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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Brown, I.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 488 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Panella

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Jack A. Panella](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8243/jack-a-panella/)

J-S01024-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ISAIAH J. BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 488 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 4, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000762-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: March 10, 2026

Isaiah J. Brown appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the

Erie County Court of Common Pleas on March 4, 2025, after a jury found him

guilty of robbery and related charges. On appeal, Brown claims the trial court

erred by allowing the Commonwealth to exercise a peremptory strike in

violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After careful review,

we find Brown’s claim is waived and otherwise without merit. We therefore

affirm Brown’s judgment of sentence.

As Brown only challenges the voir dire portion of his trial, the underlying

facts supporting his conviction are not germane to this appeal. Briefly, on May

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• Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S01024-26

23, 2024, Brown was charged with multiple offenses related to a robbery

which occurred on December 4, 2023 at a Citizens Bank.

On January 9, 2024, following a trial, a jury found Brown guilty of

Robbery−Threat of Immediate Serious Injury, Robbery−Demanding Money

from a Financial Institution, Theft by Unlawful Taking−Movable Property,

Receiving Stolen Property, and Possessing Instruments of a Crime.1 On March

4, 2025, the trial court sentenced Brown to an aggregate term of 48 to 96

months’ incarceration. Brown filed a post-sentence motion for a new trial

based on a weight of the evidence claim, and the improper handling of a

Batson challenge. Following consideration of the Commonwealth’s response,

the trial court denied the post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed.

In his sole claim raised on appeal, Brown argues the trial court erred by

finding the Commonwealth presented a race-neutral explanation for striking a

venire person and denying his Batson challenge. Specifically, Brown argues

the trial court did not follow the proper procedure for a Batson challenge, and

in any event the court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to strike a Korean-

American venire person, one of only three persons of color represented in the

jury panel.

Initially, we note a Batson claim presents mixed questions of law and

fact. Therefore, our standard of review is whether the trial court’s legal

---

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3925(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).

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J-S01024-26

conclusions are correct and whether its factual findings are supported by the

record or clearly erroneous.

In Batson, the [Supreme Court of the United States] held that a
prosecutor’s challenge to potential jurors solely on the basis of
race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. When a defendant makes a Batson challenge during
jury selection:

First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that
the circumstances give rise to an inference that the
prosecutor struck one or more prospective jurors on account
of race; second, if the prima facie showing is made, the
burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral
explanation for striking the juror(s) at issue; and third, the
trial court must then make the ultimate determination of
whether the defense has carried its burden of proving
purposeful discrimination.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 177 A.3d 963, 971 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). “The trial court should consider the totality of

circumstances when determining whether the prosecutor acted with

discriminatory intent or engaged in purposeful discrimination.”

Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 602 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

This Court must give great deference to the trial court’s finding about the

absence of discriminatory intent in peremptory challenges, and we will not

overturn it unless it is clearly erroneous. See id.

Further, with respect to the preservation of Batson claims, our Supreme

Court has stated an appellant must raise a Batson objection during voir dire

in order to “preserve a challenge to the Commonwealth’s use of peremptory

strikes.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 894 (Pa. 2011). Where

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“defense counsel did not raise or preserve any claim of racial discrimination in

jury selection with a contemporaneous Batson objection at trial, we have

repeatedly held that the Batson framework does not apply.” Commonwealth

v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 287 (Pa. 2011).

Here, the record reveals that the parties waived the presence of the

judge and the court reporter during the jury selection process. Accordingly,

we cannot confirm whether Brown raised a Batson objection during the jury

selection process. However, the trial court, along with both parties, all cite to,

and rely on, a discussion that occurred seemingly contemporaneous with voir

dire regarding the striking of the at-issue venire person. According to the

Commonwealth, in its response to Brown’s post-sentence motion, arguments

about voir dire were heard outside of the presence of the venire in Judge

Mead’s chambers with a court stenographer present. See Commonwealth’s

Response to Motion for Post-Sentence Relief, 3/26/25, at ¶ 11. Despite this

contention, no such transcript appears in the certified record. 2 We note, “[i]t

is the responsibility of an appellant to ensure that the record certified on

appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary

for the reviewing court to perform its duty.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65

A.3d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

---

2 Further, our informal efforts to secure the transcript were unsuccessful as it

appears no transcript of this “argument” was filed with the clerk of courts.

-4-
J-S01024-26

Even if we were to rely on the parts of the in-chambers argument that

the parties cite to, as the discussion appears to be undisputed, these citations

only prove that the Commonwealth, immediately prior to exercising

peremptory challenges, indicated that it was attempting to strike a person

who the Commonwealth noted, on its own accord, was Korean-American. See

Trial Court Opinion, at 2. The Commonwealth stated it was going to challenge

her and wanted to explain its reasoning, namely, because it found her maturity

to be questionable based on her lack of eye-contact and the amount of

personal items she brought up with her during questioning. See id.

The trial court noted it found that reason was proper. See id. In

response, defense counsel stated the venire person was rehabilitated and

there was no reason to strike her. See id. at 1-2. Notably, defense counsel

did not mention race at all. Therefore, there is no indication that defense

counsel raised a Batson challenge. Accordingly, Brown has waived his Batson

claim for both his failure to include the relevant transcript in order for us to

conduct our review, and because there is no record indication that Brown even

raised a Batson claim.

We note, even if not waived, this claim appears to lack merit. In the

totality of the circumstances, we discern no legal or factual error. Again, even

if we were to rely on the citations provided by the parties and the trial court

to the argument that occurred in the judge’s chambers, it is clear the

Commonwealth provided a race-neutral explanation, and the trial court found

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J-S01024-26

Brown failed to carry his burden of proving a Batson claim. See Trial Court

Opinion, 6/23/25, at 1-3; see also Edwards, 177 A.3d at 971; Towles, 106

A.3d at 602. Therefore, even if not waived, Brown’s issue would not merit

relief.

As we find Brown’s sole claim raised on appeal is waived and otherwise

without merit, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 03/10/2026

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