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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Rainier, H.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 982 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Murray

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (341)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Murray

J-S45018-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
HAROLD HAKEEM RAINIER : No. 982 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered June 27, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-41-CR-0001342-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2026

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania files this interlocutory appeal from

the trial court’s order granting Harold Hakeem Rainier’s (Rainier) motion to

suppress evidence (Suppression Motion),1 which he filed after the

Commonwealth charged him with one count of possession with intent to

deliver a controlled substance (PWID).2 The Commonwealth claims the

suppression court erred in determining that law enforcement lacked

---

• Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Commonwealth complied with Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), as it “certifie[d] in the

notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the
prosecution.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Petty, 157 A.3d 953, 954
n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing Rule 311(d) and stating, “[t]he Commonwealth
may appeal an interlocutory order suppressing evidence when it provides a
certification with its notice of appeal that the order terminates or substantially
handicaps the prosecution.”).

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
J-S45018-25

reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful investigative detention of Rainier.

Because we conclude law enforcement possessed the requisite reasonable

suspicion under the totality of the circumstances, we reverse the order of the

suppression court and remand for further proceedings.

At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented three

witnesses:3 two Lycoming County Narcotics Enforcement Unit (LCNEU)

Detectives, and one confidential informant (CI-1), who cooperated with

LCNEU. The suppression court summarized the evidence presented at the

hearing in its opinion and order granting suppression:

[LCNEU] Detective Robert Anderson ([Detective] Anderson)
testified that he was part of a [joint] narcotics investigation of [a
residence located on Second Street in] Williamsport, Lycoming
County [(“the residence”),4 which also involved officers from the
Williamsport Bureau of Police (WBP)]. Five separate [controlled]
buys for methamphetamine and crack cocaine, and two attempted

---

3 Rainier, who was represented by retained counsel, presented no witnesses

at either the suppression hearing or his preliminary hearing. However, at the
suppression hearing, Rainier successfully moved for admission of the
transcript of the preliminary hearing, held on October 17, 2023, before
Lycoming County Magisterial District Judge Christian Frey. See N.T., 9/17/24,
at 37-39, Defense Ex. 2; see also Commonwealth Brief Appx. E (preliminary
hearing transcript). At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Judge Frey
found that the Commonwealth had presented a prima facie case for PWID,
and bound the charge over for court. See N.T., 10/17/23, at 11.

4 The suppression court found that the residence is a “known drug house” to

law enforcement and located in a “a high drug area[.]” Opinion and Order,
6/27/25, at 1.

-2-
J-S45018-25

buys of crack cocaine, occurred at [the residence] between
February 2023 and October 4, 2023.5

On October 5, [2023, Detective] Anderson was present in
the area [of the residence, while conducting surveillance,] with …
[a different confidential informant, CI-2.6 LCNEU Detective] Sarah
Edkin [(Detective Edkin)7] was in the area [of the residence] with
[CI-1]. [Law enforcement was] going to attempt another
controlled buy [of narcotics from the residence on that date.
Detective Anderson testified that other LCNEU officers surveilling
the residence observed a] dark grey Kia Forte [drive up] to the
residence, and a tall, skinny, black male with dreads exited the
vehicle and entered the residence. Five or six minutes later, the
black male exited the residence, and re-entered the Kia. [CI-1
observed this individual from her vantage point and informed
Detective Edkin that the individual] was probably “Keem.” “Keem”
was described [by CI-1, who informed law enforcement that]
“Keem” would supply [the residence] with drugs.8

[LCNEU Detective Tyson Havens (Detective Havens) also
testified at the suppression hearing. Detective Havens stated that
while he was conducting surveillance of the residence on October

---

5 The record is limited and does not reveal the identities of the confidential

informants who conducted these controlled buys/attempted buys, or the
seller(s) of the narcotics. See, e.g., N.T. (suppression hearing), 9/17/24, at
4 (Detective Anderson detailing the controlled buys at the residence, albeit
very briefly). Further, although the suppression court, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion (Rule 1925(a) Opinion), found that “none of the controlled buys
involved Rainier,” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/25/25, at 4, this finding is not
supported by the record. There is no evidence that excluded Rainier as a
potential perpetrator; rather, the record is silent on this point.

6 CI-2 did not testify at the suppression hearing.

7 Detective Edkin did not testify at the suppression hearing; however, she
previously testified at Rainier’s preliminary hearing. See N.T., 10/17/23, at
7-9.

8 As discussed infra, CI-1 testified at the suppression hearing that although

she did not see Rainier sell narcotics at the residence on October 5, 2023, she
saw Rainier sell narcotics “[t]he day before and many others.” N.T., 9/17/24,
at 17; see also id. at 14-15.

-3-
J-S45018-25

5, 2023, he] observed the black male[, who had arrived at the
residence in the grey Kia,] exit the residence [after a brief period.
Detective Havens recognized the individual as Rainier from prior
encounters, radioed Detective] Anderson[, and stated] that [the
individual] was Rainier. [Detective] Anderson looked up Rainier
[on his police computer] and discovered that Hakeem is [Rainier’s]
middle name.

Believing that Rainier was “Keem,” the drug supplier,
[Detective Havens] followed the Kia to Maynard Street, [observed
it] enter Burger King, go through the drive-thru, exit Burger King,
and proceed north on Maynard Street, where [WBP Officer Tyson]
Minier [(Officer Minier)]9 stopped the vehicle.10 [Detective]
Anderson [subsequently] obtained a warrant to search the vehicle
and found [one ounce] of methamphetamine in a black zipper bag.
[Detective] Anderson sent the suspected methamphetamine to
the lab. [At the suppression hearing, Detective] Anderson
identified [] Rainier in the courtroom.

On cross-examination, [Detective] Anderson admitted that
no information was relayed [to law enforcement] that[, on October
5, 2023,] Rainier was seen taking drugs into the residence,
conducting a drug transaction, or leaving the [residence] with
drugs.11 [Detective Anderson testified there] were no
[confidential informants] inside the residence while Rainier was
inside it [on October 5, 2023]. Although [Detective Anderson]
had no contact with anyone inside the residence while Rainier was

---

9 Officer Minier did not testify at either the suppression hearing or preliminary

hearing.

10 It is undisputed that the traffic stop was not based upon law enforcement’s

observation of any Motor Vehicle Code infraction. See, e.g., N.T. (preliminary
hearing), 10/17/23, at 5; Opinion and Order, 6/27/25, at 6 (“There was no
testimony about the reason for the stop, or any observed motor vehicle
violation to justify the stop.”). Additionally, the suppression court explained
that during the traffic stop, “Rainier admitted to the officers that he had a
racquetball[-]sized amount of methamphetamine in a small bag in the
vehicle.” Opinion and Order, 6/27/25, at 1.

11 Detective Anderson confirmed that, on October 5, 2023, “nobody
witnessed” Rainier engage in “any criminal activity whatsoever[.]” N.T.,
9/17/24, at 9; see also id. at 28 (Detective Havens confirming same).

-4-
J-S45018-25

inside, [Detective Anderson noted that CI-1] identified Rainier as
“Keem” [to Detective Edkin] as [Rainier] went into the residence.
[Detective Edkin] relayed that information to … [Detective]
Anderson.

Opinion and Order, 6/27/25, at 2-3 (footnotes and some paragraph breaks

added; some punctuation and quotation marks modified).

The suppression court also summarized CI-1’s suppression hearing

testimony:

[CI-1] testified that she was assisting the LCNEU. On October 5,
2023[, CI-1] worked with Det[ective] Edkin. [CI-1 testified, on
that date, she] was at Belle’s house12 [(i.e., the residence). CI-
1] was getting high and had [previously] been [at the residence]
several times to get high. [According to CI-1,] “Keem” came to
the [residence] several times. [CI-1] pointed to Rainier [in the
courtroom] as “Keem[.” CI-1] knew [Keem] to supply the
[residence] with crack. On October 4, 2023[, CI-1] saw “Keem”
inside [the] residence and deliver drugs.

[CI-1 testified that o]n October 5, [2023, CI-2, who was
with Detective Anderson on that date,] came to rescue [CI-1] from
the [residence].13 [CI-1] saw “Keem” enter [the residence],

---

12 It is undisputed that “Belle” is Cameron Belle (Belle), the owner of the
residence and Rainier’s father-in-law. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/25/25, at 9
n.4. Law enforcement did not become aware of Rainier’s relationship to Belle
until after the traffic stop of Rainier’s vehicle. N.T., 9/17/24, at 10.

13 As the suppression court explained,

[o]n October 5, [2023,] … [CI-2] was with Detective Anderson.
[From his vantage point,] Detective Anderson could not see the
[black male who arrived in the grey Kia] entering and exiting the
residence. Since [CI-2] was with Detective Anderson, [CI-2] also
would not have seen the individual entering and exiting the
residence. [CI-2] was dating … [CI-1], and was concerned that
[CI-1] was involved in drugs in the [residence].

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-5-
J-S45018-25

pointed to him, and said that’s the guy who delivers drug[s], but
[CI-1] did not see “Keem” leave the residence. Keem [was
carrying] a book bag when he entered the residence[; CI-1]
immediately relayed that information to [Detective] Edkin.

On cross[-examination, CI-1] testified that she did not see
[Rainier] bring drugs in or out of the [residence on October 5,
2023]. [CI-1] had no conversation about drugs or any
transactions that day.

On re-direct, [CI-1] testified that she saw Rainier deliver
drugs [at the residence] the day before (Oct[ober] 4). [CI-1] said
that Rainier would meet Belle in the kitchen [of the residence].
[When purchasing narcotics, CI-1] would go [to the residence]
and wait for Rainier. Belle would [inform CI-1 that Rainier is] on
his way. [According to CI-1, t]here were many people [at the
residence] waiting for drugs, but not on this day (October 5).

Id. at 3-4 (footnotes and some paragraph breaks added; some punctuation

modified).

Finally, the suppression court expounded upon Detective Havens’s

suppression hearing testimony:

[Detective Havens] testified that [while he was surveilling the
residence on October 5, 2023,] he saw the Kia arrive and observed
a black male exit the Kia and enter [the] residence. A short time
later, [approximately] a minute or two, [Detective] Havens
observed a [black] male exit the residence. When [this individual]
exited, [Detective] Havens [was able to view his face and] realized
then [that] the black male was Rainier[, with whom Detective

---

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/25/25, at 3 (internal citations and paragraph break
omitted). The suppression court ruled that because CI-2 “did not testify at
the [suppression] hearing,” the court “ultimately did not consider Detective
Anderson’s testimony about what … [CI-2] told him because [CI-2’s
statements were] hearsay.” Id.; see also N.T., 9/17/24, at 5 (Rainier’s
hearsay objection regarding CI-2’s purported statements).

-6-
J-S45018-25

Havens was acquainted]….14 [Detective] Havens testified that he
transmitted [information about] who he observed over [police]
radio[. Upon receiving this information, Detective] Anderson
[entered] Rainier[’s name into his vehicle’s police computer] ….
[Detective] Havens testified that [Detective] Anderson saw [on his
police computer] that Rainier’s middle name was Hakeem.

[When the Kia drove away from the residence, Detective]
Havens [] followed the Kia … south to Burger King. [Detective]
Havens said that [law enforcement’s] plan was to have a [WBP]
officer, [i.e., Officer] Minier, stop the vehicle when it left Burger
King. [Officer] Minier stopped the vehicle at the intersection of
Maynard Street and First Street. [Detective] Havens arrived to
the location of the stop and assisted [Officer] Minier with stop.
[Detective] Havens said that there was only one person in [the]
vehicle. ….

[Detective Havens] did say that the driver of the vehicle was
the person that he saw both enter and exit the [residence].
[Detective Havens testified that when he observed Rainier exit the
residence, Rainier had] in his possession a black [“]cross draw
bag.[”15 N.T., 9/17/24, at 22.]

[During the traffic stop,] Rainier identified himself to law
enforcement. [Detective Havens stated] Rainier did not reside at
the [residence], but [Detective] Havens didn’t recall where Rainier
said he lived. Rainier was asked to step out of [the] vehicle and
remove the cross draw bag for officer safety. Rainier laid his bag

---

14 Detective Havens further testified that Rainier “came and went [from the

residence] over a short period of time, which is consistent with a drug delivery
and/or purchase,” i.e., based on Detective Havens’s police training and
experience. N.T., 9/17/24, at 30; see also N.T., 10/17/23, at 7 (Detective
Havens confirming at the preliminary hearing that the brief period of time in
which Rainier was inside the residence “add[ed] to [Detective Havens’s]
suspicion[.]”).

15 The black bag is relevant to this appeal. At Rainier’s preliminary hearing,
Detective Havens described the bag as a “fanny pack” that was “worn cross
draw,” i.e., “worn across the shoulder.” N.T., 10/17/23, at 3 (capitalization
and punctuation modified). Detective Havens confirmed that, in his police
experience, and that of his fellow LCNEU officers, “recently [], it’s a new thing”
for criminals to use “fanny packs … to store guns and drugs[.]” Id.

-7-
J-S45018-25

on the driver’s seat. [Detective] Havens estimated that the stop
lasted about 14 minutes. Toward end of the stop, Rainier
admitted he had drugs in his bag and that he obtained them inside
[the residence]. [Detective] Havens said that Rainier claimed he
was being a good Samaritan by taking the drugs to try to clean
up the [residence]. ….

On cross-examination, [Detective] Havens stated he was
not sure how long he had been surveilling [the residence on
October 5, 2023]. He estimated that it was … probably about 10-
15 minutes. [Detective] Havens acknowledged that he testified
at the preliminary hearing that … [during his surveillance,] he saw
[two males] go in [the] residence and [stated] that they are
known [to law enforcement as] drug dealers.16 Rainier had the
cross draw bag on when he went both into and out of the
residence.

[Detective] Havens [conceded that he] did not see anything
that happened inside [the] residence [on October 5, 2023].
[Detective] Havens testified that [law enforcement] had quite a
bit of information about [drug activity at] the residence, but not
on that particular da[te] and time. The information law
enforcement had was that [the residence] was a drug house.17 …
[Detective Havens] also felt [that law enforcement] had a lot of

---

16 See N.T., 10/17/23, at 2-3, 5 (Detective Havens’s preliminary hearing
testimony regarding his observation of two individuals, who were known to
law enforcement, entering and exiting the residence on October 5, 2023); see
also N.T., 9/17/24, at 27 (Detective Havens confirming at the suppression
hearing that these two individuals were “known drug dealers[.]”).

17 Detective Havens elaborated that law enforcement was “inundated with
information about [the residence] being a drug house. We get tip after tip
after tip and informant after informant after informant that tells us this house
is a problem.” N.T., 9/17/24, at 30. Moreover, at Rainier’s preliminary
hearing, Detective Havens testified that law enforcement “may have 1
conviction” associated with the residence, and “served at least 1 search
warrant and we ma[de] 3 arrests at the [residence] so far.” N.T., 10/17/23,
at 2.

-8-
J-S45018-25

information about Keem selling [narcotics at the] residence.18
[Detective] Havens acknowledged that a lot of people go by [the]
name “Keem” …. [Detective] Havens said that he saw Rainier’s
face and knew who he was.

[Detective Havens testified that law enforcement] also had
[communications with] a [confidential informant] who [was]
dating [CI-1, i.e., CI-2], and [explained that CI-2 was] worried
about [CI-1] doing drugs[. Detective Havens testified law
enforcement] sent [CI-2 into the residence to] get [CI-1] out of
the [residence]. [Detective Havens testified that, on October 5,
2023, CI-1] identified Rainier as “Keem”. [According to Detective
Havens, law enforcement] knew about the drug transactions [at
the residence that occurred on October 4, 2023. Detective]
Havens did not remember if he was present on October 4 when
the transactions happened or if there was any surveillance [of the]
residence on that day. [Detective Havens testified that no
controlled] buy was planned for …October 5[, 2023]. [Finally,
Detective] Havens believed that Rainier told him [during] the
traffic stop that [] Belle was his father-in-law.

Opinion and Order, 6/27/25, at 3-5 (footnotes and some paragraph breaks

added; some punctuation modified).

Following Rainier’s arrest on October 5, 2023, the Commonwealth

charged him with one count of PWID. On April 5, 2024, Rainier filed his

Suppression Motion. Rainier asserted that “the initial traffic stop of the vehicle

and interrogation of [Rainier] were illegal and done in violation of [his] rights

under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Suppression Motion, 4/5/24,

---

18 Detective Havens testified, “I had plenty of information about a guy named

Keem, who was selling drugs to th[e] residence, who matched the description
of [] Rainier who I [] identified as Keem and then realized [that Rainier’s]
middle name is Hakeem.” N.T., 9/17/24, at 29.

-9-
J-S45018-25

¶ 5.19 Rainier sought suppression of “all evidence and fruits of such evidence

that were gained as a result of the illegal search of [Rainier].” Id. (prayer for

relief).20

Rainier’s suppression hearing occurred on September 17, 2024.

Detective Anderson, Detective Havens (collectively, “the Detectives”), and CI-

1 testified as the only witnesses. Following the conclusion of evidence, the

suppression court considered argument from the parties. See N.T., 9/17/24,

at 39-43. Rainier argued, in relevant part, that

[t]he testimony [of the Detectives] was they didn’t see [Rainier]
engage in any … criminal activity while he was [at the residence
on October 5, 2023, or] any criminal activity as he left. The only
identification [that the Detectives offered] was from a [CI-1]
saying that it was Keem, but nothing from that day[, i.e., October
5, 2023]. So we have … no facts that [Rainier] did anything wrong
on that day whatsoever other than he showed up at [the]
residence and left [the] residence and that is it.

---

So [although the Detectives] had information allegedly that [the
residence] was being used by Rainier] to supply drugs, [] they
couldn’t give us any evidence of when the last time that would
have been.

Id. at 39; see also id. at 40 (Rainier arguing that although CI-1 testified she

saw Rainier sell narcotics at the residence “the day before” October 5, 2023,

---

19 The Suppression Motion did not expressly claim law enforcement lacked
reasonable suspicion to lawfully stop Rainier’s vehicle. See generally
Suppression Motion, 4/5/24.

20 The Commonwealth filed no written response to the Suppression Motion.

• 10 - J-S45018-25

“[n]obody else testified to the day before.”), and id. at 41 (Rainier asserting

law enforcement “didn’t corroborate [that] anything happened [at the

residence] the day before.”).

In its argument at the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth

countered that Rainier

is arguing for much higher standards [of proof]. The standard is
a reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring or has occurred[.
Law enforcement was] allowed to stop [Rainier’s vehicle]. ….
[Law enforcement was not] just stopping any individual that was
going in and out of the [residence]. What they were looking for
was the individual that was supplying drugs to [the residence].

Id. at 42-43. The suppression court took the matter under advisement.

On June 27, 2025, the suppression court filed its opinion and order

granting suppression, concluding that “[t]he stop of Rainer’s vehicle was not

supported by reasonable suspicion and was unlawful.” Opinion and Order,

6/27/25, at 9. The court found that

based on [CI-1’s] statement that Rainier had brought drugs to the
[residence] in the past, the members of the LCNEU thought that
Rainier was bringing drugs to the residence[,] but no testimony
was presented to establish what [Rainier] was doing at [the
residence] on October 5[, 2023]. It does not appear that [Officer]
Minier had the required reasonable suspicion to stop Rainier.
There was no testimony presented that Rainier was operating the
vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. It is clear that the
sole purpose for the stop of Rainier’s vehicle was to investigate
him for possible drug activity.

Id. at 7 (formatting and some capitalization modified). The suppression court

further found that “[a]lthough [CI-1] testified that Rainier supplied the

[residence] with drugs on October 4[, 2023], no evidence was presented

• 11 - J-S45018-25

regarding the reliability of [CI-1]. In fact, [CI-1] admitted that she was

getting high at the residence” on October 5, 2023. Id.; see also id. (pointing

out that no evidence was presented that CI-1 “was involved in any of the

successful controlled buys” that occurred at the residence between February

and October of 2023, or the exact dates on which those buys took place).

On July 14, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal that

included its Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) certification. The Commonwealth subsequently

filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal.

The suppression court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 25,

1. Therein, the court concluded that law enforcement lacked reasonable

suspicion to conduct an investigative detention of Rainier, where they “only

had a hunch that Rainier was in possession of drugs [on October 5, 2023,]

and that hunch was the only basis for stopping Rainier’s vehicle.” Rule

1925(a) Opinion, 8/25/25, at 9. The suppression court found reasonable

suspicion was lacking where

[t]he only non-hearsay testimony21 about Rainier allegedly being
involved in criminal activity [derived from] the testimony of [CI-
1], which was not credible/reliable. [CI-1] was a rogue
[confidential informant], who was high [on narcotics] at the time
she gave information to Detective Edkin [on October 5, 2023].
See N.T., []9/17/24, at 13. [CI-1] was not at the residence on

---

21 We reiterate the suppression court’s ruling that any testimony regarding
what CI-2 may have said to law enforcement on October 5, 2023, was
inadmissible as hearsay, as CI-2 did not testify at the suppression hearing.
Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/25/25, at 3-4.

• 12 - J-S45018-25

October 4 and October 5[, 2023,] as a [confidential informant];
she was there getting high. [CI-1] would have said anything to
redeem herself as a [confidential informant]. There also was no
testimony that [CI-1] was involved in any of the successful
controlled buys [that previously occurred at the residence,] or
when any of the successful controlled buys occurred. If
[Detective] Anderson could not recall the specific dates of the
controlled buys, the Commonwealth could easily have refreshed
Detective Anderson’s recollection with his [police] reports related
to the buys. Due to this lack of evidence and the fact that [CI-1]
was a rogue [confidential informant] who was high on drugs, the
Commonwealth failed to establish the reliability/credibility of [CI-
1].

Id. at 4 (paragraph break omitted; footnote added); see also id. at 7 (opining

that “[u]sing drugs can affect an individual’s ability to accurately perceive

individuals and events.”).

According to the suppression court, “the Commonwealth is ignoring the

fact that this case is not about the residence but the alleged criminal activity

of Rainier.” Id. at 7. The suppression court further maintains it

never said that reasonable suspicion had to be based on the
personal observations of the officer conducting the [traffic] stop.
…. The court [did] stat[e] that there had to be evidence of
observations of criminal or suspicious activity on the date in
question (October 5[, 2023]) for [law enforcement] to reasonably
believe that criminal activity was afoot. The court found that
there were no observations of criminal or suspicious activity on
the date in question. Both [of the D]etectives testified that they
did not see [Rainier engage in] any criminal activity on the date
in question.

Id. at 4-5 (paragraph break omitted); see also id. at 5 (“Even [CI-1] did not

see Rainier engage in criminal activity on” October 5, 2023).

Finally, according to the suppression court, “[t]here also was no

evidence that Rainier was engaging in furtive movements” while law

• 13 - J-S45018-25

enforcement observed him outside of the residence, “clutching the black cross

draw bag [un]usually tightly, looking around like his head was on a swivel[,]

or anything of that nature when he entered or exited [the] residence.” Id. at

8-9 (footnote omitted).

On appeal, the Commonwealth presents a single issue for review:

Whether the [suppression] court abused its discretion and erred
as a matter of law in determining that there was a lack of
reasonable suspicion to support the stop of [Rainier’s] vehicle.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.22

We are mindful of our standard of review:

We review the grant of a suppression motion to determine
whether the record supports the [suppression] court’s factual
findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are correct. We defer to the suppression court’s factual findings
if they are supported by the record. We, however, give no such
deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions and,
instead, review them de novo.

Commonwealth v. Seeney, 316 A.3d 645, 648 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). “Our scope of review of suppression

rulings includes only the suppression hearing record[.]” Commonwealth v.

Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (citation and footnote omitted).

Where, as here, “the defendant prevailed in the suppression court, we may

consider only the evidence of the defense and so much of the evidence for the

Commonwealth as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the

---

22 Rainier did not file an appellee’s brief or any form of response.

• 14 - J-S45018-25

record as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Tillery, 249 A.3d 278, 281 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (citation and brackets omitted).

It is well settled that appellate courts “are highly deferential to the

suppression court’s factual findings and credibility determination[s].”

Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(en banc). “The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the

evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Byrd,

185 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

“Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the

Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,23 that

the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s

rights.” Seeney, 316 A.3d at 648-49 (citation omitted; footnote added); see

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H) (same). “The Commonwealth satisfies its

preponderance of the evidence burden if it proves to the satisfaction of the

suppression court that the evidence was properly seized.” Commonwealth

v. Fulton, 345 A.3d 352, 360-61 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation, quotation

marks, and brackets omitted). Further, our Supreme Court has explained that

“[t]he Commonwealth may sustain its threshold preponderance burden by

---

23 As this Court has stated, “[t]he preponderance of the evidence is the lowest

burden of proof in the administration of justice, and it is defined as the greater
weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly in one’s favor.”
Commonwealth v. Easter, 331 A.3d 675, 680 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).

• 15 - J-S45018-25

means of circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 340 A.3d

297, 309 (Pa. 2025).

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and

seizures.” Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 279 A.3d 508, 515 (Pa.

2022). “Jurisprudence arising under both charters has led to the development

of three categories of interactions between citizens and police,” including an

investigative detention,24 which “permits the temporary detention of an

individual if supported by reasonable suspicion.” Commonwealth v. Lyles,

97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

It is well settled that

a police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an
investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual
is engaging in criminal conduct. This standard, less stringent than
probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion.

Commonwealth v. Metz, 332 A.3d 92, 98 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation and

brackets omitted). To establish reasonable suspicion in support of an

investigative detention, “a police officer must be able to point to specific and

articulable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot.”

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011); see also

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)

---

24 In the instant appeal, it is undisputed that the traffic stop of Rainier’s vehicle

constituted an investigative detention of Rainier. See, e.g., Opinion and
Order, 6/27/25, at 6; Commonwealth Brief at 24.

• 16 - J-S45018-25

(stating that a police officer may stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes

where the officer reasonably suspects that criminal activity is afoot).

“Reasonable suspicion is dependent on both the quantity and quality of

the information police possess prior to detaining an individual.”

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en

banc). This Court has stated that

certainty about individual factors has never been a prerequisite
for reasonable suspicion. It is []settled that to justify their
decision to stop and briefly detain an individual, the police
need not establish their suspicions to a level of certainty, a
preponderance, or even a fair probability.

Id. at 1251 (emphasis added; citation, quotation marks, and brackets

omitted); see also id. at 1249-50 (“The reasonable suspicion inquiry falls

considerably short of 51% accuracy, for… to be reasonable is not to be

perfect.” (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted)).

However, law enforcement “must be able to articulate something more than

an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Commonwealth v.

Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 768-69 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).

See also In re J.V., 762 A.2d 376, 380 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“In order to assess

whether [] reasonable [suspicion] existed, consideration is given to the

specific reasonable inferences which the officer can draw from the facts in the

light of his experience[,] but no consideration is given to his unparticularized

suspicions or hunches.” (citation omitted)).

• 17 - J-S45018-25

The inquiry into whether reasonable suspicion exists “is an objective

one, namely, whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the

intrusion warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action

taken was appropriate.” Commonwealth v. Haines, 166 A.3d 449, 457 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Importantly, this Court has stated that

[i]n order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable
suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be
considered. In making this determination, we must give due
weight to the specific reasonable inferences the police officer is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the
totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when
taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
officer.

Commonwealth v. Stilo, 138 A.3d 33, 39 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted; emphasis added).

Our Supreme Court has explained that “a proper reasonable suspicion

analysis considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop and

affords due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from

the facts in light of the officer’s experience.” Commonwealth v. Lewis,

343 A.3d 1016, 1029 (Pa. 2025) (emphasis added; citation, brackets, and

quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d

667, 671 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“Reasonable suspicion … must be assessed based

upon the totality of the circumstances[,] viewed through the eyes of a trained

police officer” (citation and ellipses omitted)).

• 18 - J-S45018-25

In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, courts should consider

factors such as, inter alia, “tips, the reliability of the informants, time, location,

and suspicious activity.” Haines, 166 A.3d at 457 (citations and quotation

marks omitted). Regarding the location of suspected criminal activity, our

Supreme Court has held that although an individual’s “mere presence in a

high-crime area” is alone insufficient to authorize an investigative detention,

“the fact that [a] stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’” is a relevant factor to

consider “in assessing the totality of the circumstances” regarding the

existence or absence of reasonable suspicion. In the Int. of D.M., 781 A.2d

1161, 1164 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124

(2000)); see also Lewis, 343 A.3d at 1030 (reiterating that “a suppression

court may properly consider [whether an area is high in crime] among the

totality of the circumstances when assessing whether reasonable suspicion

existed at the time of a stop[,]” and explaining that “officers are not required

to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the

circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”

(quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124)).

Regarding the appropriate weight to be assigned to an informant’s tip

to law enforcement, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “[i]f a

tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required

to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the

tip were more reliable.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1990).

• 19 - J-S45018-25

Moreover, a report of criminal activity made to a police officer in person “must

be given more weight than a mere anonymous phone call.” Commonwealth

v. Williams, 980 A.2d 667, 672 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that an in-person

report both provides an officer the opportunity to observe the tipster’s

demeanor and assess their credibility, and subjects the tipster to criminal

liability if they knowingly provide false information).

Instantly, the Commonwealth argues the suppression court erred as a

matter of law in granting Rainier’s Suppression Motion, and

should have found that there was the requisite reasonable
suspicion to support the stop of [Rainier’s] vehicle …. In failing to
correctly apply and interpret the totality of the circumstances test,
the [suppression] court [] also erred in applying a stricter
standard more akin to probable cause than reasonable suspicion
in reaching its decision.

Commonwealth Brief at 38 (paragraph break omitted); see also id. at 20

(asserting the suppression court “did not cite any of the facts from [Rainier’s]

preliminary hearing transcript,” which was admitted into evidence at the

suppression hearing). The Commonwealth contends it

presented several pieces of specific evidence, including the
identification of the residence as a known drug house, the
recognition of [Rainier] by both [CI-1] and [the D]etectives, the
[brief] amount of time that [Rainier] was in the residence, the
presence of known drug dealers at the residence [on October 5,
2023], and the cross draw bag [Rainier wore when entering and
exiting the residence].

Id. at 43. Further, pointing to the five successful controlled buys that

occurred at the residence between February and October of 2023, the

Commonwealth asserts, the Detectives “were investigating ongoing criminal

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activity at the residence; thus, the specific dates of [the] controlled buys [are]

not necessary … and should not have been weighed so heavily” by the

suppression court. Id. at 41 (punctuation modified).

According to the Commonwealth, the suppression court’s

claimed credibility issue based on the Detectives’ reliance on [CI-
1’s] identification of [Rainier] after [CI-1] had consumed drugs is
unpersuasive and the court’s characterization of [CI-1] as “rogue”
is misplaced and weighed too heavily. The [suppression c]ourt
neglected to recognize that [confidential informants] are deterred
from providing false information to officers, that [confidential
informants] are more likely to provide truthful information than
other informants, [and] that independent police work can
compensate for a [confidential informant’s] lower indicia of
reliability ….

Id. at 25 (internal record citation omitted; formatting modified); see also id.

at 30 (asserting the suppression court “improperly weighed [the reliability of

CI-1’s] … information alone, rather than weighing it in light of the abundant

information that the [Detectives] independently drew from, in determining

whether the stop was justified.”).

The Commonwealth contends “[r]easonable suspicion was established

for Officer Minier to stop [Rainier’s vehicle] because he received the dispatch

from Detective Havens[,] who observed [Rainier’s] activity [at the residence]

and formed a basis of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 40; see also id. at 39-

40 (citing Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 542 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(“[P]recedent confirms that a law enforcement officer may conduct an

investigative detention of a suspect based on reasonable suspicion formed in

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whole or in part upon facts observed by a reliable source, such as another

officer[.]”)).

The Commonwealth relies on this Court’s decisions in Stilo, 138 A.3d

33, and Commonwealth v. Myers, 728 A.2d 960 (Pa. Super. 1999). See

Commonwealth Brief at 26-29. In Stilo, after the defendant (Stilo) was

arrested and charged with drug possession, he filed a motion to suppress

evidence. Stilo, 138 A.3d at 35. The evidence presented at the suppression

hearing established that a police officer (Officer Cleaver) was conducting

surveillance outside of a certain residence (the property) in Philadelphia, in

response to receiving an anonymous tip that drug activity was occurring at

the property. Id. at 34. Officer Cleaver observed Stilo arrive outside the

property in a white Ford Explorer driven by an unknown individual. Id. at 34-

1. Stilo exited the vehicle and “entered the basement of the property[,]

where he remained for approximately three minutes.” Id. at 35 (record

citation omitted). The suppression court detailed what next transpired:

As Stilo exited the property, an unknown white male arrived on
location in a red Ford pickup truck and entered the property. Stilo
re-entered the Ford Explorer and waited a few minutes. Shortly
thereafter, the unknown white male exited the property and
entered his truck. Both Stilo and the male left the location
simultaneously. Stilo was followed [by law enforcement],
stopped, and removed from the vehicle. Officer Cleaver spoke
25

to Stilo and Stilo gave the officer a clear Ziploc bag containing
marijuana[; Stilo] was arrested. Following his arrest, Stilo was

---

25 There is no indication in Stilo that police observed the Ford Explorer commit

any Motor Vehicle Code violations.

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searched and [police] recovered [additional narcotics] from his
person ….

Id. (footnote added; internal record citations and brackets omitted).

In his suppression motion, Stilo claimed law enforcement lacked

reasonable suspicion to believe he was engaged in criminal activity to justify

the stop of the Ford Explorer. Id. Following a suppression hearing, the

suppression court denied Stilo’s motion, after which he was convicted of drug

possession and sentenced. Id. Stilo appealed, challenging only the denial of

his suppression motion. Id.

This Court affirmed, holding that our prior decision in Myers, supra,

“support[s] the suppression court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress.”

Id. at 38. We analyzed Myers as follows:

In Myers, police officers began conducting surveillance of a home
in Philadelphia [(the home)] after receiving a number of
complaints that the home was the site of a drug trafficking
operation. While conducting surveillance, the police arrested two
persons for narcotics violations on March 25 and 26, 1997. On
April 1, 1997, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the police observed a
man enter the home, and exit two minutes later. Approximately
one hour later, the officer observed a woman enter the ho[me]
and then quickly depart. At 6:30 p.m., the officers observed
Myers knock on the door of the home, gain admittance and depart
approximately two minutes later. The surveillance officer thought
he saw something in Myer[s]’s hand, but [Myers’s hand] was
closed. [Myers] then placed [the unknown item] in his pocket,
entered his vehicle, and drove away. The officers followed
[Myers], pulled him over,26 removed him from his vehicle, and
patted him down. During this pat-down, the officers discovered
two plastic packets of crack cocaine. See id., 728 A.2d at 961.

---

26 There is no indication in Myers that police stopped Myers’s vehicle based

upon any Motor Vehicle Code infraction.

• 23 - J-S45018-25

Myers was [charged with and eventually] convicted of …
possession of cocaine.

On appeal, this Court held that the officers did have
reasonable suspicion to stop Myers, explaining:

The police had received at least four citizen complaints
regarding drug sales occurring at [the home]. While
conducting surveillance of the [home], police had
arrested two drug purchasers the weekend prior to
[Myers’s] arrest. On the day [Myers] was arrested,
the police observed two other individuals enter and
exit the [home] after only a few minutes - a male at
5:00 p.m. and a female at 6:00 p.m. When the police
saw [Myers] do the same at approximately 6:30 p.m.,
they had reasonable suspicion to stop him for
investigative purposes, since[,] in the eyes of a
trained officer, the surrounding circumstances g[a]ve
rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
[was] afoot.

Id. at 962-[]63 (citation omitted).

Stilo, 138 A.3d at 37 (footnote added; footnote in original omitted).

The Stilo Court, applying Myers, determined that Officer Cleaver

possessed reasonable suspicion to support a lawful traffic stop of Stilo’s

vehicle, based on the following:

When police received the [anonymous] “narcotics complaint[”
regarding the property,] Officer Cleaver “verified” the complaint
in learning that the owner of the [property] had previously been
arrested on drug charges by members of his narcotics unit. As
such, police had information of a prior nexus [between] the
[property] to drugs. During surveillance, police witnessed the
same suspicious activity of Stilo and another individual, separately
entering and then leaving the [property] after a very brief visit,
within moments of each other. This activity was viewed through
the eyes of a trained officer, Officer Cleaver, who believed it was
a drug transaction.

• 24 - J-S45018-25

Id. at 39 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 38 (observing that Officer

Cleaver testified at the suppression hearing “that he had been a police officer

for 16 years, had worked in the narcotics unit for six years, and had conducted

several narcotics surveillances. [Officer Cleaver] had [previously] seen ‘this

type of interaction where an individual goes into a house and comes out a

short time later.’” (internal record citations omitted)).

The Stilo Court concluded that

Stilo’s argument fails because “[a] suppression court is
required to take[] into account the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture.” Commonwealth v.
Carter, … 105 A.3d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal
denied, 117 A.3d 295 (Pa. 2015). “[E]ven in a case where one
could say that the conduct of a person is equally consistent with
innocent activity, the suppression court [is not] foreclosed from
concluding that reasonable suspicion nevertheless existed.” Id.
at 772. “In conducting a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a
suppression court is required to afford due weight to the specific,
reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s
experience[.]” Id. at 773 (quotations and citation omitted).

Stilo, 138 A.3d at 39 (emphasis added). Moreover, we noted that

this Court has held that “[t]he existence of arguably more
persuasive means of corroboration [i.e., controlled buy,
observations of specifically prohibited transactions, or
confirmation with other informants] did not by itself render
insufficient that information which was produced by police action.”
Commonwealth v. Woods, … 590 A.2d 1311, 1314 (Pa. Super.
1991).

Stilo, 138 A.3d at 38 (footnote omitted).

Instantly, the Commonwealth persuasively argues that

[l]ike the officers in Stilo and Myers, Detective Anderson and
Detective Havens made reasonable inferences[,] based on their

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law enforcement experience and training[,] to justify [the stop of
Rainier’s] vehicle. The totality of the circumstances presented a
particularized and objective basis for the Detectives’ reasonable
suspicion, including the established nexus between the …
residence and drug activity; the five (5) controlled buys and two
(2) attempted controlled buys conducted at the residence between
February of 2023 and October 5, 2023; [CI-1’s] tip that there was
drug activity at the residence on October 4, 2023 ([i.e., CI-1]
observed Rainier deliver drugs); the presence of other known drug
dealers at the residence on October 5, 2023; the Detectives’
knowledge of an alleged drug dealer [who sold drugs at the
residence] named Keem; [CI-1’s] identification of [Rainier] as
Keem; [Detective Havens’s] … recognition of [Rainier as he exited
the residence]; the discovery that [Rainier’s] middle name was
Hakeem; the short amount of time that [Rainier] was in and out
of the residence; and the black cross body bag [Rainier carried,
which, Detective Havens maintained, was] consistent with bags
used for the concealment of guns and drugs, … in and out of the
residence. The [suppression] court failed to consider the
overwhelming cumulative information that the [D]etectives had in
comparison to what is legally necessary for a stop. If the totality
of the circumstances test had been applied properly, the evidence
would prove that it was reasonable for [the D]etectives to suspect
that criminal activity was afoot that justified the stop and
investigative detention of [Rainier].

Commonwealth Brief at 29-30 (paragraph break omitted).

Following our review of the record before the suppression court,

including the notes of testimony from Rainier’s preliminary hearing, we agree

with the Commonwealth; its foregoing argument is supported by the record

and the law. Initially, Stilo is closely analogous. Like the situation in Stilo,

here,

police had information of a prior nexus [between] the [residence
and] drugs. During surveillance, police witnessed … suspicious
activity of [Rainier, whom police recognized from prior
experience,] … entering and then leaving the [residence] after a
very brief visit ….

• 26 - J-S45018-25

Stilo, 138 A.3d at 39.

In the instant case, the record supports the suppression court’s

observation that law enforcement did not observe Rainier engage in any

criminal activity on October 5, 2023. See, e.g., N.T., 9/17/24, at 9, 28.

However, the record does not support the court’s determination that “there

were no observations of [Rainier engaging in] … suspicious activity on the

date in question.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/25/25, at 5 (emphasis added). As

the suppression court conceded, the residence is a “known drug house” and

located in “a high drug area[.]” Opinion and Order, 6/27/25, at 1; see also

Lewis, 343 A.3d at 1021 (holding suppression courts may properly consider

whether an area is high in crime “among the totality of the circumstances

when assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time of a stop”).

Further, in the approximately seven months leading up to the date of Rainier’s

arrest, law enforcement had (1) conducted multiple controlled buys of

narcotics from the residence, see N.T., 9/17/24, at 4 (Detective Anderson,

albeit briefly, mentioning five prior successful controlled buys); and (2)

effectuated “3 arrests at the [residence]” and “served at least 1 search

warrant[.]” N.T., 10/17/23, at 2 (Detective Havens’s testimony at the

preliminary hearing). Indeed, Detective Havens testified that law

enforcement was “inundated with information about [the residence] being a

drug house” and had received multiple tips about drug activity at the residence

from confidential informants. See N.T., 9/17/24, at 30.

• 27 - J-S45018-25

Further, CI-1 testified that although she did not see Rainier sell narcotics

at the residence on the date of his arrest (October 5, 2023), she saw him sell

drugs there “[t]he day before and many others.” Id. at 17. We acknowledge

the suppression court discredited CI-1’s testimony. See Rule 1925(a)

Opinion, 8/25/25, at 4, and Opinion and Order, 6/27/25, at 7. We do not

disturb this finding and accord it due deference. See Carmenates, supra,

at 1123 (appellate courts must be highly deferential to a suppression court’s

credibility determination); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 7

(Pa. Super. 2022) (“[W]e will not disturb a suppression court’s credibility

determinations absent a clear and manifest error.”). However, even without

CI-1’s testimony, the Detectives possessed independent, articulable facts to

reasonably believe that Rainier was engaged in criminal activity on October 5,

1. See White, 496 U.S. at 330-31 (stating that if “a tip has a relatively

low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the

requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more

reliable.”).

The record reflects that on October 3, 2023, Detective Havens observed

Rainier, whom the Detective recognized, both entering and exiting the

residence while wearing a black fanny pack bag in a “cross draw” fashion

across his shoulder. See N.T., 9/17/24, at 22. In Detective Havens’s police

experience, wearing such a bag in this fashion, in that particular

• 28 - J-S45018-25

neighborhood, was consistent with the concealment of “guns and drugs[.]”

N.T., 10/17/23, at 3; see also N.T., 9/17/24, at 22.

Detective Havens further testified that “[Rainier] came and went [from

the residence] over a short period of time[.]” N.T., 9/17/24, at 30. In

Detective Havens’s police training and experience, the brevity of Rainier’s visit

“is consistent with a drug delivery and/or purchase[.]” Id.; see also N.T.,

10/17/23, at 7 (Detective Havens confirming, at Rainier’s preliminary hearing,

that the brief period of time in which Rainier was inside the residence (i.e.,

approximately one or two minutes) “add[ed] to [Detective Havens’s]

suspicion”); Williams, 980 A.2d at 671 (stating that whether reasonable

suspicion existed at the time of an investigative detention must be “viewed

through the eyes of a trained police officer[,]” and cautioning that reviewing

courts must “not ignore the ability of experienced police officers to draw

deductions and inferences which other persons might not make.” (citation and

quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, Detective Havens testified that in addition to CI-1 identifying

Rainier, on October 5, 2023, as the drug supplier to the residence, Detective

Havens observed two known drug dealers entering and exiting the

residence. See N.T., 9/17/24, at 27; N.T., 10/17/23, at 2-3, 5.

In sum, we conclude the totality of the above-mentioned evidence, and

all “reasonable inferences” that the Detectives were “entitled to draw from the

facts in light of [their] experience,” Stilo, 138 A.3d at 39 (citation omitted),

• 29 - J-S45018-25

established a particularized and objective basis for the Detectives to

reasonably suspect that Rainier was engaged in criminal activity. Id.; Myers,

728 A.2d at 962-63; see also Jefferson, supra, at 1251 (stating that the

reasonable suspicion standard does not require law enforcement to “establish

their suspicions to a level of certainty, a preponderance, or even a fair

probability”). The evidence of record belies the suppression court’s finding

that “the Detectives only had a hunch that Rainier was in possession of drugs

… and that hunch was the only basis for stopping Rainier’s vehicle.” Rule

1925(a) Opinion, 8/25/25, at 9 (some capitalization modified). Accordingly,

keeping in mind our standard of review, we conclude that law enforcement

possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to support its investigative

detention of Rainier. See, e.g., Stilo, 138 A.3d at 38-39.

Based upon the foregoing, as the suppression court erred as a matter

of law in granting Rainier’s Suppression Motion, we reverse the order granting

the Motion and remand for further proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/10/2026

• 31 -