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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Snyder v. Cohen CA2/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B338944

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.5K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/9/26 Snyder v. Cohen CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

STEPHEN SNYDER, B338944

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV21032)

LES COHEN et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Elaine Lu, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen Snyder, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Krause-Leemon Cohen & Daneshrad and David R. Krause-
Leemon for Defendant and Respondent Les Cohen.
Nemecek & Cole, Michael McCarthy and Vikram Sohal for
Defendants and Respondents David Daneshrad, Assaf “Jay”
Cohen and Cohen & Daneshrad, LLP.

---

Respondent Les Cohen secured a default judgment against
appellant Stephen Snyder. When his efforts to set aside default
failed, Snyder sued Cohen and his attorneys, who moved to strike
the complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation
(SLAPP). The state anti-SLAPP law curbs “lawsuits brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).)1 The trial court struck
Snyder’s complaint.
On de novo review, we conclude (1) Snyder’s complaint
arises from Cohen’s First Amendment petitioning activity, and
(2) Snyder cannot prevail on the merits. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Prior Litigation
Cohen sued Snyder for fraudulently inducing him to make
sham investments (the Cohen Action). He alleged that Snyder
absconded with his money. Respondents David Daneshrad and
Assaf “Jay” Cohen (Attorneys) represented Cohen in the lawsuit.
Snyder was served with the Cohen Action on September 26,
2020. He did not answer. At Attorneys’ request, the superior
court clerk entered default on October 28, 2020.
Snyder Challenges the Default
In 2022, Snyder moved to quash service and set aside the
default, arguing that proof of service in the Cohen Action was
fraudulent. He claimed to be living in Florida in 2020, and the
court lacked personal jurisdiction because he was never served in
California. He sought to set aside the default for lack of notice
and extrinsic fraud.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2
Snyder asserted that he and Cohen entered a settlement
and release (Settlement) in May 2020, encompassing all disputes
between them. It required arbitration. Cohen sued Snyder after
signing the Settlement.
In opposition, Cohen asserted that Attorneys hired a
private investigator to ascertain Snyder’s whereabouts. An
investigation revealed that he was living with a girlfriend in
Covina. A registered process server declared he personally
served Snyder on September 26, 2020.
The Trial Court Denies Relief
The trial court denied Snyder’s motions. On the motion to
quash, it ruled that the proof of service filed by a process server
created a rebuttable presumption of proper service. It rejected
Snyder’s claim of nonresidence in California, finding his
declaration “self-serving” and unsupported by evidence of
residence in Florida. Snyder did not rebut the presumption of
proper service.
The trial court declined to set aside the default, reiterating
that Snyder was personally served. He did not “present sufficient
facts to demonstrate that he lacked notice” or refute that “any
purported lack of notice was not caused by avoidance of service or
inexcusable neglect.” He did not prove he was in Florida at the
time of service. Though Cohen did not show he served Snyder
with notice of entry of default, the court found Snyder was not
“reasonably diligent in bringing the request for relief.”
The Court Enters Default Judgment
Cohen applied for default judgment. The court entered
judgment for Cohen totaling nearly $2 million, including
prejudgment interest and costs, on his causes of action for fraud

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and conspiracy to commit fraud. Snyder was given a credit of
$212,500. He appealed the judgment.2
Snyder Sues Respondents
Acting in propria persona, Snyder sued Cohen and
Attorneys, alleging fraud, tortious interference with contract, and
Business & Professions Code (BPC) violations. He alleged the
Settlement was signed in May 2020, but respondents concealed it
in the Cohen Action. Cohen had released his claims against
Snyder and agreed to arbitrate disputes.
Snyder alleged that respondents “never actually served”
the Cohen Action. He was not living in California, the process
server lied, and default judgment was improper because he was
denied due process. Snyder acknowledged the trial court’s denial
of his motion to set aside the default.
Respondents’ Motions to Strike
Cohen moved to strike Snyder’s complaint under section
425.16, arguing that the lawsuit infringed on his constitutional
rights: “Snyder’s entire Complaint is premised on the assertion
Snyder has been damaged because Cohen sued Snyder in a prior action and obtained a judgment
against him. Snyder’s current Complaint seeks to penalize
[Cohen] for exercising his right of petition (and prevailing) in the
underlying action.” Cohen also asserted that Snyder cannot
prevail on the merits of his claims, which are barred by the
litigation privilege and res judicata.

2 The judgment was affirmed by Division Three of this
district in Cohen v. Snyder (Feb. 2, 2026, B333194 [nonpub.
opn.].) We refer to the opinion as B333194.

4
The Attorneys separately moved to strike the complaint.
They argued that Snyder sued them for filing the Cohen Action
on behalf of their client. Their activity is protected by the
litigation privilege, and the issues Snyder raises are res judicata.
In opposition, Snyder argued that respondents committed
fraud upon the court in the Cohen Action, pointing to the
Settlement. This lawsuit “is intended to stop the fraudulent
misconduct upon the court and the Plaintiff . . . as well as to undo
the injustice perpetrated against Snyder.” Snyder contended that
respondents’ concealment of the Settlement is criminal, and he
seeks to enforce its release clause. Cohen has already received
six-figure settlements from other parties.
Snyder argued he is likely to prevail on the merits. The
litigation privilege does not apply because respondents engaged
in fraud and professional misconduct. Res judicata does not
apply because Snyder is not relitigating issues. He simply wants
to enforce the Settlement.
In reply, respondents argued that filing the Cohen Action
was protected activity. Failure to disclose the Settlement to the
court was not criminal. At most, the Settlement was a potential
defense to the Cohen Action. The litigation privilege and res
judicata prevent Snyder from prevailing.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court found respondents engaged in protected
petitioning activity, and it could not identify any illegal conduct.
Filing the Cohen Action, failing to disclose the Settlement, and
filing a false proof of service are not crimes. The court did not
take judicial notice of the Settlement, which bears no file stamp
to show it is a court record. It sustained Attorneys’ objection to

5
Snyder’s claim that Cohen settled with other parties, because the
claim lacked personal knowledge or foundation.3
The court found Snyder is unlikely to prevail on the merits.
The litigation privilege applies. Filing the Cohen Action and a
false proof of service arose from the prosecution of litigation. The
court struck Snyder’s complaint and entered judgment for
respondents.
DISCUSSION
Overview of the Anti-SLAPP Law
Courts must strike causes of action arising from a
defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights unless plaintiff
shows a probability of prevailing on the claim. (§ 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).) The law is construed “broadly” (id., subd. (a)) as “a
procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims
arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016)
1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) An order granting an anti-SLAPP
motion is appealable. (§ 425.16, subd. (i).) Review is de novo.
(Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.)
A two-step analysis is done. First, the defendant must
show claims made against him arise from his protected First
Amendment activity. If constitutional rights are affected, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing
on the merits. If the plaintiff’s showing is not sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment, the claims are stricken. (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396; Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669,
678–679.) Courts consider “the pleadings, and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or
defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) Without weighing the

3 Snyder has not challenged any evidentiary rulings.

6
evidence, we determine if the moving party’s evidence defeats
plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law. (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)
Respondents’ Petitioning Activity
The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the
defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability”
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92) and “whether the
cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech
or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This encompasses “any
written or oral statement or writing” in a judicial proceeding, or
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
judicial body, and “any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(e)(1), (2), (4).)
“ ‘[T]he constitutional right to petition . . . includes the
basic act of filing litigation.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &
Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115.) Prefiling settlement
negotiations are also protected activity. (Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1024–1025.) A lawsuit
arising from prior litigation is subject to dismissal. (Shekhter v.
Financial Indemnity Co. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 151.)
Snyder’s claims arise from respondents’ petitioning
activity. He alleged: “Due to the fact that SNYDER has been
unable to properly defend himself against [Cohen’s]
FRAUDULENT COMPLAINT due to the improper service, the
court ordered a default judgment against SNYDER on
August 8th, 2023. Thus, this lawsuit is necessary in order to
undo the injustice that has been perpetrated against him.”
Opposing the motions to strike, Snyder averred that the claims
and causes of action in his lawsuit “solely have to do with fraud,

7
concealment, conspiracy, deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation of
material facts and other acts of moral turpitude that were
perpetrated against me (Snyder), the court, and other parties” in
the Cohen Action. On appeal, Snyder writes he “was never
properly served in [the Cohen Action], there was a fraudulent
proof of service filed and thus Snyder was denied due process in
that proceeding.”
The Cohen Action falls squarely within section 425.16.
Prosecuting a civil complaint is protected conduct, even if “filed
with a malicious motive and without probable cause.” (Chavez v.
Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1087–1088.) Protection
extends to counsel. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048,
1056 (Rusheen); Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 141, 158 [section 425.16 applies to “a nonclient
who alleges causes of action against someone else’s lawyer based
on that lawyer’s representation”].) “ ‘[C]onduct that would
otherwise come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute does
not lose its coverage . . . simply because it is alleged to have been
unlawful or unethical.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 285.)
Petitioning includes respondents’ allegedly fraudulent
service of summons. Service of process is a necessary step in
litigation. Misconduct related to service arises from petitioning.
(Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 966.) Abuse of
process claims are subject to a special motion to strike. (Booker v.
Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370–1371; Rusheen,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1058–1059 [false declarations of service
used to secure a default judgment].)
Apart from the claimed failure to receive service or notice,
Snyder cites respondents’ failure to disclose the Settlement,

8
which Cohen signed before filing his lawsuit. Snyder argues that
concealing the Settlement was illegal, a fraud upon the court, and
unprotected by section 425.16.
Section 425.16 does not apply if, as a matter of law, speech
or petitioning activity “was illegal and by reason of the illegality
not constitutionally protected. [Citation.] In such a narrow
circumstance, where either the defendant concedes the illegality
of its conduct or the illegality is conclusively shown by the
evidence, the motion must be denied.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006)
39 Cal.4th 299, 316.) In Flatley, an attorney’s threatening letter
amounted to extortion, which is not protected speech as a matter
of law. (Id. at pp. 328–333.)
Snyder asserts that Attorneys violated BPC section 6128.4
He points to their concealment of the Settlement as proof of
deceit. Snyder also argues that Attorneys engaged in theft, in
violation of the Penal Code.
Snyder alleged that the Attorneys were retained between
June and August 2020, after Cohen signed the Settlement. No
evidence shows Attorneys drafted the Settlement or knew of it.
Regardless of Attorneys’ knowledge, there is no proof of a crime,
let alone conclusive proof. Lawyers who make false claims may
be subject to criminal prosecution or State Bar disciplinary
proceedings, not a civil suit. (People v. Potter Handy, LLP (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 938, 944–945, 956–957.) Snyder has no proof of
perjury or theft. The “criminal activity” exception to section
425.16 does not apply here.

4 The statute reads, “[e]very attorney is guilty of a
misdemeanor who . . . [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or
consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the
court or any party.”

9
Probability of Prevailing
Snyder must show a probability of prevailing to defeat the
motion to strike. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) This step of the analysis requires
admissible evidence; plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in the
complaint or conclusory statements. (Finton Construction, Inc. v.
Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 213.) Though
“minimal merit” is needed to survive an anti-SLAPP motion
(Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89), Snyder cannot
make a minimal merit showing here.
First, the litigation privilege bars Snyder’s claims. (Civ.
Code, § 47.) It applies to communications made (1) in judicial
proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants; (3) to achieve
litigation objectives; (4) with “some connection or logical relation
to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.)
“To effect its purposes—access to the courts without fear of
later harassment by derivative tort actions, . . . giving finality to
judgments, and avoiding endless litigation—the litigation
privilege ‘is absolute and applies regardless of malice,’ and ‘ “has
been given broad application.” ’ ” (Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock
& Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 814; Rusheen, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 1063.)
The absolute privilege applies when, as here, default
judgment was allegedly based on perjured declarations of service.
(Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1052–1053, 1062.) Though
Snyder claims respondents concealed the Settlement, “the
litigation privilege extends to fraudulent statements, even when
made to a court, if they were made in furtherance of litigation”
because “ ‘ “[t]he ‘furtherance’ requirement was never intended as
a test of a participant’s motives, morals, ethics or intent.” ’ ”

10
(Herterich v. Peltner (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1141–1143
[lawsuit for fraud and concealment against an attorney and her
client arising from prior litigation].)
Second, Snyder cannot relitigate issues resolved in the
Cohen Action. Collateral estoppel applies when (1) the issue
sought to be precluded is identical to one decided in prior
litigation; (2) it was actually litigated; (3) it was necessarily
decided; and (4) the prior decision is final and on the merits.
(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)
The issues raised in this lawsuit regarding improper
service of process, extrinsic fraud, and concealment of the
Settlement were decided in B333194, Snyder’s appeal of the
default judgment. In B333194, the court found no abuse of
discretion in denying Snyder’s request for relief from default. He
did not refute the presumption of proper service. (B333194,
supra.) No due process violation occurred because he was
properly served. (Ibid.)
The court wrote in B333194 that Snyder was served with
summons and had notice and an opportunity to defend; therefore,
it rejected his claim of extrinsic fraud. Once served, Snyder could
have filed a demurrer or answer challenging respondents’ lawsuit
on the grounds that Cohen released his claims in the Settlement.
He forfeited his claim that Cohen failed to notify him of entry of
default. (B333194, supra.) Snyder cannot relitigate these issues
in his lawsuit against respondents.
Third, Civil Code section 1714.10 prohibits causes of action
against attorneys for conspiring with a client while representing
the client in a dispute, unless the plaintiff first obtains a court
order declaring there is a reasonable probability of prevailing in
the action. The “preamble” to Snyder’s complaint states that he

11
was “subjected to a grave injustice” owing to “the conspiracy
between all named Defendants”—Cohen and the Attorneys—who
willfully deceived the court and others by filing the Cohen Action
without mentioning the Settlement. All of Snyder’s causes of
action incorporate the preamble.
Snyder did not show Attorneys have an independent legal
duty to him, or that their acts went beyond representation of
Cohen for their financial gain. (Civ. Code, § 1714.10, subd. (c).)5
This is not like Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler,
Simon & Gladstone (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 54, 84–85, finding
that counsel for an insurance company had an independent duty
not to misrepresent its insured’s policy limits. Because Snyder
alleges a conspiracy between Attorneys and their client, and
failed to obtain an order allowing the claim, he cannot prevail on
his causes of action against Attorneys. (Civ. Code, § 1714.10,
subd. (b).)

5 Snyder cites malpractice cases to support the idea that
his lawsuit does not arise from protected activity. The cases are
inapposite because he is not Attorneys’ client.

12
DISPOSITION
The order striking appellant’s complaint is affirmed.
Respondents are entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

GILBERT, J.

 Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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