Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Stoffel v. ICAO

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1793

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (701)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

25CA1793 Stoffel v ICAO 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1793
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
DD No. 11781-2025

Andrew Stoffel,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Grove and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 5, 2026

Andrew Stoffel, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent
¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, claimant, Andrew Stoffel,

seeks review of an order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the

Panel) dismissing his administrative appeal. We affirm the order.

I. Background

¶2 In April 2025, a deputy for the Division of Unemployment

Insurance determined that Stoffel was entitled to unemployment

benefits. Stoffel’s former employer, Raising Cane’s USA, LLC

(Employer), timely appealed that determination, and a hearing was

scheduled for July 2. The notice of hearing required the parties to

check in at least a day before the hearing and explained that, if they

did so, a hearing officer would call them at the scheduled time.

¶3 Stoffel did not check in and, thus, did not receive a call or

otherwise appear for the hearing. Although the notice of hearing

states that it was mailed on June 13, Stoffel claims that he received

the notice by email on June 30.1 He says that, upon receiving the

notice, he “tried leaving a message with appeals that [he] no longer

needed the hearing because [he] had won the case.” Then, when he

1 In his email to the Panel after the hearing officer’s decision, Stoffel

said he received the email notice of the hearing “around mid-June.”

1
did not receive a call from the hearing officer at the scheduled time,

he assumed the hearing had been canceled based on his request.

¶4 The hearing officer reversed the deputy’s determination and

concluded that Stoffel was disqualified from receiving benefits

under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV), C.R.S. 2025. The written

decision states that it was mailed to the parties on July 18, 2025.

It lists Stoffel as a party, along with his correct mailing address.

The decision indicates that any appeal must be received within

twenty calendar days of the date the decision was mailed.

¶5 On August 22, Stoffel emailed the Panel and asked to appeal

the hearing officer’s decision. He said that he had “just found out

recently” that the hearing “did happen” and that the prior decision

had been reversed. He explained that he had discovered this “by

seeing an email from Unemployment Insurance saying [he] had

documents to look at” and then logging into his MyUI+ account.

¶6 The Panel denied the request. It concluded that the appeal

was untimely under section 8-74-104(1), C.R.S. 2025, and that

Stoffel had not shown good cause for filing a late appeal. The Panel

therefore dismissed Stoffel’s appeal of the hearing officer’s decision.

2
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 We may set aside the Panel’s decision only if (1) the Panel

exceeded its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the

findings of fact do not support the decision; or (4) the decision is

erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6)(a)-(d), C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 An appeal of a hearing officer’s decision must be received by

the Panel within twenty calendar days after notification of the

decision. § 8-74-104(1). When an interested party files an untimely

appeal from a hearing officer’s decision or requests a new hearing

after failing to participate as directed in a hearing on an appeal

from a deputy’s decision, the Panel must “determine if good cause

has been shown . . . for permitting the untimely appeal or excusing

the failure to participate in the hearing as directed.” Div. of

Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.3.3, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.

¶9 In determining whether a party has shown good cause, the

Panel may consider (1) whether the party acted as a reasonably

prudent individual would have under the circumstances;

(2) whether there was administrative error by the Division;

(3) whether the party exercised control over the untimely action;

(4) the length of time the action was untimely; (5) whether any other

3
interested party has been prejudiced; and (6) whether denying good

cause would lead to a result that is inconsistent with the law. Div.

of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.8, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.

¶ 10 The Panel has discretion to weigh these factors, and we will

not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Nguyen v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 174 P.3d 847, 848-49 (Colo. App. 2007).

III. Discussion

¶ 11 Stoffel does not dispute that his appeal was late. The hearing

officer’s decision was mailed on July 18, 2025, making the deadline

to file an appeal August 7, 2025. Stoffel did not seek to appeal until

August 22, 2025. But Stoffel argues that there was good cause for

his late filing because he was not aware of the hearing officer’s

decision earlier and filed an appeal as soon as he became aware of

it. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the Panel’s determination.

¶ 12 The Panel determined that Stoffel did not establish good cause

for the late appeal. In making that determination, it made the

following findings, all of which have record support: (1) the hearing

officer’s decision was timely mailed to Stoffel’s address of record

and posted to his MyUI+ account, thus giving him notice of the

need to take timely action; (2) Stoffel was physically and mentally

4
able to file a timely appeal; and (3) Stoffel was not prevented from

filing a timely appeal due to circumstances beyond his control.

¶ 13 The Panel also found that Stoffel did not act as a reasonably

prudent person would have acted by failing to monitor his emails,

failing to log into his MyUI+ account earlier, and assuming the

hearing had been cancelled. In particular, the Panel explained that

Stoffel was notified on July 18 by email — his stated delivery

preference — that new correspondence had been posted to his

account but apparently did not see that email. The Panel also

noted that no Division administrative error contributed to the

untimely appeal and that the fifteen-day delay was “not minimal.”

¶ 14 After review of the record, we conclude that the Panel properly

considered the applicable good cause factors in Regulation 12.1.8

and did not abuse its discretion in determining that Stoffel failed to

demonstrate good cause for his untimely appeal. See Nguyen, 174

P.3d at 849; see also Mohawk Data Scis. Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n,

671 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. App. 1983) (“[F]actual determinations

concerning the reasons for the [party’s] failure timely to file its

appeal are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.”).

5
¶ 15 Stoffel’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. He asserts

that “to his knowledge,” he did not “receive a mailed copy of the

decision.” But even accepting this as true, he does not dispute that

he received email notification of the decision on July 18. He simply

explains that checking the electronic system was “a low priority” for

him because he was employed and no longer receiving benefits. We

agree with the Panel that this does not constitute good cause for

failing to review the notification for more than a month —

particularly when he was on notice that Employer had appealed.

¶ 16 Stoffel also contends that since the original decision was in his

favor, he could “successfully defend his case if given the

opportunity.” But aside from being irrelevant to the timeliness of

the appeal, he was given the opportunity. Stoffel admits that he

received an email on June 30 advising him of the hearing set for

July 2. He also admits that the MyUI+ system alerted him to the

hearing two weeks earlier. Yet, despite the notice clearly stating

that “[y]ou must CHECK IN for your hearing AS SOON AS

POSSIBLE and NO LATER than 2 PM the DAY BEFORE YOUR

HEARING,” Stoffel says he did not understand the need to check in.

6
We agree with the Panel that Stoffel did not act reasonably by

failing to check in and then assuming the hearing was cancelled.

¶ 17 Stoffel next contends that, as a nonlawyer, he did not

comprehend the notices he received and is unfairly disadvantaged

as a result. But the issue is not whether Stoffel understood the

notice concerning his appeal rights — he clearly did, as he

requested an appeal immediately upon learning of the decision.

The issue is that he did not review the document when he received

it. In any event, having sought unemployment benefits, Stoffel is

presumed to know the legal requirements for doing so. Boeheim v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 23 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 18 Finally, Stoffel argues that his repayment of $3,100 in benefits

he received would result in undue financial hardship to him, and he

requests a “hardship waiver.” That is not relief we can grant in this

appeal because it was not raised before the Panel. Moreover,

section 8-74-109(2), C.R.S. 2025, requires the Division to recoup

benefits “to which [the claimant] is subsequently determined to be

not entitled as a result of a final decision in the appeals process.”

¶ 19 We note, however, that the Division may waive repayment if it

determines repayment to be inequitable. See § 8-81-101(4)(a)(I),

7
C.R.S. 2025. Stoffel is free to pursue a request for a waiver of his

repayment obligation in a separate proceeding before the Division.

See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 15.2.2., 7 Code Colo. Regs.

1101-2 (outlining process for requesting waiver of overpayment).

IV. Disposition

¶ 20 The Panel’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE YUN concur.

8