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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

M.B.M. v. M.R.-l.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-0984-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.3K)

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Combined Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0984-24

M.B.M.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.R.-L.,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Submitted February 24, 2026 – Decided March 9, 2026

Before Judges Firko, Perez Friscia, and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County,
Docket No. FD-11-0503-23.

Law Offices of Sklar Smith-Sklar, attorneys for
appellant (Keith D. Sklar, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

1
We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the family in these proceedings.
R. 1:38-3(d)(13).
Following a plenary hearing, defendant M.R.-L. appeals from the July 26,

2024 Family Part order granting the parties shared custody, designating plaintiff

M.B.M. as the parent of primary residence (PPR), and ordering defendant to

have supervised visitation. 2 Having reviewed the record, defendant's arguments,

and applicable law, we affirm.

I.

The parties had a non-marital relationship and resided in Pennsylvania.

Their son, M.E.M., was born in October 2016, and daughter, A.M., was born in

October 2018. After custody proceedings in Pennsylvania, plaintiff moved to

New Jersey with the children.3

On December 6, 2022, plaintiff filed an order to show cause (OTSC) in

New Jersey seeking full custody, which was denied. On December 23, 2022,

defendant filed her own OTSC in New Jersey seeking custody, which was

denied. After defendant moved for a review of custody, a plenary hearing was

ordered.

2
Plaintiff did not file a responsive brief to this appeal.
3
We have not been provided the Pennsylvania court orders and initial Family
Part orders in this matter. See R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I) (requiring the appellant to
include in the appendix on appeal "such other parts of the record . . . as are
essential to the proper consideration of the issues, including such parts as the
appellant should reasonably assume will be relied on by the respondent in
meeting the issues raised").

A-0984-24
2
At the hearing, defendant testified that her relationship with plaintiff was

tumultuous. They had resided together for about one year at plaintiff's mother,

A.M.G.'s, residence in Pennsylvania. Defendant asserted that in August 2019,

an incident occurred while she was at a friend's house with the children. After

she and plaintiff had a verbal disagreement, the police were called and she was

arrested. Defendant later appeared in Pennsylvania court, and it was "agreed"

that plaintiff would have the children for ninety days. She believed that "the

kids were going to be returned to" her upon completion of "a drug test."

Defendant maintained that in March 2021, plaintiff "absconded" to Trenton with

the children without informing her or the Pennsylvania court.

At the hearing, which spanned several days over four months in 2024,

defendant produced social media photographs that she represented evinced

inappropriate conduct of plaintiff smoking marijuana and gesturing with his

hand to mimic a handgun. She maintained plaintiff was not taking care of A.M.

because she was "urinating on herself," and the children were dirty and injured

when in his care. Defendant alleged plaintiff refused her continued attempts to

have visitation with the children in 2022 and 2023. In January 2023, defendant

went to Paul Robeson Elementary School to obtain school records for M.E.M.

but the school denied her any information, believing the parties had a restraining

order. She testified there was never a restraining order and the school called

A-0984-24
3
A.M.G. to pick up the children. Defendant relayed that when she went to the

school again in May 2023, attempting to "talk to the principal and teachers," the

school called the police. Regarding the school's emergency contact information,

defendant maintained that plaintiff "never told the school [she] existed."

Defendant asserted A.M.G. primarily watched the children and that

plaintiff was "affiliated with gangs," was a member of a "drag-racing team," and

put the "children in jeopardy." She represented that plaintiff had multiple motor

vehicle infractions, had charges for eluding the police, and did not have a valid

driver's license. Defendant acknowledged she did not have a driver's license.

Defendant asserted on Easter, March 31, 2024 (Easter incident), she

received an anonymous call advising that the children were at a park "in danger."

She travelled from Pennsylvania to a New Jersey park with other people and

"grabbed" the children after she observed they were with A.M.G. Later that

evening, she returned the children to plaintiff after the police became involved.

Before returning the children, defendant bathed them and took pictures of their

"private" areas as well as other body parts, believing they were injured and dirty.

She introduced photographs of the children that she maintained depicted dirt,

warts, bruising, and other various injuries. After contacting the Division of

Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) an investigation occurred, and she

later learned "the case was closed."

A-0984-24
4
Defendant explained she lived in a nice home in Pennsylvania with her

partner, D.B., and that the children had their own rooms. Her home was about

fifteen to twenty minutes away from plaintiff's house. She was concerned that

M.E.M. was not receiving speech therapy for a speech impediment and A.M.

was not in therapy because she was born "a preemie."

On cross-examination, defendant admitted that during the Easter incident

she was wearing an Easter bunny costume. She alleged that the anonymous

caller gave her the exact location where the children were. She did not see

plaintiff or view her children in any danger but had decided to take them.

Regarding plaintiff's custody of the children, she alleged he fabricated a letter

from Pennsylvania Child Protective Services (CPS), which stated that she could

not have the children. 4 She maintained the listed individuals on the letter did

not exist and she obtained a contradictory letter from CPS. Defendant admitted

she would go to plaintiff's residence and place of employment without

contacting him.

Defendant explained the parties appeared in Pennsylvania court in 2018.

The parties later "failed . . . drug test[s]" and in 2019, the Pennsylvania court

ordered defendant to have supervised visitation. The parties also received

"Conciliation and Evaluation Services" in Pennsylvania. Defendant maintained

4
Defendant has not provided the referenced letters on appeal. R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I).
A-0984-24
5
that from "2021 to 2023" her "mom," J.A., and "sister" "supervised [her]

visitation."

Defendant called Trenton Police Department Detective Ryan Hornberger

as a witness. He testified that on October 30, 2022 (Halloween incident), he was

dispatched to plaintiff's home regarding a visitation dispute. After learning

defendant was supposed to have the children for Halloween, he tried to assist in

resolving the dispute because plaintiff requested defendant write a note for the

school, to explain the upcoming absences. Hornberger stated that defendant

maintained she had not seen the children "in a few months" and plaintiff declined

assistance because he "wanted it to all be handled through the court." Later, in

March 2023, Hornberger was again involved with the parties over a visitation

dispute and recalled plaintiff "did not want to . . . cooperat[e] in the matter."

J.A. testified that defendant and the children briefly lived with her. She

corroborated that the children have not lived with defendant since 2019. J.A.

explained that when defendant had the children for visitation, J.A. observed they

were "full of bruises" and "smelled . . . like a pet." She believed plaintiff had

"threatened" defendant and "did not want [the] children to be back with her."

J.A. expressed that the children "were happy" when with defendant. On cross-

examination, J.A. admitted the police arrested her and defendant in

A-0984-24
6
Pennsylvania because plaintiff's "neighbors believe[d] that [they] were

kidnapping the children."

D.B. testified he had been dating defendant for about five years and that

they were currently living together in a three-bedroom house. He stated the

children were dirty and would smell after they were in plaintiff's care. He

explained the children were "overjoyed" when with defendant. "In [his] opinion,

[defendant] was the best mother [the] kids could have." Regarding the

Halloween incident, he recalled the police were called after plaintiff refused to

exchange the children. He also recounted that during a visit to the elementary

school, a school official expressed concerns over an allegedly existing

restraining order and a DCPP investigation. D.B. asserted plaintiff moved to

Trenton in 2021. Regarding the Easter incident, he admitted they "took" the

children and had intended to "assess . . . a plan of action" after examining the

children for injuries.

A.M.G. testified that after A.M. was born, the children began to live with

her and plaintiff in Pennsylvania. She maintained plaintiff had received the

children in January 2019, after CPS became involved. A.M.G. asserted plaintiff

has "been the one with the children all this time" and that she "t[oo]k[] care of

the children during the day." She relayed plaintiff worked as a mechanic and

was a manager at Toyota. She believed the children's school needs were met

A-0984-24
7
and they were "playful." Regarding the parties' involvement with the police, she

recounted that the police were called several times after defendant came to their

house.

She recalled that during the Easter incident, defendant came to the park in

an Easter bunny costume and "took the children by force" with a "posse." After

detectives investigated, A.M.G. believed they found "a GPS [tracking device]

underneath [her] car" and retained it for evidence. Plaintiff's counsel offered a

video recording of the Easter incident, which the court noted depicted yelling

and screaming.5

On cross-examination, A.M.G. denied ever telling the school there was a

restraining order. She also recalled that defendant had infrequently seen the

children since 2022. A.M.G. was adamant the children suffered no mistreatment

in plaintiff's care but conceded at times they got hurt. She conceded eleven

people lived in the Trenton home, which she maintained had four-and-a-half

bedrooms.

Plaintiff testified that he obtained an associate's degree in automotive

specialized technology and was a vehicle dealership service manager. He

explained he had used drugs in the past but stopped and was not involved in drag

racing. Plaintiff recounted he received a call from CPS in January 2019 and was

5
Defendant has not provided the referenced video on appeal. R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I).
A-0984-24
8
instructed that he had to pick up his children or they would be placed in foster

care. He maintained that, in 2019, defendant was a "stripper" and kept moving

with the children, creating instability. When defendant received the children,

he immediately ensured they received standard preventative medical care.

Plaintiff explained he moved because the landlord for his Pennsylvania home

decided to sell the property. He moved with A.M.G. to Trenton after they

located a rental house. He asserted his attorney was advised about the move,

and the attorney notified the Pennsylvania court. After defendant later moved

to her new home, plaintiff conceded the updated travel time between their

residences increased to about forty-five minutes.

Plaintiff acknowledged that the Pennsylvania court required the parties to

have supervised visitation for a period of time. He conceded A.M.G. underwent

a drug test to become his parenting supervisor. Defendant's parenting time was

supervised by J.A., D.B., and her sisters. Plaintiff acknowledged there was an

order requiring him to be drug tested in April 2020, but he did not complete the

test.

He also admitted having prior motor vehicle tickets but maintained he was

not arrested and had restored his driver's license. Plaintiff relayed the children

were in school and involved in activities. Regarding the Easter incident, he

explained he had gone to drop off his girlfriend and, "in the snap of a finger,"

A-0984-24
9
defendant removed the children. He also relayed that during the Halloween

incident, he had asked defendant to write a note for the school because they

would miss school days and he did not want any issues.

Regarding DCPP's involvement, plaintiff asserted defendant called

multiple times reporting that the children were in need of assistance but after

each investigation there were only "negative" findings. Plaintiff maintained

defendant had supervised visitation from 2019 through 2022. He asserted that

he was agreeable to defendant having visitation with parameters.

On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted the police in Pennsylvania

charged him on December 30, 2023 with eluding police and resisting arrest. He

also acknowledged that A.M.G. watched the children while he was working.

Regarding bathing and examining his children, he explained he did not feel

comfortable looking at A.M.'s private areas, so he relied on his mother. He also

admitted the children at times got bruises and scratches, recalling that M.E.M.

was injured in a bouncy house after he brought in a windshield ice scraper.

Further, plaintiff acknowledged sharing a bedroom with his children in the

Trenton house.

After the hearing, the court issued an order accompanied by a ninety-page

oral decision. The court awarded the parties joint legal custody and designated

plaintiff as the PPR. Defendant was ordered to have continued supervised

A-0984-24
10
parenting time and was required to pay any costs associated with facilitating the

supervision. The court required the parties to "enroll in a parenting skills

program and complete the course." The court also retained jurisdiction under

the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-53 to -95, and prohibited the parties from relocating with the

children from New Jersey without a further court order.

The court was unpersuaded by defendant's argument that plaintiff violated

Pennsylvania's and New Jersey's anti-removal statutes because a November

2021 Pennsylvania court order "acknowledg[ed] that . . . [plaintiff] had relocated

to New Jersey with the children" and there was no subsequent order awarding

defendant custody. Regarding credibility, the court found both plaintiff and

A.M.G. credible, but determined defendant lacked credibility at times during her

testimony. It specifically found defendant's testimony regarding the Easter

incident was inconsistent and the video depicting her conduct was relevant

because it showed that defendant "grabbed" the children from the park. The

court was "deeply concerned" by defendant's actions of going to the park in an

Easter bunny costume and that D.B. carried M.E.M. off screaming and crying.

Regarding defendant's photographs of the children in allegedly unhealthy

conditions, the court found they were "not impactful" because the DCPP

investigations revealed no concerns with the "safety and care of the children."

A-0984-24
11
The court considered each factor enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) in

evaluating the children's best interests. The court found certain factors more

relevant. Under factor one, the court determined the parties had "no ability to

agree" or "communicate." In considering factor three, the court found

defendant's relationship with her children was "problematic" based on her

actions. The court was satisfied under factors seven, eight, and nine, that

plaintiff was meeting the children's needs as "reflected in the DCPP report,"

demonstrated a stable home, and was attending "to their education." Regarding

geographical proximity, the court determined the distance between the parents'

homes in "Northeast Philadelphia and Trenton" was not a great burden on the

parenting exchanges. With respect to defendant's fitness to parent under factor

ten, the court had serious concerns regarding defendant's conduct "over the

course of many years." The court found defendant's resort to "self-help as to

unsupervised visitation" during the Easter incident was a violation of the prior

court orders. It determined that defendant, after two months had passed and

following the completion of parenting classes, could seek "unsupervised

parenting time." After fully considering the issues, the court determined

defendant failed to demonstrate a change of circumstances warranting a

modification of custody and visitation. This appeal followed.

A-0984-24
12
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in ordering that plaintiff

would be the PPR of the children as its decision is unsupported "by any

evidence."

II.

Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "Appellate courts accord particular deference to the

Family Part because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters."

Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154

N.J. at 412); see also Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 111 (App. Div. 2007)

(stating that because of Family Part judges "special expertise in family matters,

we do not second-guess their findings and the exercise of their sound

discretion"). "We review questions of law, including the issue of statutory

interpretation, de novo." Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (App.

Div. 2020).

A decision concerning custody and parenting time rests in "the sound

discretion of the trial courts." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 611 (1995).

"We defer to the trial judge whether a plenary hearing must be scheduled."

Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 123 (App. Div. 2012). In "reviewing

decisions granting or denying applications to modify child support, we examine

A-0984-24
13
whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her discretion." J.B. v.

W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013) (quoting Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116).

"[I]n custody cases, it is well settled that the court's primary consideration

is the best interests of the children." A.J. v. R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173, 181 (App.

Div. 2019) (quoting Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105). "A party seeking to modify

custody must demonstrate changed circumstances that affect the welfare of the

children." Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105. "Where there is already a judgment or

an agreement affecting custody in place, it is presumed it 'embodies a best

interests determination' and should be modified only where there is a 'showing

[of] changed circumstances which would affect the welfare of the child[].'" A.J.,

461 N.J. Super. at 182 (first alteration in original) (quoting Todd v. Sheridan,

268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993)). To determine whether the requisite

changed circumstances exist, the court must consider the circumstances that

existed at the time the current order was entered. See Beck v. Beck, 239 N.J.

Super. 183, 190 (App. Div. 1990); see also Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J.

Super. 117, 127-29 (App. Div. 2009).

The UCCJEA controls a court's jurisdiction for child custody

determinations, including modifications of visitation and parenting time.

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-54; see also Griffith v. Tressel, 394 N.J. Super. 128, 137 (App.

Div. 2007). A court that has made an initial child custody determination "has

A-0984-24
14
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" over the determination and modifications

until:

(1) a court of this State determines that neither the
child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a
person acting as a parent have a significant connection
with this State and that substantial evidence is no longer
available in this State concerning the child's care,
protection, training, and personal relationships; or

(2) a court of this State or a court of another state
determines that neither the child, nor a parent, nor any
person acting as a parent presently resides in this State.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-66(a)(1) to (2).]

"'Home state' means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person

acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the

commencement of a child custody proceeding." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-54.

In accordance with N.J.S.A. 9:2-2, trial courts are required to find "a

showing of 'cause' before a court will authorize the permanent removal of a child

to another state without the consent of both parents or, if the child is of 'suitable

age' to decide, the consent of the child." Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 323

(2017). The Supreme Court in Bisbing recognized "the 'growing trend in the

law easing restrictions on the custodial parent's right to relocate with the

children and recognizing the identity of interest of the custodial parent and

child.'" Id. at 326 (quoting Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91, 109 (2001)). A court

"should conduct a best interests analysis to determine 'cause' under N.J.S.A. 9:2-
A-0984-24
15
2 in all contested relocation disputes in which the parents share legal custody —

whether the custody arrangement designates a [PPR] and a parent of alternative

residence, or provides for equally shared custody." Id. at 335.

When "making an award of custody," courts must consider the following

fourteen factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) in a best interests analysis:

[(1)] the parents' ability to agree, communicate and
cooperate in matters relating to the child; [(2)] the
parents' willingness to accept custody and any history
of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on
substantiated abuse; [(3)] the interaction and
relationship of the child with its parents and siblings;
[(4)] the history of domestic violence, if any; [(5)] the
safety of the child and the safety of either parent from
physical abuse by the other parent; [(6)] the preference
of the child when of sufficient age and capacity to
reason so as to form an intelligent decision; [(7)] the
needs of the child; [(8)] the stability of the home
environment offered; [(9)] the quality and continuity of
the child's education; [(10)] the fitness of the parents;
[(11)] the geographical proximity of the parents'
homes; [(12)] the extent and quality of the time spent
with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation;
[(13)] the parents' employment responsibilities; and
[(14)] the age and number of the children.

Courts must also "identify on the record the specific factors that justify the

arrangement." See J.G. v. J.H., 457 N.J. Super. 365, 374 (App. Div. 2019)

(quoting Bisbing, 230 N.J. at 322).

A-0984-24
16
III.

Defendant contends reversal is warranted because the court erroneously

maintained "the status quo" by ordering plaintiff to continue as the PPR and for

her to have supervised visitation with the children. She also argues the court

erred by "fail[ing] to enforce the UCCJEA" because plaintiff was permitted to

"flee" Pennsylvania's jurisdiction and orders. After a review of the record, we

affirm.

We first address defendant's contention that the court abused its discretion

by not finding plaintiff violated Pennsylvania's orders by relocating to New

Jersey. While defendant has failed to provide the relevant Pennsylvania orders

referenced, we are not inhibited from a meaningful appellate review because the

court recited the portions of the order it relied on. The court explained that the

November 1, 2021 Pennsylvania "domestic court sheet" noted plaintiff resided

in New Jersey. Further, the Pennsylvania order required defendant to advise

"the welfare office" "that the children were residing in New Jersey." The court

highlighted the order referenced that the parties had placed their agreement on

the record the same day. The court had requested defendant provide a transcript

of the Pennsylvania court's November 1, 2021 proceeding but she never

complied. We are unpersuaded by defendant's argument that the court should

have designated her as the PPR because she demonstrated the case "was really

A-0984-24
17
about [plaintiff's] fleeing . . . and not doing what [wa]s required of him in order

to relocate."

Relevantly, defendant acknowledged the parties agreed, in 2019, that

plaintiff would have residential custody of the children after CPS became

involved and she had tested positive for using controlled dangerous substances.

Her argument that plaintiff was only "temporarily" awarded custody for ninety

days is unsupported by the record. She produced no order giving her custody of

the children. While defendant maintains plaintiff unlawfully moved to Trenton

around March 2021, she offers no explanation as to why the November 2021

Pennsylvania order references plaintiff's New Jersey move and an agreement

between the parties. Moreover, her vague testimony that she filed multiple

Pennsylvania court applications seeking to find plaintiff in violation of

Pennsylvania's anti-removal statute and to change custody is uncorroborated by

any evidence. For these reasons, we discern the court did not abuse its discretion

in finding the Pennsylvania order acknowledged plaintiff's relocation with the

children to New Jersey and no subsequent order awarded defendant custody.

We next address defendant's argument that no evidence supports the

court's order continuing plaintiff as the PPR and requiring defendant to have

supervised visitation. The court specifically found defendant lacked credibility

and expressed serious concerns over her behavior. Substantial evidence in the

A-0984-24
18
record supports the court's concerns and determination that it was

"inconceivable and not credible that [defendant] would travel from Philadelphia

in an Easter bunny outfit and try to determine whether her children were safe. "

Further, after thoroughly reviewing each factor under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c),

the court found defendant failed to demonstrate a warranted change of

circumstances and determined it was in the children's best interests to stay with

plaintiff. In ultimately determining that plaintiff "would provide a more stable

home environment" for the children, the court found it relevant that DCPP found

no issues with the children's welfare, the children were in school, and their needs

were being met. We discern no error in the court finding that defendant should

have supervised visitation and permitting her to move to "file a subsequent

application seeking unsupervised parenting time" after completing the imposed

conditions. Substantial credible evidence in the record supports the court's

finding that "the prior [o]rders entered by Pennsylvania courts providing . . .

plaintiff with primary residential custody . . . shall be maintained."

To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining contentions lack

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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19