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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Int of BD

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1733

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

25CA1733 Peo in Interest of BD 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1733
Montezuma County District Court No. 24JV20
Honorable William Young Furse, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner,

In the Interest of B.D., a Child,

and Concerning C.B.,

Appellant,

and

B.D.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 5, 2026

No Appearance for Petitioner

Beth Padilla, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant
One Accord Legal, LLC, Katelyn B. Parker, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for
Appellee
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.B. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for seven-year-old B.D. (the child) to mother and

B.D. (father), with father serving as the primary residential parent

during the school year. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The child lived with mother and father in Rico during the first

six years of her life, attending school in Telluride, before mother

moved with the child to Cortez in the fall of 2024. Shortly

thereafter, mother filed a petition for allocation of parental

responsibilities.

¶3 During the domestic relations case, the domestic relations

court ordered the Montezuma County Department of Social Services

to investigate child safety concerns. The court also entered a

temporary order for the child to reside primarily with mother with

the Department’s protective supervision. The Department then filed

a petition in dependency and neglect.

¶4 Both parents entered no-fault admissions, and the juvenile

court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected with regard to

both mother and father and adopted treatment plans for both

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parents. Later, the juvenile court set a contested allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) hearing. The juvenile court’s

resulting APR order made father the primary residential parent

during the child’s school year.

II. Mother’s Primary Argument

¶5 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by relying solely

on best interest factors from the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage

Act (UDMA) in determining that father should be the child’s primary

custodial parent during the school year. She argues that the

juvenile court did not apply the required provisions of the

Children’s Code. We are not convinced.

A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law

¶6 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the

sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. When there

is record support for the court’s findings, its resolution of

conflicting evidence is binding on review. Id. However, whether the

court applied the correct legal standard presents a question of law

that we review de novo. Id.

2
¶7 The tests for determining parenting time pursuant to the

UDMA and the Children’s Code are not identical. L.A.G. v. People in

Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996). In custody

proceedings initiated pursuant to the UDMA, a district court must

“determine [parenting time] . . . in accordance with the best

interests of the child” applying the factors specifically enumerated

in section 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2025. See also L.A.G., 912 P.2d at

1388.

¶8 But when allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency

or neglect proceeding, the court “shall hear evidence of the proper

disposition best serving the interests of the child and the public,”

L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1391 (citation omitted), and consider the

legislative purposes of the Children’s Code, id. at 1385. See also

People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011).

The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s

welfare and safety by providing procedures through which the

child’s best interests can be served. See § 19-1-102(1), C.R.S.

2025; L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). Still, a

juvenile court may consider provisions of the UDMA, including the

best interest factors in section 14-10-124, so long as the court’s

3
focus remains on the child’s safety and protection and not on the

parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA

70, ¶ 13.

B. Analysis

¶9 The juvenile court’s written order indicates that it “considered

evidence and testimony along with the factors outlined in section

14-10-124.” And its oral findings are consistent with many best

interest factors from section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (a.5). The court

considered

• the wishes of the child regarding parenting time and

concluded that the child’s young age gave her wishes

“minimal weight when determining her best interests,”

see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(II);

• the bond between the child and parents and determined

that “the child’s best interests are served through equal

parenting time tempered by the child’s school needs,” see

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I), (III), (IV);

• the distance between the parents’ residences and the fact

that child exchanges have been going smoothly, § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a)(VIII);
4
• mother’s mental health conditions, including a finding

that they “significantly impair at times her cognitive

functioning and her ability to fulfill her parental

responsibilities,” see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V); and

• that Colorado law requires it to give “paramount

consideration [to] the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs,” see § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a.5).

¶ 10 In addition to considering these UDMA best interest factors,

the juvenile court’s findings and order are consistent with the

Children’s Code and its legislative purposes. The juvenile court’s

written order explicitly states that that it had jurisdiction over the

APR by virtue of the Children’s Code, specifically, that it had

jurisdiction “pursuant to C.R.S. 19-1-104[, C.R.S. 2025].” See

L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1388 (Once a court accepts jurisdiction

pursuant to section 19-1-104, it “must determine the question of

custody according to the provisions of the [Children’s] Code.”).

¶ 11 And significantly, the juvenile court’s oral findings and order

focus on the protection and safety of the child rather than the

parents’ custodial interests. H.K.W., ¶ 13. The juvenile court
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repeatedly considered the child’s safety and welfare, both as it

related specifically to section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V), but also more

generally. It found, “[w]hen rendering a decision as to parenting

time . . . , the court must evaluate how a parent’s mental health

issues . . . impact the child’s well-being and safety, ensuring that

decisions are evidence based and focused on the child’s best

interests pursuant to [section] 14-10-124.” But it also stated,

without referencing the UDMA, that “protective measures . . . [were]

necessary to optimize the child’s safety and serve her best

interests.” The juvenile court thus focused on the protection of the

child’s welfare and safety in addition to the best interest factors

from the UDMA. See § 19-1-102(1); L.G., 890 P.2d at 654. In this

way, its ruling considered the legislative purposes of the Children’s

Code because it “encompass[ed a] determination of whether [the

parenting time award] would best serve [the] child’s welfare and the

best interests of society.” L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1393.

¶ 12 We are satisfied that the court applied the correct legal

standard in this matter.

6
III. Mother’s Remaining Argument

¶ 13 To the extent that mother also argues that the juvenile court’s

ruling was not supported by the evidence, we disagree. Mother

accurately points out that the record contains evidence that she

“engaged in mental health therapy, maintained safe and

appropriate housing, and . . . could meet the child’s needs.”

Nevertheless, other evidence supports the court’s findings. For

example, mother did not inform father of major decisions for the

child, mother’s mental health issues sometimes prevented her from

safely driving with the child, mother struggled with employment,

and the child had school-attendance issues while in mother’s care.

Because there is record support for the juvenile court’s findings, we

will not disturb its resolution of conflicting evidence. See B.R.D.,

2012 COA 63, ¶ 15.

IV. Disposition

¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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