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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Zeng v. Wang CA1/5

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A171521

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.4K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/9/26 Zeng v. Wang CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

YING MAGGIE ZENG,
A171521
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Sonoma County
v.
Super. Ct. No. SFL-089930)
ALBERT WANG,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Albert Wang appeals from a minute order and a final order
that required him to pay plaintiff and respondent Ying Maggie Zeng $50,000
in sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271.1 He also appeals from a
minute order denying his request for appointment of minor’s counsel and a
child custody evaluator pursuant to sections 3111 and 3150. We conclude
that the minute order imposing sanctions is not appealable and affirm the
other orders.

1 Except where otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the

Family Code.
1
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Prior Proceedings
Wang and Zeng married in 2005 and have one child (Daughter). Their
marriage was dissolved in 2013 in Orange County Superior Court, and the
matter was transferred to Sonoma County Superior Court in 2021. Pending
the transfer, Zeng filed another case in Sonoma County and obtained a two-
year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Wang in March
2022.2 Zeng was also granted “temporary sole legal and physical custody” of
Daughter. Wang appealed and we affirmed. (Zeng v. Wang (March 25, 2024,
A165473) [nonpub. opn.].)
In July 2022, Wang filed a request for an order (RFO) in Sonoma
County Superior Court to compel compliance with earlier custody and
visitation orders issued by the Orange County court. He also sought
appointment of minor’s counsel and a child custody evaluation.
In August 2022, the trial court denied Wang’s request to compel
compliance with the Orange County orders. It declined to rule on Wang’s
other requests because they were not properly before the court. It
nonetheless gave Wang the opportunity to re-file his requests for minor’s
counsel, a child custody evaluation, sanctions, and attorney fees and costs if
he first met and conferred with Zeng’s counsel. Wang appealed and we
affirmed. (Zeng v. Wang (March 26, 2024, A166681) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Wang’s RFO for Custody Evaluation and Minor’s Counsel
In March 2024, Wang filed a RFO for a child custody evaluation and
appointment of counsel for Daughter. After a hearing, the trial court denied

2 The DVRO, which expired in March 2024, was renewed. The renewal
is the subject of another appeal (case No. A172228), which we resolve in a
separate opinion.
2
the RFO in a minute order on April 22, 2024, but did not issue a Findings
and Order After Hearing (FOAH).
C. Zeng’s RFO for Attorney Fees
In July 2024, Zeng filed a RFO for $65,120.58 in sanctions against
Wang pursuant to section 271, including an award of attorney fees as the
prevailing party in two of Wang’s appeals (case Nos. A165473 and A166681).
In her supporting declaration, Zeng summarized the history of the
proceedings and Wang’s purported abuse of Zeng and Daughter. Asserting
that the trial court had denied every one of Wang’s many motions, she
alleged that she incurred $59,297.08 in legal fees due to his litigation tactics
since the DVRO was issued. She further alleged that Wang was not
providing financial support for Daughter and was forcing Zeng to use her
“precious [financial] resources to pay for legal representation.” Zeng averred
that Wang is an attorney and “financially comfortable,” so he could afford to
“sit[ ] at home, drafting endless pleadings.” She also provided an itemization
of the total fees and costs she sought.
In his opposition, Wang characterized the litigation as a “decade-long
parental alienation.” He reasserted his request for appointment of minor’s
counsel and a custody evaluation. In addition, he sought need-based attorney
fees pursuant to section 2030, claiming he had been borrowing money from
his sister to cover his living expenses. He asserted that he had little income
and there was a financial disparity that favored Zeng. He averred that his
litigation efforts were in good faith because earlier orders had deprived him
of his parental rights.
The trial court heard Zeng’s request for sanctions on August 19, 2024.
No record of the oral proceedings appears in the record. By minute order

3
dated August 19, the court imposed sanctions of $50,000, finding that Wang’s
“motions and appeals have been baseless, meritless, and frivolous.”
In a FOAH entered on September 26, 2024, the trial court imposed
$50,000 in sanctions against Wang under section 271, finding that his
“actions have been non-cooperative, meritless, and frivolous.” The court
supported that finding with evidence attached to the FOAH. It also denied
Wang’s request for attorney fees on two grounds. First, the request was not
properly pled. Second, Wang had unclean hands because he ignored an April
25, 2022 order that required him to pay Zeng $21,582.15 in attorney fees as
the prevailing party in the DVRO proceedings.
Wang timely appealed from the August 19, 2024 minute order and the
September 26 FOAH. He later amended his notice of appeal to add a
challenge to the April 22 minute order that denied his request for the
appointment of minor’s counsel and a child custody evaluation.3
II. DISCUSSION
We have considered Wang’s arguments and conclude they lack merit.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint minor’s
counsel and order a custody evaluation, the August 2024 minute order
regarding sanctions is not appealable, and the September 2024 FOAH
imposing sanctions was not erroneous.4

3 The trial court declared Wang a vexatious litigant at a January 2025

hearing and by written order on February 19, 2025. Zeng requests that we
take judicial notice of the order. We deny the request because the vexatious
litigant finding was made after the orders challenged in this appeal. Zeng
also filed a motion in this court to declare Wang a vexatious litigant. We
denied that motion on April 3, 2025.
4 Zeng asks us to strike Wang’s opening brief because it does not

address appealability. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B).) We
decline to do so. (Id., rule 8.204(e).
4
A. April 2024 Minute Order (Minor’s Counsel and Custody Evaluation)
Wang challenges the April 22, 2024 minute order denying his request
for minor’s counsel and a custody evaluation. He fails to demonstrate an
abuse of discretion.
1. Appealability
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) authorizes an
appeal from a postjudgment order. Zeng does not dispute that the April 2024
minute order is a postjudgment order. She nonetheless argues that the order
is not appealable because it does not affect the judgment or relate to its
enforcement. (In re Marriage of Levine (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 585, 588.) We
disagree.
The rule that a postjudgment order must affect the judgment or relate
to its enforcement is intended to exclude review of orders that lack finality
because they are preliminary to a later judgment. (Lakin v. Watkins
Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651–653.) Zeng argues that the
minute order is preliminary to later proceedings because it is not a final
custody order, it does not modify the March 2022 temporary custody order,
and it only denies Wang the relief he might need to seek a change in custody
or visitation in the future. But in denying what Wang claimed he needed to
seek a change in custody or visitation, the minute order is not preliminary to
a later proceeding, but arguably preclusive of one. It therefore appears to be
sufficiently final for appellate review.
Zeng further argues that temporary child custody and visitation orders
are interlocutory and not appealable, citing Smith v. Smith (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1074, 1090. The April 2024 minute order, however, is not a
temporary child custody or visitation order. Moreover, Smith is
distinguishable for another reason. There, a temporary custody order and a

5
temporary restraining order were not appealable because the custody issue
was already slated for trial. (Ibid.) Here, by contrast, there is no indication
that the custody issue is or will be set for adjudication.
At any rate, Zeng acknowledges that the trial court’s denial of Wang’s
request for a child custody evaluation and appointment of minor’s counsel
may be reviewed pursuant to an extraordinary writ petition. (Lester v.
Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 565.) Zeng does not dispute that we may
treat Wang’s appeal from the April 2024 minute order as a writ petition. We
therefore proceed to the merits.
2. Merits
Wang contends that the trial court should have ordered a custody
evaluation and appointed counsel for Daughter because the March 2022
custody order was temporary and because the court has not determined that
continuing the order is in Daughter’s best interests. He argues that the
evaluation and appointment of counsel may help him rebut the presumption
under section 3044 that awarding custody to a parent who perpetrated
domestic violence within the past five years is detrimental to the child’s best
interests. He further argues that the current custody order deprives him of
his parental rights and that he and Daughter have been deprived of their due
process rights. We review the denial of a RFO seeking minor’s counsel and a
child custody evaluation for abuse of discretion and find none here. (See In re
Marriage of Metzger (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1450.)
The trial court’s authority to appoint counsel for a minor is governed by
sections 3150 and 3151 and rule 5.240 of the California Rules of Court. Upon
determining that it would be in the minor child’s best interests, the court
may appoint counsel to represent the child’s interests, provided that the court
and counsel comply with California Rules of Court, rules 5.240, 5.241, and

6
5.242. (§ 3150, subd. (a).) Among other things, the court should consider
whether (1) the child is subject to stress that might be alleviated by the
intervention of counsel representing the child; (2) counsel for the child would
likely provide the court with relevant information not otherwise readily
available or likely to be presented; and (3) the child’s best interests appear to
require independent representation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.240(a).)
Wang does not address these considerations. Instead, he merely
asserts that in December 2024 – eight months after the trial court made its
decision – Daughter told a Sonoma Family Court Services counselor that she
wanted to visit him. But evidence arising after a court’s decision does not
demonstrate that the decision was erroneous. Moreover, evidence of
Daughter’s desire to visit Wang does not compel the conclusion that minor’s
counsel must be appointed to assist Father in his efforts to obtain custody.
Wang therefore fails to establish an abuse of discretion.
The trial court’s authority to appoint an evaluator to conduct a child
custody evaluation is set forth in section 3111. The court may appoint an
evaluator if it determines that an evaluation is in the child’s best interests.
(§ 3111, subd. (a).) For the same reasons he fails to show the court abused its
discretion by refusing to appoint minor’s counsel, Wang fails to establish that
the court abused its discretion by declining to appoint an evaluator.
B. August 19, 2024 Minute Order Awarding Sanctions to Zeng
Zeng contends that the August 19, 2024 minute order granting Zeng’s
motion for sanctions is not appealable because it is preliminary to the
September 26 FOAH. Wang does not argue otherwise. We will therefore
dismiss the appeal from the August 19 minute order and address the issues
Wang raises in his challenge to that minute order in the context of his appeal
from the September 26 FOAH.

7
C. September 26, 2024 FOAH Awarding Sanctions to Zeng
Wang contends that the trial court erred by awarding Zeng $50,000 in
sanctions under section 271.5 We disagree.
We review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence (In
re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 995 (Falcone))
and its decision to impose sanctions for abuse of discretion (Parker v. Harbert
(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177). The order will be overturned “only if,
considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and
indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably
make the order.” (Ibid.)
Section 271, subdivision (a), authorizes the trial court to “base an
award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each
party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote
settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by
encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” Litigants who
engage in conduct that increases litigation costs are subject to section 271
sanctions. (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1524.)
The trial court found that Wang’s motions were “baseless, meritless
and frivolous,” that he filed “meritless claims,” that his “actions have been
non-cooperative, meritless, and frivolous,” and that his failure to pay an
earlier sanctions order gave him “ ‘unclean hands.’ ” These findings were
supported by the evidence presented to the court, including the evidence
attached to the FOAH. Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for the
court to conclude that Wang improperly increased the costs of litigation.
Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion to impose sanctions under section 271.

5 There is no dispute that the order is appealable. (George v. Shams-
Shirazi (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 134, 138.)
8
Wang insists that he did try to promote settlement and reduce
litigation costs by requesting settlement conferences and seeking minor’s
counsel and a child custody evaluation. He denies that his filings were
frivolous and blames Zeng for the bulk of the litigation expenses. But his
attempt to relitigate the facts does not establish a lack of substantial
evidence or abuse of discretion.
Wang next argues that the sanctions award imposed an unreasonable
burden because his 2022 income was $3,000 and he had no income in 2023.
But Wang produced no evidence of his income in 2024, the year the sanctions
were imposed. Furthermore, the trial court found that Wang was supported
by his family and able to work. These findings were supported by substantial
evidence.
Finally, Wang argues that Zeng is a “highly compensated physician.”
Section 271, however, is not a needs-based statute. (Falcone, supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 990.) Accordingly, Zeng did not have to prove her need to
be reimbursed for the fees. (Ibid.) Wang fails to establish error.
III. DISPOSITION
The April 22, 2024 minute order and September 26, 2024 FOAH are
affirmed. The appeal from the August 19, 2024 minute order is dismissed.

CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR.

JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.

9