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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Cooper CA2/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B343191

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (13.9K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/9/26 P. v. Cooper CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B343191

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA085495)
v.

DAMAJAI COOPER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Lisa Strassner and Robert Chu, Judges.
Affirmed.
Sunnie L. Daniels, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Damajai Cooper
of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)1 Cooper’s
sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in revoking
his in propria persona (pro. per.) status after he refused to appear
for a pretrial hearing. When granting his motion for self-
representation, the trial court warned Cooper that his refusal to
appear in court would result in the termination of his pro. per.
status. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Factual Background
Because the facts underlying Cooper’s conviction are not
relevant to the resolution of this appeal, we summarize them only
briefly. Cooper dated Albert Madden’s granddaughter and
occasionally lived with Madden before the couple broke up.
In July 2023, Madden was found dead in the hallway of his
home with a gunshot wound to his head. Expert testimony
established that bullets and cartridges found at Madden’s home
and a bullet recovered from Madden’s body matched test bullets
and cartridges fired from a gun found in Cooper’s bedroom.
Bloodstains in a bedroom of Madden’s home matched Cooper’s
DNA. Surveillance videos and cellular telephone records
indicated that Cooper walked from his house to Madden’s house
in the early morning of the day Madden’s body was found.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Procedural Background
The People charged Cooper by information with murder
committed with malice aforethought (§ 187, subd. (a)) and alleged
that Cooper personally used a firearm in the commission of the
murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
In January and March 2024, Cooper made Marsden
motions after his attorney requested trial continuances to review
prosecution evidence and obtain expert opinions.2 At each
hearing, Cooper expressed frustration about his attorney’s
requests for continuances and the lack of progress in his case.
The trial court denied his motions.
On April 23, 2024, at a trial setting hearing, Cooper
invoked his right to represent himself. Cooper agreed that he
was familiar with a form titled “Advisement and Waiver of Right
to Counsel”; had placed his initials next to each paragraph,
indicating that he understood the warnings; and had signed at
the bottom. One of the advisements on the form stated: “I
understand that the Judge may terminate my right to act as my
own attorney in the event that I engage in serious misconduct or
obstruct the conduct and progress of the trial.”
The trial court confirmed that Cooper understood the risks
of self-representation. Among other things, the court asked: “Do
you understand that if you misbehave while in court or on the
way to court or refuse to come to court or in any way disrupt the
integrity of the courtroom proceedings, your pro[.] per[.]
privileges will be terminated?” Cooper asked the court to repeat
the question. The court again asked: “If you misbehave while in
court, on the way to court, or refuse to come to court, or in any
way disrupt the integrity of the courtroom proceedings, your

2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

3
pro[.] per[.] privileges will be terminated. [¶] Do you understand
that?” Cooper stated that he understood.
The trial court found that Cooper voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently waived his right to be represented by an
attorney and granted him pro. per. status.
The court subsequently advised Cooper of his “AB700
rights.”3 In pertinent part, the court stated: “You have the right
and obligation to be personally present in court. The trial or
other proceedings will proceed without you if you refuse to be
personally present. . . . Your absence from the trial or other
proceeding will constitute a voluntary waiver of any
constitutional or statutory right to confront any witnesses
against you or to testify on your own behalf.” Cooper confirmed
that he understood.
Cooper indicated that he wished to proceed to trial as soon
as possible. The trial court asked the prosecutor to provide
Cooper with written discovery by the end of the week and set a
discovery compliance hearing for May 3, 2024. The prosecutor
agreed to have the discovery redacted and ready to turn over to

3 Assembly Bill No. 700 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 196) (Assembly Bill No. 700), amended section 1043 to provide
that a felony trial may continue in a defendant’s absence if the
court makes specific findings by clear and convincing evidence,
including that “[t]he defendant is in custody and is refusing,
without good cause, to appear in court on that day for that trial”;
“[t]he defendant has been informed of their right and obligation
to be personally present in court”; and “[t]he defendant has been
informed that the trial will proceed without the defendant being
present.” (§ 1043, subd. (f)(1)(A)–(C); Stats. 2021, ch. 196, § 2.)

4
Cooper on that date. The trial court explained that if Cooper did
not waive time, the case would be sent out for trial on May 20.4
On May 3, 2024, the trial court stated that Cooper was not
present in the courtroom. The Sheriff’s Department had provided
the court with paperwork indicating that Cooper had refused to
leave his cell to attend court that morning. The court explained
on the record that, when granting Cooper pro. per. status, it had
made “it very clear, quote, if you . . . refuse to come to court, or in
any other way disrupt the integrity of the courtroom proceedings,
your pro[.] per[.] privileges will be terminated. [¶] He has refused
today in direct violation of what I just indicated were things he
needed to follow, in terms of his pro[.] per[.] status.” The court
terminated Cooper’s pro. per. status and reappointed his public
defender.
A jury found Cooper guilty of second degree murder and
found true firearm enhancements under sections 12022.5,
subdivision (a), and 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d).
The trial court sentenced Cooper to a total of 40 years to
life, consisting of 15 years to life for the murder conviction and 25

4 The court urged Cooper to consider whether he would have
enough time to prepare for trial, asking: “Do you really think
that’s enough time to look at all your discovery? If you’re getting
some of it, only some of it on May 3rd, your investigator will have
none of it, and you’re really talking about going to trial two weeks
later, on a murder, looking at 35-to-life, with no experts.” Cooper
responded: “Respectfully, yes.”

5
years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement.5
Cooper timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It
Terminated Cooper’s Self-Representation
Cooper argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it revoked his pro. per. status based on a single refusal to
come to court. We disagree and affirm.
A. Applicable legal principles
The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution gives a
defendant the right of self-representation. (Faretta v. California
(1975) 422 U.S. 806, 807, 819.) “That right is not without limits,
however. [Citation.] ‘ “[The] government’s interest in ensuring
the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the
defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.” ’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Becerra (2016) 63 Cal.4th 511, 518.) “Whenever
‘deliberate dilatory or obstructive behavior’ threatens to subvert
‘the core concept of a trial’ [citation] or to compromise the court’s
ability to conduct a fair trial [citation], the defendant’s Faretta
rights are subject to forfeiture.” (People v. Carson (2005) 35
Cal.4th 1, 10 (Carson).)
The California Supreme Court has identified “several
factors in addition to the nature of the misconduct and its impact
on the trial proceedings” that a trial court should consider when

5 The trial court also imposed, but stayed, sentences of 20
years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (c)
enhancement; 10 years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b)
enhancement; and the mid-term of four years for the
section 12022.5, subdivision (a) enhancement.

6
deciding whether to terminate a defendant’s self-representation.
(Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 10.) “One consideration is the
availability and suitability of alternative sanctions. [Citation.]
Misconduct that is more removed from the trial proceedings,
more subject to rectification or correction, or otherwise less likely
to affect the fairness of the trial may not justify complete
withdrawal of the defendant’s right of self-representation.
[Citations.] The court should also consider whether the
defendant has been warned that particular misconduct will result
in termination of in propria persona status. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Finally, the court should “assess whether the defendant has
‘intentionally sought to disrupt and delay his trial.’ ” (Ibid.) A
dilatory purpose is sufficient to support termination, but intent is
not a necessary condition. (Ibid.)
“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining
whether termination of Faretta rights is necessary to maintain
the integrity and fairness of proceedings. [Citation.] A court’s
decision will not be disturbed absent a strong showing of clear
abuse.” (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 495 (Ng).)
B. Analysis
We evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion in
revoking Cooper’s pro. per. status based on the Carson factors.
Thus, we consider “the nature of the misconduct and its impact
on the trial proceedings.” (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
Cooper refused to appear in court for a pretrial hearing. The
purpose of the hearing was for Cooper to receive discovery, which
he would need to prepare for trial which was set to begin in
around two weeks. Yet, Cooper absented himself entirely, thus
obstructing the proceedings.

7
As to the availability and suitability of alternative
sanctions, we note that the trial court expressly warned Cooper
that his refusal to come to court would result in the court
terminating his pro. per. status. Further, the nature of the
misconduct—Cooper simply refusing to come to court—limited
the court’s ability to impose other sanctions or correct the
behavior. The trial court cannot chastise, advise, or “hear [the
defendant] speak on the matter,” when the defendant refuses to
present himself to the court. Cooper does not suggest what
“alternative sanctions” would have been available in this case.
We are not persuaded that, having already explicitly
warned Cooper of the consequence for refusing to come to court,
the trial court was required to overlook Cooper’s decision to
ignore the warning or attempt to address Cooper’s behavior in
some other fashion. Moreover, our Supreme Court has also
stated that a trial court is not required to consider alternative
sanctions when a defendant has engaged in intentional
obstructionist conduct, as such conduct is an independently
sufficient ground for the termination of the right of self-
representation. (Ng, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 498; Carson, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
As to whether Cooper intentionally sought to disrupt and
delay the trial (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 10), the trial court
did not make any express findings relevant to the factor.
However, in Carson, the court explained it was not holding “that
an intent to disrupt is a necessary condition. . . . Ultimately, the
relevance inheres in the effect of the misconduct on the trial
proceedings, not the defendant’s purpose.” (Id. at pp. 10–11.)
Here, irrespective of Cooper’s intent, his refusal to come to court
to receive discovery was disruptive. The trial court could

8
reasonably conclude his conduct would threaten the core integrity
of the proceedings if allowed to repeat.
People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507 (Kirvin) is
instructive. In Kirvin, the defendant argued the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing his request to represent himself
based on his repeated refusals to come to court, including to meet
with a court-appointed expert.6 (Kirvin, at pp. 1513, 1516.) The
appellate court rejected the claim, explaining: “The court did not
act beyond the ‘bounds of reason’ in concluding that Defendant’s
repeated refusal to come to court or obey court orders to meet
with others would seriously threaten the core integrity of the
trial. An in-custody defendant who wishes to represent himself
but demonstrates a pattern of refusing to come to court or to
leave his cell when ordered puts the trial court on the horns of a
dilemma: That court must either (1) halt the court proceedings
whenever the defendant decides to remain in his cell (thereby
inconveniencing the jurors and witnesses, and playing havoc with
the court’s busy calendar), or (2) face the unpleasant prospect of
proceeding with trial in the absence of the defendant or anyone
representing him (in derogation of the strong statutory and
constitutional preference that criminal defendants be present
during a trial in which their liberty is on the line). [Citations.]
If, as our Supreme Court has noted, a defendant’s refusal to sit in
the appropriate place in the courtroom is a basis for denying the
right to self-representation [citation], the defendant’s total
absence from the courtroom surely is.” (Id. at p. 1516.)

6 The defendant in Kirvin once refused to leave his jail cell to
attend court proceedings and twice refused to go to court to meet
with a court-appointed mental health expert. (Kirvin, supra, 231
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1512, 1513, 1516.)

9
Cooper asserts Kirvin is distinguishable because the
defendant in that case refused to attend court proceedings more
than once. While we acknowledge that Cooper did not engage in
a similar pattern of refusals to present himself in court, we
nevertheless find the Kirvin court’s reasoning applicable. As in
Kirvin, Cooper was forewarned that refusing to come to court
would result in the court terminating his pro. per. status. Given
the warning, which appears to have been more explicit here than
it was in Kirvin, the trial court was faced with a similar dilemma.
Cooper refused to come to court at the very next proceeding after
the court granted his Faretta motion. The trial court could
reasonably interpret Cooper’s refusal to come to court as a
demonstration of his willingness to flout the court’s warnings and
to obstruct the proceedings in a manner that would seriously
threaten the core integrity of the trial. (See Carson, supra, 35
Cal.4th at p. 10 [“[T]he defendant’s acts need not result in a
disruption of the trial. . . . The likely, not the actual, effect of the
misconduct should be the primary consideration.”].)
Cooper argues that although the trial court warned him
about the consequence of refusing to come to court, the court’s
subsequent Assembly Bill No. 700 advisement contradicted and
nullified that warning. However, that advisement did not
reference Cooper’s right of self-representation, and Cooper had no
reason to believe that it superseded the court’s prior warnings.
The fact that Cooper would waive other constitutional rights if he
refused to be present, and that proceedings would continue in his
absence, did not directly contradict the court’s warning that
Cooper would forfeit his right of self-representation by refusing to
appear. Because we find no conflict between the warnings and
advisement, the cases Cooper cites to support his claim that the

10
consequences of failing to appear were unclear, or that the
Assembly Bill No. 700 advisement controls, are inapposite.
Cooper also contends that although at least one court has
found a single act of misconduct was sufficient to support the
termination of a defendant’s pro. per. status where the defendant
attempted to intimidate a witness (People v. Torres (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 984, 989–990), his single refusal to appear in court
was far less egregious, and “[n]ot every obstructive act will be so
flagrant and inconsistent with the integrity and fairness of the
trial that immediate termination is appropriate.” (Carson, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
While a single refusal to attend court proceedings may be
misconduct of a different nature than witness intimidation, it is
nonetheless inconsistent with the integrity and fairness of a trial,
in that it requires the trial court to either halt and delay the
proceedings, or proceed in the defendant’s absence. Further, we
may not disturb the trial court’s ruling absent a strong showing
of clear abuse. Cooper’s prompt failure to heed the trial court’s
warning and the inconsistency between his requests to proceed to
trial and his refusal to appear support the trial court’s conclusion
that the revocation of Cooper’s pro. per. status was necessary to
maintain the integrity of proceedings. We conclude that the
court’s ruling was not outside the bounds of reason.

11
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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