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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com.

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: A167721A

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (154)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/9/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, INC. et al.,
Petitioners,
v. A167721
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
(Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 22-12-056)
Respondent;

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
COMPANY et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.

For over 30 years, California has used a net energy metering (NEM)
tariff that allows public utility customers with renewable electrical
generating facilities to receive credit on their electric bills for excess energy
exported to the power grid. (Pub. Util. Code, § 2827, added by Stats. 1995,
ch. 369, § 1; undesignated statutory references are to this code.) In 2013, the
Legislature enacted section 2827.1, directing the Public Utilities Commission
(Commission) to develop a successor tariff. (Stats. 2013, ch. 611, § 11.)
Under then-existing law, NEM customers received credit at the full retail
rate — including certain fixed costs of the exported energy — resulting in a
“substantial subsidy” to those customers and a shifting of costs to non-NEM
customers. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis

1
of Assem. Bill No. 327 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 6, 2013, p. 7
(Sen. Analysis).) By enacting section 2827.1, the Legislature directed the
Commission to ensure the successor tariff “is based on the electrical system
costs and benefits received by nonparticipating customers” and “prevents a
cost shift to non-NEM customers.” (Sen. Analysis, at p. 4.)
In 2022, the Commission adopted a successor tariff in its Decision
Revising Net Energy Metering Tariff and Subtariffs (2022) Cal. P.U.C. Dec.
No. 22-12-056 (Decision). Petitioners Center for Biological Diversity, Inc.,
Environmental Working Group, and The Protect our Communities
Foundation (collectively, petitioners) filed a petition for writ review in this
court, contending the successor tariff was inconsistent with section 2827.1.
We granted the petition and affirmed the Decision. (Center for Biological
Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 20, review
granted Apr. 10, 2024, S283614 (CBD I).)
The California Supreme Court granted review and addressed an issue
it acknowledged petitioners had failed to raise in our court: whether the
“highly deferential” approach of Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities
Com. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 406 (Greyhound) applies to the Commission’s
interpretation of the Public Utilities Code. (Center for Biological Diversity,
Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 293, 301 (CBD II).) The court
concluded it does not, and it reversed and remanded the matter to this court
to address in the first instance whether the successor tariff should be upheld
under the standard set forth in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of
Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th at page 1 (Yamaha). (CBD II, at p. 309.)
After applying that standard here, we again affirm the Decision.

2
BACKGROUND
The supply of power generated by renewable systems is neither
constant nor consistent. Solar panels, for example, may generate electricity
only when the sun shines, and the amount of power they generate depends on
the intensity of the sunlight. They “may generate less—or more—electricity
than their owners need at a particular time. At night or on a cloudy day, for
example, a utility customer with solar panels may need to draw additional
electricity from the power grid. On a sunny morning, by contrast, the panels
may generate more electricity than the customer needs, allowing the
customer to export excess energy to the grid.” (CBD II, supra, 18 Cal.5th
at p. 299.)
The Legislature has required utilities to compensate eligible “customer-
generators” for energy those customers export since the enactment of section
2827 in 1995. (§ 2827, subd. (b)(4)(A); CBD II, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 299;
Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 656, Stats. 1995 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.)
Summary Dig.) The program was expected to “encourage substantial private
investment in renewable energy resources, stimulate in-state economic
growth, reduce demand for electricity during peak consumption periods, help
stabilize California’s energy supply infrastructure, enhance the continued
diversification of California’s energy resource mix, reduce interconnection
and administrative costs for electricity suppliers, and encourage conservation
and efficiency.” (§ 2827, subd. (a).)
The Commission created the first NEM tariff (NEM 1.0) pursuant to
section 2827. Under NEM 1.0, residences with solar power systems1 were

1 Originally, the NEM tariff required by section 2827 applied only to

solar power systems operated by an electric utility’s residential customers.
(Former § 2827, subd. (b).) The tariff now applies to any “renewable
electrical generation facility” with a total capacity of one megawatt or less
3
allowed to install an electricity meter that measured the difference between
the quantity of electricity supplied to the residence by the utility and the
quantity of electricity supplied to the grid by the residence — hence the
name, “net energy metering.” (Former § 2827, subds. (c), (d).) The residence
was charged only for this difference — i.e., the net use of electricity from the
grid. (Id., subd. (f)(2).) By offsetting exported power with imported power,
NEM 1.0 functionally required utilities to purchase excess power at the price
paid by the customers for electricity. (CBD II, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 299.)
Almost two decades later, the Legislature instructed the Commission to
revisit the compensation for consumer-generators by enacting section 2827.1.
(CBD II, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 300, citing Stats. 2013, ch. 611, § 11,
pp. 5030–5031.) A bill analysis identified a more specific purpose: “to ensure
that the [successor tariff] is based on the electrical system costs and benefits
received by nonparticipating customers and prevents a cost shift to non-NEM
customers.” (Sen. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.)
Under NEM 1.0, consumer-generators had received bill credit at the
full retail rate. (Sen. Analysis, supra, at p. 7.) Because this rate included
certain fixed costs, like transmission and distribution costs, NEM customers
were receiving a “substantial subsidy,” thereby shifting costs to non-NEM
customers. (Ibid.) A bill analysis observed that “transmission and
distribution costs are typically one-half to two-thirds of a residential
customer’s billing.” (Ibid.) It thus estimated that full retail NEM “comes at a
cost of approximately $60 million to non-NEM customers across the state.”
(Ibid.) While the Legislature had “in the past justified this subsidy as it
stimulates the solar industry, helps the state reach its renewable energy

operated by a utility customer, regardless of the way the power is generated
or the nature of the customer. (§§ 2827, subd. (b)(4)(A), 2827.1, subd. (a).)
4
goals, and provides other external benefits,” the Legislature now directed the
Commission to develop a successor tariff that “prevents a cost shift to non-
NEM customers.” (Id. at pp. 7, 4.)
As relevant here, section 2827.1, subdivision (b) (section 2827.1(b))
identifies three objectives the Commission must ensure in developing the
successor tariff. The Commission must (1) ensure that the successor tariff
“ensures that customer-sited renewable distributed generation continues to
grow sustainably,” and include “specific alternatives designed for growth
among residential customers in disadvantaged communities” (id.,
subd. (b)(1)); (2) ensure that the successor tariff be “based on the costs and
benefits of the renewable electrical generation facility” (id., subd. (b)(3)); and
(3) ensure that the “total benefits” of the successor tariff “to all customers and
the electrical system” are “approximately equal to the total costs” (id.,
subd. (b)(4)). Section 2827.1(b) also allows the Commission to revise the
successor tariff “as appropriate to achieve the objectives of this section.”
The Commission adopted a revised tariff (NEM 2.0) in 2016 as an
interim measure to address some of the concerns about cost-shifting under
NEM 1.0. NEM customers continued to receive full retail rate credit but
were charged a onetime interconnection fee and other periodic “non-
bypassable” fees. It was thought that NEM 2.0 would be subject to review in
or after 2019, when a more permanent replacement for NEM 1.0 would be
adopted.
The Commission initiated a proceeding in 2020 to “revisit” NEM 2.0
and issued its Decision adopting the successor tariff — which it calls a net
billing tariff — in 2022. (Decision, supra, at p. 137.) The “foundation” for the
successor tariff was the Net-Energy Metering 2.0 Lookback Study, January
21, 2021 (Lookback Study), an evaluation of NEM 2.0 by outside consultants

5
Verdant Associates, LLC that concluded “NEM 2.0 participants benefit from
the structure, while ratepayers see increased rates.” (Decision, at p. 207;
Lookback Study, at p. 1.)
Drawing on the Lookback Study, the Commission found the NEM 2.0
tariff “negatively impacts non-participating ratepayers, disproportionately
harms low-income ratepayers, and is not cost-effective.” (Decision, supra,
at pp. 2–3, 207.) The Commission explained this negative impact was caused
by the “20-year legacy” of full retail rate compensation, which allowed NEM
customers to avoid paying their proportionate share of the “infrastructure
and other service costs”2 associated with electrical service — because those
costs are “embedded in” the rates charged for electricity — and shifted those
costs to non-NEM customers. (Id. at pp. 47, 208.) The Commission found
these shifted costs to be one of three drivers of high electricity rates (along
with costs of transmission and distribution and wildfire mitigation). (Id.
at p. 208.) And by equating the prices of imported and exported electricity,
the Commission further found the NEM tariff had overcompensated
customers for the electricity they supplied back to the grid, effectively paying
such customers at a rate from “3.8 to 5.4 times” greater than the benefit
conferred. (Id. at p. 216.)
Based on these and other findings, the Commission adopted the
successor tariff. (Decision, supra, at pp. 137, 207–237.) The most
fundamental change from the prior NEM tariff was that imported and
exported power under the successor tariff are calculated separately (i.e., “no
netting of consumption and production”), and customers are then billed for

2 In addition to the costs of servicing customers and maintaining the

power grid, these costs include funding for various public policy programs,
such as those subsidizing utility service to low-income customers.
6
the difference between the value of the power imported and exported, rather
than the difference in quantity. (Id. at p. 237.) In other words, imported and
exported power are no longer treated as equivalent. (Ibid.)
Under the successor tariff, export compensation rates are based on
values derived from the “Avoided Cost Calculator” (calculator), a tool
developed earlier by the Commission “ ‘to determine the primary benefits of
distributed energy resources.’ ” (Decision, supra, at pp. 59, 233, 237.) As set
forth by the Commission, the calculator “ ‘calculates seven types of avoided
costs: generation capacity, energy, transmission and distribution capacity,
ancillary services, Renewables Portfolio Standard, greenhouse gas emissions,
and high global warming potential gases.’ ” (Id. at p. 59.) The avoided costs
determined in the calculator “are the utilities’ marginal costs of providing
electric service to customers” that “can be avoided when the demand for
energy decreases because of distributed energy resources, and are, thus, the
benefits of using distributed energy resources.” (Ibid.)
The Commission stated the successor tariff “makes great strides in
tackling the cost shift” to nonparticipating customers. (Decision, supra,
at p. 170.) For participating customers, the Commission acknowledged the
changes would likely reduce bill credits (as the price paid for exported power
determined by the calculator is typically less than the full retail price), but
they would still provide credits targeting a nine-year payback period on the
upfront cost of a stand-alone solar system (or the equivalent of nearly $100 in
monthly bill savings). (Id. at p. 77, Appendix at p. 2.)
To ease the transition and “ensure the sustainable growth of customer-
sited renewable distributed generation,” the Commission adopted a five-year
“glide path” in the successor tariff. (Decision, supra, at pp. 4, 170.) The glide
path consists of an “adder” to increase compensation rates for new residential

7
customers above the value determined by the calculator, with a stepdown
over time so the path ultimately ends at the calculator-based values. (Id.
at p. 148.) The glide path includes a higher adder for residential customers
enrolled in the California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE) program,
resident owners of single-family homes living in disadvantaged communities,
and residential customers who live in California Indian country. (Id.
at pp. 158, 176.)
Finally, the Commission stated it would evaluate the successor tariff by
collecting data for three years after its implementation and follow “a similar
process as conducted in the Lookback Study, reviewing the entire successor
tariff but with a focus on affordability, equity, and grid benefits.” (Decision,
supra, at p. 200.) According to the Commission, it is currently in the process
of collecting such data.
Petitioners submitted an application for rehearing to the Commission,
which was denied. (Order Denying Rehearing of Decision 22-12-056 (2023)
Cal. P.U.C. Dec. No. 23-06-056.) They filed a petition for a writ of review in
this court. (§ 1756, subd. (a) [within 30 days after denial of application for
rehearing, “any aggrieved party may petition for a writ of review in the court
of appeal or the Supreme Court for the purpose of having the lawfulness of
the original order or decision or of the order or decision on rehearing inquired
into and determined”].) Petitioners argued the Decision was inconsistent
with the objectives in section 2827.1(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(4). We granted the
petition, and answers were filed by the Commission and real parties in
interest.3

3 Given the extensive record of exhibits lodged by petitioners, we

declined to require the Commission to file an administrative record but
permitted the parties to request supplementation. We grant the
Commission’s request to add the Assigned Commissioner’s Scoping Memo
8
We affirmed the Decision. (CBD I, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 43,
review granted.) In so doing, we used the standard set forth in Greyhound,
concluded the successor tariff bore a reasonable relation to the purpose and
language of section 2827.1, and concluded the Commission did not otherwise
err. (CBD I, at p. 43; see Greyhound, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 410–411
[“[C]ommission’s interpretation of the Public Utilities Code should not be
disturbed unless it fails to bear a reasonable relation to statutory purposes
and language”].)
Petitioners subsequently presented the following issues in their
petition for review to the California Supreme Court: whether the deferential
standard of review in our opinion conflicted with law and identified a conflict
in case law for resolution, and whether the Commission failed to proceed in a
manner required by section 2827.1(b)(1) (that the Commission must “include
specific alternatives designed for growth among residential customers in
disadvantaged communities” in developing the successor tariff) and (b)(3)
(that the Commission must ensure that the successor tariff is “based on the
costs and benefits of the renewable electrical generation facility”).
The Supreme Court noted petitioners had not raised the first issue in
this court but addressed it given the absence of any objection and because the
issue “presents a question of law of considerable statewide importance.”
(CBD II, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 301.) The court concluded the “highly
deferential” approach of Greyhound no longer applies to the Commission’s
interpretation of the Public Utilities Code. (CBD II, at p. 299.) It explained
that “[w]here, as here, the primary question is whether a state agency has

and Ruling, Rulemaking 22-11-013 (May 31, 2023) as it appears appropriate
for inclusion in the administrative record. We otherwise deny the request, as
it seeks inclusion of other material that postdates both the Decision and the
order denying petitioners’ application for rehearing.
9
acted in a manner consistent with the statute it purports to implement,
judicial review typically differs meaningfully from the approach we described
in Greyhound,” and the “leading case concerning review of an agency’s
statutory interpretation” is Yamaha. (CBD II, at p. 305.)
The court declined to resolve whether our ultimate conclusion in CBD
I — that the successor tariff is consistent with section 2827.1 — was correct
or incorrect, leaving for us the question of whether the tariff should be upheld
under the Yamaha standard. (CBD II, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 299, 309.)
The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion. (Id. at p. 309.) Supplemental opening and
responding briefs have since been filed by petitioners, the Commission, and
real parties in interest. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b).)
DISCUSSION
The parties agree section 1757.1 governs the scope of our review
because the successor tariff was adopted by the Commission through a
rulemaking proceeding. (Compare § 1757 [scope of review “[i]n a complaint
or enforcement proceeding, or in a ratemaking or licensing decision of specific
application that is addressed to particular parties”] with § 1757.1 [scope of
review “[i]n any proceeding other than a proceeding subject to the standard of
review under Section 1757”].) Section 1757.1, subdivision (a) provides, in
relevant part, that judicial review “shall not extend further than to
determine,” based on the entire record, whether the Decision “was an abuse
of discretion,” the Commission “has not proceeded in the manner required by
law,” or the Decision “is not supported by the findings.” (Id. subd. (a)(1)–(2),
(4).)
Most of petitioners’ arguments, including those presented in their
original petition and in their supplemental briefing after remand, seek

10
review pursuant to section 1757.1(a)(2). That is, they contend the
Commission failed to proceed in the manner required by section 2827.1(b)(1),
(b)(3), and (b)(4) in developing and adopting the successor tariff.
As the Supreme Court explained in CBD II, the Yamaha standard
governs our inquiry of whether the Commission has acted in a manner
consistent with section 2827.1, the statute it purported to implement in
developing and adopting the successor tariff. (CBD II, supra, 18 Cal.5th
at p. 305.) Yamaha differentiated the scope of that inquiry on the “opposite
ends of an administrative continuum,” from “quasi-legislative regulations
adopted by an agency to which the Legislature has confided the power to
‘make law’ ” to “[a]n agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a
statute.” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 6, fn. 3, 7.) On one end of the
continuum, quasi-legislative regulations are “subject to a substantially
narrower scope of review: ‘If satisfied that the rule in question lay within the
lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature, and that it is reasonably
necessary to implement the purpose of the statute, judicial review is at an
end.’ ” (CBD II, at p. 305, quoting Yamaha, at pp. 10–11.) On the other end
of the continuum, “the binding power of an agency’s interpretation of a
statute or regulation is contextual: Its power to persuade is both
circumstantial and dependent on the presence or absence of factors that
support the merit of the interpretation.” (Yamaha, at p. 7.)
We agree with the Commission that its Decision is a quasi-legislative
administrative decision properly reviewed at that end of the Yamaha
continuum. “[Q]uasi-legislative rules are the substantive product of a
delegated legislative power conferred on the agency.” (Yamaha, supra,
19 Cal.4th at p. 8, italics omitted.) Through its enactment of section
2827.1(b), the Legislature explicitly directed the Commission to develop a

11
tariff for eligible customer-generators with a renewable electrical generation
facility and afforded the Commission with discretion to revise that tariff as
appropriate to achieve statutory objectives. Pursuant to this directive, the
Commission engaged in an extensive, yearslong rulemaking proceeding,
instituting the proceeding in 2020 and issuing its Decision in 2022. During
this proceeding, the Commission presented the Lookback Study, adopted
guiding principles for the development of the successor tariff to reflect the
objectives of section 2827.1, reviewed 19 proposals from parties, held 12 days
of evidentiary hearings, and considered briefing and comments presented by
a broad range of stakeholders. (Decision, supra, at pp. 10–11.)
Petitioners’ contentions that the Commission failed to proceed in the
manner required by section 2827.1(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(4) are thus subject to
the “narrow” scope of review under Yamaha: specifically, whether the
Commission’s Decision developing and adopting the successor tariff “lay
within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature.” (Yamaha,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.) But Yamaha instructs that “even quasi-
legislative rules are reviewed independently for consistency with controlling
law. A court does not, in other words, defer to an agency’s view when
deciding whether a regulation lies within the scope of the authority delegated
by the Legislature. The court, not the agency, has ‘final responsibility for the
interpretation of the law’ under which the regulation was issued.” (Yamaha,
at p. 11, fn. 4.)
Accordingly, we exercise our independent judgment in interpreting the
provisions of section 2827.1. Our fundamental task is to give effect to the
intended purpose of the statute, and we apply well-settled principles of
construction. (California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017)
3 Cal.5th 924, 933–934 (Cannabis Coalition).) We begin with the words of

12
the statute themselves because “ ‘ “ ‘they generally provide the most reliable
indicator of legislative intent.’ ” ’ ” (Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018)
5 Cal.5th 627, 634.) We ascribe to words “their ordinary meaning, while
taking account of related provisions and the structure of the relevant
statutory . . . scheme.” (Cannabis Coalition, at p. 933.) “ ‘ “If the statutory
language is clear and unambiguous our inquiry ends.” ’ ” (Lopez, at p. 634.)
But if any ambiguity remains, we may then consider extrinsic aids such as
legislative history materials. (Cannabis Coalition, at p. 934.)
With this framework in mind, we address petitioners’ arguments
regarding section 2827.1(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(4) in turn.
I.
The objective set forth in section 2827.1(b)(1) contains two components
for development of the successor tariff: that the Commission ensure that the
successor tariff ensures customer-sited renewable distributed generation
“continues to grow sustainably,” and that the Commission include “specific
alternatives designed for growth among residential customers in
disadvantaged communities.” Petitioners argue the Commission failed to
proceed in the manner required by each of these components. They fail to
persuade.
As a preliminary matter, the Commission contends petitioners’
arguments regarding this first component of section 2827.1(b)(1) (as well as
their arguments regarding § 2827.1(b)(4)) cannot be revisited on remand
because petitioners did not seek Supreme Court review of those issues, and
our prior opinion thus remains “law of the case” on those issues. (Santa
Barbara County Water Agency v. All Persons & Parties (1960) 53 Cal.2d 743,
745.) But the Commission’s cited authority suggests any such rule is not
applicable given the procedural posture here. (Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (2003)

13
113 Cal.App.4th 738, 744, fn. 1 [concluding certain points in original opinion
were not affected by United States Supreme Court action and thus remained
“law of the case”].) We originally concluded the successor tariff bears a
reasonable relation to the purpose and language of the provisions in section
2827.1, but the Supreme Court reversed our judgment — concluding this
“highly deferential” approach was no longer applicable — and remanded to us
to address in the first instance whether the successor tariff should be upheld
under the Yamaha standard. (CBD I, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 43, rev.gr.;
CBD II, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 301, 309.) Because application of that
standard affects how we analyze the challenges raised here, we consider
them anew.
Turning to the first component of section 2827.1(b)(1), petitioners do
not suggest the successor tariff has halted all growth of customer-sited
renewable distributed generation. Rather, they contend the term “continues”
in section 2827.1(b)(1) should be interpreted in accordance with a dictionary
definition “ ‘to maintain without interruption a condition, course, or action,’ ”
and because the successor tariff created a significantly longer payback
period for renewable systems by reducing bill savings — slowing the rate
of growth — the tariff is inconsistent with the statute.
We are unpersuaded that using this dictionary definition gives proper
effect to the purpose of section 2827.1(b)(1). The statutory phrase, in its
entirety, requires the Commission to ensure the successor tariff ensures
customer-sited renewable distributed generation “continues to grow
sustainably.” (Italics added.) The legislative history of section 2827.14

4 We deny as unnecessary the requests for judicial notice filed by

petitioners on May 3 and July 31, 2023, the Commission on September 29,
2023, and real parties in interest on June 21, 2023 and January 12, 2026.
These requests seek judicial notice of legislative history materials,
14
indicates what the Legislature meant when it added the term “sustainably.”
A bill analysis explained that, over the prior two decades, the NEM tariff had
resulted in a “substantial subsidy” to participating customers and a shifting
of costs to non-NEM customers. (Sen. Analysis, supra, at p. 7.) The
Legislature estimated this cost shift to be “approximately $60 million.”
(Ibid.) Given the increasing number of participating customers over time —
and the decreasing number of non-NEM customers bearing the resulting cost
shift — it is clear the Legislature understood the NEM 1.0 tariff was not
sustainable. We decline to interpret section 2827.1(b)(1), as petitioners urge,
to require the Commission to ensure that the successor tariff preserves a
subsidy (and resulting cost shift) the Legislature expressly sought to address.
(Sen. Analysis, at p. 4.)
Section 2827.1(b)(1) must also be read alongside the surrounding
subsections. (Cannabis Coalition, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933.) Section
2827.1(b)(4) requires the Commission to ensure the total benefits and costs of
the successor tariff to “all customers and the electrical system” are
approximately equal. Legislative history shows the sustainability objective
in section 2827.1(b)(1) was linked to the equity objective in section
2827.1(b)(4). The author of the bill enacting section 2827.1 described the
successor tariff as “allowing [a] sustainable program, which ensures that the
total benefits of the program to all customers and the electric system are

Commission decisions, and other agency documents, all of which are
published. Such requests are unnecessary. “ ‘Citation to the material is
sufficient.’ ” (Wittenburg v. Beachwalk Homeowners Assn. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 654, 665, fn. 4 [considering request for judicial notice of
published Senate bill analysis as citation to material]; Thornton v. California
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410, fn. 3
[denying request for judicial notice of published agency recommendation].)
15
equal to the total costs.” (Assem. Henry T. Perea, Fact Sheet on Assem. Bill
No. 327, dated Aug. 28, 2013 (Fact Sheet) p. 2.)
Moreover, section 2827.1(b)(6) required the Commission to establish a
transition period for customer-generators taking service under a NEM tariff
prior to July 1, 2017, and to consider “a reasonable expected payback period
based on the year the customer initially took service” in doing so. This is
further confirmation that the Legislature did not intend to require the
Commission to maintain the NEM tariff (and its resulting payback period)
without interruption. In short, nothing in section 2827.1(b)(1) requires the
Commission ensure the successor tariff would result in continued growth of
customer-sited renewable distributed generation at the same pace as before
its adoption.
As to the second component of section 2827.1(b)(1), petitioners contend
the Commission failed to “include specific alternatives designed for growth
among residential customers in disadvantaged communities.” In its
supplemental briefing after remand, the Commission maintains it addressed
this requirement in two ways. First, the glide path in the successor tariff
includes a higher adder for residential customers enrolled in the CARE
program, resident owners of single-family homes living in disadvantaged
communities, and residential customers who live in California Indian
country. (Decision, supra, at pp. 158, 176.) Second, the Commission adopted
a series of programs through rulemaking proceedings in 2017 and 2018 to
promote the growth of renewable energy in disadvantaged communities. The
Solar on Multifamily Affordable Housing Program (SOMAH), for example,
provides financial incentives for the installation of solar systems on
multifamily affordable housing properties. (See Decision Adopting
Implementation Framework for Assembly Bill 693 and Creating the Solar on

16
Multifamily Affordable Housing Program (2017) Cal. P.U.C. Dec. No. 17-12-
022, at pp. 9–10.)
Petitioners argue these earlier adopted programs are insufficient to
satisfy section 2827.1(b)(1) because the Commission was required to adopt
specific alternatives in the successor tariff. In other words, they contend the
statute should be interpreted to require the Commission to have developed
new alternatives at the same time it created the successor tariff. This
interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Section
2827.1(b)(1) requires the Commission (not the successor tariff itself) to
include specific alternatives designed for growth among residential customers
in disadvantaged communities. We are not persuaded that the inclusion of
specific alternatives adopted by the Commission through earlier rulemaking
proceedings falls outside the lawmaking authority delegated by the
Legislature.5 (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
For the first time in their supplemental briefing after remand,
petitioners alternatively argue the higher adder and earlier adopted
programs are insufficient to satisfy section 2827.1(b)(1) because they focus on
low-income households and not communities “defined by geographic, public-
health, and environmental-hazard criteria.” Specifically, they argue the term
“disadvantaged communities” in section 2827.1(b)(1) should be interpreted to
include those falling within the top 25 percent scoring areas of

5 Given this conclusion, we reject any argument by petitioners that the

Commission did not proceed in a manner consistent with section 2827.1(b)(1)
because the “specific alternatives” requirement is plural. We similarly reject
any argument that the earlier adopted programs cannot satisfy the
requirement because they were not relied upon or mentioned in the Decision.
The Decision makes multiple references to SOMAH, including a finding that
evaluation of the program “could be useful in determining future changes to
the tariff.” (Decision, supra, at pp. 227, 174, 182, 236.)
17
“CalEnviroScreen,” a screening methodology developed by an office of the
California Environmental Protection Agency to identify communities
disproportionately burdened by pollution. (Cal. Office of Environmental
Health Hazard Assessment, CalEnviroScreen 4.0 (Oct. 2021) p. 8.)
As a preliminary matter, petitioners have not explained why this
argument is not forfeited. (Cf. Unzueta v. Akopyan (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 67,
78, fn. 8 [declining to find forfeiture where new argument was made in
response to issue raised on remand].) Even if not forfeited, there is nothing
in section 2827.1(b)(1) that suggests the term “disadvantaged communities”
must be defined to include the communities specified by petitioners. And in
any event, the Commission explains that the higher adder does apply to those
communities: resident owners of single-family homes living in
“disadvantaged communities” include those “among the top 25 percent of
communities statewide” identified by CalEnviroScreen (with the exception of
the Community Solar program). (Decision, supra, at p. 176; Alternate
Decision Adopting Alternatives to Promote Solar Distributed Generation in
Disadvantaged Communities (2018) Cal. P.U.C. Dec. No. 18-06-027, at p. 96.)
Petitioners also raised several arguments regarding section
2827.1(b)(1) in their original petition that they do not appear to maintain in
their supplemental briefing on remand. But given the nature of such
briefing — and petitioners’ raising of an issue in the Supreme Court that they
failed to raise when previously before us — we address them in an abundance
of caution. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b) [“Supplemental briefs must be
limited to matters arising after the previous Court of Appeal decision in the
cause, unless the presiding justice permits briefing on other matters”].)
Petitioners contend the higher adder fails to provide a sufficient
alternative for growth because it underestimated the cost of installing solar

18
in disadvantaged communities. To the extent this raises a challenge under
section 1757.1(a)(2) (that the Commission failed to proceed under manner
required by law), we see nothing in section 2827.1(b)(1) that mandates any
specific amount of growth among residential customers in disadvantaged
communities, or that such growth must be equivalent to growth for other
customers. To the extent this raises a challenge under section 1757.1(a)(4)
(that the Decision is not supported by the findings), the Commission found a
value of $3.30 per watt for the cost of solar used in calculating the higher
adder to be reasonable as the adopted 2023 cost of solar, and expressly
rejected petitioners’ proposed $4.28 value because it was derived from a
materially different solar incentive program. (Decision, supra, at pp. 82–84.)
Petitioners offer no basis to review the sufficiency of evidence supporting this
finding. (See § 1757.1(c) [factual findings are “final and shall not be subject
to review” except as otherwise provided in statute]; California Community
Choice Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 845, 854
[explaining § 1757.1 includes grounds for judicial review in § 1757 “except for
the fourth ground authorizing a substantial evidence review of the
Commission’s findings”].)
Finally, petitioners contend the Commission otherwise failed to proceed
in the manner required by section 2827.1(b)(1) because it did not create an
equity fund, which would use a billing surcharge imposed through the
successor tariff to assist low-income customers in acquiring renewable
systems, and it deferred consideration of community solar systems upon
finding such consideration “premature.” (Decision, supra, at p. 188.) But
nothing in section 2827.1(b)(1) suggests the Commission was required to
include any particular “alternatives” to ensure growth of renewable energy in
disadvantaged communities. Importantly, our interpretation does not

19
suggest the Commission was barred from considering such alternatives (or
would be precluded from revisiting them in the future after, for example,
reviewing data from the initial implementation of the successor tariff).
But the statutory language here dictates that the Commission’s development
of the successor tariff be measured by what it did include, rather than by
what it did not. Petitioners have not shown that such development lay
outside the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature. (Yamaha,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
In sum, we conclude the Commission did not fail to proceed in the
manner required by section 2827.1(b)(1) or otherwise err when it adopted the
successor tariff.
II.
Section 2827.1(b)(3) requires the Commission to ensure the successor
tariff “is based on the costs and benefits of the renewable electrical
generation facility.” The original petition argued the Commission failed to
proceed in the manner required by section 2827.1(b)(3) because the calculator
focuses on economic benefits conferred on the grid by exported power and
fails to account for “several acknowledged benefits” of distributed renewable
generation.6 Specifically, petitioners cited four purported “societal” benefits:
resiliency, avoided out-of-state methane leakage, avoided land use impacts,
and avoided transmission costs.

6 In analyzing this argument, we need not address petitioners’ citation

to generalized principles regarding cost-benefit analysis by an administrative
agency. (Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.
(9th Cir. 2008) 538 F.3d 1172; Golden Hill Neighborhood Assn., Inc. v. City of
San Diego (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 416.) We find these cases inapposite, as
section 2827.1 provides the framework governing the Commission’s Decision
here.
20
As a preliminary matter, we clarify that section 2827.1(b)(3) refers to
the costs and benefits of “the renewable electrical generation facility,” not
distributed renewable generation more generally. But even applying
petitioners’ argument to the correct statutory category of costs and benefits,
we are not persuaded that petitioners have shown the Commission’s Decision
fell outside its lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature. (Yamaha,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
First, the original petition described increased resiliency as “the ability
to maintain power during a blackout or other grid disruption,” including to
cool one’s home during a heat wave and prevent food spoilage due to loss of
refrigeration. The Commission declined to adopt the suggestion that this
purported increased resiliency be included in the calculator for valuing excess
power. (Decision, supra, at p. 69.) It explained that proponents had only
provided examples of such benefits that were private, highly speculative,
and/or limited to unique circumstances. (Ibid.)
Second, the original petition identified the avoidance of methane
leakage in other states that occurs when the utilities’ need for production and
transmission of out-of-state natural gas is reduced by the export of excess
power. The Commission explained that in-state methane leakage was
already accounted for in the calculator but declined to include out-of-state
methane leakage because it did not decrease regulatory compliance costs for
utilities and ratepayers. (See Decision, supra, at p. 70; Decision Adopting
Changes to the Avoided Cost Calculator (2022) Cal. P.U.C. Dec. No. 22-05-
002, at pp. 46–47 (ACC Decision).) Recognizing “greenhouse gas emissions
know no state boundary,” however, the Commission had authorized
continued monitoring and update of the issue during the next update of the
calculator. (ACC Decision, at p. 47.)

21
Third, the original petition described avoided land use impacts from
“reduced transmission projects” (i.e., rooftop solar versus utility-scale solar)
due to distributed generation. The Commission again declined to include this
suggestion in the calculator because its proponents had failed to “offer any
evidence that increased net energy metering installations will directly result
in decreased utility scale projects,” especially given analysis presented to the
Commission that a reduction in the rate of growth of customer-side solar
(contemplated with adoption of the successor tariff) would mean the need
for utility-scale solar “ ‘remains virtually the same.’ ” (Decision, supra,
at pp. 70–71.)
In each of these instances, the Commission considered but ultimately
declined to include the purported benefit in the calculator because there was
insufficient evidence at the time of its Decision that there was an actual
benefit to customers and/or the electrical system. Nothing in the language of
section 2827.1(b)(3) suggests the Commission was required to do otherwise.
Indeed, the legislative history of section 2827.1 makes clear that the
Legislature intended to provide the Commission with “flexibility to
implement fair and reasonable reforms, in line with the state’s energy policy
goals and objectives.” (Assem. Henry T. Perea, Assem. Bill No. 327 Press
Release Aug. 30, 2013.) Effectuating that intent, section 2827.1(b) explicitly
provides a mechanism for the Commission to revise the tariff “as appropriate
to achieve the objectives of this section.” We see no reason why this provision
would not include future revisions to the tariff based on new or additional
evidence regarding the costs and benefits of renewable electrical generation
facilities.
Fourth, the original petition argued that the calculator fails to fully
account for transmission costs avoided because of exported energy. The

22
Commission reviewed competing proposals for a methodology to estimate
avoided transmission costs, adopting the one it deemed most reasonable and
authorizing further review and analysis of avoided transmission costs to aid
in the development of improved methods to estimate such costs. (ACC
Decision, supra, at pp. 73–75.) Petitioners have not shown that the
Commission’s methodology falls outside its lawmaking authority delegated by
the Legislature. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.) The original petition
did not propose any alternative estimation methodology. Instead, it
presumed that the calculator undervalued avoided transmission costs by
comparing its $481 million projection of such costs for the three major public
utilities during the period 2021–2025 with a Commission report in the record
identifying a regulatory category called “transmission revenue requirements”
that exceeded $4 billion for the three utilities in 2021. But an examination of
that report makes clear that the regulatory category sweeps much broader
than costs avoided by the export of energy from renewable systems,
including, for example, “wildfire mitigation work, including enhanced
inspections and vegetation management efforts.”
The original petition also argued that the Commission failed to proceed
in the manner required by section 2827.1(b)(3) because the successor tariff
treats reduced use of grid-supplied energy by NEM customers as a cost rather
than a benefit and penalizes them when they reduce their electric bill. We
disagree. Consumer-generators are billed for the energy they import,
regardless of the degree to which they reduce their use of imported energy.
In this way, the successor tariff makes no attempt to address any cost shift
that results solely from the reduction in those customers’ use of imported
energy. Instead, it remedies only the cost shift that occurred when the NEM
tariff permitted consumer-generators to avoid paying for imported energy by

23
offsetting exported energy against it. The Legislature clearly contemplated
and wanted a successor tariff that would prevent this shift. (Sen. Analysis,
supra, at p. 4.)
The original petition lastly argued that the Commission improperly
dismissed an alternative test for evaluating distributed energy resources,
known as the “Societal Cost Test.” The Commission found it “premature” to
apply the Societal Cost Test because it was still under development by the
Commission at that time. (Decision, supra, at p. 211.) Petitioners have not
shown that the Commission’s methodology fell outside its lawmaking
authority delegated by the Legislature. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
Section 2827.1(b)(3) does not specify how the Commission should determine
the costs and benefits of renewable electrical generation facilities, let alone
require the Commission adopt a particular methodology not fully developed
at the time of its Decision. As detailed above, the Legislature intended to
provide the Commission with flexibility and we see no reason why its
discretion under section 2827.1(b) would not include future revisions to the
tariff based on new or additional methodology regarding the costs and
benefits of renewable electrical generation facilities.7
For the first time in their supplemental briefing after remand,
petitioners argue that the successor tariff is based on the utilities’ avoided
costs, and it fails to account for the benefits “that accrue when customer-

7 In its briefing before the Supreme Court, the Commission stated it

has “long acknowledged the possibility of including certain societal effects in
its cost-benefit analyses” and that the Societal Cost Test (finalized in 2024)
will be an “informative tool going forward.” The Decision also indicated the
Commission “may consider” resiliency benefits at a future time, given
“evolving analysis and changing grid conditions.” (Decision, supra, at pp. 69–
70.) Nothing about our interpretation of section 2827.1(b)(3) forecloses such
consideration.
24
generators invest in private facilities to generate and use renewable energy
on-site.” Petitioners have not explained why this argument is not forfeited.
(Unzueta v. Akopyan, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 78, fn. 8.) Even if not
forfeited, we are not persuaded that petitioners have shown the Commission’s
Decision fell outside its lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature.
(Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
As to the argument that the successor tariff is improperly based on the
utilities’ avoided costs, the Commission adopted a methodology that
considered the benefit of the renewable electrical generation facility in
reducing utilities’ costs for providing electricity that would otherwise be
recouped from customers through electricity rates. (Decision, supra, at p. 59.)
As petitioners acknowledge, “Ratepayers are on the hook for all of the
utilities’ spending.” The Legislature understood the connection between the
utilities’ avoided costs and the costs and benefits of renewable electrical
generation facilities when it enacted section 2827.1 and directed the
Commission to develop a successor tariff that prevented the shifting of utility
costs to certain customers. (Sen. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.)
Moreover, petitioners do not sufficiently describe the purported benefits
of “customer-generators invest[ing] in private facilities to generate and use
renewable energy on-site” or how they differ from the “societal benefits”
raised in their original petition. For example, petitioners contend that
generation and use of on-site power reduces the demand for electricity during
hot days and stabilizes California’s energy supply infrastructure. These
purported benefits resemble the resiliency benefit presented in the original
petition, which the Commission declined to include in the calculator because
proponents had only provided examples of such benefits that were private,
highly speculative, and/or limited to unique circumstances. (Decision, supra,

25
at p. 69.) Petitioners’ supplemental briefing cites no evidence regarding any
of these benefits. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
Commission’s Decision fell outside its lawmaking authority delegated by the
Legislature. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
Petitioners also argue that on-site generation of renewable energy
provides a benefit by generating “electricity that ratepayers are not on the
hook for.” The Decision explains that the calculator does consider this benefit
in terms of costs utilities may avoid when customers use their renewable
electrical generation facility to meet their consumption needs. (Decision,
supra, at p. 59 [noting “avoided costs determined in the Avoided Cost
Calculator are the utilities’ marginal costs of providing electric service to
customers” and “can be avoided when the demand for energy decreases
because of distributed energy resources”].) But as directed by the
Legislature, the successor tariff does not overvalue that benefit at the
expense of nongenerating customers. (Sen. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.)
Inflating the benefits of customer-generators to the detriment of
nongenerating customers would be contrary to the purpose of section 2827.1.
Petitioners appear to suggest otherwise by pointing to “the history of
the Legislature’s efforts to promote customer-generated renewable
electricity.” Specifically, petitioners rely on the express findings and
declarations made by the Legislature in 1995 when it enacted former section
2827, subdivision (a), including that net energy metering “is one way to
encourage private investment in renewable energy resources.” But the
legislative history of section 2827.1 shows why such reliance is misplaced.
The author of the bill explained the Commission would be required “to
develop a new structure for Net Energy Metering (NEM) unconstrained by
existing law (PUC code, Section 2827) governing the existing NEM program.”

26
(Fact Sheet, supra, at p. 2, italics added.) Accordingly, we decline petitioners’
invitation to import legislative findings and declarations from section 2827 to
section 2827.1, especially when it would alter the statutory objectives set
forth in section 2827.1(b).
In sum, we conclude the Commission did not fail to proceed in the
manner required by section 2827.1(b)(3) or otherwise err when it adopted the
successor tariff.
III.
Section 2827.1(b)(4) requires the Commission to ensure the “total
benefits” of the successor tariff “to all customers and the electrical system are
approximately equal to the total costs.” The original petition argued the
Commission failed to proceed in the manner required by section 2827.1(b)(4)
because its cost-effectiveness analysis improperly placed the interests of
nonparticipating customers over “cost-effectiveness to the electrical system as
a whole.” We disagree.
The Lookback Study used certain cost-effectiveness tests from the
Commission’s Standard Practice Manual. (Decision, supra, at p. 14.) This
included the Total Resources Cost (TRC) test, which “measures the net costs
of a demand-side management program as a resource option based on the
total costs of the program, including both the participants’ and the utility’s
costs.” (Decision, at p. 15, fn. 17.) It also included the Ratepayer Impact
Measure (RIM) test, which “measures what happens to customer bills or
rates due to changes in utility revenues and operating costs caused by a
program.” (Decision, id. at fn. 18.)
Contrary to petitioners’ characterization, the adoption of a successor
tariff that bases its export compensation rates on the value of the power
exported — rather than providing an offset based on quantity alone — did

27
not constitute an improper focus on nonparticipating customers. (Decision,
supra, at p. 237.) The Legislature recognized the offset used in NEM 1.0 was
inequitable because it shifted costs to non-NEM customers. (Sen. Analysis,
supra, at p. 4.) In response, section 2827.1(b)(4) directs the Commission to
ensure the total costs and benefits to all customers (and the electrical system)
are approximately equal. The clear implication of that language is to ensure
the successor tariff does not grant unwarranted benefits to, or impose
unwarranted costs on, any particular group of ratepayers. Moreover, the
TRC test did consider the costs to the electrical system as a whole. (Decision,
at pp. 62–63 [“the TRC test has the ability to indicate whether a demand side
program is cost-effective to the grid relative to other resource options”].)
Petitioners have not shown that the Commission’s cost-effective analysis fell
outside its lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature. (Yamaha,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
The original petition also argued that the Commission did not proceed
in the manner required by section 2827.1(b)(4) and erred or abused its
discretion because the successor tariff “dramatically reduce[d]” compensation
for nonresidential customers without support from findings. (§ 1757.1, subds.
(a)(1)–(2), (4).) Again, we disagree.
The Lookback Study explained that the NEM 2.0 tariff had TRC test
results for nonresidential customers averaging 1.25, where a score of 1.00
represents no net cost or benefit. (Decision, supra, at pp. 48–49.)
Accordingly, under the TRC test, the nonresidential NEM 2.0 tariff conferred
a fairly small net benefit on the electrical system and was thus cost-effective
for these market segments. (Id. at p. 49.) But the Commission declined to
adopt this conclusion because it found the nonresidential NEM 2.0 tariff
performed poorly on the RIM test: it earned an average score of .57,

28
indicating an increase in rates for all customers and an increase in bills for
nonparticipating customers. (Id. at pp. 48–50.) Given the equity objective in
section 2827.1(b)(4), and the RIM test’s usefulness in “examining whether
disproportionate impacts occur on non-participants,” the Commission placed
“more weight” on the RIM test results and found the nonresidential NEM 2.0
tariff was not cost-effective. (Decision, at p. 50.)
Petitioners appear to contend the Commission should have accepted
the cost-effectiveness conclusion from the TRC test because it is designated
as the “ ‘primary test’ ” in the Standard Practice Manual. But the TRC test
measures cost-effectiveness for the electrical system. Section 2827.1(b)(4),
however, does not require the successor tariff to be cost-effective only for the
electrical system. Instead, it requires the Commission ensure the total costs
and benefits of the successor tariff “to all customers and the electrical system”
are approximately equal. (Ibid., italics added.) Consistent with this
directive, the Commission considered test results showing the nonresidential
NEM 2.0 tariff failed to equalize costs and benefits among customers.
Petitioners also appear to contend that nonresidential customers “pay
far more in utility bills than the actual cost to provide them energy from the
grid.” The intended significance of this contention is unclear. Section
2827.1(b)(4) directs the Commission to devise a successor tariff that balances
the total costs and benefits across all customers and the electrical system. It
does not require the Commission to ensure no customers were charged more
by the utilities than the cost to serve them.
Finally, in their supplemental briefing after remand, petitioners argue
for the first time that the Commission failed to proceed in the manner
required by section 2827.1(b)(4) because the successor tariff is based on the
utilities’ avoided costs and fails to quantify benefits of the tariff to all

29
customers and the electrical system. Petitioners have not explained why this
argument is not forfeited. (Unzueta v. Akopyan, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th
at p. 78, fn. 8.) Even if not forfeited, we remain unpersuaded that petitioners
have shown the Commission’s Decision fell outside its lawmaking authority
delegated by the Legislature. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
The Legislature made clear that the equity objective of section
2827.1(b)(4) was to “ensure[] that the total benefits of the program to all
customers and the electric system are equal to the total costs.” (Fact Sheet,
supra, at p. 2.) As explained above, the successor tariff based export
compensation rates on values derived from the calculator, which determined
utilities’ avoided costs for providing electricity that would otherwise be
recouped from customers through electricity rates. (Decision, supra,
at pp. 59, 233, 237.) The Legislature understood the role of utilities’ avoided
costs in ensuring the costs and benefits of the successor tariff were equitable
across all customers and the electrical system. (Sen. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.)
It enacted section 2827.1 to prevent the continuation of a decades-long shift
of utilities’ costs from NEM to non-NEM customers. (Sen. Analysis, at p. 4.)
And petitioners do not sufficiently describe the benefits of the tariff
that the Commission purportedly failed to quantify. Instead, they make
vague reference to benefits of the renewable electrical generation facility
cited in their section 2827.1(b)(3) argument, including benefits of consumers
generating renewable energy on-site and other “societal” benefits. We do not
see how recharacterizing these as benefits of the tariff shows the
Commission’s Decision fell outside its lawmaking authority delegated by the
Legislature. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.) As explained above, the
tariff did account for the benefits of consumers’ renewable electrical
generation facility to meet their consumption needs but balanced it in

30
consideration of the total benefits and costs to all consumers and the
electrical system. (Decision, supra, at p. 59.) And like section 2827.1(b)(3),
nothing in section 2827.1(b)(4) requires the Commission to have balanced the
four “societal” benefits identified in the original petition when there was
insufficient evidence at the time of its Decision of an actual benefit to
customers and/or the electrical system. Nor does it preclude the Commission
from revising the tariff in the future upon new or additional evidence
regarding the total benefits and costs of the tariff to all customers and the
electrical system.
In sum, we conclude the Commission did not fail to proceed in the
manner required by section 2827.1(b)(4) and did not otherwise err or abuse
its discretion when it adopted the successor tariff.
DISPOSITION
The Decision is affirmed. The Commission and real parties in interest
shall recover their costs in this proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(1)–(2).)

31

---

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

---

TUCHER, P. J.

---

PETROU, J.

A167721; Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. P.U.C.

32
Malinda R. Dickenson; Complex Appellate Litigation Group and Steven A.
Hirsch for Petitioners The Protect our Communities Foundation and
Environmental Working Group.

Roger Lin and Anchun Jean Su for Petitioner Center for Biological Diversity,
Inc.

Samuel T. Harbourt, Mica L. Moore and Sophia Park for Respondent.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Henry Weissmann, L. Ashley Aull and Rebecca
Hansen for Real Parties in Interest Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San
Diego Gas & Electric Company, and Southern California Edison Company.

Ashley E. Merlo for Real Party in Interest Pacific Gas and Electric Company.

E. Gregory Barnes for Real Party in Interest San Diego Gas & Electric
Company.

Rebecca Meiers-De Pastino for Real Party in Interest Southern California
Edison Company.

33