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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Belogolovsky, E. v. Gitter, L.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1332 MDA 2024
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Olson

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Judith Ference Olson](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8241/judith-ference-olson/)

J-S28018-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ELENA BELOGOLOVSKY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
LEONARD GITTER : No. 1332 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 16, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County Civil Division at No(s):
18-90051

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2026

Elena Belogolovsky (“Mother”) appeals pro se from the August 16, 2024

order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Union County, making final

the court’s prior interim order which, inter alia, granted a petition to terminate

child support filed by Leonard Gitter (“Father”).1 We affirm.

“The parties are former spouses. Their marriage lasted less than one

year, and they separated when their child, A.G. (Child) (born June 2017), was

five months old.”2 Gitter v. Belogolovsky, 315 A.3d 97 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 318 A.3d 94 (Pa. 2024). “This

---

1 Consistent with Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(2) of our appellate rules, we have used the

parties’ full names in the caption because the trial court, in this custody
matter, used the parties’ full names in its caption and no one has asked that
we use only the initials of the litigants. See Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(2).

2 We note, in sympathy, that the Child passed away in March 2024. As will
be discussed infra, the current dispute concerned support retroactive from
September 1, 2022 until the date of the Child’s death.
J-S28018-25

custody and support litigation began in late 2017.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Father resides in Lakeland, Florida, while Mother resides in Lewisburg,

Pennsylvania, which has added to “this protracted litigation.” Id.

In February 2020, the parties’ settlement agreement effectively
granted Mother primary physical custody, and allowed Father
to exercise all of his partial custody in Florida. As Child neared
primary school age, [however,] both parties sought primary
physical custody. In January 2021, Father filed a modification
petition for primary custody, and, in March 2021, Mother filed
her modification petition. The trial court granted Father's
petition. On August 11, 2022, the court entered a custody
order, granting the parties shared legal custody and granting
Father primary physical custody. See Order, 8/21/22.
[Thereafter, Father filed a motion for termination of support on
August 29, 2022 and Mother filed a motion for modification of
support on September 2, 2022. Mother, however, appealed the
August 11, 2022 order, which caused the trial court to enter a
stay in the aforementioned matters.

Ultimately, on appeal,] this Court remanded to the trial court to
supplement its best interest analysis with consideration of the
Section 5337(h) child custody factors. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5337(h). We also stated that “[w]ithin [30 days] of the date
the record is remitted, the trial court shall enter a new custody
order; the trial court shall delineate its reasons for the award in
accordance with Section 5323(d).” L.J.G. v. E.B., 2023 WL
4044173 *1, *9 ([non-precedential
decision)]. Additionally, we ordered that the August 11, 2022
custody order remain in effect as a temporary order. Id.
Mother filed a petition for allowance of appeal in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied, see L.J.G. v.
E.B., 303 A.3d 704 (Pa. 2023), and she also filed an appeal in
this Court seeking recusal of the trial judge, which, by judgment
order, this Court quashed. Gitter v. Belogolovsky, 2023 WL
5321015 *1 ([non-precedential decision])
(stating: “This case having been remanded to the trial court by
way of this Court's Order and Memorandum Opinion filed June
16, 2023, and there being no merit to the argument that the
trial court should recuse, this appeal is hereby quashed so that
the matter may return to the trial court for a determination in
accordance with the June 16, 2023 remand with instructions.”).

-2-
J-S28018-25

Mother sought reconsideration, which was denied on October 2,
2023. On November 29, 2023, President Judge Hackenberg
complied with this Court's remand order, filed a supplemental
opinion, and reinstated the August 11, 2022 custody order as a
final order. Mother did not appeal this order.

Belogolovsky v. Gitter, 2024 WL 728746 *1, n.2. (Pa. Super. 2024)

(non-precedential decision).

Thereafter, following other appeals in this matter, the Union County

Domestic Relations Office conducted a support hearing on May 30, 2024,

attempting to resolve Father’s request to terminate his support obligation, as

well as Mother’s request to modify support, both of which were lodged in 2022.

Based on the conference officer’s recommendation, [the trial
court] entered an [o]rder on June 13, 2024, as follows:

1. Granting [Father’s] petition for [termination] filed
   August 31, 2022, as it had been determined that
   [Father] was awarded primary physical custody of
   [the Child] beginning on August 8, 2022, and
   [Mother] had less than 50[%] of the physical custody
   time with the minor child.

2. Terminating the [o]rder dated May 4, 2022, effective
   August 31, 2022. As support was no longer
   warranted, [Mother’s] petition for modification . . .
   [was] dismissed.

3. Remitting an overpayment in the amount of
   $24,651.73, which [Father] did not wish to pursue.

4. Refunding [Appellant] overpayments made in the
   amount of $43,987.24.

5. Marking the case terminated and ended.

On July 8, 2024, [Mother] filed a demand for a hearing de novo.
[The trial court conducted a de novo hearing on August 16,
2024. On that day, the trial court] affirmed its [June 13, 2024
order. This timely appeal followed].

-3-
J-S28018-25

Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/24, at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Mother raises the following issues for our consideration:

1. [Whether the trial court] committed an error of law and an
   abuse of discretion in failing to consider Colonna v.
   Colonna, 855 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2004) [in terminating Father’s
   support obligation?]

2. [Whether the trial court] committed an error of law and an
   abuse of discretion in failing to apply an upward deviation to
   the support order by:

i. [F]ailing to apply Rule 1910.16-5(b)(5), which
requires the trier-of-fact to consider both parties’
relative assets and liabilities when determining
whether to deviate from basic child support;

ii. [F]ailing to consider that Mother’s loans are liabilities;

iii. [F]ailing to let Mother [] present evidence and
testimony about her loans;

iv. [F]ailing to consider that Mother was unemployed
since October 2020;

v. [F]ailing to examine parties’ expense statements[;]

vi. [F]ailing to conduct a required thorough determination
of the Child’s] actual reasonable needs . . . and a
mandatory complete and independent review of the
evidence when ruling on exceptions[;]

vii. [F]ailing to consider that the August 11, 2022 order by
[the Honorable] Lori Hackenberg, which was a death
sentence for the minor child, not only imposed an
extraordinary financial burden on [] Mother, forcing
her to bear the costs of traveling to Florida to see her
only child while still covering living expenses in
Pennsylvania, but also made it impossible for her to
maintain employment due to the mandated custody
schedule. The financial burden included hotel
accommodations, airfare, luggage fees, car rentals,
gas, dining out, parking fees at Harrisburg airport,
entertainment costs for the [C]hild and more.

-4-
J-S28018-25

viii. [F]ailing to consider the evidence in this case [which]
clearly demonstrates the vastly different standards of
living between Mother and Father. Father, with an
annual income exceeding $1,630,000[.00] in 2022 and
$1,606,000[.00] in 2023, enjoyed a lavish lifestyle and
residence, while Mother was unemployed since
October 2020 and does not own a home or an
apartment.

ix. [F]ailing to consider any factors of Pa.R.C.P.
1910.16-5(b)

1. [Whether the trial court] committed an error of law and an abuse of discretion in failing to recuse[?]

Mother’s Brief at 3-4.

Mother’s first two issues challenge the trial court’s order granting

Father’s petition to terminate support and denying Mother’s petition to modify

support. We will address these claims together.

This Court previously stated:

When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse
the trial court's determination where the order cannot be
sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the
broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the
discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order.
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment;
[rather,] if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or
misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the
record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of
partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will, discretion has been
abused.

Brickus v. Dent, 5 A.3d 1281, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

Moreover, this Court

must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by
competent evidence of record, as our role does not include
making independent factual determinations. In addition, with

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J-S28018-25

regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, this
Court must defer to the trial judge who presided over the
proceedings and[,] thus[,] viewed the witnesses first hand.

When the trial court sits as fact[-]finder, the weight to be
assigned the testimony of the witnesses is within its exclusive
province, as are credibility determinations, and the court is free
to choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.
This Court is not free to usurp the trial court's duty as the finder
of fact.

Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted); see also E.R.L. v. C.K.L., 126 A.3d 1004,

1006 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“The principal goal in child support matters is to serve

the best interests of the children through the provision of reasonable

expenses.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In Colonna v. Colonna, 855 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2004), our Supreme Court

determined that, if there is a significant “disparity in the parties’ incomes,” a

parent with primary physical custody may still be obligated to provide child

support to the non-custodial parent. Id. at 651. In such a situation, our

Supreme Court held that it is “an abuse of discretion for the trial court to fail

to consider whether deviating from the support guidelines is appropriate” if

“the incomes of the parents differ significantly.” Saunders v. Saunders, 908

A.2d 356, 359 (Pa. Super. 2006), citing Colonna, 855 A.2d at 652.

In deciding whether to deviate from the amount of support
determined by the guidelines, the trier of fact shall consider:

(1) unusual needs and unusual fixed obligation;

(2) other support obligations of the parties;

(3) other income in the household;

-6-
J-S28018-25

(4) ages of the children;

(5) assets of the parties;

(6) medical expenses not covered by insurance;

(7) standard of living of the parties and their children;

---

(9) other relevant and appropriate factors, including
the best interests of the child or children.

Colonna, 855 A.2d at 652, citing Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16–5(b). The High Court

further directed,

[in cases where there is a substantial disparity in parental
income], the trial court should inquire whether the non-
custodial parent has sufficient assets to provide the children
with appropriate housing and amenities during his or her period
of partial custody. We specifically note that the term
“appropriate” does not mean equal to the environment the
children enjoy while in the custodial parent's care, nor does it
mean “merely adequate.” The determination of
appropriateness is left to the discretion of the trial court, upon
consideration of all relevant circumstances.

Id.

On appeal, Mother challenges the trial court’s decision to grant Father’s

request to terminate his support obligation, thereby denying Mother’s demand

for continued child support and an upward deviation from the Support

Guidelines. In support of her claim, Mother argues that the trial court failed

to consider the vast disparity between the parties’ income, Mother’s

unemployed status, as well as the parties’ various expense statements.

Mother also alleges that the trial court failed to conduct a thorough inquiry

into the Child’s reasonable needs. In addition, Mother argues that the trial

-7-
J-S28018-25

court erroneously considered the personal loans provided to Mother through

friends and family, which Mother claims amounted to $73,000.00, as assets,

not liabilities. We disagree.

The certified record supports the trial court’s determination. First, in

contrast to Mother’s claims, in considering whether deviation from the Support

Guidelines was appropriate, the trial court considered the factors set forth in

Rule 1910.16-5(b). See Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/24, at 9. In addition, the

trial court considered all of the evidence submitted by the parties, including

the parties’ 2022 and 2023 tax returns and income/expense statements. See

id. at 6. The trial court found that Mother’s testimony regarding her income

and expenses lacked credibility. These determinations were supported by the

record, which showed that Mother refused to answer financial inquiries and

received substantial gratuitous transfers from friends and family.

Second, the court considered whether Mother, as the non-custodial

parent, possessed “sufficient assets to provide for the [Child] with appropriate

housing and amenities during [Mother’s] periods of partial custody.” Id. at 5,

citing Colonna, 855 A.2d at 652. In so doing, the trial court explicitly

determined that Mother’s “assets” included $730,000.00 in “gifts from friends

and family” and that “deviation was not warranted because of those gifts.”

Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/24, at 6. The certified record supports the trial

court’s conclusion. Indeed, we note that Mother did not, at any point during

the August 16, 2024 hearing, contend that she was provided with $73,000.00,

rather than $730,000.00 by friends and family. Compare Mother’s Brief at

-8-
J-S28018-25

10 (asserting that the “correct amount” was $73,000.00). To the contrary, at

the de novo hearing, the hearing officer, Lemey Feese, specifically testified

that Mother previously indicated that “she was the recipient of many loans

from family and friends totaling at least $730,000[.00].” N.T. Hearing,

8/16/24, at 42. Mother did not contest Ms. Feese’s statement or provide any

evidence to the contrary. Ms. Feese also testified that, during the support

hearing, Mother “told [her] there were no repayment terms” for the money

received by Mother from her friends and family. Id. at 44. Again, Mother did

not present any evidence to the contrary. Hence, the trial court “made a

credibility determination that the approximately $730,000[.00] received by

[Mother] from friends and family without any repayment terms were gifts and

not loans.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/24, at 7. We are bound by the trial

court’s credibility determinations. See Mackay, 984 A.2d at 533 (explaining

that an appellate court must defer to the trial court’s credibility

determinations). We further note that the record and our case law supports

the trial court’s conclusion. See Suzanne D. v. Stephen W., 65 A.3d 965,

970 (2013) (holding that the trial court’s credibility determination that the

payments provided to the father were gifts had record support). Because the

evidence presented, which Mother did not provide any evidence or testimony

to dispute, supported the trial court’s decision that Mother had the ability to

provide the Child with appropriate assets and amenities, we discern no abuse

of discretion. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 884 A.2d 301, 307 (Pa. Super. 2005)

-9-
J-S28018-25

(holding that a gift may be considered as a reason for deviating from the child

support guidelines).

Finally, we note that, in contrast to Mother’s claims, the trial court

correctly determined that an upward deviation from the Support Guidelines

was not supported by the evidence presented during the August 16, 2024 de

novo hearing. Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/24, at 9. While Mother questioned

Father regarding his standard of living, Mother refused to provide any

evidence or testimony regarding her own living standard or financial situation.

See N.T. Hearing, 8/16/24, at 60-61 (Mother: refusing to answer questions

regarding her savings accounts); id. at 63 (Mother: refusing to answer

questions regarding a stock sale; id. at 74 (Mother: refusing to answer

whether she moved to Israel). It is apparent, therefore, that Mother would

like the trial court, as well as this Court, to “simply grant [her, as the]

non-custodial parent[,] child support [because] there is[, in her

unsubstantiated view,] a significant disparity in income.” Saunders, 908

A.2d at 362. This is contrary to our case law. See id.; see also Colonna,

855 A.2d at 652 (holding that “a parent with primary custody may be ordered

to pay child support to a parent with partial custody” but the court must

consider “all relevant circumstances” in making such a determination)

(emphasis added). Because Mother failed to provide any evidentiary support

for her position and because the trial court’s determination bears record

support, we discern no abuse of discretion in its decision to terminate Father’s

• 10 - J-S28018-25

support obligation and, in turn, deny Mother’s request for modification of

support.

We turn to Mother’s final appellate claim, in which she alleges the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itself. This claim is waived

because Mother failed to raise a timely objection before the trial court.

Bowman v. Rand Spear & Assocs., P.C., 234 A.3d 848, 862 (Pa. Super.

2020) (“A party seeking recusal must assert specific grounds in support of the

recusal motion before the trial judge has issued a ruling on the substantive

matter before him or her.”). Instead, Mother first raised this issue in a motion

for reconsideration, filed on September 13, 2024, after the relevant hearing.

Because this claim is waived, we will not consider the merits thereof. See

Commonwealth v. Rominger, 199 A.3d 964, 976-977 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(holding that a defendant who raised the issue of recusal in a post-sentence

motion waived his claim).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/10/2026

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