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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

IRENE J. NEELEY v. MAREN C. PARSELL

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A25A1958

• Disposition: Dismissed

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Dismissed

Combined Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 10, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A1958. NEELEY v. PARSELL et al.

PIPKIN, Judge.

This case involves a boundary dispute between owners of adjacent residential

properties. In August 2020, Appellant Irene Neeley filed a complaint for declaratory

judgment and other relief to establish title by prescription to the disputed strip of land.

The following month, Appellees Maren and Jason Parsell filed an answer and

counterclaims to quiet title and for other relief. The parties consented to have the title

issues decided by a special master, and on November 16, 2022, the special master filed

his report and recommendations, which he amended on December 27, 2022. After a

hearing, on February 28, 2024, the trial court entered an order on the special master’s

report and recommendations in which the court rejected Appellant’s claims and
quieted title to the disputed strip of land in Appellee Maren Parsell. On August 9,

2024, Appellees filed a voluntary dismissal of their remaining counterclaims. On

Monday, September 9, 2024, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s

February 28, 2024 order in which Appellant noted that Appellees had dismissed their

remaining counterclaims on August 9, 2024.

“It is ... the duty of a reviewing or appellate court to raise the question of its

jurisdiction in all cases in which there may be any doubt as to the existence of such

jurisdiction.” Patterson v. State, 321 Ga. 487, 487 (915 SE2d 555) (2025) (citation

modified). Appellant’s notice of appeal identifies the order being appealed as the trial

court’s February 28, 2024 order. See OCGA § 5-6-37 (requiring a notice of appeal to

“set forth ... a concise statement of the judgment, ruling, or order entitling the

appellant to take an appeal”); Mateen v. Dicus, 281 Ga. 455, 456 (637 SE2d 377)

(2006) (“[A]n appellant need only include in the notice of appeal the single judgment

that entitles the appellant to take an appeal ... .”). But Appellant did not file her notice

of appeal until September 9, 2024, long after the 30-day deadline to file a notice of

appeal from the February 28, 2024 order had expired. See OCGA § 5-6-38(a) (“A

notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or

2
judgment complained of ... .”). Appellees’ voluntary dismissal of their remaining

counterclaims was not a judgment, ruling, or order of the trial court that could itself

be appealed, and Appellees’ filing of the voluntary dismissal did not extend the time

to file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s February 28, 2024 order. See Dykes v.

Atlanta Paving & Concrete Constr., Inc., 375 Ga. App. 119, 122-25 (914 SE2d 416)

(2025). Accordingly, Appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, and we therefore lack

jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Heard v. State, 274 Ga. 196, 196 (1) (552 SE2d

818) (2001) (“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute prerequisite to

confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court ... .”).1

Appeal dismissed. Hodges, J., concurs. McFadden, P. J., dissents.

1
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for a different reason. In light
of our disposition of this appeal, we dismiss Appellees’ motion as moot.
3
A25A1958. NEELEY v. PARSELL et al.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent for the reasons set out in my dissent from the denial of en

banc consideration, joined by Presiding Judge Barnes, Presiding Judge Doyle, then-

Judge Land, and Judge Watkins, in Dykes v. Atlanta Paving & Concrete Constr., 375 Ga.

App. 119, 126-29 (914 SE2d 416) (2025). I adhere to that dissent because, as explained

therein, the majority opinion in Dykes, is contrary to precedent from our Supreme

Court. See Blash v. State, 318 Ga. 325, 329-30 (1) (a) (898 SE2d 522) (2024); Clark v.

Deal, 298 Ga. 893, 894 (2) (785 SE2d 524) (2016); State v. Hood, 295 Ga. 664, 664–65

(763 SE2d 487) (2014).