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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Consolidated With 2025-C-00868 BEVERLY ALEXANDER; RISE ST. JAMES; INCLUSIVE LOUISIANA; AND MOUNT TRIUMPH BAPTIST CHURCH BY AND THROUGH THEIR MEMBERS v. ST. JAMES PARISH

Supreme Court of Louisiana

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-C-00866

• Judges: Weimer, C.J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (21.7K)

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Syllabus

(Parish of St. James) VACATED AND RENDERED. SEE OPINION.

Combined Opinion

                        by [John L. Weimer](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/4604/john-l-weimer/)

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #009

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 6th day of March, 2026 are as follows:

BY Weimer, C.J.:

2025-C-00866 BEVERLY ALEXANDER; RISE ST. JAMES; INCLUSIVE LOUISIANA;
Consolidated with AND MOUNT TRIUMPH BAPTIST CHURCH BY AND THROUGH
2025-C-00868 THEIR MEMBERS VS. ST. JAMES PARISH (Parish of St. James)

VACATED AND RENDERED. SEE OPINION.

Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-C-00866

c/w

No. 2025-C-00868

BEVERLY ALEXANDER; RISE ST. JAMES;
INCLUSIVE LOUISIANA; AND MOUNT TRIUMPH BAPTIST CHURCH
BY AND THROUGH THEIR MEMBERS

VS.

ST. JAMES PARISH

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Parish of St. James

WEIMER, Chief Justice*

Koch Methanol St. James, LLC (“Koch”), applied for a land use permit in St.

James Parish (“Parish”) seeking approval for a project to upgrade its already existing

methanol production facility. Plaintiffs opposed the project. The approval process

is governed by the St. James Parish Land Use Plan (“Plan”). Pursuant to the Parish’s

interpretation of the Plan, the project was considered and approved by the Parish

Planning Commission (“Commission”). Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Parish Council

(“Council”) was rejected. Plaintiffs sought judicial review in the district court, which

upheld the Council’s decision. However, a divided panel of the court of appeal

reversed the district court’s ruling. Applying what the majority of the court of appeal

referred to as “de novo review,” the appellate court disagreed with the Parish’s

*
Judge Allison H. Penzato of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, appointed as Justice pro tempore,
sitting for the vacancy in the First District.
interpretation of the Plan and interpreted the Plan to require a more stringent and

extensive review process.

Certiorari was granted to examine whether the court of appeal majority erred

in its ruling, which in turn requires us to clarify the proper scope of judicial review

of land use decisions by local governments. For the reasons that follow, we vacate

the ruling of the court of appeal, finding that court exceeded its role and erred by

applying a de novo standard of review and failing to accord the decision of the Parish

appropriate discretion. The court of appeal failed to consider whether the

interpretation of the land use plan by Parish officials and the resulting decision were

arbitrary and capricious, absent which the Parish’s decision must be upheld as a

legitimate exercise of its constitutionally vested power to make land use decisions.1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Koch operates a methanol production facility in St. James Parish. On July 12,

2023, the company submitted a land use permit application proposing an upgrade to

its existing facility which required the installation of a pipeline to connect to an

existing ethane pipeline owned by a third party, approximately 1000 feet of which

would run through a wetlands area. The third-party underground ethane line already

traverses the wetlands. Approval of the application is governed by the Plan,

contained in Section 82-25 of the St. James Parish Code of Ordinances. Section 82-

25 is a master plan which incorporates a three-level system of review and approval,

each requiring a different level of scrutiny. The underlying dispute concerns whether

the Parish engaged in the proper decision making process required under the Plan in

1
This court will also address and reject a motion to dismiss filed by plaintiffs.

2
approving Koch’s land use application, more specifically whether the requested land

use falls under Tier 2 or the more stringent Tier 3 review process.2

Section 82-25(c) outlines “allowable uses” for each “land use category.” Tier

2 review pursuant to Section 82-25(f) generally involves listed “allowable uses”

under Section 82-25(c) when the proposed use involves a large land area or requires

certain state or federal permits. Such use requires approval by the Commission.3 The

more extensive Tier 3 review is required when the proposed use is prohibited at its

proposed location by virtue of the list of allowable uses set forth in Section 82-25(c).

If a use is not listed as an “allowable use,” approval requires public vetting, a

recommendation from Commission, and approval by the Council, which has authority

to approve or deny a project. Section 82-25(e) directs that such use is prohibited

unless the Commission considers the use and makes affirmative findings in

accordance with certain outlined factors4 and the Council approves the use. The

2
Application of Tier 1 review is not at issue. Basic Tier 1 review applies when a proposed project
is on the list of allowable uses designated for its particular location. Approval is handled
administratively as a matter of course through the Parish’s customary building permit process.
3
Section 82-25(f) provides in part:

Planning commission consideration of certain allowable uses. Notwithstanding
subsection (d) of this section, the following uses or activities shall not be issued a
building permit until approved by the planning commission (or by the parish council
on appeal):

(1) Any residential building containing three or more dwelling units.
(2) Any nonresidential development exceeding 10,000 square feet of building area
or sites three acres or more.
(3) Any commercial or industrial development that requires a state or federal permit
for air, water, solid waste, hazardous materials, or section 404 [of the Clean Water
Act] Wetland/Rivers and Harbors Act permits ....
4
Section 82-25 (e) directs the Commission to make affirmative findings regarding the following
under subsection (h):

(1) Whether the impacts of the proposed use would be substantially different from
the impacts of allowable uses for the districts. Such impacts may include, but are not
limited to, air and water emissions, noise, lighting, traffic (road and rail), effect on
property values, and neighborhood.
(2) The public benefits of the proposed use, such as job creation, expansion of the tax
base, and enhancing the attractiveness of the parish for future development.

3
Commission cannot recommend a use for approval, and the Council cannot approve

a use, unless it makes affirmative findings that there is a compelling public benefit,

that the use is compatible with surrounding uses and adverse impacts of the use are

inconsequential; or that approval is required as a matter of constitutional imperative

or other vested legal right superior to this section.

Section 82-25(c) specifies the allowable uses for “wetlands” as follows:

Shown for information only; wetland areas should remain unoccupied
except for unique situations requiring a location in the water, subject to
any permits required under article V, chapter 18.

The Commission considered Koch’s application at a meeting on July 31, 2023. It

determined the pipeline was an allowable use under Section 82-25(c) under this

circumstance (i.e., a “unique situation”), and applied Tier 2 review under Section

82-25(f) in approving Koch’s application. The resolution granting approval provided,

in pertinent part:

WHEREAS, Koch Methanol St. James, LLC (“Koch”) applied for
approval to increase the capacity of its existing methanol plant ...
predominantly in an area designated in the Land Use Plan for Industrial
Use and to a limited extent in an area designated as Wetlands, identified
as #23-25 (the “Application”); and

WHEREAS, public notice of the Application was published in
accordance with Section 82-25(g)(2) of the St. James Parish Code of
Ordinances and public comments on the proposal were solicited; and

WHEREAS, the commission took up the matter at its meeting of July
31, 2023, when it received and considered a presentation by Koch about
the Application, along with one citizen comment in favor of the project
and none against, and questions posed by the commission members were
responded to by Koch representatives; and

(3) The physical and environmental impacts of the proposed use on the air, water,
and land, with particular attention to whether the public benefits of the proposed use
are commensurate with those impacts, and whether the environmental impacts may
impair the ability of the parish to attract other beneficial development.
(4) Vested property rights and other constitutional protections enjoyed by the
proponent of the proposed use.
....

4
WHEREAS, the commission also received an explanation from its
counsel as to how the land use ordinance applied to the application, and
the decision-making criteria therein, Counsel also addressed the
allowability of the ethane pipeline connection depicted in the
Application being located in an area designated as Wetlands in the
land use plan, such pipeline connection being a unique situation
requiring a location in a Wetlands area because the existing ethane
pipeline to which the connection will be made is already located in
the Wetlands area, in accordance with ordinance Section
82-25(c)(11). The commission concurs that the pipeline connection
is an allowable land use in the Wetlands in this circumstance.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED under ordinance Section
82-25(f), that the planning commission hereby approves the
Application, subject to the conditions stated below.

---

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the planning commission finds that
approval is appropriate under ordinance Section 82-25, with specific
reference to the factors described in Section 82-25(h) because: the
impacts of the proposed use are common to industrial plants and would
not be substantially different from the impacts of other allowable uses
[in] industrial areas; the project would retain existing jobs while
providing new job opportunities, and would expand the tax base with
the value of additional facilities. Such benefits outweigh the relatively
modest physical and environmental impacts without impairing the
parish’s ability to attract other beneficial development by virtue of the
project’s location in an industrial area and its distance from potentially
impacted uses.

---

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs appealed the Commission’s decision to the Council. Following a

public hearing, the Council voted unanimously to reject the appeal. Plaintiffs then

sought judicial review in the district court. Following briefing and a hearing, the

district court denied plaintiffs’ request to reverse the Council’s decision. The court

analyzed the issue under laws governing review of zoning decisions, explaining that

what the law requires is a review of the overall decisions and decision-making

processes followed by the Parish entities to determine whether those actions were

arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable:

5
Judicial review of zoning decisions acts merely as a check on the
legislative power ... to ensure there is no abuse of that power. Courts
will not and cannot substitute their judgment for that of the legislative
authority. Louisiana jurisprudence provides that a presumption of
validity attache[s] to all zoning decisions. The burden rests on the
challenger to overcome this presumption .... The interpretation of a
legislative authority with respect to a legislative zoning ordinance is
entitled to great weight. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated
that, “in order to justify a holding that the legislative action is
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable,” the challenger must show
“that there was no room for a reasonable difference of opinion, and
that there was no substantial evidence upon which the legislative
action could have been justified. [Internal citations omitted; emphasis
in original.]

The court acknowledged that the language referencing “wetlands” in Section 82-25(c)

creates an ambiguity because the procedure for evaluating uses in wetlands is not

succinctly defined, but found the Parish properly rejected plaintiffs’ argument that

Tier 3 review was required. The court reasoned that plaintiffs’ interpretation of the

language (that any use in the wetlands, no matter how small, would require

consideration by the Commission as well as approval by the Council) would produce

an absurd result.

The district court further found the Council’s decision was not arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable. The court noted that the permit was subject to two

separate public hearings before two governmental bodies. Representatives of the

public and Koch were allowed to attend and speak at the hearings. There was

substantial public comment, discussion and presentations regarding the permit at the

appeal of the Commission’s decision before the Council. The district court found that

the procedures followed by the Commission and the Council in reaching a decision

on the permit were “done honestly and upon due consideration” and that the issues

presented regarding the approval or denial of the permit left room for reasonable

differences of opinion to those considering the application. Thus, the court concluded

6
that the decisions of both the Commission and the Council do not meet the arbitrary,

capricious and unreasonable standard as defined under the law.

Plaintiffs filed an appeal in the appellate court, which reversed the district

court’s ruling in a split opinion. Alexander v. St. James Par., 24-557 (La. App. 5

Cir. 5/14/25), 415 So.3d 437. Engaging in what the majority referred to as a “de novo

review” of the Plan, the court found that any proposed use in the wetlands is generally

a non-allowable use, but that certain exceptions may be permitted once the

Commission has conducted Tier 3 level review of the process pursuant to Section

82-25(e) and has recommended approval to the Council. Alexander, 24-557 at 10,

415 So.3d at 446. The court disagreed with the Parish’s interpretation of the phrase

“unique situation requiring a location in the water.” Id. The court noted an

ambiguity exists regarding what may be considered a “unique situation” that could

ultimately become an approved use of the wetlands. Id., 24-557 at 11, 415 So.3d at

1. Because “pipeline” is not listed specifically as an allowable use, the court found

such use is prohibited unless approved using the Tier 3 review process. Id. The court

concluded the Parish failed to follow its own ordinance by using Tier 2 review under

Section 82-25(f), rather than Tier 3 review under Section 82-25(e), to analyze Koch’s

land use application. Thus, the court reversed the decision of the Council denying

plaintiffs’ appeal and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id., 24-557 at 14-

15, 415 So.3d at 449.

Judges Molaison and Windhorst dissented, rejecting the contention that Tier

3 review was required. Id., 24-557 at 2, 415 So.3d at 450. The dissent noted that

Section 82-25(c) is clear that “unique situations requiring a location in the water” are

“allowable uses” in wetlands. Id., 24-557 at 1, 415 So.3d at 449. The dissent found

the Parish’s interpretation of this language does not lead to an absurd result on the

7
facts presented and is not clearly wrong. “Here, tapping into the existing ethane

pipeline falls within the very definition of a unique situation, as the only logical way

to physically approach the pipeline is through the wetland.” Id., 24-557 at 1-2, 415

So.3d at 449. Adopting the district court’s reasons for judgment, the dissent found

that Koch’s proposed pipeline extension falls squarely in the category of “unique

situations requiring a location in the water,” as provided in the “wetlands” provision

of the Plan. Id., 24-557 at 2, 415 So.3d at 450.5

Defendants, Koch Methanol St. James, LLC and St. James Parish, filed writ

applications in this court which were granted. Alexander v. St. James Par., 25-0866

(La. 10/22/25), 421 So.3d 883; Alexander v. St. James Par., 25-0868 (La. 10/22/25),

421 So.3d 883. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Dismiss Proceedings” in

this court. Plaintiffs state that Koch resubmitted its land use application which was

then approved by Parish following procedures outlined in the court of appeal’s

opinion, and that construction of the pipeline through the wetlands was complete.

Thus, plaintiffs assert the writ applications are moot. This court referred the motion

to the merits.

5
The original opinion issued by the court of appeal was corrected on limited rehearing to delete
references to a prior version of La. R.S. 49:964(G), which addressed judicial review of state agency
decisions in adjudication proceedings. The court explained on rehearing:

This Court found that the Parish failed to follow its own ordinance in violation of La.
R.S. 49:964. Upon review, we agree that we concluded, in error, that Appellee, St.
James Parish was required to comply with La. R.S. 49:964 for this action, and we
have corrected the appropriate portions of the analysis in the opinion. Accordingly,
we grant the rehearing applications for the limited purpose of issuing the corrected
opinion rendered on June 6, 2025.

Alexander v. St. James Par., 24-557, p. 1 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/6/25).

8
DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss

As a threshold issue, plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss must be addressed. As

detailed above, Koch’s initial application was approved by the Commission, and

plaintiffs’ appeal to the Council and petition for judicial review in the district court

were denied. Following the court of appeal’s reversal and remand of the matter to the

Commission, Koch submitted an updated application6 to the Parish consistent with

the court of appeal’s decision. The Commission considered and unanimously

recommended the Council approve the application on June 30, 2025. On August 6,

2025, the Council considered the recommendation and passed a resolution approving

Koch’s application and denying plaintiffs’ related appeal. Notably, the resolution

made clear the Council did not change its original interpretation of the Plan and that

it disagreed with the court of appeal opinion, stating in relevant part:

NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED as follows:

1. As the legislative body of the parish, the parish council finds that the Fifth Circuit’s decision misapplied the parish’s land use ordinance in the following non-exclusive particulars:

a. The land use ordinance expresses the parish’s preference to
leave Wetlands in their natural state, but it does not
prohibit development in wetlands. The ordinance fully
anticipates that limited development may occur in
Wetlands.

b. Unique situations requiring a location in Wetlands are
allowable uses under the land use ordinance, and are not
subject to the approval process and the criteria in code of
ordinances Sec. 82-25(e).

c. Whether a use presents a unique situation, and whether it
requires a location in Wetlands, are determinations that
may be made as administrative decisions under Sec. 82-
25(d), or as planning commission decisions under Sec. 82-

6
The application presented substantially the same proposed project.

9
25(f), based on the requirements pertinent to each of those
sections.

1. Pending action on the parish’s writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and out of respect for the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the parish council has considered the Remand Application in accordance with that decision, while at the same time rejecting the rationale of that decision as being inconsistent with the parish’s land use ordinance.

Plaintiffs argue the subsequent approval and issuance of the land use permit for

Koch’s project renders the writ applications moot. The Parish opposes the motion to

dismiss, asserting the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine is

applicable.

It is well-settled that courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical or moot

controversies or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies.

Shepherd v. Schedler, 15-1750, p. 13 (La. 1/27/16), 209 So.3d 752, 764. This court

has explained that, as a general rule:

[A]n issue is “moot” when a judgment or decree on that issue has been
“deprived of practical significance” or “made abstract or purely
academic.” A case is “moot” when a rendered judgment or decree can
serve no useful purpose and give no practical relief or effect. If the case
is moot, then there is no subject matter on which the judgment of the
court can operate. That is, jurisdiction, once established, may abate if
the case is moot.

Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, Dept. of Finance, 98–0601, p. 8 (La.

10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1193 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

However, exceptions to the mootness doctrine have been recognized.

In Cat’s Meow, this court discussed the collateral consequences exception in

the context of whether a curative amendment to a challenged article, statute, or

ordinance will moot an attack on its former provisions:

A second exception to the mootness doctrine, applicable when a
challenged article, statute, or ordinance is amended or repealed, is the
collateral consequences exception. Although this exception is most

10
often used to enable review of expired criminal sentences, it has
frequently been applied in the civil context. Under this exception, the
court must determine the nature of the relief sought by the parties in
concluding whether or not a change in the law moots a case. Thus, if a
plaintiff’s petition sought solely prospective relief in the form of a
declaratory judgment, then the change in the law may lead to dismissal
of the case. However, if, in addition to prospective relief, claims for
compensatory relief are made, then a change in the law may not moot
the case. Therefore, although the primary subject of a dispute has
become moot, the controversy is not moot if there are collateral
consequences to one of the parties. The collateral consequences of the
case or controversy give a party a concrete interest in the outcome of the
litigation and ensure that the appeal is not moot.

Cat’s Meow, 98-0601 at 12-13, 720 So.2d at 1196 (finding collateral consequences

exception applied because plaintiffs sought compensatory relief, in addition to

declaratory relief, based upon the former provisions of the challenged legislative

ordinances); see also, Ulrich v. Robinson, 18-0534, pp. 12-13 (La. 3/26/19), 282

So.3d 180, 188-89 (finding collateral consequences exception did not apply where

plaintiff solely sought declaratory relief that statute was unconstitutional, and a

statutory amendment had cured the constitutional issue). This court has not explicitly

defined the type or scope of collateral consequences necessary to trigger application

of the collateral consequences exception, but it has not been limited to cases where

a challenged law had been amended, or cases where a claim for monetary damages

remain. For example, we have applied the collateral consequences exception in a

security interest case where the sequestered property had been sold, finding that

although the sale of the property rendered moot the issue of whether the writ of

sequestration should be dissolved, the propriety of the sequestration could still be

reviewed to determine whether there was any merit to the request for an award of

damages. First Nat. Bank of Picayune v. Pearl River Fabricators, Inc., 06-2195,

p. 8 (La. 11/16/07), 971 So.2d 302, 308. Additionally, in Watson v. Banguel, the

court of appeal declined to consider defendant’s appeal of an order of protection

11
(stalking), finding it moot because the order of protection had expired. This court

granted defendant’s writ with a brief per curiam opinion applying the collateral

consequences exception, noting entry of the protective order could have lasting

effects on defendant’s personal and professional life, and pointing out that if the order

were overturned on appeal, defendant would have the right to an expungement.

Watson v. Banguel, 21-01793, p. 1 (La. 2/8/22), 332 So.3d 632.7

After considering the particular facts of this case, we find sufficient collateral

consequences exist to justify application of the exception. When considering whether

an issue is moot, the underlying concern is whether a ruling by the court can serve a

useful purpose and have a practical effect. See Cat’s Meow, 98-0601 at 8, 720 So.2d

at 1193. Although the original dispute regarding approval of Koch’s application has

been resolved, disputed issues remain regarding the Parish’s power to interpret its

own Plan in the course of making land use decisions, as well as the proper scope of

judicial review of those decisions.

Furthermore, as will be discussed more fully below, jurisprudence related to

judicial review of local governmental land use decisions has gone astray, leading to

confusion and inconsistencies. Clarification is necessary. Moreover, because we

ultimately find the court of appeal erred in its analysis, it is necessary to correct that

error to prevent the court’s decision from being used as precedent in other cases.

Without correction, the Parish would be deprived of the constitutional authority to

interpret its own land use plan, and would be bound to apply the court of appeal’s

7
See also In re Interdiction of Raspanti, 24-166, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/4/24), 410 So.3d 282,
286-87, wherein the court of appeal declined to dismiss an appeal of an interdiction order as moot
following the death of interdicted person. The court noted that although the interdiction abated upon
her death, there were collateral consequences to a determination of whether her interdiction was full
or limited while it was in effect (i.e., affecting which juridical acts the interdicted person lacked
capacity to make while the order was in effect).

12
interpretation of the Plan, effectively necessitating Tier 3 review for all land use cases

involving wetlands use.

Although the Council ultimately approved the resubmitted Koch application

in line with provisions of the court of appeal opinion (applying Tier 3 review), these

issues outlined above remain unresolved, indicated by the Council’s expressed

disagreement and rejection of the court of appeal’s analysis and interpretation of the

Plan, and the court’s holding that Tier 3 review was necessary (as outlined in the

Council’s August 6, 2025 Resolution).

“[A]lthough it may become unnecessary or impossible to grant the primary

relief originally sought in an action, remaining consequences of the litigation may

prevent the case from becoming moot.” St. Charles Par. Sch. Bd. v. GAF Corp.,

512 So.2d 1165, 1172 (La. 1987) (on reh’g) (discussing United States Supreme Court

jurisprudence). For these reasons, and based on the particular facts of this case, we

find the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable.

Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

Merits

The Louisiana Constitution specifically and expressly confers the power to

regulate land use to local governments, such as St. James Parish. Article VI, §178

explicitly grants parishes and municipalities9 not only the power to adopt land use

regulations, but also the power to implement those regulations through the creation

of commissions, and the power to review the land use decisions of any such

commission:

8
Similarly, Article XIV, § 29 of the 1921 Constitution empowered municipalities “to zone their
territory, to create residential, commercial and industrial districts, and to prohibit the establishment
of places of business in residential districts.”
9
La. Const. art. VI, § 44 defines “local governmental subdivision” to mean “any parish or
municipality.”

13
Subject to uniform procedures established by law, a local
governmental subdivision may (1) adopt regulations for land use,
zoning, and historic preservation, which authority is declared to be a
public purpose; (2) create commissions and districts to implement those
regulations; (3) review decisions of any such commission; and (4) adopt
standards for use, construction, demolition, and modification of areas
and structures. Existing constitutional authority for historic preservation
commissions is retained.

This court has long recognized that land use regulation is derived from the police

power of the governmental authority and is legislative in nature. See Four State

Realty Co., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So.2d 659, 664-65 (La. 1974); State

ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 443-44 (La. 1923).10 The Parish

exercised its police power relative to land use regulation through enactment of the

Plan.

Because a land use decision is an exercise of the parish or municipality’s

legislative power and function, it is not subjected to the same standard of judicial

review as a typical civil decision by a court or similar tribunal. Jurisprudence reflects

that courts have historically afforded deference to local government land use

decisions. In Palermo Land Co. v. Plan. Comm’n of Calcasieu Par., 561 So.2d

482 (La. 1990), this court considered a challenge to the decision of the Police Jury of

Calcasieu Parish to rezone several tracts of land, thereby preventing expansion of an

existing landfill. In finding the decision was a valid exercise of police power, this

court explained in part:

Zoning is a legislative function. The authority to enact zoning
regulations flows from the police power of the various governmental
bodies. As the local governing body with final zoning authority, the
Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish has the authority to amend, supplement,
change, modify or repeal existing zoning ordinances.
....

10
Although these cases discuss municipal zoning regulations, they are equally applicable to other
land use regulations which are an exercise of constitutionally conferred governmental police power.

14
A challenge to a zoning decision in Louisiana is a de novo proceeding
in which the issue is whether the result of the legislation is arbitrary
and capricious, and therefore a taking of property without due process
of law. Whether an ordinance bears the requisite relationship to the
health, safety and welfare of the public is a factual question which must
be determined from the evidence in the record. If it appears appropriate
and well founded concerns for the public could have been the
motivation for the zoning ordinance, it will be upheld.

The differing needs of each parish, according to its size, population,
level of industrial and commercial development, and the rapidity of
growth of such development, will naturally result in different planning
and zoning regulations in each parish. The need for change through
rezoning or reclassification will depend on the same factors, thus
rezoning decisions are properly left to those officials who are most
familiar with the needs of each community. Judicial review of zoning
decisions acts merely as a check on this legislative power granted to
parish officials to ensure that there is no abuse of the power. Courts
will not and cannot substitute their judgment for that of the
legislative authority.

Palermo Land Co., 561 So.2d at 491-92 (La. 1990) (emphasis added).

In King v. Caddo Par. Comm’n, this court recognized the “broad powers” to

adopt regulations for land use, zoning and historic preservation and confirmed the

arbitrary and capricious standard relative to review of land use decisions:

Because zoning falls under the jurisdiction of the legislature, courts will
not interfere with their prerogative unless their action is palpably
erroneous and without any substantial relation to the public health,
safety or general welfare.

The terms “arbitrary and capricious action” when used in a manner like
the instant one, must mean willful and unreasoning action, absent
consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances of the case.
On the other hand, when there is room for two opinions, action is not
arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due
consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous
conclusion has been reached.

The test of whether a zoning board’s action is arbitrary and capricious
is whether the action is reasonable under the circumstances. A
reviewing court does not consider whether the district court
manifestly erred in its findings, but whether the zoning board acted
arbitrarily, capriciously or with any calculated or prejudicial lack
of discretion.

15
King v. Caddo Par. Comm’n, 97-1873, pp. 10, 14-15 (La. 10/20/98), 719 So.2d 410,

416-18 (emphasis added; internal citations and quotations omitted).

Likewise, in Toups v. City of Shreveport, this court reiterated these principles

and further explained:

The courts may not assume powers and functions which the law has
lodged in other agencies of government relative to the adoption and
administration of the zoning laws; in other words, a court may not
constitute itself as a zoning commission, or ‘super-zoning’ commission,
or zoning board. Courts have recognized it is not within the province of
the appellate court to second guess a zoning decision that appears to
have been based on appropriate and well-founded concerns for the
public.

Toups v. City of Shreveport, 10-1559, p. 5 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So.3d 1215, 1218.

This standard of judicial review is not limited to zoning decisions. The same

standard applies to other land use decisions by a governmental entity, as those

decisions derive from the same constitutionally bestowed police power. See, e.g.,

Glomax, LLC v. Lafayette Consol. Gov’t, 24-183, p. 7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/27/24),

403 So.3d 32, 37, writ denied, 24-01587 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 573; Garber v. City

of New Orleans Through City Plan. Comm’n, 16-1298, pp. 4-6 (La. App. 4 Cir.

12/13/17), 234 So.3d 992, 996-97. Moreover, this standard of review is applicable

regardless of whether a court is reviewing the validity of a zoning or land use

regulation, or reviewing the governmental entity’s decision after application of its

regulation. See Toups, 10-1559 at 7-8, 60 So.3d at 1220. Enactment,

implementation, decision making, and review are all powers constitutionally

conferred to parishes and municipalities under Article VI, § 17.

The court of appeal’s de novo review was inconsistent with the principles

expressed in these cases. We recognize that in the process of discussing proper

judicial review of municipal land use decisions, this court has previously stated that

16
a challenge to such a decision in Louisiana “is a de novo proceeding.” See Toups,

10-1559 at 4, 60 So.3d at 1218 (emphasis added); King, 97-1873 at 15, 719 So.2d at

419 (emphasis added); Palermo Land Co., 561 So.2d at 492 (emphasis added). But

this should be distinguished from “de novo review” as that term is otherwise used to

describe the role of appellate courts in resolving legal issues. There should be no de

novo review in the context of judicial review of municipal land use decisions.11 Thus,

we reaffirm the arbitrary and capricious standard as discussed by this court in

Palermo Land Co., King, and Toups as the proper standard of judicial review of

local governmental land use decisions.

A court’s review in land use cases simply examines whether the governmental

entity’s administrative decision was made within the confines of the constitutional or

statutory police power and whether the result of the decision was arbitrary or

capricious. See Palermo Land Co., 561 So.2d at 492. In Palermo Land Co., the

court emphasized that the role of judicial review is to ensure there is no abuse of the

municipality’s legislative power. Id. “When the propriety of a zoning decision is

debatable, it will be upheld. It is only when an action of a zoning commission is

found on judicial review to be palpably unreasonable, arbitrary, an abuse of

discretion, or an unreasonable exercise of police power that such action will be

disturbed.” City of Baton Rouge/Par. of E. Baton Rouge v. Myers, 13-2011, p. 6

(La. 5/7/14), 145 So.3d 320, 327-28. The court of appeal was required to afford

deference to the Parish’s interpretation of the Plan and its substantive decision based

on that interpretation. As long as the Parish did not exceed its constitutional authority

11
Unfortunately, use of the “de novo” term has only resulted in confusion and misapplication of the
proper standard of review in land use cases. This confusion is evidenced in the divergent analyses
of the district court, court of appeal majority, and the dissent. Perhaps a better practice would be to
omit the “de novo” term entirely when referring to the constitutionally imposed deferential standard
of review in these judicial proceedings.

17
under Article VI, § 17 or other constitutional limit, abuse the discretion granted it, or

fail to comply with due process requirements, the decision approving Koch’s

application should not be disturbed.12

The Parish, through the Commission, unanimously approved Koch’s

application, interpreting the “unique situation” language in Section 82-25(c) of the

Plan to recognize that the ethane pipeline connection was an “allowable use” in the

wetlands because the ethane pipeline to which it was connecting was already located

in the wetlands. The Commission’s decision was made after public notice,

solicitation of public comments, and a public meeting. At the meeting, the Parish’s

land use counsel discussed application of the Plan to the Koch project and outlined

the decision making criteria under the Plan. He specifically explained the

circumstances that made the pipeline an allowable use under Section 82-25(c). The

Commission determined that the pipeline connection to an existing pipeline in the

wetlands was an allowable use that was appropriately considered under Section

82-25(f) (Tier 2 review) rather than Section 82-25(e) (Tier 3 review) of the Plan.

Subsequently, the Council rejected plaintiffs’ appeal, thereby upholding the

Commission’s decision and indicating its approval of the Commission’s interpretation

and application of the Plan. The Commission’s interpretation and application of the

Plan language was reasonable, and entitled to judicial deference.

Section 82-25(c) specifies the allowable uses for “wetlands” providing that “...

wetland areas should remain unoccupied except for unique situations requiring a

12
Further support for this more limited judicial review of land use decisions is found in the zoning
statutes, which do not authorize de novo review of a local government’s interpretation of its zoning
ordinances. See La. R.S. 33:4721 (limiting judicial review of a municipality’s zoning decisions to
grounds of abuse of discretion, unreasonable exercise of the police powers, an excessive use of the
power granted by the statute, or the denial of the right of due process) and La. R.S. 33:4780.40 (same
for parish zoning decisions).

18
location in the water ....” (Emphasis added.) The meaning of terminology in an

ordinance, and its application to particular facts, involve tasks and decisions that are

constitutionally delegated to the Parish. What constitutes a “unique situation” to

satisfy an exception for wetlands uses, and whether the list of allowable uses

specifically incorporated such a unique situation, are part of the Parish’s decision

making process. The text makes clear that development in the wetlands is not

prohibited. The word “should” in this section of the Plan is correctly construed as

permissive rather than mandatory. See Louisiana Seafood Mgmt. Council v.

Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm’n, 97-1367, pp. 12-13 (La. 5/19/98), 715

So.2d 387, 394. Thus, the language “wetland areas should remain unoccupied” is

aspirational, not regulatory. Moreover, the phrase “except for unique situations

requiring a location in the water...” expressly allows for an exception to any general

prohibition. A fair and reasonable reading of the Plan provides that “unique

situations requiring a location in the water” are “allowable uses” under the Plan and

therefore subject to Tier 2 level review. As properly noted by the dissenting judges

in the court of appeal, “tapping into the existing ethane pipeline falls within the very

definition of a unique situation, as the only logical way to physically approach the

pipeline is through the wetland.” Alexander, 24-557 at 1-2, 415 So.3d at 449.

The court of appeal did not find the Parish exceeded its constitutional authority

under La. Const. art. VI, §17, nor did the court of appeal find the result of the Parish’s

decision arbitrary and capricious. Rather, under the pretense of finding that the

Parish “failed to follow its own ordinance,” the court performed a customary de novo

review to engage in its own interpretation of the Plan. The court found that there was

ambiguity in the language of the Plan regarding what could be considered a “unique

situation” and thereby a potential “allowable use” in the wetlands. The court went

19
on to find that because “pipeline” was not specifically listed as an allowable use in

the wetlands, it was necessarily prohibited unless approved using Tier 3 level

scrutiny. By so holding, the court of appeal erred by failing to accord any discretion

to the Parish’s interpretation of the Plan and decision making, and substituting its

own interpretation of the Plan language. The Parish did not fail to follow its Plan.

The Parish interpreted and applied the language of the Plan to require Tier 2 review.

Notably, it is the court of appeal’s interpretation of the Plan language that conflicts

with the explicit text. By requiring any proposed use in the wetlands be specifically

named in Section 82-25(c) in order to be considered an allowable use, the court of

appeal ignores and gives no effect to the language “unique situation requiring a

location in the water.” Such interpretation would necessarily prohibit all uses in the

wetlands unless such use is subjected to extensive Tier 3 level review.13

CONCLUSION

There has been no showing that the Parish’s decision to classify the pipeline

as an allowable use under the Plan, thereby triggering Tier 2 review to approve the

application, was arbitrary and capricious. While one may disagree with or debate the

Parish’s interpretation of the Plan, it had a sound, rational basis and was therefore a

legitimate and reasonable exercise of the discretion constitutionally vested in local

authorities to make this land use decision. For the above reasons, the ruling of the

court of appeal is vacated and the ruling of the district court is reinstated.

DECREE

VACATED AND RENDERED.

13
It is also noted that a zoning or other land use ordinance is in derogation of the rights of private
ownership expressed in Article I, § 4(A) of the Louisiana Constitution. Thus, such an ordinance
must be construed, when subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, according to the
interpretation which allows the least restricted use of the property. City of New Orleans v. Elms,
566 So.2d 626, 632 (La. 1990).

20
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-C-00866

c/w

No. 2025-C-00868

BEVERLY ALEXANDER; RISE ST. JAMES; INCLUSIVE LOUISIANA;
AND MOUNT TRIUMPH BAPTIST CHURCH BY AND THROUGH
THEIR MEMBERS

VS.

ST. JAMES PARISH

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Parish of St. James

GUIDRY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I disagree with the majority opinion. First, I would find this matter moot as

the controversy between the parties became so when the Parish approved the land

use application and the pipeline became operational. Because the controversy is no

longer definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse

legal interests, see St. Charles Parish School Board . GAF Corporation, 512 So.2d

1165, 1171 (La. 1987), I would grant the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.1

This case is moot. When and if a justiciable case and controversy presents

itself in the future that would afford us subject matter jurisdiction, then and only then

should we address any unresolved disputed issues regarding the Parish’s power to

interpret its plan of government in the course of making land use decisions.

On the merits, I would affirm the court of appeal. While Section 82-25(c)

provides “for information only” that “wetland areas should remain unoccupied

except for unique situations requiring a location in the water,” Section 82-25(e)

1
If the case is moot there is no subject matter on which the judgment of the court can operate. St.
Charles Parish School Board v. GAF Corporation, 512 So.2d 1165, 1171 (La. 1987).
provides that uses not specifically listed as allowable under 82-25(c) are prohibited

unless the use is considered in accordance with Tier 3 review. For context here, and

as an example, under Section 82-25(c) and the land use category of “recreation,” the

following “allowable uses” are specifically listed: parks, playgrounds, athletic fields,

golf courses, open spaces, natural areas, and wildlife. Under the category of

“commercial,” allowable uses include retail outlets, grocery stores, restaurants,

lodging, service businesses, and offices, to name a few.2

The majority fails to recognize that Koch did not submit a land use application

for a “unique situation.” Rather, Koch submitted its application for the installation

and use of a pipeline—a use not specifically listed as allowable in the wetlands, and

therefore, subject to Tier 3 review.

This is not a matter of disagreeing with the Parish’s land use decision, for

which the Parish is entitled to deference. To the contrary, where Section 82-25(e)

imposes additional procedure on the Parish for the evaluation of land use and in

making its recommendation regarding that use, the Parish acts arbitrarily and

unreasonably when it abandons its procedure.

The Parish’s reading of its ordinance is neither reasonable nor fair; it is the

role of the court to say so. The Parish acts outside of the confines of its power when

it fails to follow its own ordinance. I therefore dissent.

2
Section 82-25(c) further provides:

These category descriptions are not intended to be a comprehensive prescriptive list
of all possible land uses, but shall be interpreted to control the general character
and impacts of development so that the physical development within each use area
is compatible with and beneficial to other uses within the same area.