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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

L.A. v. E.K.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1823-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (35)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (44K)

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Combined Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1823-24

L.A.,1

Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent,

v.

E.K.,

Defendant-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant.

---

Argued February 24, 2026 – Decided March 9, 2026

Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket No. FD-14-0252-24.

Bonnie C. Frost argued the cause for appellant/cross-
respondent (Einhorn Barbarito Frost Botwinick Nunn
& Musmanno PC, attorneys; Bonnie C. Frost and Jessie
M. Mills, on the briefs).

1
We use initials to protect the privacy and welfare of the parties' minor daughter
who is the subject of this appeal. R. 1:38-3(d).
Kristen E. Marinaccio argued the cause for
respondent/cross-appellant (Harwood Lloyd, LLP,
attorneys; Michael J. Muller, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

In this child relocation and custody case, plaintiff L.A. and defendant E.K.

both appeal from a February 3, 2025 order as amended on February 4, 2025.

After a plenary hearing with several witnesses testifying, the Family Part judge

awarded the parties joint physical custody with equal parenting time of the

parties' three-year-old daughter and granted defendant's opposed application to

move to Connecticut with the daughter. The judge initially ordered that

Connecticut would be the daughter's home state, and New Jersey would retain

jurisdiction. On reconsideration, the judge amended her order, providing

defendant would be designated as the parent of primary residence (PPR) and

plaintiff the parent of alternate residence (PAR). The judge further ordered that

despite granting the removal application, New Jersey would be regarded as the

daughter's home state. We affirm.

I.

Factual Background

We summarize the facts developed in the record. The parties began a

relationship and had a religious wedding ceremony in November 2021, but never

A-1823-24
2
legally married. Around that time, they began living together in plaintiff's

parents' home in Riverdale. Their daughter was born in New Jersey in

November 2022.

Following allegations of domestic violence, on October 20, 2023,

defendant obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against plaintiff along

with temporary custody of the daughter. Defendant relocated with the daughter

to Connecticut to live in her childhood home with her parents and three brothers .

The Complaint and Consent Order

Plaintiff filed his complaint on November 9, 2023. The parties entered a

consent order on November 15, 2023, wherein defendant voluntarily dismissed

her TRO. They agreed to share joint legal custody of the daughter. Relevant

here, they agreed "[t]he home state of the child is New Jersey. All matters

relative to custody, parenting time, and child support should be determined in

the State of New Jersey." The consent order further provided that plaintiff

would have supervised visitation with Family Matters and would have FaceTime

calls with the daughter on the days when he did not visit with her. The parties

agreed they would communicate utilizing the Our Family Wizard application.

Defendant filed a counterclaim on January 11, 2024.

A-1823-24
3
Parenting Time

Following entry of the consent order, plaintiff participated in a substance

abuse evaluation, which found substance abuse treatment was not necessary.

However, he completed an anger management program. Plaintiff then sought

additional parenting time, but defendant declined such request due to the

ongoing investigation by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the

Division). The record indicates the Division ultimately determined the

allegations against plaintiff for neglect of the daughter were unfounded. Family

Matters reported that plaintiff's supervised parenting time was successful.

As a result, the judge entered an order on January 24, 2024, providing that

plaintiff would have unsupervised parenting time every other weekend on

Saturday through Sunday, as well as one dinner visit during the week in

Connecticut. The judge further ordered that a plenary hearing would be held

regarding defendant's request to relocate permanently to Connecticut with the

daughter.

On March 4, 2024, the judge entered an order awarding plaintiff additional

parenting time, specifically unsupervised every other weekend from Friday

night until Sunday. On April 8, 2024, the judge entered an order granting

A-1823-24
4
plaintiff additional parenting time and granted him unsupervised parenting time

every other weekend, from Friday through Monday.

On June 12, 2024, in the midst of the plenary hearing, the judge entered

an order by consent awarding plaintiff parenting time from 1:00 p.m. on Fridays

overnight until 1:00 p.m. on Mondays, apparently on every other weekend, with

additional parenting time on the alternate weekends from Thursday at 1:00 p.m.

until Saturday at 1:00 pm.

On July 4, 2024, consistent with the judge's order, plaintiff traveled to

Connecticut to pick up the daughter for his parenting time, but defendant did not

appear and consequently plaintiff was unable to see the daughter. According to

defendant's counsel, defendant "misinterpreted" the June 2024 parenting time

order.

The Plenary Hearing

The plenary hearing took place over eight days from May through August

1. Plaintiff testified he has a bachelor's degree and worked for his father's

construction company. He first met plaintiff in October 2018, when she was

living in Connecticut, but beginning in March 2019 she began staying with him

at his parents' home a few nights per week. Plaintiff testified that after defendant

A-1823-24
5
moved into his family's home in November 2021, he helped her obtain a full-

time job at UBS in Weehawken, and she had also worked as a makeup artist.

Plaintiff described the alleged domestic violence from October 2023,

which began with the parties' dispute over taking the daughter to a pumpkin

patch. He testified that defendant yelled at the daughter, and he got "mad." He

stated that defendant put her fists on his leg and was "screaming . . . nonstop."

Plaintiff denied causing defendant any injuries, specifically refuting that he

grabbed her throat, pushed her on the couch, and pulled her hair.

Plaintiff testified that the morning after this incident, defendant left the

daughter alone in the house for an hour without informing any of the other

occupants. Thereafter, defendant told plaintiff's father that she wanted to move

out, so plaintiff's father drove her to Connecticut. Subsequently, the police

arrived at plaintiff's home and arrested him based on defendant's allegations of

domestic violence, and the daughter went to stay with defendant in Connecticut.

Plaintiff testified that defendant's parents and three brothers lived in her

family's four-bedroom home in Connecticut, and sometimes the brothers'

paramours lived there as well. He expressed concern that defendant's family

kept firearms in their home, her older brother had a drug problem , and her

younger brother had "bipolar issues" and hit defendant. Plaintiff testified that

A-1823-24
6
defendant told him she "hate[d] [her] family." He stated that there were

"termites, ants, [and] leftover food" in her family's home. Plaintiff explained

that he often sent messages via Our Family Wizard to defendant but would not

get a response, which would make him concerned about the daughter's

whereabouts. He testified that the drive from New Jersey to defendant's home

in Connecticut took more than two-and-a-half hours.

Plaintiff stated that his family home, where he lived at the time of the

hearing, had security cameras, a generator in case of a power failure, and child

safety gates. He testified that the home had five bedrooms, including one solely

for the daughter. Plaintiff clarified that he and his parents were the only

occupants of the home. He testified that defendant did not contribute financially

while living there. Plaintiff alleged that he owed his parents about $140,000.

Plaintiff testified that if he was granted custody, his mother, L.A., was

available to watch the daughter while he was at work. Plaintiff claimed that he

routinely bathed the daughter, changed her diapers, and clothes. He expressed

a willingness to attend coparenting therapy.

Plaintiff represented that the parties had not yet decided if the daughter

would attend preschool, and he was concerned about sending her to a preschool

A-1823-24
7
in Connecticut. He testified that if defendant moved to New Jersey, she could

decide where to send the daughter to preschool.

Plaintiff stated that he provided health insurance for the daughter.

According to plaintiff, the parties jointly selected Dr. Nilesh Jariwala in Wayne

as the daughter's pediatrician, however, defendant unilaterally selected a new

pediatrician in Connecticut and had the daughter's records transferred there over

his objection. Regarding child support, plaintiff testified that defendant did not

provide any financial data despite his counsel serving a notice to produce on

plaintiff. He testified that his income in 2023 was $22,168.

Plaintiff's mother testified on his behalf. L.A. testified she had a good

relationship with defendant and that she bought many things for defendant while

she lived in her home. L.A. testified that she, her husband, and plaintiff paid

for all of the daughter's expenses. L.A. testified that she cared for the daughter

while defendant was at work and bathed her even when defendant was at home.

L.A. stated that plaintiff, rather than defendant, woke up to care for the daughter

at night.

L.A. testified that the parties took the daughter to Macedonia in the

summer of 2023, and she and her husband paid for the trip. L.A. testified that

the parties had a fight during this trip in which they yelled at each other , and

A-1823-24
8
defendant threw fruit at plaintiff. However, L.A. never observed plaintiff

exhibit any physical violence toward defendant. L.A. testified that the parties

had verbal altercations in October 2023, and defendant hit her with an object

identified as a candle holder.

I.A., plaintiff's father, testified on his son's behalf. I.A. testified he

worked as a mason and carpenter and that plaintiff worked with him. I.A.

testified that plaintiff paid $750 per month to live in his home. I.A. explained

that plaintiff owed him money for the wedding party and for a loan to pay his

attorneys.

I.A. testified that his wife, L.A., watched the daughter while the parties

worked. I.A. confirmed that if plaintiff was awarded custody, his wife would

watch the daughter while plaintiff worked. I.A. stated that plaintiff fed the

daughter and changed her diapers. I.A. testified that plaintiff did not use drugs

or alcohol and never yelled at the daughter.

I.A. testified that he never observed physical violence between the parties

but explained that the parties had a disagreement about taking the daughter to a

pumpkin patch in October 2023, which escalated to the alleged domestic

violence. According to I.A., defendant's allegations were false and fabricated.

The following day, I.A. testified he drove defendant to her family's home in

A-1823-24
9
Connecticut. The next day, the police came to his home, served the TRO, and

arrested plaintiff. Defendant and her father were present, and the police

transferred the daughter to them.

D.W., who operated Family Matters, testified on behalf of plaintiff. D.W.

testified that the daughter responded positively to plaintiff and had no trouble

separating from defendant. D.W. observed improvement in plaintiff's parenting

skills. For example, he brought appropriate snacks, toys, and supplies to visits

and engaged in activities with the daughter. D.W. testified she had no concerns

about his ability to parent, the daughter's safety, or her well-being when

spending time with plaintiff.

C.P., a police officer with the Riverdale Police Department, testified for

plaintiff. C.P. testified that defendant came to the police department alleging

domestic violence in October 2023, and he referred her to the courthouse to

pursue a TRO.

Defendant's Case

Defendant confirmed that the daughter was born in New Jersey, and the

parties lived in plaintiff's parents' home at the time. In contrast to plaintiff's

testimony, defendant described the alleged domestic violence in October 2023

and testified that after a disagreement about pumpkin picking, plaintiff grabbed

A-1823-24
10
her by the neck, punched her twice, and pushed her onto a bed. Defendant

claimed that after the alleged altercation, she had an argument with plaintiff's

parents. Defendant testified that the following day, plaintiff "harass [ed] [her]

all day," and when she returned home from work, he pulled out her hair

extensions. Defendant also testified that plaintiff's mother "spit" at her.

Defendant testified that living with plaintiff and his family "was just very

abusive," and he physically abused her "every few days." She stated that he was

"controlling" and often showed "anger." Defendant testified that after

disagreements with plaintiff's mother, L.A., plaintiff "called me disrespectful

and was like hitting me." Defendant testified that plaintiff "would just like slap

me or like punch me in like my arm or my stomach, or my thigh or like more

places where you wouldn't really notice, or a lot of times it was like my hair ."

Defendant testified that plaintiff pushed and punched her in May and June 2022,

causing bruises. She testified that he pushed, choked, and slapped her during a

trip to Macedonia. Defendant added that plaintiff's mother once locked her

grandson in a closet.

Defendant testified that she earned $55,000 per year at UBS before

receiving a raise in March 2024, which increased her salary to $64,000.

Defendant explained that she resigned from UBS in July 2024 because UBS

A-1823-24
11
wanted her to work in the office four days per week. Defendant testified that

she would seek another job.

Defendant testified that she and her family lived in a spacious home in a

nice neighborhood in Connecticut, and this was a "more loving household" than

plaintiff's. She explained that her mother, G.K., was available to assist with

childcare. Defendant testified that the daughter was doing very well since

moving to Connecticut. She stated that she took the daughter to a pediatrician

in Connecticut for a routine visit and plaintiff objected.

Defendant testified that she was enrolled in therapy and expressed concern

about the physical and emotional abuse in plaintiff's family's home. She

expressed concern that plaintiff would try to "alienate" her from the daughter.

Defendant described difficulties in picking up and dropping off the daughter and

mentioned that plaintiff once followed her in his car. However, defendant

testified that she would attempt to cooperate with plaintiff if she was permitted

to remain in Connecticut with the daughter. Defendant admitted that she made

a mistake as to the schedule for the July 4 weekend, which resulted in plaintiff

missing his parenting time.

Defendant's mother testified on her behalf. G.K. worked as a registered

nurse. G.K. testified that defendant returned to her home in October 2023,

A-1823-24
12
"confused" and "scared" and that the daughter began living there the following

day. G.K. testified that defendant and the daughter shared a room. G.K. testified

that she works three days per week and coordinates childcare with defendant.

G.K. testified that the daughter played with many activities in their home, she

had no concerns about the daughter being left alone with anyone in their

household, and nearby relatives were available for support. Photographs,

plaintiff's U.S. passport, Google Maps listings, videos, a voice recording, and

financial and other documents were received in evidence. The judge reserved

decision.

The Judge's Opinion

On August 15, 2024, the judge issued an oral decision. The judge found

that plaintiff was "mostly credible" and visibly emotional. Similarly, the judge

found that defendant was "mostly credible" but was evasive on cross-

examination, which detracted from her credibility. The judge determined D.W.

was credible, and that plaintiff's mother, L.A., was "mostly credible" but, like

plaintiff, was "invested in the outcome of the trial." The judge found that

plaintiff's father, I.A., was a "biased witness" but nonetheless credible. The

judge noted defendant's mother, G.K., to be "very credible" but that she had an

inherent bias.

A-1823-24
13
The judge ruled that both parents would share joint physical custody with

equal parenting time, and that "both can be the [PPR]." The judge granted

defendant's removal application, thus permitting defendant and the daughter to

remain in Connecticut, but held that New Jersey would retain jurisdiction.

Regarding child support, the judge directed a calculation based on the last

income defendant was earning prior to her raise, because the judge did not think

defendant got the benefit or the raise. The judge ordered imputation of plaintiff's

income based on a minimum wage salary. The judge instructed the parties to

return to court to finalize a holiday schedule and child support.

The October 4, 2024 Order

On October 4, 2024, the parties returned to court. The same day, the judge

entered an order memorializing her August 15, 2024 oral opinion, stating that

the parties would share joint legal custody and share "50/50 physical custody"

of the daughter. The order provided that "Connecticut will be the 'home state'

for [the daughter]" but stated "New Jersey shall retain jurisdiction over [the

daughter]" and "[a]ll matters relative to custody, parenting time, and child

support shall be determined in the State of New Jersey." Despite her oral

opinion, the order did not expressly designate a PPR or PAR.

A-1823-24
14
The order provided for an alternating weekly parenting time schedule with

alternating holidays on an annual basis. Each party would have summer

vacation time with the daughter. The parties were ordered to attend co-parenting

therapy. The judge ordered that the parties would alternate claiming the

daughter as a dependent on their income tax returns.

Regarding child support, the judge imputed income of minimum wage for

forty hours per week to plaintiff and income of $50,000 per year to defendant.

Using the Child Support Guidelines worksheet, the judge calculated child

support of $27.50 per week to be paid by defendant to plaintiff effective August

15, 2024.

The judge ordered that Dr. Jariwala would remain as the daughter's

pediatrician but permitted defendant to bring her to doctors in Connecticut in

case of emergency. The judge directed communication via Our Family Wizard,

ordered the parties to refrain from making negative or harassing statements

about each other, and further ordered that they not follow or stalk each other.

The October 21, 2024 Order

Following entry of the October 4, 2024 order, defendant's counsel wrote

to the judge seeking clarification of her oral decision that the parties would share

joint physical custody, both serve as PPR, New Jersey would retain jurisdiction,

A-1823-24
15
and whether Dr. Jariwala would be the daughter's primary physician. Counsel

further sought clarification that the New Jersey pediatrician would be the

daughter's primary physician. On October 21, 2024, the judge entered an

amended order confirming only the grant of defendant's removal application.

The remaining terms of the prior order were unchanged.

Motions for Reconsideration

On November 11, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the

October 21, 2024 order and sought an order identifying New Jersey as the

daughter's home state. Defendant cross-moved for reconsideration regarding the

grant of 50/50 physical custody and sought to be designated as PPR, ret ain New

Jersey's jurisdiction, child support, and the pediatrician designation.

On January 31, 2025, the judge heard oral arguments on the parties'

motions for reconsideration. Defendant's counsel noted that the daughter had

lived in New Jersey for six months prior to the filing of the complaint in

November 2023 and had only relocated to Connecticut in October 2023. The

judge entered an order 2 on February 3, 2025, granting in part, plaintiff's request

2
This order is captioned as an "amended order" and the judge's signature date
is October 21, 2024, but it appears to be the order entered on reconsideration
and is file-stamped February 3, 2025. We surmise that the judge reused the
template from her October 21, 2024 order without updating this text.

A-1823-24
16
for reconsideration and confirming that the parties would share joint legal and

physical custody consistent with the October 21, 2024 order. However, the

judge ordered that New Jersey would "retain jurisdiction as home state,"

consistent with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(UCCJEA), N.J.S.A. 2A:34-53 to -95, "because of the significant contacts" here.

Regarding defendant's motion for reconsideration, the judge held that

despite the 50/50 custody arrangement, defendant would be designated as PPR

and plaintiff would be designated as PAR. In addition, the judge denied

defendant's request for additional parenting time once the daughter was enrolled

in school, finding that this ruling should abide by the event because it was

"completely hypothetical." The judge further held that defendant could choose

the daughter's pediatrician but noted the parties should make all major decisions

jointly. The judge further held that she would correct a typographical error as

to the obligor and obligee for child support. 3 This appeal followed.

In his appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred:

(1) when she conflated the custody and relocation
analyses instead of first determining custody;

3
The record indicates that the judge entered a revised child support order on
January 31, 2025. On February 4, 2025, the judge entered an amended order to
correct another typographical error.

A-1823-24
17
(2) in permitting defendant to relocate to Connecticut
with the daughter and in granting 50/50 physical
custody to the parties;

(3) in naming defendant as PPR because the parties
were to share 50/50 parenting time and by basing her
decision on the wrong legal standard;

(4) when she designated his status as a joint legal
custodian and allowed defendant to unilaterally select
the pediatrician;

(5) in permitting the parties to alternate claiming the
daughter on their tax returns; and

(6) in imputing defendant with an income that is lower
than her actual earnings before she quit her job.

In her cross-appeal, defendant argues the judge:

(1) correctly granted her removal application;

(2) correctly designated her as the PPR;

(3) properly exercised her discretion by permitting her
to designate the child's pediatrician as the PPR;

(4) erred in awarding 50/50 physical custody because
that ruling is inconsistent with the grant of the removal
application and appointment of defendant as PPR and
not in the best interests of the daughter;

(5) erred in designating New Jersey as the home state
after initially and correctly determining that
Connecticut is the daughter's home state;

(6) correctly imputed income to defendant but erred in
imputing a minimum wage to plaintiff in the face of

A-1823-24
18
uncontroverted evidence as to his education and
experience; and

(7) exercised sound discretion in allowing the parties to
alternate the tax exemption.

II.

Our review of a Family Part order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Generally, the family court's factual findings "are binding

on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial[,] and credible evidence."

Id. at 412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv's Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474,

484 (1974)). The scope of appellate review of a Family Part judge's findings

following a bench trial is limited. N.T.V. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215

(App. Div. 2015) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411).

The conclusions of Family Part judges regarding child custody "are

entitled to great weight and will not be lightly disturbed on appeal." DeVita v.

DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 123 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Sheehan v. Sheehan,

51 N.J. Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 1958)). Because we recognize "the special

expertise of judges hearing matters in the Family Part," Parish v. Parish, 412

N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412), we will

only disturb the Family Part's factual findings if "they are so wholly

A-1823-24
19
insupportable as to result in a denial of justice." In re Guardianship of J.T., 269

N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84).

An appellate court, in consequence, will only reverse the Family Part's

conclusions if those conclusions are so "'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'"

that they result in the denial of justice. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 48 (quoting

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). The Family

Part's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010).

"Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to

discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci,

448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547

(2006)). It is well settled that, "[w]hen examining a trial court's exercise of

discretionary authority, [appellate courts] reverse only when the exercise of

discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances." Newark Morning

Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App.

Div. 2011) (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J.

Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007)).

An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision "'rested on an

impermissible basis,' considered 'irrelevant or inappropriate factors,' . . . 'failed

A-1823-24
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to consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or

unsupported by competent evidence.'" Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424,

434 (App. Div. 2015) (citations omitted) (first quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.

Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002); then quoting Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J.

Super. 464, 479 (App. Div. 2004)). Challenges to legal conclusions, as well as

the trial court's interpretation of the law, are subject to de novo review. Ricci,

448 N.J. Super. at 565 (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App.

Div. 2013)).

Similarly, appellate courts "defer to the credibility determinations made

by the trial court because the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the

witnesses, and hears them testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a

reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222

N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). However, "[a]ll 'legal

conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the facts, are subject to

our plenary review.'" Slutsky v Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 344-45 (App. Div.

2017) (quoting Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 568).

A parent's right to enjoy a relationship with his or her child is

constitutionally protected. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346

(1999). "Parental rights, though fundamentally important, are not absolute." Id.

A-1823-24
21
at 347. "In custody cases, it is well settled that the court's primary consideration

is the best interests of the children." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105

(App. Div. 2007). Courts should apply the best interests analysis to determine

cause under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 in all removal disputes. Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J.

91 (2001), overruled by Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 312-13 (2017).

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) provides:

In making an award of custody, the court shall consider
but not be limited to the following factors: the parents'
ability to agree, communicate[,] and cooperate in
matters relating to the child; the parents' willingness to
accept custody and any history of unwillingness to
allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse;
the interaction and relationship of the child with its
parents and siblings; the history of domestic violence,
if any; the safety of the child and the safety of either
parent from physical abuse by the other parent; the
preference of the child when of sufficient age and
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision;
the needs of the child; the stability of the home
environment offered; the quality and continuity of the
child's education; the fitness of the parents; the
geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the
extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior
to or subsequent to the separation; the parents'
employment responsibilities; and the age and number
of the children.

[N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).]

In Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 598 (1995), our Court held:

"Although both [legal and physical custody] create responsibility over children

A-1823-24
22
of [separated parents], the primary caretaker has the greater physical and

emotional role." The Court stated:

[T]he many tasks that make one parent the primary,
rather than secondary, caretaker [include]: preparing
and planning of meals; bathing, grooming, and
dressing; purchasing, cleaning, and caring for clothes;
medical care, including nursing and general trips to
physicians; arranging for social interaction among
peers; arranging alternative care, i.e., babysitting or
daycare; putting [the] child to bed at night, attending to
[the] child in the middle of the night, and waking [the]
child in the morning; disciplining; and educating the
child in a religious or cultural manner.

[Id. at 598-99.]

The secondary caretaker role is equally important and exercised by means

of a parenting time schedule befitting the circumstances of the case. Id. at 597.

We next apply these foundational principles to the matter before us.

III.

Plaintiff's Appeal

50/50 Physical Custody and Relocation

First, we address plaintiff's challenge to the judge's decision regarding

50/50 physical custody and relocation. Plaintiff maintains the judge conflated

the custody and relocation analyses instead of first determining custody.

Plaintiff also argues the judge erred and "tainted" her entire decision by

A-1823-24
23
reviewing the custody best interests factors against the "backdrop" of domestic

violence and should have conducted a best interests analysis first before

determining relocation.

We reject plaintiff's claim that the judge did not consider the daughter's

best interests and viewed the case through the lens of domestic violence. The

judge's findings under the statutory factors clearly considered whether those

factors served the daughter's best interests. Indeed, several of the best interests

factors focus on the parents' roles in the child's life or th e parents' living and

working situations. Regardless, this does not mean that the judge reverted to

the now overruled Baures standard. Under Baures, the parent seeking to remove

the child was required to prove the move was sought in good faith and not

inimical to the child's best interests by addressing the following factors:

(1) the reasons given for the move; (2) the reasons
given for the opposition; (3) the past history of dealings
between the parties insofar as it bears on the reasons
advanced by both parties for supporting and opposing
the move; (4) whether the child will receive
educational, health[,] and leisure opportunities at least
equal to what is available here; (5) any special needs or
talents of the child that require accommodation and
whether such accommodation or its equivalent is
available in the new location; (6) whether a visitation
and communication schedule can be developed that will
allow the noncustodial parent to maintain a full and
continuous relationship with the child; (7) the
likelihood that the custodial parent will continue to

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foster the child's relationship with the noncustodial
parent if the move is allowed; (8) the effect of the move
on extended family relationships here and in the new
location; (9) if the child is of age, [their] preference;
(10) whether the child is entering [their] senior year in
high school at which point [they] should generally not
be moved until graduation without [their] consent; (11)
whether the noncustodial parent has the ability to
relocate; (12) any other factor bearing on the child's
interest.

[167 N.J. at 116-17.]

Crucially, at the outset of her opinion here, the judge expressly noted the

applicable legal standard:

So, the legal standard the [c]ourt applies for the
application, it is Bisbing. The [c]ourt also cites to
Baures v. Lewis. The factors that the [c]ourt has to
consider and the custody factors are pursuant to
[N.J.S.A.] 9:2-4.

Thus, we are satisfied the judge acknowledged and considered the proper

standard. In particular, the judge recognized the daughter's relocation was

governed by Bisbing—our governing case law on relocation—and that the

custody determination was governed by N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. Thereafter, the judge

precisely evaluated the issues of physical custody and parenting time using the

statutory best interests standard in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) and then considered the

removal application in light of those same factors, consistent with Bisbing.

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Although some of the Baures factors implicate similar considerations

under the N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) best interests factors, namely the: child's

educational and general needs; parties' interactions with one another and the

child; and the child's age and preferences, this does not persuade us that the

judge adjudicated this case using the Baures standard. The judge's findings

clearly considered the requisite statutory best interests factors. Moreover, she

was not confined to the statutory factors, as N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) expressly provides

Family Part judges "shall consider but not be limited to the [statutory] factors

. . . ." Therefore, it was reasonable, indeed expected, that the judge would

discuss the parties' living circumstances in New Jersey and Connecticut, their

extended family relationships, and their working conditions. However, this did

not transform the judge's findings into a Baures analysis.

We reject plaintiff's argument that the judge improvidently allowed the

daughter to relocate to Connecticut based on domestic violence between the

parties. The judge reasoned she was "compelled to start the analysis with the

question as—or the issue—or the factor of domestic violence." The judge found

there was a history of prior domestic violence here but declined to make findings

as to whether the specific incidents alleged actually occurred. Nonetheless, the

judge fairly concluded that the testimony demonstrated at least some history of

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26
domestic violence existed between the parties. Moreover, the judge noted

defendant's testimony about the domestic violence was "not fabricated ," and

because of the domestic violence, her request to relocate to Connecticut was not

unreasonable. The judge rejected certain video evidence on this issue as not

probative.

Importantly, the judge emphasized that in the days leading up to

defendant's relocation, there was conflict in the parties' home, and thus

defendant's move was "in good faith." Plaintiff cites R.K. v. F.K. for the

proposition that even in cases where domestic violence occurred, the victim is

not entitled to a presumption of custody. 437 N.J. Super. 58, 65 (App. Div.

2014). However, in the matter under review, the judge did not find any

presumption of custody and merely considered the domestic violence history as

one of several factors in her custody analysis.

The judge then addressed the statutory custody factors in N.J.S.A. 9:2 -

4(c). Regarding the parents' ability to agree, communicate and cooperate, the

judge found the parties had an "extremely limited" ability to do so, and they

were required to use Our Family Wizard. As to the parents' willingness to accept

custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on

substantiated abuse, the judge noted that "much of the focus has been on . . . the

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domestic violence." Regarding the interaction and relationship of the daughter

with her parents, the court noted that she was "very young," and the interactions

were consistently described as positive.

As to the safety of the child, the judge found no reason to believe that the

daughter's safety was in jeopardy with either parent and no indication of physical

abuse by either parent. The judge noted that the Division's case was determined

to be unfounded. Regarding the preference of the child when of sufficient age

and capacity to reason, the judge noted that the daughter was too young to have

the capacity to reason.

As to the needs of the child, the judge found that her needs were met in

both parties' homes. Regarding the stability of the home environment offered,

the judge determined both homes were suitable for the daughter and rejected any

claim that defendant's home was too crowded. In addition, the judge rejected

any claim of conflict with defendant's brothers, highlighting there was no

evidence that any bad behavior occurred in the daughter's presence.

Concerning the quality and continuity of the daughter's education, the

judge found that the daughter was not old enough to attend school yet. As to

the fitness of the parents, the judge found no "true concerns" that either parent

was unsuitable or unfit. The judge again noted the history of domestic violence

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between the parties but concluded neither parent was violent or unfit toward the

daughter. The judge found that plaintiff showed a "positive and healthy and

loving" relationship with the daughter.

Regarding the geographical proximity of the parents' homes, the judge

found that difficulty arose because the parties lived ninety miles apart. As to

the extent and quality of the time spent with the daughter prior to or subsequent

to the separation, the judge noted that during the relationship, both parents

worked during the day, but the daughter spent time with plaintiff daily.

As to the parents' employment responsibilities, the judge explained that

plaintiff worked for his father earning $22,000 or $23,000 annually, with a

flexible schedule, and defendant had recently quit her job. Further, the judge

found that both parties were fully dependent on their parents. Finally, regarding

the age and number of children, the judge noted that the daughter was twenty-

one months old at the time.

After carefully considering these factors, the judge determined that both

parents were fit and New Jersey favored "50/50 custody," and therefore, both

parties were awarded equal parenting time. The judge then stated, "[n]ow going

to the removal—the factors for removal . . . ." As to the reasons given for the

move, the judge found that defendant went to Connecticut because of the

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October 2023 incident. Next, the judge reiterated that the daughter was "very

young," and the "educational opportunities are in equipoise." The judge noted

that plaintiff's preferred preschool was not yet open, and defendant had not yet

looked into educational opportunities for the daughter. The judge explained

there was limited testimony as to the "health options" and whether or not New

Jersey or Connecticut was better for the daughter. The judge found the daughter

had no special needs or talents requiring individual attention in one state or

another. The judge reasoned that a schedule could be developed to allow the

parties to continue to have joint physical custody of the daughter. As to the

effect of the move on any familial relations, the judge concluded that living in

Connecticut would still allow both parties and their families to foster a

relationship with the daughter. The judge mentioned that there was no expert

testimony proffered as to what schedule was in the daughter's best interests.

The judge fixed a schedule of "one week on, one week off" to minimize

driving between the parties' homes and noted minimizing the number of

exchanges would be in the daughter's best interests and reduce conflict. We

decline to second-guess the judge's application of the facts to the statutory

factors because that is not our role on appeal. See R. 2:10-2. The judge's

findings are supported by the adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in the

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30
record, and she neither abused her discretion nor misapplied the law in weighing

the N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) factors.

The circumstances presented do not persuade us that an order compelling

both defendant and the daughter to move back to New Jersey is in the best

interests of the daughter compared to the parenting time awarded plaintiff. By

awarding a 50/50 physical custody arrangement, the judge comported with the

public policy of N.J.S.A. 9:2-4, which promises a child "frequent and continuing

contact with both parents . . . ." The record shows the parties' relationship

endured tumult, and defendant's decision to remain in Connecticut was the result

of the breakdown in the parties' relationship, rather than a desire to prevent

plaintiff from having custody or parenting time. It was reasonable for defendant

to stay in Connecticut as she did not have a means of residing independently

with the daughter in New Jersey. The record supports the judge's determination.

Home State

Plaintiff contends there was no basis for the judge to make a determination

of the daughter's home state. However, in his complaint, plaintiff expressly

sought a determination of the daughter's home state. 4 Thus, the judge rightfully

4
Because plaintiff's amended complaint is not contained in the record, we
cannot ascertain whether similar relief was sought.

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31
adjudicated this issue consistent with her obligations under Rule 1:7-4(a).5 The

judge's responsibility under this Rule included an obligation to decide all critical

issues. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 1:7-4(a)

(2026). We conclude plaintiff's argument lacks merit and is plainly inconsistent

with the relief sought in his complaint.

PPR

Plaintiff next argues the judge erred in naming defendant PPR where the

parties share equal parenting time. Again, we disagree.

The Child Support Guidelines define PPR and PAR as follows:

(1) [PPR] - The parent with whom the child spends most
of his or her overnight time. The primary residence is
the home where the child resides for more than 50% of
the overnights annually. If the time spent with each
parent is equal (50% of overnights each), the PPR is the
parent with whom the child resides while attending
school . . . .

5
Rule 1:7-4(a) provides:

The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum
decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state
its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried
without a jury, on every motion decided by a written
order that is appealable as of right, and also as required
by R[ule] 3:29. The court shall thereupon enter or
direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.

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(2) [PAR] - This is the parent with whom the child
resides when not living in the primary residence.

[Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero,
Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶
14(b) (2026).]

A judge's designation of a specific parent as the PPR requires a "best

interests of the child" inquiry. Bisbing, 230 N.J. at 335. The designation of

either parent as PPR is significant, having "tangible, monetary effects." Benisch

v. Benisch, 347 N.J. Super. 393, 396 (App. Div. 2002).

In Benisch, the judge awarded the parents equal parenting time, and the

children spent an equal number of school nights with each parent such that, as

here, the Guidelines' definition of PPR and PAR was not strictly applicable. 347

N.J. Super. at 395-96. However, we acknowledged that even in such a shared

custody arrangement with equal parenting time, one party can be designated as

PPR and the other as PAR. Id. at 400. Nonetheless, we remanded the matter

for the judge to better articulate its reasons for designating one party as PPR.

Ibid.

In her initial oral opinion, the judge here held that "both [parents] can be

the [PPR]," though the initial order did not specifically designate a PPR.

Thereafter, on reconsideration, the judge stated that her failure to designate a

PPR had caused confusion and held defendant would be PPR, explaining:

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[The designation of defendant as PPR] was
contemplated in the [c]ourt's granting of the removal
application, that was contemplated by the findings that
were placed on the record, and the arguments that were
set forth by defense in terms of why there was the
removal. There were many arguments as to the history
between the parties, the reason for the move and, again,
the credibility findings, and that was part of why the
[c]ourt granted the removal. And so in light of that, in
furtherance of what the [c]ourt had intended to
accomplish by entering the order on October 21[]
following the decision, the defendant will be granted
the [PPR].

Here, the judge's opinion on reconsideration, designating defendant as

PPR was supported by the record and consistent with the rationale of her earlier

decision, which included consideration of the daughter's best interests.

Moreover, the judge clarified that although her initial failure to designate one

parent as PPR had caused confusion, the subsequent designation of defendant as

PPR was based on her earlier analysis of the custody factors and grant of the

removal application. These findings are amply supported by the record, and we

discern no error.

Plaintiff cites Wunsch-Deffler v. Deffler, 406 N.J. Super. 505, 508 (Ch.

Div. 2009), for the proposition that the PPR and PAR designations do not apply

when the time spent with each parent is equal. However, plaintiff

mischaracterizes that case, which simply provided a formula for allocating costs

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34
where the parents had equal parenting time. Id. at 506. Further, the plain

language of the Child Support Guidelines permits the designation of a PPR when

the time spent with each parent is equal. Child Support Guidelines, Pressler &

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶ 14(b) (2026).

Therefore, we reject plaintiff's argument.

The Daughter's Pediatrician

Plaintiff contends the judge erred in disregarding the joint legal custody

provision by allowing defendant to unilaterally select the daughter's pediatrician

based on the judge's designation of defendant as the PPR. Plaintiff maintains

reversal is warranted because "the parties agreed to share joint legal custody,"

and the judge gave defendant "more power in this situation."

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(a) provides that "[j]oint custody of a minor child to both

parents, [] shall include [] provisions for consultation between the parents in

making major decisions regarding the child's health, education and general

welfare . . . ." However, in Boardman v. Boardman, 314 N.J. Super. 340, 348

(App. Div. 1998), we upheld a provision in a divorce judgment awarding joint

legal custody with the mother as the primary custodial parent, who had final

decision-making authority. Boardman made clear that "the legal authority and

responsibility for making 'major' decisions regarding the children's welfare is

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35
shared by both parents" in a joint custody arrangement. Ibid. However, the

primary caretaker has "somewhat more authority to decide issues in the event of

a disagreement." Ibid.

On reconsideration in this matter, the judge held that defendant could

choose the daughter's pediatrician, despite the joint custody provision. We are

satisfied the decision as to who would serve as the daughter's pediatrician was

plainly within the judge's afforded discretion. Saliently, in light of the judge's

designation of defendant as PPR, and consistent with Boardman, we agree

defendant should have "somewhat more authority" to make this decision.

Therefore, we find no reversible error. 314 N.J. Super. at 348.

Tax Exemption

Plaintiff next argues that the judge erred in permitting the parties to

alternate claiming the daughter as an exemption on their tax returns. Plaintiff

alleges this decision is unsupported because defendant was unemployed at the

time of the hearing. Plaintiff's argument lacks merit.

Under New Jersey law, "[t]he trial court may exercise its discretion in

allocating tax exemptions, subject to acceptance by the Internal Revenue

Service." Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 352-53 (App. Div. 1996). Here,

the judge held that the parties would alternate claiming the daughter as a

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dependent on their tax returns until her emancipation, with plaintiff claiming her

in even years, and defendant claiming her in odd years. The judge reasonably

exercised her broad discretion, as permitted in Heinl, to order the parties to

alternate claiming the daughter on their tax returns. While plaintiff asserts this

decision was erroneous because defendant was unemployed at the time of trial,

she testified that she was seeking employment and did not intend to remain

unemployed. Therefore, there was no error or abuse of discretion.

Imputed Income

Finally, plaintiff contends that the judge erred in imputing to defendant an

income that is lower than what she earned before quitting her job. He argues

that the judge imputed $50,000 to her per year, meanwhile she was earning

$65,000 when she quit her job.

The court may impute income to a parent who is voluntarily unemployed.

Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 268-69 (2005); Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J.

Super. 298, 312 (App. Div. 2008). "Imputation of income is a discretionary

matter not capable of precise or exact determination but rather requiring a trial

judge to realistically appraise capacity to earn and job availability." Storey, 373

N.J. Super. at 474. Accordingly, there are no bright line rules that govern the

imputation of income. Ibid. A trial court's imputation of income for support

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purposes is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Tash v. Tash, 353 N.J.

Super. 94, 99 (App. Div. 2002).

Here, the judge imputed to defendant an annual income of $50,000. In

doing so, the judge acknowledged defendant had previously received a raise,

such that her salary was approximately $64,000 or $65,000, shortly before

leaving her job, but held defendant's income should be determined "prior to the

raise, because I don't think she really got the benefit of the raise."

We conclude, the judge did not abuse her discretion. The imputed sum of

$50,000 was close to defendant's $55,000 annual salary prior to her raise.

Moreover, the judge reasoned that because defendant left her job shortly after

receiving the raise, she did not truly receive the benefit of the raise. The record

supports that determination. Further, this decision reasonably reflects the fact

that defendant might be unable to secure future income at $65,000 after leaving

her job, particularly having moved outside the immediate New York City

metropolitan area. Therefore, we reject plaintiff's argument.

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IV.

Defendant's Cross-Appeal

Custody

Defendant argues in her cross-appeal that the judge erred in ordering and

then failing to reconsider the award of "50/50 physical custody" because the

judge should have granted her additional parenting time to facilitate the

daughter's enrollment in school in the near future. Defendant argues that the

parenting time arrangement ordered is inconsistent with the judge's grant of her

removal application and appointment as PPR. We disagree.

New Jersey courts will not issue advisory opinions or rule on hypothetical

situations. G.H. v. Township of Galloway, 199 N.J. 135, 136 (2009). "The

judicial function operates best when a concrete dispute is presented to the

courts." Ibid. Further, our courts will not decide cases based on facts that are

"undeveloped or uncertain." N.J. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't

of Hum. Servs., 89 N.J. 234, 241 (1982).

On reconsideration, the judge here denied defendant's request for

additional parenting time once the daughter was enrolled in school, finding that

this ruling should abide by the event because it was "completely hypothetical."

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The judge was correct in her analysis and rightfully declined to address custody

and parenting time in light of the record, which demonstrated that the daughter

was not yet enrolled in school, and the parties were uncertain where and when

she would begin school. Such a ruling on this issue would have been purely

speculative as the school's location and schedule were not before the judge. We

reiterate the judge's custody ruling was amply supported by the evidence, and

we will not disturb it.

Home State

Defendant next argues that the judge erred in designating New Jersey as

the daughter's home state. We are unpersuaded.

The UCCJEA prohibits simultaneous custody proceedings in separate

states or countries and instead establishes a preference for the resolution of

custody disputes by courts of the child's "home state." Fall & Romanowski,

Child Custody, Protection & Support § 27:11 (2026). N.J.S.A. 2A:34-54

provides that "home state" is defined as

the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child
custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six
months of age, the term means the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons
mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of
the mentioned persons is part of the period.

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[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-54.]

Again, plaintiff's initial complaint sought a determination of the

daughter's home state. Therefore, the issue was before the judge. In their

November 2023 consent order, the parties agreed that the daughter's home state

would be New Jersey. 6 The judge ultimately held on reconsideration that New

Jersey would be considered the daughter's home state despite permitting her

relocation to Connecticut and initially ruling Connecticut would be the home

state.

We affirm the judge's determination to regard New Jersey as the

daughter's home state. In November 2023, even after relocating with the

daughter to Connecticut, but prior to filing her counterclaim for removal,

defendant conceded that New Jersey was the home state. Further the record

indicates that, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-54, the daughter had lived in New

Jersey for more than six consecutive months immediately before the

commencement of the complaint filing for child custody. Accordingly, the

6
Defendant's counterclaim for removal later sought to change the home state
designation to Connecticut.

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judge had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the parties' custody dispute under

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-65(a).7

Defendant argues that the daughter lived in Connecticut for six months

prior to the judge's granting of the removal application that Connecticut should

be deemed her home state. However, defendant ignores the plain language of

the statute, which provides that the home state is determined based on the child's

residence "before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." N.J.S.A.

2A:34-54. It is undisputed this custody proceeding began in early November

2023, and the daughter lived in New Jersey until she was removed to

Connecticut in late October 2023. Therefore, defendant's argument is

unavailing.

Imputed Income

Defendant next argues that the judge erred in imputing only minimum

wage to plaintiff in light of his education, which included a college degree and

his work experience. Again, "[i]mputation of income is a discretionary matter

not capable of precise or exact determination but rather requiring a trial judge

7
The daughter's relocation to Connecticut in the few days preceding plaintiff's
filing of this action does not defeat New Jersey's status as home state. See
Dalessio v. Gallagher, 414 N.J. Super. 18, 23-24 (App. Div. 2010) (rejecting a
claim that a relocation in the days prior to the filing of the complaint negated
home state status).
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to realistically appraise capacity to earn and job availability." Storey, 373 N.J.

Super. at 474. There are no bright line rules that govern the imputation of

income. Ibid. A trial court's imputation of income for support purposes is

subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Tash, 353 N.J. Super. at 99.

Here, the judge's imputation of minimum wage was consistent with the

evidence in the record, which indicated that plaintiff earned only $22,168 per

year while working for his father's construction company. While this annual

income appears to be below minimum wage for full-time employment, by

imputing a minimum wage of forty hours per week, the judge rightly exercised

her discretion to approximate plaintiff's income at a reasonable rate for

construction work.

To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because

either our disposition deems it unnecessary or the argument was without

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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