Maki v. State - Criminal Law

THE SUPREME COURT, ST ATE OF WYOM ING 20 26 W Y 32 OC TO BE R TE RM, A. D. 20 25 March 9, 2026 AARON R. MAKI, Appellant (Defendant), v. THE STATE OF WY OMING, Appellee (Plaintiff). S-25-0166 Appeal from the Distri ct Court of Campbell County The Honorable Matth ew F.G. Castano, Judg e Representing Appellan t: Donna D. Domonkos of Domonkos Law Office, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Dom onkos. Representing Appellee: Keith G. Kautz, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, Seni or Assistant Attorney General; Donovan Burton, Assistan t Attorney General. Arg ument by Mr. Burton. Before BOOMGAAR DEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, an d H ILL, JJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before pu blication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 8200 2, of any t ypographical or other forma l errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent v olume.

1 FENN, Justice. [¶1] Aaron R. Maki entere d into a plea a greement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to certain charges in exchange for a deferred s entence under Wyoming Statute § 7-13-301 (2023). At the sentenc ing hearing, the State informed the distri ct co urt Mr. Maki might not be eligible for a def erred sentence because he previously rec eived a deferred sentence in a misdemeanor case in 1996, although his probation in that case was ultimately revoked and he never received a discharge and dismissal of the underlying offense. The di strict court found Mr. Maki was not eligible fo r a second deferred senten ce, and it imposed a suspended prison sente nce. On appeal, Mr. Maki asserts the district court erred when it found he was ineligible for a deferre d sentence. We reverse and remand. ISSUE [¶2] The dispositive issue in this case is: Did the district court err wh en it ruled Mr. Maki was ineligible for a def erred sentence? 1 FACTS [¶3] The State charged Mr. Maki with one count of felony conspiracy to commit theft and one count of felony theft for helping anot her person steal three spools of copper wire and a generator from a ranch in Campbell Co unty. While out on bond for those cha rges, Mr. Maki was arrested and charged with four new misdemea nors: driving while under the influence; elu ding; rec kless driving; and speeding 80 mph in a 45 -mph zone. Mr. Maki was able to reach a global plea agreement with the State to address these charges. Mr. Maki agreed to plead g uilty to one count of fe lony conspiracy to co mmit theft, one count of misde meanor theft, one count of misdeme anor driving while under the influence, and one count of mis demeanor eluding. The State agr eed to reco mmend the following sentences: a deferred sentence pursu ant to Wyoming Statute § 7 -13-301 on the felony conspiracy cha rge, with three years of supervised probation; a sentence of 180 days in jail, with all but 30 days suspended, on the theft charge; a sentence of 180 days in jail, w ith all but 10 days su spended, on the driving while u nder the influence charge; and a sentenc e of 180 days in jail, with all but 10 days suspended on the eluding charge. The misdemeanor jail sentences would run concurrently with each other. The State would dis miss the remaining misdemeanor counts. [¶4] The district court accep ted Mr. Ma ki’s guilty pleas at a change of plea hearing, b ut it deferred sentencing p ending the completion of a presentenc e investigation (PSI). When the PSI was completed, the State learned for the first time that Mr. Maki had previo usly 1 Mr. Maki also raised the issue of whether the prosec utor committed m isconduct when she informed the district court that he might be ineligib le for a deferred sentence. Because we find his first issue to be dispositive, we wi ll not address his se cond issu e.

2 received a deferred sentence for a mi sdemean or driving while u nder the influence charge in 1996. Mr. Maki’s probation was ultimately revoked in that case in 1997, and the district court entered his misdemeanor conviction. The PSI al so reveal ed Mr. Maki had an extensive criminal hist ory with more than 30 misdemeanor char ges and num erous traffi c citations and moving violations. [¶5] At the sente ncing hearing, the State informed the district court it had agreed to recommend a deferre d sentence, and it continued to stand by t hat recommendation. How ever, the State info rmed the di strict court it was concerned about the deferred s entence Mr. Maki had received in 1996. T he State beli eved because M r. Maki had already received one deferre d sentence, he wa s ineligible for a second deferral, eve n though he did not receive a discharge and dismissal of the misdemeanor charge. The State indicated it had no intent to deviate from the plea agre ement, but it was concerned th e “law may not allow this [c]ourt to impose a deferred sentence [] on the felony conspir a cy to commit theft if he already recei ved one b ack in 1996.” The State further indicated the 1996 deferral did not show up in the NCIC database, and the State was completely una ware of the previous deferral at the time it entered into the plea agreement with Mr. Maki. Because the State believed the 1996 misd emeanor def erral lega lly precluded the district court from entering a deferred s entence a nd because Mr. Maki had previously been a dvised he could not withdraw his plea if the district court de clined to follow the plea agr eement, the S tate made an alternative sentencing recommendation. The State recommended four – six y ears i n prison, sus pended i n li eu of probation, on t he felony cons piracy cha rge, and an additional ten days in jail on the misdemeanor theft charge. If the district court felt a deferred sentence was still a legally valid option, the State indicated it intended to stand by the plea agreement. Mr. Maki argued he was still eligible for a deferral because he had not received a discharge an d dismissal of the 1996 misdemeanor offense and he had no pr ior felony convictions. [¶6] After considering the a rguments of the parties, the district court ruled: [H]aving reread 7-13-3 01 and then putting into context of other things an in terpretation of that statute that if you were unsuccessful on a 301 that you get another sho t at it is contrary to at least this [c]ourt’ s common se nse. So t he [c]ourt is going to decline to treat th is under 7-13-301. The distric t court sent enced Mr. Maki to tw o – four years in prison and suspended the sentence in lieu of three years of supervised probation on the felon y co nspiracy charge. On the misdemeanor theft charge, t he d istrict cour t senten ced Mr. Maki t o 180 days in jail. He was given cr edit for 2 0 days served, ordered to serve an additional 10 days in jail, and the rest of the sentence was suspended. His sentence on the thef t charge would run concurrently with his se ntence on the conspirac y charge. This appeal timely followed. The

3 district court stayed the imposition of Mr. Maki’s sentence, including the conditions of his probation, pending this Court’s decision on hi s appeal. STANDARD OF RE VIEW [¶7] “ This Court applies a de novo standard of review to issue s of statutory interpretation. ” Lynch v. State, 2026 WY 8, ¶ 5, 582 P.3d. 908, 909 (Wyo. 2026) (citing In re Birkholz, 2019 WY 19, ¶ 13, 434 P. 3d 1 102, 1105 (W yo. 2019)). “ We afford no deference to t he district cour t’ s dete rminations.” Alvarado v. State, 2024 WY 9, ¶ 4, 541 P.3d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 2024) (citat ion omitted). When interpreting stat utes, we seek t he legislature ’ s intent as reflected in the plain a nd ordi nary meaning of the words used in the stat ute, giving eff ect to every word, claus e, and sentence. The plain, or dinary, a nd usual mea ning of words used in a statute controls in the absence of clear statutory provisions to the contrary. Where the re is plain, unamb iguous language used in a statute there is no r oom for constructi on. The omiss ion of words from a st atute is considere d to be an i ntentional act by the legislature, an d this Court will not read words into a statute when the legislature ha s chosen not to include them. Id. (quoting Minter v. S tate, 2023 WY 35, ¶ 24, 527 P.3d 1249, 1254 (Wyo. 2023)). DISCUSSION [¶8] The district court conc luded Wyoming Statute § 7-13- 301 preclud es a defendant from getting “anot her shot” at a deferred sente nce if he did not successfully comple te his probation and receive a discharge and dism issal in the first misdemeanor prosecution. The plain language of the st a tute imposes no s uch restriction. [¶9] Wyoming Statute § 7 - 13 -301(a) states, in re levant part: 2 (a) If a person wh o ha s not previously been c onvicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty or no contest to... any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree, aggravate d assault and battery or arso n in the first or se cond degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a 2 Wyoming Statute § 7 -13-301(a) also pr ovid es that def endants charged with second or subsequent counts of certain misde meanors are ineligib le to receive a deferred sentence. Mr. Maki’s charg e does not fal l within that class o f statutori ly excepted misdemeanors.

4 judgment of guilt or conviction, defer fu rther proceedings an d place the person on pr obation for a term not to exceed thirty - six (36) mon ths u pon terms and conditions set by the court. If a defendant vi olates a term or condition of his probation before hi s conviction has been discharged under Wyo ming Statute § 7 -13-301, the district court may either ent er his conviction and “impose sentenc e upon the defendant” or order that the defendant be tried on the ori ginal charge as if he had not pled guilty or been convicted. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7 - 13-301(c). If a defend ant successfully completes his probation, he receives a discharge and dismissal of the offense, which is “not a conviction for any purpose.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7 -13- 301(d). The legislature has determined a defenda nt “s hall” only receiv e on e “discharge and dismissal” under Wyoming Statute § 7 -13- 301 “or under any similar section of the pr obationary stat utes of any other jurisd iction.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7 -13-301(e). [¶10] Although Mr. Maki has an extensive history of misdemean or charg es, he had not previously been convicted of any felony at the time he agreed to plead guilty to the charges in this case. Therefore, he was still “a per son who [had] not previously been convicted of any felony” under Wyo ming Statute § 7 -13-301(a). Fur ther, whil e he had received a deferred senten ce in 1996 on a misdemeanor charge, his probation was revoked and he ne ver received a “discharge and dismissal” for that charge. 3 Therefore, Mr. Maki could receive a discharge and dismissal for the felony conspiracy charge without running afoul of the provisions of Wyoming Statute § 7-13- 301(e). Under the plain language of Wyoming Statute § 7-13 -301, Mr. Maki remained eligible for a deferred sen tence in th is case. [¶11] The State relies on la nguage fr om our deci sion in Rawson v. Sta te where we describ ed the deferred sentencing statute as a “manifestation of legislative grace” th at is not intended “to be inv oked repetitiv ely.” 900 P.2d 1136, 11 39 (Wyo. 1995). However, the question in Rawson was whether Ms. Rawson was entitled to the benefit of a discharge and dismissa l under the Wyoming stat ute wh en she had already rece ived a sim ilar bene fit under a Colorado statute. Id. We concluded Ms. Rawson failed to present evidence establishing she had not been convicted of a felony in Colorado, or alternati vely, if her conviction had not been entered, then she had already rece ived the bene fit of a Colorad o statute like Wyo ming Statute § 7 -13-3 01. Id. Therefore, she did n ot “qualify as a first offender under our statute.” Id. Unlike Ms. Rawson, the evidence in the record shows Mr. Maki never received the benefit of a “disch arge and dismis sal” in this or any other jurisdiction, and he has not previousl y been convicted of a felony. Therefore, despite his 3 We note if the charge for which Mr. Maki received the deferred sentence in 1996 had been a felony, he would now be ineligible fo r a deferred sentence becaus e when his probation was revoked, the court would likely have en tered a conv iction for that felony charge under Wyoming Statute § 7-13-301(c), and he w ould no longer have be en “ a person w ho [had] not previou sly been convicted o f any felony.”

5 misdemeanor convictions and previous unsu ccessful deferred sentence, he qualifies for treatment as a first o ffender under Wyomi ng Statute § 7 - 13 -301. [¶12] As discussed above, “[w]hen interpr eting statutes, we seek th e legislature’s intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning o f the words used in the statute [.]” Alvarado, 2024 WY 9, ¶ 4, 541 P. 3d at 1099. To determi ne the legislature’s intent, we look to statutes relating to the same subject and consider t hose statutes i n harmony. Rosen v. St ate, 202 2 WY 16, ¶¶ 12 – 13, 503 P.3d 41, 45 (Wyo. 2022). Our conclusion that Mr. Maki is eligible for a deferred prosecution under Wyoming Statute § 7 -13-301 is confirmed when we compare the language the legislature used in Wyoming Statute § 7- 13 -301 to the language it used when crafting t he deferred sentencing statute included in the Wyoming Co ntrolled Substances Act. Wyo ming Statute § 35- 7-1037 (2023) states: Whenever any person who has not previo usly been convicted of any offense under this act or under any statute of the United States or of any state relating to narcotic drug s, marihuana, or stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic drugs, pleads guilty to or is found guilty of possession of a controlled substance under W.S. 35 -7-1031(c) or 35-7-1033(a)(iii)(B), or plea ds guilty to or is found guilty of using or being under the influence of a controlled substa nce under W.S. 35 -7-1039, the court, without entering a judgment of guilt a nd with the consent of the accuse d, may defer further proceedings an d place him on probation upo n terms and condition s. Any term of probation imposed under this sect ion for a felony offense shall not exceed the maximum term of probation authorized u nder W.S. 7 -13- 302(b). Upon violation of a term or cond ition, the court may enter an a djudication of guilt and proceed as oth erwise provided. Upon fulfill ment of th e terms and conditions, the court shall dis charge the perso n and dism iss the proceedings against him. Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a convictio n for purposes of this section or for purposes o f disqualification s or disabilities im posed by law upon conviction of a crim e, including the a dditional penalties imposed for se cond or subsequent convicti ons un der W.S. 35-7-1038. There may be only one (1) discharge and dismissal under this section with respect to a ny person. This section shall not be construed to provid e an exclusive procedure. Any other procedure provided by law relating to suspension of trial or probation, may be f ollowed, in the discretion of the trial c ourt.

6 (Emphasis added). Wyoming Statute § 35-7-1037 ex pressly excludes a p erson convicted of “any offense” from being eligible for a deferred sentence for a controlled substances offense. By contrast, Wyoming Statute § 7 - 13 -301(a) does not use the term “any offense,” but instead u ses the ter m “any felony.” If the legislature intended t o preclude a defendant convicted of any previous misdemeanor fr om obtaining a deferred sentence under Wyoming Statute § 7 - 13 -301, it could have used the same “any off ense” language it used in Wyoming Statute § 35-7-1037. In stead, it chose the narrower phrase “a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony,” and we pres ume that choice was in tentional. See Alvarado, 2024 W Y 9, ¶ 4, 541 P.3d at 1099 (quoting Minter, 2023 WY 35, ¶ 24, 527 P.3d at 1254). Because Mr. Maki has never been convicted of “any felony,” he remains eligible for a deferred sentence unde r Wyoming Statute § 7 -13-301(a). [¶13] We note that while Mr. Maki is sti ll eligible for a deferred se ntence, his plea agreement was entered pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(B) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure (W.R.Cr.P.), and the district court is not bound by the plea agreement. See Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 21, 151 P.3d 1136, 1143 (Wyo. 2007) (“ A recommendation under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B) is not binding on the court, a nd t he defendant does not have the right to withdraw the plea. ”). Therefore, the district court still has the discretion to d ecide whether Mr. Maki is an appropria te candidate for a deferred sentence. See Frederick, ¶¶ 16 – 32, 151 P.3d a t 1141 – 46 (fin ding the district court had the discretion to reject a plea agreement for a deferred sentence after consid ering a wide variety of factors about the defendant and his crimes); Rawson, 900 P.2d at 1139 – 40 (holding a district court has fu ll discretion to decide whether to grant a defe rred sentence u nder Wyoming Statute § 7 -13-301 even th ough the defendant and State consent to its application). A review of the record in this ca se sho ws the district court refu sed to gra nt the deferred sentence because it found Mr. Maki was legally ineligib le for such a sentence, not beca use it fo und in its discreti on t hat such a sentence was inap propriate. Because the district court misi nterpreted Wyoming Statute § 7-13- 30 1, Mr. Maki’s sentence must be reversed, and his case must be remanded for a new senten cing hearing. CONCLUSION [¶14] The district c ourt incorr ectly found Mr. Maki is ineligible for a deferred prosecution under Wyoming Statute § 7 -13-301. Because Mr. Maki has never previously been convicted of a felony and has not received a “discharge and dismissal” of any charge under Wyoming Statute § 7 - 13 -301 or a similar statute in any other jurisdiction, he is still eligible for a deferred sentence. The district court has the discretion to de cide whether such a sentence is appropriate in this case. We reverse Mr. Maki’s sentence a nd remand this case for a new sentencing h earing.