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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Reed CA4/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: E084598

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 3/9/26 P. v. Reed CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084598

v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB054315)

DENNIS LAMAR REED, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G. Pace,

Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
Defendant and appellant Dennis Lamar Reed filed a petition for recall and

resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1),1 which the trial

court denied. On appeal, defendant contends that the court erroneously applied the

doctrine of the law of the case to deny his petition. The People concede that the court

erred in denying defendant’s petition. We reverse and remand.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

On September 14, 2010, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder

(§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246, count 2).

The jury additionally found true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm

(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and

personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) in his commission

of the murder. The court sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment of 50 years to

life. (People v. Reed (Oct. 5, 2012, E052504) nonpub. opn.; People v. Reed

(Apr. 20, 2022, E076313) nonpub. opn..)

Defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant contended his sentence was

unauthorized because section 190.5 prohibited a sentence of life without the possibility of

parole (LWOP) for juveniles under the age of 16, that his sentence of 50 years to life was

the functional equivalent of LWOP, and that his sentence was violative of the Eighth

1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code.
Defendant, born in August 1990, was 15 years old when he committed the
offenses in February 2006, for which the jury convicted him.

2 We omit a recitation of the facts because they are irrelevant to the issues raised
on appeal.

2
Amendment. This court held that defendant’s sentence was authorized under relevant

statutory law, that defendant’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP, and

that defendant’s sentence of 50 years to life was not cruel and unusual punishment.

(Reed I, supra, E052504.)

On September 23, 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to

former section 1170.95 requesting appointment of counsel. The court denied the petition,

noting that defendant was not entitled to relief as a matter of law because he was

convicted as the actual killer and not under the felony-murder rule or the natural and

probable consequences doctrine. (Reed II, supra, E076313.)

Defendant appealed. This court held that the court erred in denying defendant’s

facially sufficient petition prior to appointing him counsel and permitting briefing, and

that because whatever documentation the court relied upon in denying defendant’s

petition was not part of the record on appeal, this court had no basis for discerning

whether the court’s denial was harmless. Thus, this court reversed the order denying the

petition and remanded the matter to the court below with directions to appoint counsel for

defendant, allow the filing of a reply to the People’s opposition, and to hold a hearing to

determine whether defendant could make a prima facie showing of relief.3 (Reed II,

supra, E076313.)

3 There is nothing in the record to reflect what occurred on remand. However, the
rational implication of the abstract of judgment continuing to reflect the original
sentence, and defendant’s filing of the instant petition, is that the court below again
denied defendant’s petition.

3
On December 11, 2023, defendant filed a form petition for recall and resentencing

pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th

608 (Heard), in which he contended he was remorseful for his actions, had no juvenile

adjudications for assault or other violent felonies, had committed the offenses with at

least one adult codefendant, and related his efforts toward rehabilitation.

On June 14, 2024, the People filed opposition contending defendant was ineligible

for relief because he was not sentenced to LWOP, he was not serving the functional

equivalent of LWOP, he was convicted of a homicide, Heard was improperly decided,

defendant was insufficiently remorseful, defendant had failed to establish rehabilitation,

and he was estopped by this court’s determination in Reed I that defendant was not

serving the functional equivalent of LWOP.

At a hearing on August 2, 2024, the court noted, “I have an opposition by the

People which asserts various things, but the most important of which is that the Court of

appeal, in one of the prior appeals, has already decided that [defendant’s] sentence was

not a de facto” LWOP sentence.

Defense counsel responded, “Your Honor, I did review the opposition, as well as

the appellate record, and I concur with the Court’s opinion that the appellate court did

previously decide the issue; and I would submit on the Court’s ruling.”

The court ruled, “The prior appellate opinion with respect to [defendant’s]

conviction in this case already decided that his sentence was not an equivalent of life

4
without the possibility of parole, so he is not eligible for [section] 1170, subdivision

relief, so I’m going to deny that petition.”

Defendant personally inquired whether his sentence was the functional equivalent

of LWOP under Heard. The court responded, “No. I don’t believe that it is. I mean, you

can discuss that issue on appeal, but because . . . the issue [was] already decided by a

higher court than me, that’s the law of the case. So obviously you can challenge that in

the appellate court, but, you know, I’m stuck with what they’ve already decided.”

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the court erroneously applied the doctrine of the law of the

case to deny his petition. Specifically, he maintains that in Reed I, he was challenging the

legality of his sentence, whereas in 2024, he is seeking resentencing; thus, he asserts that

he presented two distinctly different issues with respect to the two proceedings such that

he is not estopped from the requested relief. Defendant avers the court’s error resulted

from a misunderstanding of its discretion, such that the court abused its discretion. Thus,

he further contends that the court’s decision barred him from arguing his substantive

eligibility for relief. Finally, he maintains any error was not harmless.

The People concede that the court erred in denying defendant’s petition based on

its application of the law of the case doctrine. The People maintain that after Reed I, the

court in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras) “determined that a term of

50 years to life is the functional equivalent of an LWOP,” and that that “decision changed

the legal landscape, rendering the law of the case doctrine inapplicable.” Thus, the

5
People agree with defendant that the matter must be remanded to the trial court to

determine whether defendant qualifies for resentencing under section 1170.4 We accept

the concession.

“‘The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate

court “states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that

principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its

subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . . , and this

although in its subsequent consideration this court may be clearly of the opinion that the

former decision is erroneous in that particular.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bryant, Smith

and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 374, fn. 6; see People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th

412, 442 [The “‘law-of-the-case doctrine binds the trial court as to the law but controls

the outcome only if the evidence on . . . rehearing of an issue is substantially the same as

that upon which the appellate ruling was based. [Citations.]’”]; People v. Barragan

(2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253; People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 430 [The

doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case bar a defendant from raising an issue

that was raised and rejected in a prior appeal].)

“The law of the case doctrine generally ‘precludes a party from obtaining appellate

review of the same issue more than once in a single action.’ [Citation.] It is well settled,

4 Neither party addresses whether defense counsel invited or forfeited any
argument that the law of the case doctrine did not apply when he conceded below that it
did. We will assume for purposes of avoiding any ineffective assistance of counsel
argument, which also has not been made, that defense counsel did not invite or forfeit any
error by conceding below that the law of the case doctrine barred defendant from relief.

6
however, that the doctrine may be disregarded where the ‘controlling rules of law have

been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and second appellate

determinations.’ [Citation.]” (Truck Ins. Exchange v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp.

(2024) 16 Cal.5th 67, 87, fn. 6; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716-717

[Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) “does not apply when there has been a significant

change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of

the issue”].)

Here, although defendant raised and this court previously rejected the issue of

whether, as a juvenile offender, defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional

equivalent of LWOP, the law on the issue has changed significantly and is currently split.

(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to § 3051

mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional

equivalent of LWOP]; Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 [50 years to life for juvenile

offender ineligible for § 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra,

83 Cal.App.5th at p. 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]; accord

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 441 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby

(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1061 [107 years to life]; People v. Munoz (2025) 110

Cal.App.5th 499, 513, dis. opn. of Feuer, J. [50 years to life], review granted June 25,

2025, S290828; compare Munoz, at pp. 502-503 [50 years to life is not the functional

equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 999 [44 years to

life not functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th

7
1058, 1081, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540 [50 years to life not functional

equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, 58 [parole eligibility

at 47 years of age was “by no stretch of the imagination . . . ‘functional’ or ‘de facto’

LWOP”]; People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1260, review granted Sept. 17,

2025, S292070 [“The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile

defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional

equivalent of LWOP”]; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review granted

Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 [same]; People v. Lara (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, review

granted Dec. 30, 2025, S294095 [same].) Thus, we shall reverse the order denying

defendant’s petition based on the application of the law of the case doctrine and remand

the matter for further proceedings on defendant’s substantive eligibility for relief.

8
III. DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s petition is reversed. The matter is remanded for

further proceedings on defendant’s substantive eligibility for relief pursuant to section

1170, subdivision (d)(1). We express no opinion on whether defendant is entitled to any

relief on remand.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER
J.

CODRINGTON
J.

9