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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re L.C. CA6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: H053191

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.4K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/6/26 In re L.C. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re L.C., a Person Coming Under the H053191, H053360
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 24JD027746)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND
CHILDREN'S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

The juvenile court terminated mother K.M.’s parental rights over two-year-old
L.C. after denying mother’s petition to reinstate reunification services (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 388). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother argues her recent substantial
progress demonstrates it would be in L.C.’s best interest to reinstate reunification services
such that the order terminating parental rights must also be reversed. Because the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother had not shown that further
services would be in L.C.’s best interest, we will affirm both orders.
I. BACKGROUND

The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services alleged in
2024 that then-infant L.C. was at risk of serious physical harm in his parents’ care due to
domestic violence exposure and mother’s erratic and violent behavior. (Welf. & Inst.
1
Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1); undesignated statutory references are to this Code.) According
to the petition, mother suffered from bipolar disorder and acted violently toward father in
L.C.’s presence. L.C. lived with his father, and father continued to see mother despite
having a no-contact restraining order against her. The Department’s interviews with the
parents revealed that both mother and father had a history of perpetrating intimate partner
violence (IPV). L.C. was detained and placed in the protective custody of the
Department in connection with an incident in January 2024 which resulted in mother’s
arrest for violating a protective order and father’s arrest on outstanding warrants.
The juvenile court sustained the petition, declared L.C. a dependent of the court,
removed him from his parents’ custody, and placed him with his paternal grandmother.
Both parents were granted reunification services and visitation. The parents were
instructed to participate in parent orientation and parenting without violence classes, a
substance use assessment, random weekly drug testing, and individual counseling.
Mother was instructed to take medications as prescribed and participate in a batterer’s
intervention program. Father was instructed to participate in an IPV support group.
At the contested six-month review hearing in October 2024, the court terminated
reunification services due to each parent’s minimal progress on their case plan. (The
juvenile court had continued that hearing to give the parents the opportunity to continue
to engage in services.) Mother began the violence intervention program and completed
the parenting orientation and class after initial non-engagement. She ultimately did not
complete weekly drug testing or individual counseling, attended only a few IPV
intervention program sessions, and continued to miss visits before the six-month review
hearing. She also resumed her relationship with father. The day before services were
terminated, mother began attending counseling.
Before the contested selection and implementation hearing, both parents petitioned
under section 388 for an additional six months of reunification services. In her February
2025 petition, Mother stated that she had not been taking her bipolar medication before
2
the six-month review hearing because she was pregnant with L.C.’s brother, N.C., who
was placed into protective custody with his paternal grandmother in December 2024 due
to the ongoing domestic violence between the parents. (N.C. was returned to his
mother’s care in March 2025 under a family maintenance plan.) Mother was required to
participate in individual therapy and psychiatric services as part of N.C.’s reunification
case plan, and to participate in mental health diversion program in criminal court.
Mother explained that she ended her relationship with father when N.C. was
removed from her care. She began psychiatric services and medication, moved into an
IPV shelter, started in an IPV support group, and paid to restart the violence intervention
program in January 2025. She completed a substance use assessment and began random
drug testing in February 2025. Mother also obtained a permanent restraining order
against father in March 2025. Before the contested selection and implementation
hearing, mother completed the IPV support group and continued to develop a support
system.
Visitation with L.C. was reinstated at mother’s request after N.C.’s removal in
December 2024. Although mother attended visits regularly and L.C. enjoyed the visits,
visitation was terminated before the selection and implementation hearing due to missed
visits and mother’s decision to focus on stabilizing her mental health.
A. SECTION 388 AND SECTION 366.26 HEARINGS

The juvenile court determined mother made a prima facie showing on her
section 388 modification petition. At an evidentiary hearing on the petition in April 2025,
mother testified that she was last arrested for physical violence against father in March
2023 and that she was also a victim of IPV. She explained that restarting medication for
bipolar disorder helped her establish a parenting routine. Mother stopped visiting L.C.
from July to December 2024 because she was dealing with postpartum depression and
guilt but realized L.C. needed consistency to strengthen their bond. Mother testified that
L.C. called her “mom” and was emotionally attached to her and his little brother N.C.
3
The social worker testified at the hearing about a violent incident between the parents in
November and December 2024. Also according to the social worker, mother had a
pattern of participating in services only intermittently and had “not consistently been able
to show that she has fully addressed the issues” that led to L.C.’s removal, despite making
some changes and pursuing a restraining order.
The juvenile court denied mother’s section 388 petition for additional reunification
services after concluding the April 2025 hearing. The court acknowledged mother’s
circumstances were changing, but it determined that mother did not adequately show that
circumstances had substantially changed. It found mother did not begin to address the
two issues that brought L.C. into the dependency system—mother’s history of mental
health issues and domestic violence—until three to four months after services ended and
just before the section 366.26 hearing was set. She did not begin psychiatric services and
bipolar medication until January 2025. It also found she did not take responsibility for
her own role in the history of violence between the parents, and there was not enough
time to see whether mother would truly separate from father given that her request for
restraining order against him had only recently been filed. In explaining its ruling, the
court emphasized that the dependency scheme stresses quick reunification of young
children and that “delays never work well, or in the best interest of the child.”
At the contested section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found L.C. was likely
to be adopted and the beneficial parent relationship and sibling relationship exceptions
did not apply. The juvenile court followed the Department’s recommendation to
terminate both parents’ parental rights and implement a permanent plan of adoption.
II. DISCUSSION

Section 388 allows a parent to petition the juvenile court to modify a previous
order based on changed circumstances or new evidence. (In re N.F. (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120 (N.F.).) In addition to showing a material change in
circumstances, the petitioning parent must demonstrate that the proposed modification is
4
in the child’s best interest. (Ibid.) Indeed, the change in circumstances must materially
and directly relate to the basis for dependency jurisdiction. (In re A.A. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) As a petition under section 388 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the juvenile court, we will not disturb its decision absent a clear abuse of
discretion. (N.F., at p. 120.)
A few months after the court terminated reunification services in October 2024,
mother began regularly taking psychiatric medication, participating in an IPV
intervention program, and complying with random drug testing. She also reported that
she had stopped seeing father and obtained a restraining order against him. The record
demonstrates that during that time mother took substantial steps to address the violence
and mental health issues that led to the original jurisdictional finding. But once
reunification services terminate, the paramount consideration is whether the requested
relief will advance the child’s need for permanency and stability. (N.F., supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526–527 (J.C.).)
Despite mother’s laudable efforts, we see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court
determining that additional reunification services were not warranted under the
circumstances and would not further L.C.’s interest in permanency and stability. (N.F., at
pp. 120–121; J.C., at pp. 526–527.)
The record supports the juvenile court’s observation that mother did not seriously
address her IPV and mental health issues until a few months before the section 366.26
hearing, which was almost a year after L.C. was removed from her care. Due to L.C.’s
quite young age, additional reunification services could be provided for no more than
four months after the evidentiary hearing on the modification petition, and only if there
was a substantial probability of L.C.’s return to mother’s custody. (§ 361.5,
subds. (a)(1)(B) & (a)(3)(A).) Based on mother’s history of making progress for a few
months but then falling into old habits, the juvenile court reasonably questioned whether
mother’s very recent efforts represented a lasting change in circumstances. Moreover,
5
L.C. had spent a substantial portion of his young life in the care of his paternal
grandmother, who was able to provide L.C. with a loving and stable home and wished to
adopt him.
Mother notes in her briefing the three best interest factors discussed in In re
Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519 (Kimberly F.), namely: the seriousness of the
problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the bond between the parent and child
on the one hand and between the foster parent and child on the other; and the degree to
which the problem underlying the dependency has been remedied. In addition to those
factors, we agree that the proper focus at this late stage of dependency jurisdiction is
L.C.’s need for stability. (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) Mother also
acknowledges, with commendable candor, that she made little or no progress on her case
plan until well after reunification services had ended and a selection and implementation
hearing had been set under section 366.26.
Having considered mother’s arguments and the record under our deferential
standard of review, we are satisfied that the juvenile court gave due consideration to the
Kimberly F. factors in reaching its decision about what would be in L.C.’s best interest.
The court expressed particular concern that mother had only recently begun to make
changes addressing the serious IPV and mental health issues that brought L.C. into the
dependency system, such that a finding premised on resolution of those issues would be
premature. The court also stressed the importance of avoiding further delay in
permanency, which we interpret as an acknowledgment that L.C. was securely bonded to
his paternal grandmother despite his good relationship with mother.
We recognize, as did the juvenile court, that the new information proffered by
mother in her section 388 petition shows progress on important elements of her case plan.
But as we have explained, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying
mother’s modification petition on this record. (N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 120.)
Since mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s selection of a permanent plan under
6
section 366.26 derives from her arguments on the section 388 petition to reinstate
services, her challenge to the order terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as
the permanent plan is also unsuccessful. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630.)
III. DISPOSITION

The order denying mother’s section 388 modification petition for further
reunification services and the order terminating mother’s parental rights as to L.C. are
affirmed.

7

Grover, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Lie, J.

Wilson, J.

H053191, H053360
In re L.C.; Santa Clara County DFCS v. K.M.