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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Bmfc v. Msc

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 374354
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.5K)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

BMFC, UNPUBLISHED
March 09, 2026
Petitioner-Appellant, 9:21 AM

v No. 374354
Emmet Circuit Court
MSC, LC No. 2025-108614-PP

Respondent-Appellee.

Before: WALLACE, P.J., and GARRETT and ACKERMAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, BMFC, sought a personal-protection order (PPO) against respondent, MSC,
after she filed a complaint for divorce against him. She appeals by right the trial court’s denial of
her petition. She also challenges the trial court’s previous order denying her request to issue the
PPO on an ex parte basis. Because the trial court did not err by denying BMFC’s petition, on an
ex parte basis or otherwise, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

BMFC, proceeding in propria persona, filed a petition for an ex parte PPO against MSC
on January 2, 2025, shortly after she initiated divorce proceedings against him. In her affidavit in
support of the petition, she stated that she lived with MSC until March 3, 2024, at which point the
couple separated. She stated that, on that date, MSC “bruised his son’s face up and kept him from
school.” She also indicated that MSC had been “hacking into accounts” and changing information,
and that he snuck onto her father’s property and banged on the door to force her to come to the
door. BMFC claimed that MSC physically and mentally abused her and the children in their home
for years and had previously threatened to harm or kill both his son and his son’s mother. She
stated she feared that MSC would try to harm her or the children after she served him with her
complaint for divorce that week.

The trial court denied BMFC’s request for an ex parte PPO, stating she failed to
demonstrate that “immediate irreparable injury, loss, or damage would occur” if the PPO was not
granted on an ex parte basis. The court provided BMFC 14 days to request a hearing or the court
would dismiss the petition. BMFC requested a hearing at which she testified that her attorney filed

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a complaint for divorce on her behalf in Cheboygan County, where BMFC lived. When asked
why she filed her PPO petition in Emmet County, rather than Cheboygan County, BMFC
responded that she worked in Emmet County and was able to file the petition at the courthouse on
a workday. She also explained that she had not yet filled out the PPO paperwork when her attorney
filed her divorce complaint, and her domestic-violence advocate believed the PPO would be
denied.

BMFC testified that she wanted a PPO against MSC because she feared for her life and
had lived in fear for her life for years. When asked what her fear was based on, she responded:

That is based on sleep deprivation, continued abuse, daily abuse, screaming
at me every single day, alienating me from my family, from my friends, tracking
my locations, beating on children, forcing me to lie regarding beating on children,
threats of reporting me for tax fraud to ruin my career.

BMFC maintained that she and MSC separated in March 2024 and that, around that time, MSC hit
his eight-year-old son who lived with them. The police and Child Protective Services (CPS) were
contacted because of the incident.

BMFC testified that she last had direct contact with MSC via text message in July 2024
when he purportedly locked her out of her cell-phone account. In November 2024, she discovered
when she renewed her license-place tabs at the Secretary of State that MSC had changed the
mailing address associated with the vehicle to his address. She also alleged that MSC harassed
her boss by creating fake social-media accounts and commenting on her employer’s Facebook
page. She asserted that she discovered a social-media post in which members of MSC’s family
admitted that they had harassed her boss and neighbors for months. BMFC claimed she was fearful
of MSC because she was “working through PTSD,” MSC was generally abusive physically and
mentally, and she “got screamed at and spit on every day.” She was treated by a therapist, a
psychiatrist, and a psychologist, and recently scheduled an appointment with another therapist who
specialized in PTSD. She denied that MSC had physically appeared at her work but claimed he
“stalked” her work and her TikTok account.

BMFC’s brother provided a written statement on her behalf and testified that he had often
observed BMFC upset, scared, and anxious. He heard MSC raise his voice at BMFC and believed
that MSC was irrational and became angry easily. He feared that MSC could engage in violence
with BMFC but denied witnessing any physical violence between MSC and BMFC. He
characterized MSC’s conduct as “degrading” and “relentless” emotional abuse that included
financial abuse, such as threatening to open a separate bank account and to skip work, resulting in
financial harm for the family.

MSC denied harassing BMFC or engaging in any activity that involved her employment.
He testified that he stopped using Facebook years previously and did not have a TikTok account.
He shared a cell-phone account with BMFC and logged onto the account using his cell phone or
e-mail address. He changed his address at the Secretary of State, which automatically changed the
address associated with BMFC’s vehicle because his name was on the title. MSC admitted going

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to the home of BMFC’s father, where BMFC lived in August 2024,1 but denied banging on the
door and getting “into her father’s face.” MSC called the police afterward, and an officer told him
that BMFC’s father did not want him to come back to the house. MSC denied attempting to contact
BMFC after that incident and claimed that he did not know where she worked until she stated
where she worked when she testified. Finally, he maintained that he shared joint custody of his
son with his son’s mother and had never been charged with child abuse.

The trial court asked BMFC if she had evidence of the Facebook messages posted on her
employer’s Facebook page. BMFC responded that her employer had deleted the messages. The
court then asked whether BMFC had any witnesses who could testify regarding that matter. BMFC
stated that her boss could testify, but he was not at the hearing. She referred the court to the police
report. The court reviewed the report and remarked that it was “pretty limited.” The report stated
that BMFC reported to the police that MSC harassed her on Facebook since she began working at
a new job. The police officer encouraged BMFC to complete the paperwork to obtain a PPO and
to report the harassment to Facebook.

The trial court denied BMFC’s petition. The court found credible BMFC’s testimony that
she suffered emotional abuse during the marriage and had been diagnosed with PTSD, but the
court stated, “I don’t think there’s enough evidence here for the personal protection order.” The
court explained that a PPO prohibits conduct “that’s occurred that ought not to be occurring,” such
as stalking. The court determined that BMFC failed to present evidence that MSC was stalking
her at work or interfering with her job and remarked, “The problem with it is that anyone can create
a Facebook page.” The court determined it lacked evidence indicating that MSC, or his family
members on his behalf, made the Facebook postings, and BMFC had no direct contact with MSC
since August 2024. The court advised BMFC that she would “have a little bit more of a remedy”
if she had filed her PPO petition in the same court as her divorce proceeding and recommended
that the parties consider a mutual no-contact order in their divorce case. Further, the court
admonished MSC, stating, “Just because I’m not granting the PPO doesn’t mean that I don’t find
that there’s some evidence here that’s of concern to the Court.” The court advised MSC that if he
or his family members interfered with BMFC’s ability to work and earn an income, it would have
negative consequences for him in the divorce proceeding. The court concluded:

So with that, I’m going to deny the request for the PPO. I don’t think the
evidence has risen to the level that the Court can find that it was the defendant [sic]
that was interfering in late December and early January. That really would be the
basis of this particular point because he’s not had contact with you and, you know,
there’s been no evidence that he’s been over to your home since that August event
when he was told by the police not to go back. So this doesn’t mean that down the
road you can’t seek a PPO. I’m going to tell you right now, though, that it would
be best to have all your cases heard by your circuit judge [in the divorce case].

1
Because MSC went to the home to retrieve his belongings, it appears he also lived there before
the couple separated.

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The court entered a written order stating that it denied the petition on the basis that there did not
exist reasonable cause to believe that MSC may commit an act listed in MCL 600.2950(1). This
appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a PPO petition.
CAJ v KDT, 339 Mich App 459, 463; 984 NW2d 504 (2021). “An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Powers v
Brown, 328 Mich App 617, 620; 939 NW2d 733 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
We review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings underlying its PPO ruling. CAJ, 339
Mich App at 464. “The clear-error standard requires us to give deference to the lower court and
find clear error only if we are nevertheless left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” SP v BEK, 339 Mich App 171, 176; 981 NW2d 500 (2021) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Likewise, we defer to the trial court’s special opportunity to view the demeanor
of witnesses and determine the weight and credibility to be accorded to their testimony. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

“Two different statutes, MCL 600.2950 and MCL 600.2950a, provide for three types of
PPOs in Michigan.” TM v MZ, 501 Mich 312, 315; 916 NW2d 473 (2018). “The nature of the
petitioner’s relationship with the respondent and the respondent’s acts govern which form of PPO
is appropriate.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). MCL 600.2950 governs PPOs when
the parties are in a domestic relationship. Id. Under MCL 600.2950(1), a person may file a petition
for a PPO requesting the court to restrain the respondent from engaging in certain conduct,
including:

(a) Entering onto premises.

(b) Assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding a named individual.

(c) Threatening to kill or physically injure a named individual.

---

(e) Purchasing or possessing a firearm.

---

(g) Interfering with petitioner at petitioner’s place of employment or education or
engaging in conduct that impairs petitioner’s employment or educational
relationship or environment.

---

(j) Engaging in conduct that is prohibited under section 411h [stalking] or 411i
[aggravated stalking] of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h
and 750.411i.

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---

(l) Any other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with personal
liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.

In addition, MCL 600.2950(4) states:

The court shall issue a personal protection order under this section if the
court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be
restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1). In
determining whether reasonable cause exists, the court shall consider all of the
following:

(a) Testimony, documents, or other evidence offered in support of the
request for a personal protection order.

(b) Whether the individual to be restrained or enjoined has previously
committed or threatened to commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1).

Notably, a petitioner is not required to show that the respondent “actually committed one of the
acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1), only that there was reasonable cause to believe that he may commit
one of the acts.” SP, 339 Mich App at 187. “The burden of proof in obtaining a PPO is on the
applicant for the restraining order.” CNN v SEB, 345 Mich App 151, 160; 4 NW3d 759 (2023)
(alterations omitted).

BMFC first argues that the trial court erred by denying her PPO petition based in part on
venue, contrary to MCR 3.703(E)(1). That provision states, “If the respondent is an adult, the
petitioner may file a personal protection action in any county in Michigan regardless of residency.”
BMFC asserts that, because MSC is an adult, venue was irrelevant, but the trial court nevertheless
focused on venue and questioned her extensively regarding why she did not file her PPO petition
in the same court as her divorce proceeding.

The record shows that the trial court did not improperly focus on venue as BMFC asserts.
When the court asked BMFC whether a divorce complaint had been filed, she responded that her
attorney filed the divorce proceeding in Cheboygan County. The court reasonably inquired why
BMFC did not also file the PPO petition in Cheboygan County. At the end of the proceeding, the
court stated that “the downfall” was that the PPO proceeding and the divorce action were not
before the same judge because BMFC would have “a bit more of a remedy” available to her
considering that the evidence did not support a PPO. The court suggested a mutual no-contact
order as a possible remedy but indicated that it could not grant such an order because the divorce
case was not before it. The court did not determine that venue was improper and did not deny
BMFC’s petition, to any extent, based on venue.

BMFC next argues that the trial court erred by suggesting a mutual no-contact order
because no evidence indicated that she presented any danger to MSC. BMFC’s argument lacks
merit because the trial court did not find that BMFC presented a danger to MSC. Rather, as
previously stated, the court suggested a possible remedy for BMFC because the evidence did not
support issuing a PPO.

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BMFC also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the PPO despite
finding her claims of abuse during the marriage credible. She asserts that the court’s finding was
inconsistent with its ultimate determination. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s
findings and legal conclusion were not inconsistent. The court found credible BMFC’s testimony
that she was in counseling and had been diagnosed with PTSD because of emotional abuse she
suffered during the marriage. The court did not conclude, however, that the emotional abuse and
the other evidence BMFC presented satisfied one or more of the factors set forth in MCL
600.2950(1). “[T]he court must make a positive finding of prohibited behavior by the respondent
before issuing a PPO.” Kampf v Kampf, 237 Mich App 377, 386; 603 NW2d 295 (1999). The
court clarified with BMFC that MSC had not directly contacted her since August 2024, more than
four months before she filed her petition, and BMFC responded affirmatively. The court therefore
focused on the Facebook messages, which occurred more recently, but determined that no evidence
indicated MSC had posted the messages. Further, the court’s admonishment of MSC, stating it
found some of BMFC’s evidence concerning, and its decision to allow BMFC to leave the
courthouse before MSC “so that [they didn’t] have to have any communication with each other,”
were not inconsistent with its ruling denying the PPO because BMFC failed to establish one of the
requirements listed in the statute.

Finally, BMFC argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for an ex parte PPO
on the basis that she failed to demonstrate immediate irreparable injury, loss, or damage. She
asserts that her petition and accompanying affidavit showed that MSC appeared unannounced at
the home she shared with her father, he changed account login information to force her to have
contact with him, and he “bruised his son’s face up.” In addition, the affidavit stated that MSC
was “always prepared” to shoot his son’s mother during MSC’s legal proceedings with her, and
BMFC intended to serve MSC with a divorce complaint the same week that she filed her petition.

MCL 600.2950(12) provides

A court shall issue an ex parte personal protection order without written or
oral notice to the individual restrained or enjoined or his or her attorney if it clearly
appears from specific facts shown by a verified complaint, written motion, or
affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from
the delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will itself precipitate
adverse action before a personal protection order can be issued. [Emphasis added.]

The trial court did not clearly err by determining that BMFC’s petition and affidavit failed to
establish that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage” would result if MSC was
provided notice of the petition. Most of BMFC’s allegations in her affidavit were too stale to
support a finding of immediate harm. The affidavit stated that MSC physically assaulted his minor
child in March 2024, and he appeared at her home on August 31, 2024. That date was BMFC’s
most recent direct contact with MSC before she filed her petition on January 2, 2025, more than
four months later. Moreover, BMFC’s allegation that MSC changed the address associated with
her vehicle in November 2024 did not allege irreparable harm.

Further, BMFC’s allegation that MSC was “always prepared” to shoot his son’s mother
during his legal proceeding involving her did not establish that BMFC was in danger. Although
BMFC stated that MSC would be served with her divorce complaint the same week that she filed

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her petition, she did not allege that MSC had taken any steps to physically harm his son’s mother
during his previous legal proceeding with her. Rather, BMFC simply stated that he had been
“always prepared” to do so. Viewed together with BMFC’s claim that MSC last had direct contact
with her more than four months previously, along with the absence of a specific allegation
involving a physical assault or threatened assault against her, the trial court did not clearly err by
determining that BMFC failed to establish a threat of immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage if MSC was provided notice of the petition.

Affirmed.

/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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