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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Adoption of: N.R.A., Appeal of: M.A.A.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 915 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Dubow

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (12.1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Dubow

J-A29014-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF N.R.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: M.A.A., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 915 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
at No(s): No. 103 of 2024

IN RE: ADOPTION OF S.R.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: M.A.A., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 916 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered June 25, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
at No(s): No. 102 of 2024

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.D.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: M.A.A., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 917 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
at No(s): 101of 2024

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: G.T.N., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
J-A29014-25

:
:
APPEAL OF: M.A.A., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 918 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
at No(s): 100 of 2024

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: March 9, 2026

Appellant, M.A.A. (“Mother”), appeals from the orders that involuntarily

terminated her parental rights to twelve-year-old G.T.N., nine-year-old J.D.C,

four-year-old S.R.A, and three-year-old N.R.A (collectively, “Children”),

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). Upon review, we find that the

record is devoid of clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511(b) and, therefore, we are constrained to vacate and

remand for further proceedings.

The following procedural and factual history is relevant to this appeal.

Mother has an extensive history with child welfare agencies in various counties

due to illegal drug use, homelessness, and child neglect. Mother has a total

of thirteen children, eleven of whom have been removed from her care.

Regarding the subjects of this appeal, W.B. is the putative father of G.T.N.;

B.F. is the putative father of J.D.C.; and R.W.A., III (“Father”) is the biological

father of S.R.A. and N.R.A. Mother and Father are engaged in an on-again,

off-again romantic relationship. The Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau

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J-A29014-25

(“the Agency”) has been involved with the family since March of 2020 due to

numerous referrals regarding Mother and Father’s illegal drug use, lack of

supervision of Children, and inadequate housing. On June 23, 2023, the trial

court adjudicated Children dependent and implemented court-ordered

supervision after Mother refused to cooperate with services. On June 28,

2023, the Agency obtained emergency custody after Children, ranging in age

from infant to nine years old, were spotted at a local Dollar General Store

without adult supervision begging for food. The two youngest children were

left outside the store in strollers with soiled diapers. Video surveillance

showed the older children attempting to open cans of food in the store and

one of the older children smoking a vape pen. Children all exhibited extremely

poor hygiene. Notably, Children all tested positive for cocaine and/or

methamphetamines, presumably from drug residue in Mother’s home.

Children were placed in foster care.

Mother was ordered to comply with random drug screens, undergo a

drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with recommendations, participate in

recommended parenting classes, maintain stable, appropriate and clean

housing, and maintain a legal and verifiable source of income.

The trial court held regular permanency review hearings and

consistently found Mother’s compliance to be minimal. On November 22,

2024, the Agency filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental

rights to Children. The trial court appointed Adam H. Andre, Esq., to serve as

legal counsel for oldest child G.T.N. The trial court appointed Emily K.

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J-A29014-25

Trisoline, Esq., to serve as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Children as well as

legal counsel for J.D.C., S.R.A., and N.R.A., after finding there was no conflict

in Attorney Trisoline serving in the dual role.

The trial court held hearings on May 1, 2025, and May 29, 2025. With

regards to Mother, the Agency presented testimony from Jean DeFilippis,

owner of ARC Point Labs; Jena Clair, visitation supervisor at UPMC Western

Behavior Health at Mon-Yough; and Karyl Piper, Agency caseworker.

In sum, Ms. DeFilippis testified that her company attempted to screen

Mother for drug and alcohol 262 times and that 175 attempts were

unsuccessful. Additionally, Ms. DeFilippis testified that Mother refused to

comply on eight occasions and tested positive 29 times for unprescribed

substances, including cocaine and methamphetamine. Ms. DeFilippis

explained that testing was on hold from January 15, 2025, until March 11,

2025, while Mother attended an inpatient drug and alcohol treatment

program. Following treatment, Mother tested positive for cocaine on April 8,

May 1, and May 15, 2025, including right before the initial termination of

parental rights hearing. Ms. DeFilippis testified that Children were tested for

illegal substances one and two days after being removed from Mother’s care.

S.R.A and N.R.A. tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine, J.D.C.

and G.T.N. tested positive for cocaine. She explained that the tests showed

that Children were exposed to these substances more than once in the three-

month period prior to Children’s removal from Mother’s care.

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J-A29014-25

Dr. O’Malley conducted an interactional evaluation between Mother and

Children in July of 2023 when Children first came into the custody of the

Agency. Dr. O’Malley testified that he rated Mother’s “insight and judgment”

as “poor” due to Mother’s denial of her substance abuse and lack of concern

regarding Children’s development. N.T. Hr’g, 5/1/25, at 48. Dr. O’Malley

testified that the three youngest children were affectionate with Mother, who

reciprocated. Dr. O’Malley noted safety concerns during the evaluation when

J.D.C. and S.R.A. were walking on tables and the couch in the visitation room

repeatedly, which Mother addressed “at times.” Id. Following the evaluation,

Dr. O’Malley recommended that Mother receive parenting instruction, drug

and alcohol treatment, and that Mother’s visits remain supervised.

Ms. Clair testified that she supervised visits between Mother and

Children and that Mother attended 56 out of the 174 total offered visits. Ms.

Clair explained that Mother was often late for visits, left early on four

occasions, and would often confirm multiple times and then fail to show at the

visits. Ms. Clair testified that when Mother did attend visits, she would spend

30 to 45 minutes in the kitchen preparing food for Children rather than

interacting with them. Ms. Clair explained that it was a “challenge” for Mother

to manage Children, that Mother failed to provide equal attention to Children,

that Mother failed to notice safety concerns such as the two younger children

leaving the visitation room and/or putting objects in their mouths. Ms. Clair

testified that Mother struggled to respond emotionally to Children and often

made unfulfilled promises to Children, for example promising to bring a cake

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J-A29014-25

and presents for their birthdays and then missing several visits. Ms. Clair

reported that Children were more affectionate with Mother when visits were

consistent, and that their excitement at seeing her “wore off a little bit” as

“gaps between visits increased.” Id. at 82. Ms. Clair informed the court that

Mother failed to visit Children following her discharge from drug rehabilitation

in February 2025 until the day before the hearing on April 1, 2025, and that

Mother never progressed from supervised visitation.

Ms. Clair testified that she also provided parenting instruction to Mother.

Ms. Clair reported that Mother failed to attend most sessions and only

attended 26 out of the 103 sessions that Ms. Clair offered.

Ms. Piper testified that she could not recommend that Mother’s visits be

changed to unsupervised due to Mother’s significant parenting deficits, lack of

supervision during visits, safety concerns, and Mother’s ongoing illegal drug

use. Ms. Piper informed the court that Mother was currently living with her

mother, Children’s maternal grandmother, and that Mother had reported

numerous housing leads to the Agency, none of which were able to be verified.

Ms. Piper testified that Mother did not have a verifiable source of income, but

that she sometimes sold illegal drugs when she was “low on money.” Id. at

1. Ms. Piper testified that Mother’s parental rights to six other children were

involuntarily terminated and that Mother had a criminal history that included

a conviction for three counts of Engaging the Welfare of Children. Ms. Piper

testified that termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and

welfare of Children because Mother had made “minimal to no” progress

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J-A29014-25

towards reunification despite the Agency offering 32 months of service,

including 9 months of supervision prior to Children being placed. Id. at 205.

Ms. Piper testified that Children are all placed in pre-adoptive foster

homes with oldest child G.T.N. in one home and the other three children in

another home. Ms. Piper testified that the foster parents are meeting

Children’s needs. She explained that G.T.N. and J.D.C. receive therapeutic

services at school and in the community and that S.R.A. and N.R.A. are

involved in an early head start program. She testified that Children are up to

date with all necessary medical appointments and attend school regularly. Ms.

Piper testified that the foster families meet all of Children’s “needs

developmentally, physically, and emotionally” and Children are all “observed

to have a close relationship with their foster families[.]” Id. at 208. Ms. Piper

testified, “[a]ll [C]hildren are observed to be happy, healthy. They’re doing

well. . . . Previously on occasion there would be some behavioral concerns

after visits [but] since the parents are visiting minimally, if at all, there have

been no behaviors reported.” Id. at 209.

Mother testified that she lived in her mother’s house with Father, who is

her fiancé, and her children 16-year-old D.R. and 17-year-old S.R.1 Mother

testified that she recently applied for housing and expects to have her own

housing in the next month. Mother testified that she is not currently

employed. Mother explained that she has had several interviews and can get

---

1 D.R. and S.R. are not subjects of this appeal.

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J-A29014-25

her job back at McDonalds at any time but that she did not want to start

working until she moved to her new housing. Mother testified that visits with

Children go well and Children cry when they must leave. She further testified

that during visits they paint, color, read books, and eat food that she brings

and prepares. Mother informed the court that she attended inpatient drug

and alcohol treatment at Cove Forge in February of 2025 and was successfully

discharged. Mother explained that she is currently in treatment at Crossroads,

where she receives a sublocade injection every month. Mother testified that

her drug and alcohol screens at Crossroads were negative on March 11, March

25, and April 1, 2025, and she submitted paper copies of the screening results

as exhibits. See Mother’s Exhibit B. Mother testified that she is seeking

outpatient treatment at both SPHS and Greensburg Drug and Alcohol Center,

but the providers cannot accommodate her. Mother stated that she plans to

find an outpatient drug and alcohol provider once she moves to her new

housing. Mother testified that she loves Children and wants to be reunified

with them. Mother stated, “I made a lot of mistakes in my past, and I’m not

– I’m sorry for that. I am not perfect by any means. Sorry. But I know I’m

doing my best and that’s all I can do.” N.T. Hr’g, 5/29/25, at 42.

Attorney Andrae represented to the court that G.T.N. wishes to remain

in his current foster home if he is not returned to Mother.

On June 24, 2025, the court issued an order and opinion involuntarily

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to Sections

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J-A29014-25

2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) of the Adoption Act.2 Children’s GAL

agreed with this disposition.

Mother timely appealed. Mother complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The

trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion relying on its June 24, 2025, order and

opinion.

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the honorable trial court erred in finding clear and
convincing evidence that the moving party met its burden
as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)?

II. Whether the honorable trial court erred in finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the moving party met its
burden as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5)?

III. Whether the honorable trial court erred in finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the moving party met its
burden as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)?

IV. Whether the honorable trial court erred in finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the moving party met its
burden as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Br. at 4-5 (some capitalization omitted).

In cases involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, this

Court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s conclusion is

supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580,

---

2 The trial court terminated the parental rights of Father, who pursued a
separate appeal at Docket Nos. 913 WDA 2025 and 914 WDA 2025. The court
also terminated the parental rights of Children’s respective putative fathers.

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J-A29014-25

591 (Pa. 2021). When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a

petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the findings

of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports

them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual findings

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an

error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent an abuse

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial

court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). We may not reverse merely because

the record could support a different result. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give

great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-hand observations of

the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he trial court is

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise

free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the

evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation

omitted). It is axiomatic that “[p]arents enjoy a fundamental right to make

decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot

be denied that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent

and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an

undeniable importance in a child’s relationship with a biological parent.”

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “[i]n

recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the

moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing

• 10 - J-A29014-25

evidence; that is, evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as

to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 592 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs

termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “[I]nitially,

the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d

1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As discussed above, “[t]he

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that

the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated

in Section 2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). If the court determines that the

parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her pareK.ntal rights, the court

then engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best

interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, we need only agree

with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well

as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). We concentrate our analysis on Section

2511(a)(2).

Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of parental rights where the

petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence

• 11 - J-A29014-25

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by

the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,

827 (Pa. 2012). “The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section

2511(a)(2) due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative

misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well

as incapacity to perform parental duties.” Int. of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474

(Pa. Super. 2020).

“Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably

prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262

(Pa. Super. 2019). Notably, a “parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period

of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,

1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

Finally, sincere efforts to perform parental duties may still be insufficient

to remedy an incapacity. Id. at 1117. This is because subsection (a)(2)

“emphasizes the child’s present and future need for essential parental care,

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being[,]”

especially “where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is

no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” Id. (citation omitted).

Instantly, the trial court found that Mother’s continued refusal to

consistently engage in drug and alcohol treatment has caused Mother to be

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non-compliant with services and, in turn, caused Children to be without

essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or

mental well-being since June of 2023. The trial court acknowledged that

Mother completed an inpatient drug and alcohol program but noted that

Mother relapsed upon discharge. The court opined:

Since the case was opened for services, Mother did not take
sufficient corrective action to alleviate the concerns of the agency.
Mother continues to struggle with substance abuse. On April 8,
2025, Mother tested positive for [c]ocaine during a random drug
screen. Despite Mother’s negative drug screens for March and
April of 2025, as submitted under Mother’s Exhibit B and proof of
Mother’s successful completion of Cove Forge’s Rehabilitation
program as evidenced through Mother’s Exhibit “A”, Mother tested
positive on May 1, 2025 at the [t]ermination [h]earing for
[c]ocaine which was confirmed by the lab. Mother tested positive
for [c]ocaine and THC on May 14, 2025 as confirmed by the lab. .
. . Substance abuse concerns remain a major hinderance to
reunification.

Trial Ct. Op. for G.T.N., 6/24/25, at 12-13 (unpaginated).3 The court

emphasized that Mother failed to consistently visit Children, attend parenting

classes, secure appropriate housing, or maintain employment.

Mother failed to consistently participate in visits or parenting
sessions with the child. No indication of Mother’s ability to
adequately parent the child has been evidenced since June of
2023. Mother remains unable to secure stable and appropriate
housing for the child nor has Mother provided proof of
employment to the caseworker. Mother’s testimony mentioned
that Mother could return to her job at McDonald’s at any time and
that Mother was on a waitlist for housing. Mother had almost two
years to satisfy these requirements for reunification but never

---

3 The trial court issued a separate opinion for each child. The trial court’s
findings regarding Mother are substantially similar even though the findings
appear on slightly different pages in each opinion.

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succeeded in doing so. Mother’s compliance and progress never
moved higher than a rating of minimal. As such, despite the
numerous services offered to Mother to assist her with reunifying
with [Children], the [c]ourt finds that the [A]gency has satisfied
its burden with respect to Mother under this factor.

Id. at 12-13 (unpaginated).

Based on our review, we conclude that the court did not err in finding

the Agency presented sufficient evidence to satisfy Section 2511(a)(2). The

court heard undisputed testimony that Mother made minimal to no progress

towards reunification with Children. N.T. Hr’g, 5/1/25, at 8. Mother failed to

consistently engage in drug and alcohol treatment, attend parenting classes,

obtain appropriate housing, and obtain employment. Most notably, Mother

failed to consistently visit with Children and attended less than half of the

scheduled visits. The record supports the trial court’s findings that Mother

refused to provide essential parental care for Children. Thus, we discern no

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s terminating Mother’s parental rights to

Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

---

With respect to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has recently

explained that the “primary consideration must be the child’s developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085,

1105 (Pa. 2023) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); some quotation marks

omitted). “Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child's

perspective, placing [his or] her developmental, physical, and emotional

• 14 - J-A29014-25

needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” Id. This determination

must be made on a case-by-case basis with the court considering each child’s

special needs. Id. at 1105-1106. Our Supreme Court has interpreted the

“emotional needs and welfare of the child . . . to include intangibles such as

love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “One major aspect of the needs and

welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond

between parent and child with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197

A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 2018) (citation omitted). The fact that a child has

a bond with a parent “does not preclude the termination of parental rights.”

In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014). Rather, the trial court must

examine the depth of the bond to determine whether the bond is so

meaningful to the child that its termination would destroy an existing,

necessary, and beneficial relationship. Id. at 898. In other words, “[c]ourts

must determine whether the trauma caused by breaking that bond is

outweighed by the benefit of moving the child toward a permanent home.”

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 253. “Moreover, by evaluating the impact of severance to

determine if it will impose more than an adverse or detrimental impact, courts

correctly refine their focus on the child's development and mental and

emotional health rather than considering only the child's ‘feelings’ or ‘affection’

for the parent, which even badly abused and neglected children will retain.”

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K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110–11. “Therefore, to grant termination when a parental

bond exists, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the bond is not

necessary and beneficial.” Id. at 1114.

“The Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration of other

important factors such as: the child's need for permanency and length of time

in foster care []; whether the child is in a preadoptive home and bonded with

foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child's developmental,

physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort,

security, safety, and stability.” Id. at 1113.

Mother avers that the trial court erred when it terminated her parental

rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). Mother’s Br. at 29. Mother argues that

the Agency failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Children and

Mother do not have a bond or have a negative bond. Id. at 33. Mother argues

that the evidence demonstrates that Children do have a bond with Mother,

and the trial court failed to address the impact of severing the bond between

Mother and Children. Id. at 31. Finally, Mother argues that the trial court

failed to make any findings regarding whether Children have a bond with their

current foster family. Id. at 32.

Our review of the trial court’s Section 2511(b) analysis reveals that the

court focused entirely on Mother’s substance abuse and her lack of progress

toward reunification, rather than the needs and welfare of each child to

determine if termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Children’s best

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interest. The court failed to make any findings regarding each child’s bond

with Mother and, if one exists, the impact of severing that bond; each child’s

need for permanency; each child’s bond with their foster family; and each

child’s needs and welfare within the foster home. Moreover, the record lacks

clear and convincing evidence in this regard.

Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the orders terminating

Mother’s parental rights to Children. We remand for the court to hold a

hearing forthwith upon remittal of the certified record for the parties to present

evidence regarding the “developmental, physical and emotional needs and

welfare” of each child pursuant to Section 2511(b), including evidence

regarding parent-child bond. The trial court shall then conduct a proper

analysis pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) as described supra.

Orders vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this

decision after receipt of the certified record, which we direct the Prothonotary

to remit immediately. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 03/09/2026

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