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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Johnson CA2/7

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B343359

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/9/26 P. v. Johnson CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B343359

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA458043)
v.

JAMES JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

This is James Johnson’s second appeal. In his first appeal
he argued the trial court erred in revoking his right under
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) to represent
himself and in appointing counsel to represent him at his
sentencing hearing. We agreed with Johnson and directed the
court to resentence him and to apply any ameliorative legislation
that went into effect while his appeal was pending.
On remand the trial court granted Johnson’s request to
represent himself. At the sentencing hearing, which occurred
after 16 months of continuances, Johnson (immediately after the
court denied his request for another continuance) sought to
revoke his waiver of his right to counsel. The court denied
Johnson’s request to reappoint counsel as untimely and
resentenced him. Johnson argues the court erred in denying his
request for counsel. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. A Jury Convicts Johnson of Multiple Crimes;
We Affirm the Convictions, but Vacate His Sentence
and Direct the Trial Court To Resentence Him
In 2018 a jury convicted Johnson of attempted robbery
(Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664);1 assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); making a
criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)); possessing a firearm as a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)); possessing ammunition as a felon

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)); and possessing a short-barreled rifle or
shotgun (§ 33215). The jury also found Johnson personally used
a deadly or dangerous weapon and a firearm in committing the
attempted robbery (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b)).
(People v. Johnson (Sept. 13, 2022, B310101) nonpub. opn..)
At the first hearing after his conviction but before
sentencing, Johnson asked the court to replace his appointed
counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. When the
trial court denied that request, Johnson made a motion to
represent himself, which the court eventually granted. During a
subsequent hearing, however, the court found Johnson failed to
“‘behave appropriately in lockup,’” revoked his right to represent
himself, and appointed counsel to represent him. (Johnson I,
supra, B310101.) At the sentencing hearing the court exercised
its discretion under section 1385 and struck one of Johnson’s
prior serious or violent felony convictions under the three strikes
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The court sentenced Johnson
to an aggregate prison term of 24 years eight months.
Johnson appealed, arguing the trial court erred in revoking
his right to represent himself at sentencing. We agreed with
Johnson and directed the trial court to resentence him, including
under then-recent amendments to sections 654 and 1170.
(Johnson I, supra, B310101.)

B. The Trial Court Grants Johnson’s Requests To
Represent Himself and for Multiple Continuances
At a February 6, 2023 hearing the trial court appointed
Johnson’s trial counsel to represent him for sentencing.
Approximately six months later, Johnson asked to represent

3
himself. To ensure Johnson’s waiver of his right to counsel was
knowing and voluntary, the court confirmed with Johnson that
he had placed his initials in each of the boxes on a form titled
“Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel” and that he had
signed the last page of the form. The court admonished Johnson:
“It is foolish to represent yourself. . . . It’s extremely foolish. You
have an excellent attorney here. You know your attorney. Do
you understand that it is foolish to represent yourself?” Johnson
replied, “Yes.” The court warned Johnson about the “many
dangers and disadvantages” of self-representation, including that
Johnson was “too involved” in his case “to make the right
decisions,” that he did not have “legal training or experience,”
and that he would “be opposed by . . . an experienced prosecutor.”
The court informed Johnson that he would not get “any special
treatment” from the court and that he would be “required to
follow [the] same rules as an attorney.” Johnson stated he
understood all of the court’s admonitions. The court asked,
“Knowing everything I’ve just told you, do you still wish to
represent yourself?” Johnson said, “Yes.” The court found
Johnson made a “knowing, express, understandingly, intelligent
waiver of his right to counsel,” relieved his counsel, and ordered
her to remain as standby counsel.
Over the next 16 months, the court granted Johnson
multiple continuances, as well as many requests for assistance,
including for funds to hire an investigator (to assist Johnson in
obtaining his prison, hospital, and juvenile hall records and in
serving subpoenas) and medical experts (to review the records he
received). In July 2024 Johnson informed the court that he had
difficulty obtaining his Department of Corrections and

4
Rehabilitation case or central file (commonly known as a C-file),2
and the court (with Johnson’s consent) appointed his standby
counsel to represent him solely for the purpose of obtaining that
file. Approximately two weeks later, the court received the file,
gave it to Johnson’s investigator to make copies for the parties,
relieved counsel for Johnson, and ordered her to remain as
standby counsel.
On October 31, 2024 the court stated that Johnson had
received all of the discovery he requested and that sentencing
would be December 5, 2024, with “no further continuances.” On
November 19, 2024 the court reset the sentencing hearing for
December 19, 2024.

C. Johnson Seeks To Revoke His Waiver of His Right to
Counsel and Requests Reappointment of Counsel;
The Trial Court Denies Johnson’s Request and
Resentences Him
At the December 19, 2024 resentencing hearing Johnson
informed the court that he was not ready for sentencing because
he wanted to file “a motion for [his] experts.” The court told
Johnson that it had “previously warned” him that the court
would proceed with resentencing “today.” Johnson stated neither
of his two experts was “able to come to court today.” The court
explained it would review the reports of both experts, and the
prosecutor said he did not object to the court receiving the
two reports into evidence. The court stated that it had received

2 A C-file “‘is the central depository for copies of all
documents, correspondence, and reports pertaining to each
inmate.’” (Lunsted v. Superior Court (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 138,
144, fn. 1.)

5
Johnson’s 22-page motion for resentencing and that Johnson had
not filed a motion under section 1050 to continue the hearing.
The court told Johnson, “The proceedings today will move
forward on the changes in the law since you were sentenced
previously in this case . . . on January 14, 2021.” Johnson asked
the court to continue the hearing for 10 days “for an opposition.”
The court denied Johnson’s request, stating it did not find “good
cause to continue at this juncture.” The court summarized the
lengthy procedural history of the resentencing proceedings and
stated it had appointed “a host of experts” and an investigator to
assist Johnson.
When the court asked Johnson if he waived formal
arraignment for judgment and time for sentencing, Johnson
stated, “I would like to give up my status and let [standby
counsel] Ms. Chang take over the case. And I would like
Ms. Chang to take over the case because I’m not going to have a
fair hearing with you . . . . I will give up my status and let
Ms. Chang take over the case today and prepare for the motion.”
The court asked Chang (who was appearing remotely) what time
she could be in court, and she said she could be in court that
afternoon, but explained she would need “a few days” to prepare
because she had not received a copy of Johnson’s motion for
resentencing and one of the expert reports was “really, really
thick.” The court stated, “I don’t have a few days. At this time,
the request to withdraw his pro per status is denied as untimely.”
The court explained that it had made clear to Johnson that it
would proceed with the resentencing hearing on that day, that
the People agreed the court could admit the reports of the
two experts, and that Johnson had not filed a motion to continue
the hearing under section 1050. Johnson said he needed his

6
experts “to testify and certify everything that is on the report for
the sentencing hearing.”
The court reviewed the reports of Johnson’s two experts
and admitted the reports into evidence. The court also
summarized Johnson’s convictions and the changes in the
sentencing laws since his original sentencing. When the court
asked Johnson if there were any other materials he wanted the
court to consider, Johnson stated, “I have requested to give up my
status to Ms. Chang, based on I don’t have any evidence, because
I wasn’t given the opportunity to bring my experts in.” The court
said that it had not “foreclosed” Johnson from calling witnesses,
that Johnson chose “not to have them present here in court
today,” and that the court had admitted the reports of his
experts. The court stated: “The court believes at this juncture,
Mr. Johnson, that you are merely playing games with this court.
The court has continued this sentencing on numerous prior
occasions. The court actually had to take the unusual step of
trying to step in so that you could get all the records that you
needed back in July, those that should have been subpoenaed
long prior to this sentencing hearing today. . . . The court finds
that the court has made great efforts to get you prepared on this
case. You knew today, and today you don’t have your witnesses
here. We are moving forward today.” After Johnson attempted
to explain why one of his experts could not be in court, the court
stated, “I’m certainly letting you argue any of the underlying
information in either [expert’s] report. Those are being
introduced into evidence at this time. The fact that the witnesses
are not available or are not here in court, I have no information
regarding that, other than your self-serving statement. They
should have been subpoenaed here in court.”

7
Citing the experts’ reports, the court found Johnson
“suffered from childhood trauma,” “post-traumatic stress
disorder,” and “mental health issues arising out of [the trauma].”
Nevertheless, the court found that imposing the lower term
under section 1170 or striking the firearm enhancement under
section 1385 “would be contrary to the interest of justice.” On
Johnson’s conviction for attempted robbery, the court imposed
the middle term of two years, doubled under the three strikes
law, plus 10 years for a firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (b), one year for a weapon
enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), and
five years for a prior serious felony conviction under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1); on his conviction for making a criminal threat,
the court imposed a term of one year four months; and on his
conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, the court
imposed a term of one year four months, for an aggregate prison
sentence of 22 years eight months. The court imposed but stayed
under section 654 execution of sentences on Johnson’s convictions
for assault with a deadly weapon, assault with a firearm,
possession of ammunition by a felon, and possession of a short-
barreled rifle or shotgun. Johnson timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“When a criminal defendant who has waived his right to
counsel and elected to represent himself under Faretta
seeks . . . to revoke that waiver and have counsel appointed, the
trial court must exercise its discretion under the totality of the
circumstances.” (People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186, 188

8
(Lawrence); see People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 163-164
(Gallego); People v. Gonzalez (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 724, 743
(Gonzalez).) The court should consider, “along with any other
relevant circumstances, ‘(1) defendant’s prior history in the
substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-
representation to counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set forth
for the request, (3) the length and stage of the trial proceedings,
(4) disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to
ensue from the granting of such motion, and (5) the likelihood of
defendant’s effectiveness in defending against the charges if
required to continue to act as his own attorney.’” (Lawrence, at
p. 192; see Gallego, at p. 164; Gonzalez, at p. 743.) “‘“While the
consideration of these criteria . . . is obviously relevant and
helpful to a trial court in resolving the issue, they are not
absolutes, and in the final analysis it is the totality of the facts
and circumstances which the trial court must consider in
exercising its discretion as to whether or not to permit a
defendant to again change his mind regarding representation in
midtrial.”’” (Lawrence, at p. 192; accord, Gallego, at p. 164; see
Gonzalez, at p. 743 [“The trial court need not review on the record
each factor.”].) “A trial court’s denial of a Faretta revocation
request is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1006; see People v. Weber
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1061.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Johnson’s Last-minute Request To Revoke
His Waiver of His Right to Counsel
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Johnson’s request to revoke his waiver of his right to counsel.

9
First, Johnson’s prior history of substituting counsel weighed
against granting his request. At the original sentencing hearing,
after the court denied his request to replace his appointed
counsel, Johnson invoked his right to represent himself. On
remand, Johnson initially accepted representation by counsel,
but after six months he again exercised his right to represent
himself. He confirmed on two subsequent occasions, in response
to the court’s inquiries, he still wanted to represent himself.
Johnson made it abundantly clear, throughout (almost) the entire
resentencing proceedings, he did not want counsel to represent
him. He did not change his mind until the court denied his most
recent request for another continuance. After successfully
arguing in Johnson I the trial court denied him his right to
represent himself at sentencing, he represented himself for many
months, and at the last minute told the court he wanted what he
said in Johnson I he did not want: to be represented by counsel.
Johnson’s alternating invocations and revocations of his right to
represent himself supported the court’s ruling. (See People v.
Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 150 (Lawley) [defendant’s history
of substituting counsel supported the trial court’s order denying
his request for representation by counsel].)
Second, Johnson did not give a “compelling” (Lawrence,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 195-196) reason for his request. The
record supports the trial court’s conclusion Johnson asked the
court to appoint counsel to represent him, not because he
sincerely needed the assistance of counsel, but to delay the
proceedings. Johnson asked to revoke his waiver of his right to
counsel immediately after the court denied his request for yet
another continuance. As the trial court found, Johnson was
“playing games” by failing to subpoena his experts and then

10
claiming he needed a continuance to get his experts to come to
court. In addition, neither of Johnson’s two reasons for no longer
wanting to represent himself—that he did not believe the court
would give him “a fair hearing” and that he “wasn’t given the
opportunity to bring [his] experts in”—was valid. There was no
indication that the trial court would not be fair to Johnson (or
that the court would be fairer to an attorney). Nor was there any
evidence the court precluded Johnson from having his experts
come to the resentencing hearing. And because Johnson did not
subpoena his experts for the sentencing hearing, standby counsel
could not have secured their presence at the last minute. If
Johnson genuinely decided he needed counsel to represent him,
he would have asked the court to appoint counsel at the
beginning of the sentencing hearing, when he already knew his
experts would not be in court to testify that day. (See Lawrence,
at p. 195 [“Buyer’s remorse” is not a “compelling” reason “for
wanting to revoke a Faretta waiver.”]; cf. People v. Elliott (1977)
70 Cal.App.3d 984, 997 [defendant’s reason for his request for
counsel, that the People announced their intention to present
evidence on an uncharged offense, “was a valid one”].)
Third, Johnson asked the court to revoke his waiver of his
right to counsel at the last possible minute, just as the court was
about to pronounce his sentence. The court had already granted
Johnson several continuances, assisted him in obtaining his
prison, hospital, and juvenile hall records, approved funds for
him to hire an investigator and medical experts, and scheduled
numerous progress hearings to address any issues or problems
Johnson may have experienced and to remind him of upcoming
court dates. All told, the court and the People waited
approximately 22 months after this court issued its remittitur in

11
February 2023 while Johnson prepared for his resentencing
hearing. Johnson’s calculated delay in making his request
weighed against granting it. (See Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d at
p. 164 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
defendant’s midtrial request for appointment of counsel, where
the request “came late in the guilt phase trial, after a substantial
part of the prosecution case had been presented, and after [he]
had a chance to perceive that things were not proceeding as
smoothly as he had envisioned”].)
Fourth, Johnson had been, and appeared likely to continue
to be, an effective advocate for himself. He filed a 22-page motion
for resentencing that discussed the ameliorative legislation that
applied to his resentencing. Among other things, Johnson asked
the court to strike his serious felony enhancement under Senate
Bill Nos. 1393 and 81; to strike the firearm enhancement under
Senate Bill No. 620; and to resentence him to the lower term
under Senate Bill No. 567 based on evidence he “experienced
psychological[,] physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not
limited to abuse[,] neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”3

3 Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1385, subdivision (b), to allow a
trial court “to dismiss a serious felony enhancement in
furtherance of justice.” (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685,
693; see People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 965.) Senate
Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) “amended section 1385 to
specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding
whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in
the interest of justice.” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657,
674.) Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 12022.53, subdivision (h), to provide that “‘a court may, in
the interest of justice pursuant to [s]ection 1385 and at the time

12
Johnson also argued the prohibition on “multiple punishment”
under section 654 applied because three of his convictions
“shared a common intent and objective.” Johnson’s ability to
present favorable evidence (when he chose to) and make
appropriate arguments for a reduced sentence weighed against
the court granting his request for counsel. (See Lawley, supra,
27 Cal.4th at p. 150 [“the quality of [the defendant’s] self-
representation did not compel the granting of his motion” for
appointment of counsel because he demonstrated he could
“successfully” carry out the tasks in a trial]; Gallego, supra,
52 Cal.3d at p. 164 [when seeking appointment of counsel, the
defendant “exhibited considerable knowledge of both trial tactics
and trial procedure,” and “the court could have legitimately
discounted [his] protestations, and concluded his future
effectiveness would not be impaired”].)
The only factor that weighed marginally in favor of
granting Johnson’s request to give up his right to represent
himself and again become represented by an attorney was that
the request “did not pose any risk of substantial delay to the
proceedings.” Chang stated she needed only a few days to
prepare for the hearing. The court, however, did not abuse its
discretion in considering the relatively short delay in the context

of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise
required to be imposed by this section.’” (People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688, 696.) And Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) created “a presumption that the sentencing court ‘shall’
enter a lower term sentence when, among other things, a
‘psychological, physical, or childhood trauma’ contributed to the
offense.” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419; see
§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)

13
of the 22-month delay the court had already allowed. And, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th 186,
no one factor “is necessarily determinative.” (Id. at p. 196.)
Rather, the standard “is whether the court’s decision was an
abuse of its discretion under the totality of the circumstances.”
(Ibid.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Johnson’s request under the circumstances here, which included
Johnson’s history of substituting counsel, the absence of a
compelling reason for the request, the timing of the request, and
Johnson’s ability to continue to represent himself effectively.
(See Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 149-151 [trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request to
“relinquish responsibility for his own defense and obtain the
appointment of counsel to represent him,” where the “timing of
the request” suggested “an attempt to delay the trial,” appointing
counsel “would have necessitated substantial delay,” the evidence
suggested the defendant had a “proclivity to substitute counsel,”
and the defendant demonstrated he could present evidence in his
defense]; Gonzalez, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 743 [trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request
the court reappoint counsel, where the defendant made the
request the day after the court denied his request for a
continuance and the victim’s family was present at the
sentencing hearing].)
Johnson asserts he had a “very good reason for requesting
re-appointment of counsel,” namely, that he made his request
“[s]hortly” after standby counsel obtained his prison records and
that counsel “could have helped [him] in presenting mitigation,
and put forth arguments to justify striking the prior strike
conviction.” The record does not support this assertion. Johnson

14
received his file from the Department in August 2024, but he did
not ask the court to appoint counsel until four months and
several hearings later. As for needing the assistance of counsel to
ask the court to strike his prior serious or violent felony
conviction, Johnson did not mention this in the trial court. In
any event, we do not compare Johnson’s abilities and capabilities
with those of an attorney. As the Supreme Court stated in
Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th 186: “That defendant’s defense
would have been more effectively presented (or a better sentence
obtained through a negotiated plea) had he been represented is
likely. But if that fact were determinative, virtually all self-
representing defendants would have the right to revoke their
counsel waivers at any time during trial. That is not the law.”
(Id. at p. 196.)
Johnson argues in his reply brief that, unlike the
defendant’s situation in Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th 186, “there
were no legitimate concerns that [his] withdrawal of his right of
self-representation would have impaired the administration of
justice.” The record does not support Johnson’s argument. In
addition to granting multiple requests by Johnson to continue the
sentencing hearing, as well as approving resources to assist
Johnson in preparing for resentencing, the court sought to ensure
Johnson had, in the court’s words, “whatever tools he has in the
tool chest . . . to argue why he might be entitled to a lower
sentence in this case.” In July 2024 (approximately five months
before the resentencing hearing), Johnson stated he was “not
ready to be resentenced” and confirmed the “only thing”
“outstanding” was his file from the Department (which, the
prosecutor observed, Johnson did not request until 15 months
after this court issued its remittitur). The trial court said the

15
“gamesmanship on the part of” Johnson included waiting
“a significant amount of time” before requesting his file from the
Department and not filing a motion to continue when he knew
the court and the People “would prepare” for the resentencing
hearing. And yet, the court again continued the hearing (and did
so several times more). The court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Johnson’s request for counsel that would have caused
further delay to the already protracted resentencing proceedings.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

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