the $171,500.00
purchase price of the property. Melvin did not cash the check.
Melvin acknowledged that he had at least one conversation with
Bonnie about her purchasing the property but he could not recall
the specifics of any discussion. Melvin confirmed that when
Bonnie made payments, he had asked her to check “rent” on the
receipt because of how he claimed the income on his taxes.

On re-direct examination, Melvin explained that the $400.00
rental amount set forth in the complaint was based on the amount
of Bonnie’s recent payments. Melvin explained that he paid the
real estate taxes and Bonnie was responsible for utilities. He
always understood that they were rental payments and none of
the payments were applied toward a loan. He stated that he never
expected to receive repayment of the $30,000.00 loan.

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J-A28008-25

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/24, at 3-6 (excess capitalization and citations to

record omitted).

The trial court summarized Bonnie’s evidence as follows:

Bonnie testified that after her second divorce, she was
unable to work due to a disability and that she was no longer
receiving alimony payments. As a result, she had difficulty paying
the mortgage and the mortgage went into default. She applied
for and received a $35,000.00 loan from the Pennsylvania Housing
Finance Agency. At the time of the hearing, she was still paying
off that loan at the rate of $25.00 per month.

When the property was listed for sheriff’s sale, she
contacted Melvin and asked him to buy the property because she
wanted to continue living there. They discussed that she would
purchase the property from him after he bought it. Under their
agreement, she would repay the $30,000.00 loan first and would
then start making payments toward the $171,500.00 purchase
price. She explained that when she filled out a receipt, she always
indicated that it was in payment toward the loan and she would
indicate how much remained on the loan until she would start
paying the $171,500.00. She noted that Melvin never disputed
the $30,000.00 loan and asked her to put “rent” on the receipt for
tax purposes.

Bonnie explained that the final check given to Melvin in the
amount of $700.00 would have paid off the $30,000.00 and that
she would have started on the $171,500.00 the following month.
She and Melvin had discussed the arrangement many times since
the sheriff’s sale. She based her payments on what she could
afford to pay as her only source of income was social security
payments. Melvin never discussed rent with her.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/24, at 6-7 (excess capitalization omitted).

The trial court then quoted an exchange between Bonnie and her

counsel in which Bonnie testified that she spoke with Melvin before the sheriff’s

sale and Melvin stated a third person offered to loan Melvin the money to buy

the property but only if Bonnie’s name was removed from the deed. Id. at 7.

-6-
J-A28008-25

Bonnie testified that when she accused Melvin of “trying to take the property

from” her, Melvin denied this, and told her she could continue to live there.

Id. According to Bonnie, she gave Melvin “a check for $700 which would have

paid off the $30,000 and he refused to cash it.” Bonnie further testified that

Melvin told her he forgot about that loan, but she “questioned that because

we discussed it.” Id.

In addition to the above, we note that, after the parties presented their

evidence, the trial court had a “question or two” to ask Bonnie because the

court wanted “to make it clear to [the court] what was actually happening.”

N.T., 5/9/24, at 46. After going over some of her previous testimony, the

following exchange occurred:

Q. None of [your payments] you believe [were] for rent?

A. Correct.

Q. So - -

A. At some point we did discuss Hannah, my daughter, and
[her husband], we discussed an apartment above a new garage
for me because my health is declining. But I never dreamed that
I - - had never had a clue that [Melvin] was going to actually kick
an elderly, the mother of his children - -

Q. Let me ask this question. Should I conclude that from what
you said that you were actually living rent-free at [the
property]? You were not paying rent, you were just
repaying this loan?

A. That’s a hard question to answer.

Q. Well I guess I’m assuming based upon what you just
testified to - -

A. I was - -

-7-
J-A28008-25

Q. Let me ask, that when you made a payment, you were not
considering that to be rent, you were considering that to be a
payment on the $30,000 loan. The full amount of whatever the
payment was, was coming off the $30,000 loan?

A. I guess it felt like rent too because I kept checking the rent
box.

Q. Well you explained that you checked the rent box because
[Melvin] asked you to do that for tax purposes?

A. Yeah.

Q. But you didn’t say that you thought that because you
thought you were paying rent, you just did it for that reason[,]
right? And I’m not trying to confuse you, I’m just trying to be
clear about was your thought was.

A. I don’t know.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean I wanted to make sure [Melvin] was getting money,
whether - - I don’t know how to answer that[.]

Id. at 47-49.

As noted above, the trial court concluded that the parties had a landlord-

tenant relationship and that Bonnie could not rely on her alleged oral rent-to-

own contract because it violated the statute of frauds.

In her first two issues on appeal, Bonnie asserts that, under the

Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act, 68 P.S. §§ 250.101-342, Melvin failed

to meet his burden of proving either a written lease agreement between the

parties or the terms of an oral one. According to Bonnie, because Melvin “has

not met his burden of proof as it relates to the existence of a lease agreement

between himself and [Bonnie],” the trial court “cannot grant relief sought by

[Melvin] under the Landlord and Tenant Act.” Bonnie’s Brief at 10-11.

-8-
J-A28008-25

Before addressing the merits of this claim, we must determine whether

it is properly before us. In both her post-trial motion and her Rule 1925(b)

statement, Bonnie made the general claim that the trial court erred in

concluding that she and Melvin had a landlord-tenant relationship. Bonnie did

not claim, as she does in her brief, that Melvin did not establish either the

terms of an oral lease or the existence of a written lease. The trial court did

not address these more specific contentions. Thus, we conclude the claim is

waived because Bonnie inappropriately raises it for the this first time on

appeal. See generally, Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Nonetheless, our review of the record supports the trial court’s

conclusion that Melvin credibly testified that he and Bonnie entered into an

open-ended oral lease arrangement. As the court explained when denying

Bonnie’s post-trial motions:

In [its October 8, 2024 opinion, the court] noted that the
parties did not ever formally express to one another the terms of
their relationship. In the complaint and in his testimony, Melvin
explained that after he purchased the property at the sheriff sale,
it was simply agreed that Bonnie would make monthly payments
in order to continue living there.

We concluded that the arrangement was more in the nature
of a landlord-tenant relationship due to the absence of any
agreement of sale and based on the parties’ conduct. The parties
agreed that Bonnie made some monthly payments to Melvin in
varying amounts. Bonnie testified that the first series of payments
were meant to repay the $30,000.00 loan Melvin had extended to
her and that none of the payments she made were meant to go
toward the purchase price of the property. When Bonnie made
the payments, she filled out a receipt where she indicated that the
payment was “towards a loan.” However, she also placed a
notation on the receipts that the payments were “for rent.” Melvin

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explained that he reported the payments as rental income on his
taxes and that he never intended to collect on the $30,000.00
loan. Melvin rejected payment from Bonnie once she indicated
that the loan had been paid off and that future payments would
go toward the purchase of the property.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/25, at 3-4 (excess capitalization omitted).

Upon review, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the

court in defining the arrangement of the parties regarding the property at

issue. Manack, supra. Thus, Bonnie’s first two issues are meritless.

In her remaining two issues, Bonnie asserts that the trial court erred in

failing to find that she and Melvin “had a valid and enforceable agreement for

purchase of the real property[.]” Bonnie’s Brief at 11. Although she concedes

that there was no written agreement, Bonnie asserts that she met her burden

of proving an exception to the statute of frauds. We disagree.

The parties cite, and the trial court relied upon, our Supreme Court’s

decision in Kurland v. Stolker, 533 A.2d 1370 (Pa. 1987). In Kurland, the

high court explained the purpose of the statute of frauds and an exception

thereto as to oral contracts for the purchase of property:

The object of the statute is to prevent the assertion of verbal
understandings in the creation of interests or estates in land and
to obviate the opportunity for fraud and perjury. It is not a mere
rule of evidence, but a declaration of public policy. In the absence
of equities sufficient of themselves to take the case out of the
statute, it operates as a limitation upon judicial authority to afford
a remedy unless renounced or waived by the party entitled to
claim its protection.

Our case law is very explicit as to the requirements which
must be met to take an oral contract for real estate out of the
statute. The terms of the contract must be shown by full,
complete, and satisfactory proof. The evidence must define the

• 10 - J-A28008-25

boundaries and indicate the quantity of the land. It must fix the
amount of consideration. It must establish the fact that
possession was taken in pursuance of the contract, and, at or
immediately after the time it was made, the fact that the change
of possession was notorious, and the fact that it has been
exclusive, continuous and maintained. And it must show
performance or part performance by the vendee which could not
be compensated in damages, and such as would make rescission
inequitable and unjust.

Kurland, 533 A.2d at 1372-73 (internal citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court further stated:

The “indubitable proof” a claimant is required to proffer is
evidence that should not only be found credible, but of such
weight and directness as to make out the facts alleged beyond a
doubt. As the alleged contract is not between a parent and child,
it may be proven by the acts and declarations of the parties, either
together or separately. The acts and declarations relied upon,
must not, however, be of an equivocal character; they must have
such clearness and directness as will leave no doubt as to their
meaning and purpose.

Id. The burden of proof falls upon the party attempting to avoid the statute

of frauds. Id. at 1374. Moreover, “[t]he contract cannot be inferred only

from the declarations of one of the parties. To hold otherwise is tantamount

to setting aside the statute of frauds.” Id. at 1375.

Here, the trial court concluded that Bonnie did not meet her burden of

establishing that the partial performance exception applied and, therefore, her

claim of an oral agreement to sell the property violated the statute of frauds.

The court reasoned:

It is true that Bonnie was in continuous exclusive possession
of the property as she was permitted to remain there after Melvin
purchased the property at the sheriff’s sale. However, the acts
relied upon by Bonnie were not of such an unequivocal nature that

• 11 - J-A28008-25

[the court was] left with no doubt that the parties had entered a
valid oral contract for the sale of the property. Melvin paid the
real estate taxes on the property and Bonnie paid the utilities,
which is indicative of a typical landlord-tenant relationship. The
monthly receipts were filled out by Bonnie and included notations
indicating that the payments were for both rent and repayment of
a loan. There was no partial performance on the terms of
the alleged oral agreement as Bonnie acknowledged that
none of the payments accepted by Melvin went toward the
purchase price. As soon as she indicated that her monthly
payment was to be put toward the purchase price, Melvin refused
to accept it and notified her that he would be selling the property
to the parties’ daughter and son-in-law. Bonnie did not claim that
she had made any improvements to the property which could not
be compensated in damages. Although Bonnie expressed her
desire to eventually purchase the property, we found that Melvin
never acquiesced to any type of arrangement of that nature. It
appeared that Melvin viewed Bonnie’s inquiries regarding her
purchase of the property as wishful thinking and that he did not
want to upset her by engaging in any discussions about a sale with
her.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/25, at 5-6 (excess capitalization omitted; emphasis

added).

Our review of the record amply supports the trial court’s conclusions.

See Morris v. Smith, 584 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding, in a

similar landlord-tenant action, that the tenants failed to plead an enforceable

contract sufficient to remove the case from the statute of frauds requirement

that an agreement for sale of real property be in writing and signed by the

parties).

• 12 - J-A28008-25

In arguing to the contrary, Bonnie largely relies on her own testimony.

However, as stated above, “[t]he contract cannot be inferred only from the

declarations of one of the parties.” Kurland, supra. Moreover, Bonnie’s own

testimony established that she did not partially perform under the “contract,”

given her testimony that all payments accepted by Melvin were made toward

an unrelated loan. Thus, Bonnie’s final two issues fail.2

In sum, our review of the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions

that the parties operated under a landlord-tenant relationship and that Bonnie

failed to establish that she partially performed under an oral rent-to-own

agreement to take the contract for the sale of the house outside the statute

of frauds.

Judgment affirmed.

---

2 Although Bonnie cites Firetree, supra, in her fourth issue, she does not
reference this decision further in her supporting argument. Thus, we need
not consider the case further. See Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81,
93 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that undeveloped claims will not be considered
on appeal).

• 13 - J-A28008-25

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/10/2026

• 14 -