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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to I.C.

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 25-0144

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Cynthia J. Bailey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0144
FILED 03-09-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD43566
The Honorable Michael Rassas, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Leticia C.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Rachael Andrews
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee I.C.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Leticia C. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s termination
of her parental rights to I.C. (“Child”).1 We affirm.

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother has struggled with substance abuse since she was a
teenager, and she continued to use methamphetamine and fentanyl while
pregnant with Child.

¶3 Child was born substance-exposed in early November 2023.
Weeks later, he was discharged from the hospital under an in-home safety
plan, which required his maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) to
provide supervision. The safety plan also required Mother to engage in
substance-abuse services. But Mother did not engage in the services and
instead continued using methamphetamine and fentanyl. Within days,
Grandmother requested law enforcement remove Mother from the home
based on her substance abuse and erratic behavior, which they did.

¶4 In late November 2023, the Department of Child Safety
(“DCS”) placed Child in Grandmother’s care and petitioned for a
dependency based on Mother’s substance abuse, mental health, and
neglect. Mother did not contest the petition, and the court found Child
dependent in March 2024.

¶5 Both before and after the dependency finding, DCS provided
Mother with substance-abuse treatment, drug testing, parenting classes,

1 Child’s father’s rights also were terminated, but he is not a party to this

appeal.

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior

court’s order. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7
(App. 2010).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.C.
Decision of the Court

and supervised visitation, with Mother only participating in the visitation.
In January 2024, Mother began serving jail terms for crimes against
Grandmother, so her visitation became virtual and the other services were
closed out. And when she was re-offered services upon her release from
jail in March 2024, she failed to engage beyond completing a substance-
abuse intake in April 2024 (at which time she confirmed she had resumed
using drugs) and calling into drug testing once in May 2024.

¶6 Beginning in May 2024, Mother was incarcerated for several
more months for assaulting a police officer while under the influence. DCS
set up virtual visitation but the renewed referrals for other services were
closed out. And again, Mother resumed her drug use upon her release from
jail. She committed a new crime against Grandmother and was
incarcerated in October 2024, again receiving virtual visitation.

¶7 A DCS case manager reviewed services with Mother twice
before her March 2025 release from jail and once the day after, when in-
person visitation resumed. But almost immediately thereafter, Mother
resumed using drugs.

¶8 Mother finally completed a substance-abuse intake with a
residential treatment provider at the end of March 2025. By that time,
however, the superior court had changed the case plan from family
reunification to severance and adoption. Accordingly, in April 2025, DCS
moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on her substance abuse
and Child’s time in an out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3),
(B)(8)(b).

¶9 In the residential treatment program, Mother participated in
substance-abuse services, drug testing, mental-health classes, behavioral
therapy, and counseling. In late May 2025, however, she left the program
because it “was not for her” and enrolled in a different residential treatment
program where she continued to receive substance-abuse and mental-
health services. DCS also offered parenting classes, drug testing, visitation,
and transportation services, with Mother participating consistently in
visitation and sporadically in the parenting classes.

¶10 To her credit, Mother earned a certificate of completion from
the second residential treatment program in July 2025. But later that month,
she used illegal drugs and overdosed. She then failed to participate in drug
testing or complete a new intake for substance-abuse treatment. And
although she continued to participate in visitation, she could not get Child
to bond with or trust her. Mother often ignored or yelled at Child, did not

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.C.
Decision of the Court

come prepared to care for him, and disregarded his safety on at least one
occasion. She also appeared to be under the influence in some of her
communications to DCS.

¶11 The superior court held the termination adjudication hearing
in August 2025, but Mother failed to appear. The court proceeded in her
absence and, on DCS’s evidence, terminated Mother’s parental rights. We
have jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal under Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find by
clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination exists under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination serves the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018). On review, we must accept the superior
court’s factual findings provided they are supported by reasonable
evidence and inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478,
¶ 30 (2023). We do not reweigh the evidence; instead, we defer to the
superior court’s determinations on conflicting evidence and witness
credibility. Id.; Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18. We will affirm the superior
court’s legal conclusions on a statutory basis for termination unless they are
clearly erroneous. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478-79, ¶ 31.

¶13 The court terminated Mother’s parental rights on two
alternate statutory grounds, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b).
Each ground required that DCS offer services to reunify the parent and
child. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8); Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz.
450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005). For A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), which authorizes
termination where a parent has chronic historical drug use that is
reasonably likely to persist, DCS must make reasonable reunification
efforts. Jennifer G., 211 Ariz. at 453, ¶ 12. And under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b),
which authorizes termination where a child under age three has been in
court-ordered out-of-home placement for at least six months and “the
parent has substantially neglected or wil[l]fully refused to remedy the
circumstances” warranting the placement, DCS must make “a diligent
effort to provide appropriate reunification services.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8).
The court must consider both the availability of reunification services to the
parent and his or her participation in the services in considering
termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). A.R.S. § 8-533(D).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.C.
Decision of the Court

¶14 In providing reunification services, DCS must give the parent
“the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help [him
or] her to become an effective parent.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 14 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). DCS must
“undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success,” id. at ¶ 15
(citation omitted), and must maintain consistent contact with the parent
and reasonably assist him or her in areas where compliance proves difficult,
Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 50 (App. 2019). That
includes when the parent is incarcerated. See Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
251 Ariz. 574, 582, ¶ 21 (2021). But DCS need not provide futile services,
“provide every conceivable service[,] or [] ensure that a parent participates
in each service it offers.” Christina G., 227 Ariz. at 235, ¶ 15 (citation
omitted). Nor must DCS duplicate services the parent receives elsewhere.
See In re Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 577 (App.
1989). And if the parent is dissatisfied with the services DCS provides, he
or she must raise the issue with the superior court before the termination
hearing or else risk waiver. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234
Ariz. 174, 178-79, ¶¶ 13-16 (App. 2014).

¶15 Here, Mother challenges DCS’s reunification efforts under the
alternate statutory termination grounds. She contends that because the
dependency petition placed her mental health at issue, DCS should have
provided her a consultation with its unit psychologist. But Mother did not
raise this issue before the termination adjudication hearing, which
generally results in her argument being waived on appeal. See Shawanee S.,
234 Ariz. at 178-79, ¶¶ 13-16. But even without waiver, her argument fails.

¶16 DCS’s failure to provide Mother a psychological consultation
was not unreasonable, even if, as Mother contends, it was a service
contemplated by the court and DCS’s internal policies. The DCS case
manager explained that its psychologist required Mother to show thirty
days of sobriety before meeting. Mother did not demonstrate sobriety until
2025, when she participated in the first residential treatment program. And
although DCS asked that provider to set up a mental-health evaluation,
Mother switched programs before the evaluation could take place.

¶17 Mother contends that she could have participated in a
psychological consultation while in jail. But Mother did not demonstrate
her sobriety while incarcerated. Moreover, DCS’s failure to provide a
consultation is not dispositive regarding the sufficiency of services.
Regarding Mother’s mental health, she was offered services from other
sources: counseling in connection with her criminal cases (in which she did
not participate) and other mental-health services in both of the residential

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.C.
Decision of the Court

programs. Further, regarding the other primary issue of Mother’s
substance abuse, DCS repeatedly offered appropriate services, but Mother
did not seek treatment until late in this case.

¶18 Mother also contends that DCS deprived the superior court of
documentary evidence of her eventual substance-abuse treatment. We
disagree. To start, this evidence was far from dispositive on the issue of
Mother’s sobriety in view of her almost immediate overdose after
completing the second residential program. Further, evidence of Mother’s
pre-overdose treatment progress was provided to the court: the DCS case
manager testified that Mother participated in treatment and received a
certificate of completion.

¶19 On this record, the superior court did not abuse its discretion
by finding DCS’s efforts sufficient to support termination under either
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) or A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). Mother does not raise, and
therefore has waived, any challenge to the superior court’s findings on the
balance of the elements set forth in A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(8)(b), and its finding that termination serves Child’s best interests.
See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577, ¶ 1 (App. 2017).

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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