Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Everett B. Slay v. Stacie D. Ross

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A25A2100

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

THIRD DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 9, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A2100. SLAY v. ROSS.

MARKLE, Judge.

In this modification of custody and contempt case, Everett B. Slay appeals from

several orders of the trial court.1 On appeal, Slay contends that the trial court erred by

granting Stacie Ross’s motion to modify visitation without a showing of any material

change in circumstances, denying his motion to hold Ross in contempt, awarding

attorney fees to Ross in violation of OCGA § 19-6-2, and denying Slay’s motions to

recuse. Finding no error, we affirm.

1
Because this appeal involves a modification of child custody, we have
jurisdiction over this direct appeal. See Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 45 (799 SE2d 160)
(2017); OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11), (d).
Before addressing the merits of the case, we are troubled by certain irregularities

in the brief filed on Slay’s behalf by his attorney, Loletha Hale. We note that several

of the cases cited therein appear to be fictitious.2 Such “hallucinated” cases are

typically a hallmark of the irresponsible use of regenerative artificial intelligence (A.I.)

in legal drafting. See Shahid v. Esaam, 376 Ga. App. 145, 146(1) (918 SE2d 198)

(2025). Although we can only surmise that the brief was drafted with the use of

unchecked generative A.I., we are aware that Hale has submitted a brief with

seemingly similar defects in federal district court. See Boston v. Williams, No.

1:23-CV-00752-WMR (ND Ga. Dec. 5, 2025) (2025 WL 3895555). However, Ross has

not complained, nor does it appear that the fictitious cases impeded her ability to

respond to Slay’s arguments. Compare Shahid, 376 Ga. App. at 147(1) (finding the use

of bogus cases and citations in appellate brief “deprived the opposing party of the

opportunity to appropriately respond”). And, we are unaware of the imposition of any

sanctions against Hale for similar conduct in this Court. We thus caution Hale that

any future filings in this Court containing fictitious cases and citations may result in

2
Slay’s brief purports to cite to these following cases: Waller v. Waller, 288 Ga.
164, 164-165 (2010); Johnson v. Johnson, 286 Ga. 720, 721 (2010); Durden v. Barron,
287 Ga. 858 (2010); and In re Waitz, 255 Ga. 474 (1986), none of which actually exist.
2
the imposition of sanctions against her. See Shahid, 376 Ga. App. at 149(1); Court of

Appeals Rule 7(e)(2) (“The panel of the Court ruling on a case, with or without

motion, may by majority vote to impose a penalty not to exceed $10,000 against any

party and/or a party’s counsel in any civil case in which there is a direct appeal,

application for discretionary appeal, application for interlocutory appeal, or motion

that is determined to be frivolous.”).

Turning now to the merits of the case, “we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to upholding the trial court’s order.”Granados v. Newsome, 373 Ga. App. 859

(910 SE2d 341) (2024).

So viewed, the record shows that Slay and Ross were divorced in 2013 and are

the parents of a minor child. Ross was granted primary physical custody of the child,

and the parties shared joint legal custody. The record reflects a contentious and

litigious history between the parties. In 2015, the trial court ordered Ross to reimburse

Slay for his child support payments for the months of June and July, as Slay was

entitled to summer visitation during those months under the custody schedule. In

2016, the trial court held Ross in wilful contempt for, among other things, refusing to

3
allow Slay to exercise certain of his visitation rights under the divorce decree. In 2018,

the trial court ordered certain modifications to the visitation schedule.

Pertaining to the case at hand, in 2022, Slay moved for a downward

modification of his child support payments. Slay then amended his petition, seeking

to increase the amount of his visitation time during spring break and certain holidays.

In response, Ross requested a reduction in Slay’s visitation time. Following a hearing,

the trial court denied Slay’s petition for modification of his child support payments

and visitation time, while granting Ross’s request to reduce Slay’s summer visitation

time. The trial court awarded Ross attorney fees under OCGA §§ 19-6-15(k)(5) and

19-9-3(g) as to these claims.

Contemporaneous with his petition to modify child support and visitation, Slay

filed a petition for contempt, alleging Ross had failed to reimburse him for his summer

child support payments, as previously ordered. This petition was consolidated and

addressed at the same hearing as the preceding petition. The trial court denied Slay’s

petition for contempt. Ross moved for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b), which

the trial court granted, concluding that the petition lacked substantial justification

because Slay had not paid child support for the summer months.

4
Additionally, the trial court granted Ross’s motion to hold Slay in wilful

contempt for his failure to comply with an earlier order of the court compelling him

to respond to discovery requests. On this basis, the trial court awarded Ross attorney

fees under OCGA § 9-11-37(b)(2).

Finally, Slay filed three motions to recuse the trial judge, all of which were

denied. This appeal followed.

1. Slay first contends that the trial court erred in modifying his visitation rights

where there was no showing of a material change in circumstances. We disagree.

Slay cites to OCGA § 19-9-3(b), but that statute places no such restriction on

the trial court under the circumstances of this case.3 Rather, that statute provides:

In any case in which a judgment awarding the custody of a child has been
entered, on the motion of any party or on the motion of the judge, that
portion of the judgment effecting visitation rights between the parties
and their child or parenting time may be subject to review and
modification or alteration without the necessity of any showing of a change
in any material conditions and circumstances of either party or the child,
provided that the review and modification or alteration shall not be had

3
Slay misstates the holding of Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445 (588 SE2d 728)
(2003). That opinion has no bearing on the case at hand as it specifically dealt with
“what weight should be given a custodial parent’s move to another state in an action
seeking a change in primary physical custody.” Id. at 446.
5
more often than once in each two-year period following the date of entry
of the judgment.

OCGA § 19-9-3(b) (emphasis added).

The record reflects that the last order of the court affecting visitation rights

issued in 2018, more than two years prior to the judgment at issue here. Accordingly,

the trial court was not required to determine there was a material change in

circumstances prior to modifying visitation, and Slay’s argument fails. See Spirnak v.

Meadows, 355 Ga. App. 857, 861(1) (844 SE2d 482) (2020); OCGA § 19-9-3(b).

1. Slay next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to hold Ross

in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s previous order to reimburse his

child support payments when he exercised his visitation rights during the summer

months. Again, we disagree.

As we have explained, “[t]he essence of civil contempt is willful disobedience

of a prior court order.” Saravia v. Mendoza, 303 Ga. App. 758, 763 (2) (695 SE2d 47)

(2010) (citation modified). “Trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on a motion

for contempt, and the trial court’s ruling will be affirmed on appeal if there is any

evidence in the record to support it.”Brown v. Brown, 300 Ga. 559, 560 (796 SE2d

6
269) (2017) (citation modified); Pate v. Pate, 280 Ga. 796, 798 (3) (631 SE2d 103)

(2006).

Here, the underlying order directed Ross to reimburse Slay the amount of his

child support payments she received from him for the months of June and July.

However, at the hearing, she testified that she never received child support from Slay

in those months. And, Slay confirmed that he had not paid child support for those

months. Thus, there was record evidence supporting the trial court’s denial of Slay’s

contempt motion. See Brown, 300 Ga. at 560; Wright v. Wright, 367 Ga. App. 15, 22(1)

(884 SE2d 610) (2023) (reversing contempt judgment where there was no evidence

father wilfully disobeyed child support order). To the extent there was any conflicting

evidence, it was for the trial court to resolve, and we will not interfere with its ruling.

Pate, 280 Ga. at 798 (4) (“A trial court in a contempt action acts as the trier of fact,

and is vested with broad discretionary power when the evidence is conflicting.”).

1. Slay next contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees against him

under OCGA § 19-6-2 because it failed to consider the parties’ financial

circumstances, and under OCGA § 9-15-4(b) because there was no evidence of

frivolous conduct on his part. This enumeration of error is unavailing.

7
(a) The trial court awarded attorney fees to Ross pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-6-15,

19-9-3, 9-11-37, and 9-15-14(b). Nevertheless, Slay contends the trial court was

required to consider the parties’ financial circumstances as if it awarded attorney fees

under OCGA § 19-6-2.4

19-6-2(a)(1) authorizes an award of attorney fees for actions “for alimony,

divorce and alimony, or contempt of court arising out of either an alimony case or a

divorce and alimony case.”

Because this action is not for alimony, divorce, or contempt for noncompliance

with the original divorce decree,5 OCGA § 19-6-2 does not apply, and the trial court

was not required to consider the relative financial circumstances of the parties. See

Spirnak, 355 Ga. App. at 871(7)(a) (statute does not apply to petition for modification

of custody); Claybrooks v. Claybrooks, 364 Ga. App. 157, 160(2)(b) (874 SE2d 190)

(2022) (statute does not apply to contempt action involving a consent order modifying

4
The trial court’s order briefly mentions OCGA § 19-6-2, but when the order
is viewed in its entirety, it is clear the trial court mistakenly named this statute in place
of OCGA § 19-6-15(k)(5). Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60(g), the trial court may correct
this error upon the return of the remittitur.
5
The order addresses the parties’ contempt motions for violations of an order
compelling discovery and for violations of orders entered in 2015 and 2018 — not the
original divorce decree.
8
custody, visitation, and child support rights); Cothran v. Mehosky, 286 Ga. App. 640,

641 (649 SE2d 838) (2007). Slay’s argument to this effect is thus misguided.6

(b) Slay argues that the record does not support the trial court’s award of fees

under OCGA § 9-15-14(b). This argument is baseless.

Under OCGA § 9–15–14(b), a court may assess reasonable and
necessary attorney fees and expenses of litigation if it finds that an
attorney or party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that
lacked substantial justification, i.e., was substantially frivolous,
groundless, or vexatious. A decision under OCGA § 9–15–14(b) must be
sustained unless the trial court abused its discretion

Glaza v. Morgan, 248 Ga. App. 623, 624 (548 SE2d 389) (2001) (quotation marks

omitted).

Here, the trial court concluded that Slay’s contempt action for reimbursement

of child support payments for the summer months lacked substantial justification

pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14(b) because the overwhelming evidence showed that he

did not pay child support for the months he sought reimbursement. The trial court

found that Slay’s claim for additional parenting time also merited an award of attorney

6
To the extent Slay contends that the trial court improperly based its fee award
on a petition he had previously withdrawn, he fails to point to any such withdrawal in
the record. Our review of the hearing transcripts contradicts this claim.
9
fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b) because the evidence showed that Slay had voluntarily

forfeited a considerable amount of parenting time in the past years.7 Notably, Slay

points to no evidence of record to challenge either of the trial court’s findings. Having

reviewed the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning

Slay under OCGA § 9-15-14(b). See generally Carson v. Carson, 277 Ga. 335, 336 (2)

(588 SE2d 735) (2003) (record supported trial court’s award of fees under OCGA §

9-15-14(b)).

1. Finally, Slay argues the trial court erred by refusing to recuse from the case.

We discern no error.

In pertinent part, Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 25.3 provides:

When a judge is presented with a motion to recuse, or disqualify,
accompanied by an affidavit, the judge shall temporarily cease to act
upon the merits of the matter and shall immediately determine the
timeliness of the motion and the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, and
make a determination, assuming any of the facts alleged in the affidavit
to be true, whether recusal would be warranted.

7
The trial court also found an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(a)
was warranted on this ground, but, ultimately, did not award fees pursuant to this
provision.
10
To be timely, the recusal motion must be filed “not later than five (5) days after

the affiant first learned of the alleged grounds for disqualification, and not later than

ten (10) days prior to the hearing or trial which is the subject of recusal or

disqualification.” USCR 25.1. With regard to the affidavit requirements, USCR 25.2

provides:

The affidavit shall clearly state the facts and reasons for the belief that
bias or prejudice exists, being definite and specific as to time, place,
persons and circumstances of extra-judicial conduct or statements,
which demonstrate either bias in favor of any adverse party, or prejudice
toward the moving party in particular, or a systematic pattern of
prejudicial conduct toward persons similarly situated to the moving
party, which would influence the judge and impede or prevent
impartiality in that action. Allegations consisting of bare conclusions and
opinions shall not be legally sufficient to support the motion or warrant
further proceedings.

We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse for failure to meet

the USCR 25.3 requirements. Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Batson-Cook

Co., 291 Ga. 114, 119 (1) (728 SE2d 189) (2012).

Here, Slay filed an emergency motion to recuse the senior judge presiding over

this matter in August 2023, on the first day of hearings. He attached an unsworn

11
“declaration” of his counsel, alleging, inter alia, the judge was biased against her and

her clients based on prior adverse rulings and racial prejudice, and due to a grievance

she filed against the judge with the Judicial Qualifications Committee (JQC).8 The

trial court deemed this motion timely because Slay could not have known prior to that

date of the senior judge assignment. See USCR 25.1 (trial court may extend time limit

for filing motion upon showing of good cause for the delay). Nevertheless, the trial

court correctly denied the motion because Slay failed to attach a sworn affidavit. See

Post v. State, 298 Ga. 241, 247 (2)(b) (779 SE2d 624) (2015) (“The Uniform Superior

Court Rules could not be clearer in their requirement that the motion be accompanied

by an affidavit.”) (quotation marks omitted); Oduok v. Fulton Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 340

Ga. App. 205, 212-213 (3) (797 SE2d 133) (2017) (unsworn “declaration was legally

insufficient to satisfy Rule 25”); USCR 25.1, 25.2.

Slay then filed substantially the same motion to recuse the senior judge in June

2024, again alleging that the judge’s prior adverse rulings in cases involving his

counsel, as well as the JQC grievance filed by his counsel, were evidence of the judge’s

bias against him. Additionally, his counsel opined that the judge suffered from

8
The judge stated on the record that he was not aware of the JQC grievance.
12
dementia.9 The trial court correctly denied this motion because Slay again violated the

procedural requirements of Rule 25 by failing to attach a sworn affidavit to the motion.

Oduok, 340 Ga. App. at 212-13 (3); USCR 25.1, 25.2.

Later that same month, Slay filed a third motion, now seeking the permanent

recusal of the judge based on substantially the same reasons as the prior two motions.

Slay attached a sworn affidavit to this motion, in compliance with USCR 25.1 and

25.2. However, the trial court deemed the motion untimely because it had not been

filed within five days “after [the affiant] first learned of the alleged grounds for

disqualification.” Indeed, all of the grounds alleged in the motion and affidavit to

show bias occurred well beyond the five-day limitation period.10 And counsel’s

9
Counsel states that this diagnosis is based solely on her “personal and
professional” opinion, and is thus unfounded.
10
In her affidavit, Slay’s counsel surmises that the trial court and opposing
counsel engaged in improper ex parte communications because the trial court used
opposing counsel’s proposed order in denying the second motion to recuse — entered
just days before the third motion was filed. But, “[a]llegations consisting of bare
conclusions and opinions that the assigned judge is biased or prejudiced for or against
a party, USCR 25.2, are not legally sufficient to support a recusal motion or to justify
forwarding the motion for decision by another judge.”Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced
Materials, 303 Ga. 764, 767 (2) (815 SE2d 70) (2018). Moreover, the motion to recuse
must be based on extra-judicial acts, and therefore cannot be based on the issuance of
an order. Echols v. Echols, 281 Ga. 546, 548 (1)(a) (640 SE2d 257) (2007); USCR 25.2.
13
affidavit makes no showing to establish good cause for the late filing. See USCR 25.1.

Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in denying this motion as untimely.

See Battlefield Invs. v. City of Lafayette, 326 Ga. App. 405, 408 (2) (756 SE2d 639)

(2014) (trial court properly denied motion to recuse as untimely where it was not filed

within five days of knowledge of alleged bias and without good cause for delay); Long

v. State, 324 Ga. App. 882, 895 (5) (752 SE2d 54) (2013); USCR 25.1.

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Padgett, J., concur.

14